HISTORICAL SUMMARY
(UNCLASSIFIED)
JULY - DECEMBER 1957
VOLUME IV
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
132 Through 182
PRIORITY X AF X

COMDR ADC

DIR STAT SVCS USAF WASH D C

ADCST-0  8000  FOR AFASC-6C. The following 1- AF - V14 as of 30 Dec 57.

2 FI SQ/Suffolk/F-102A/26/12/12/1-1/11/0/32/1/

5 FI SQ/Suffolk/F-102A/25/12/11/11/0/0/27/0/

11 FI SQ/Duluth/F-102A/17/11/0/0/0/0/25/5/

13 FI SQ/Sloux City/F-86L/24/13/0/11/0/0/0/31/22/

14 FI SQ/Sloux City/F-86L/23/12/0/11/0/0/0/32/27/

15 FI SQ/Davis Monthan/F-86L/20/10/16/3-0/3/3A90/33/25/

18 FI SQ/Wurtsmith/F-102A/8/0/3/5/0/0/0/28/0/

445 FI SQ/Wurtsmith/F-893/25/16/4/5/0/0/0/27/0/

27 FI SQ/Griffiss/F-94C/1/1/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/

27 FI SQ/Griffiss/F-102A/22/11/2/9/0/0/0/29/0/ 3 1900 Z

465 FI SQ/Griffiss/F-893/26/16/0/8/3/2/0/0/0/30/24/

ADCST-0

MAJ O.A. CARROLL/jb 2621 1

UNCLASSIFIED
COMDR ADC

29 FI SQ/Malmstrom/F-89H/13/6/16/0/0/0/0/28/23/

42 FI SQ/Greeter-Pitts/Negative due to inactivation.

46 FI SQ/Dover/F-94C/23/17/1/5/1/1/1AJQ/30/18/

98 FI SQ/Dover/F-89J/25/17/6/2/0/0/0/0/29/0/

47 FI SQ/Niagara Falls/F-86L/28/15/1/12/0/0/0/0/29/22/

48 FI SQ/Langley/F-102A/25/11/6/8/4/4/0/0/39/0/

49 FI SQ/Hanscom/F-86L/25/14/4/7/0/0/0/0/26/11/

54 FI SQ/Ellsworth/F-89J/7/0/2/1/7-3/7/7ALPD/24/0/

56 FI SQ/Wright-Patt/F-86L/28/19/0/7/2/0/2/2AJQ/39/32/

58 FI SQ/Otis/F-89J/24/16/5/3/0/0/0/0/29/23/

60 FI SQ/Otis/F-94C/28/16/3/9/0/0/0/0/34/30/

59 FI SQ/Goose/F-89J/29/18/7/2/2/0/0/0/21/15/

61 FI SQ/Truax/F-102A/25/15/2/8/10-10/0/0/0/0/Increase due to assignment of crews.

325 FI SQ/Truax/F-102A/25/15/1/9/10-10/0/0/0/26/4/

62 FI SQ/O'Hare/F-86L/17/10/3/4/0/0/0/0/45/32/

63 FI SQ/O'Hare/F-86L/17/9/3/5/0/0/0/0/0/Reassignment of aircrews.

64 FI SQ/McChord/F-102A/24/6/0/0/0/0/0/0/30/0/

318 FI SQ/McChord/F-102A/25/7/0/18/0/0/0/0/31/9/

65 FI SQ/Richards-Gebaur/No aircraft and/or aircrews assigned.

66 FI SQ/Canad/No aircraft and/or aircrews assigned.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FI SQ</th>
<th>Base/Location</th>
<th>Dates of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Selfridge/F-86L</td>
<td>24/1/6/0/0/0/0/36/26</td>
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<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Selfridge/F-86L</td>
<td>24/1/6/0/0/0/0/29/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Thule/F-89D</td>
<td>11/0/0/0/0/0/0/16/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Presque Isle/F-89H</td>
<td>28/1/8/0/1/0/0/26/23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Pincastle/F-89H</td>
<td>10/6/12/0/0/0/0/26/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Travis/F-102A</td>
<td>24/5/8/8/0/0/0/29/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Hamilton/F-86L</td>
<td>12/1/5/1/0/0/0/25/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Hamilton/F-89D</td>
<td>28/1/7/1/0/0/0/30/23</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>Scott/F-86L</td>
<td>25/1/10/0/0/0/0/35/29</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>Youngtown/F-102A</td>
<td>19/9/5/8/0/0/0/45/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Lockbourne/F-86L</td>
<td>28/3/2/7/0/0/36/29</td>
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<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Kirtland/F-86L</td>
<td>9/4/3/0/0/0/0/29/21</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>Andrews/F-86L</td>
<td>14/7/6/0/0/0/0/36/23</td>
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<td>319</td>
<td>Bunkerhill/F-89J</td>
<td>26/3/9/0/0/0/0/28/21</td>
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<td>321</td>
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<td>Paine/F-89H</td>
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<td>322</td>
<td>Larson/F-86L</td>
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<td>323</td>
<td>Harmon/F-102A</td>
<td>25/17/6/2/0/0/0/25/12</td>
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<td>324</td>
<td>Westover/F-86L</td>
<td>24/17/15/1/0/0/0/28/25</td>
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<td>327</td>
<td>Westover/F-86L</td>
<td>24/17/2/4/1/0/0/25/7</td>
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<tr>
<td>326</td>
<td>Richards-Gebauer/F-102A</td>
<td>24/9/4/10/1/0/1/1AJQ/25/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>327</td>
<td>George/F-102A</td>
<td>14/2/2/2/0/0/22/20</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADCST-0</td>
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</table>
COMDR ADC

329 FI SQ/George/F-86L/24/21/1/2/0-0-0/0/0/32/28/
330 FI SQ/Stewart/F-86L/25/17/0/8/0-0-0/0/0/39/16/
331 FI SQ/Stewart/F-86L/25/16/1/8/0-0-0/0/0/37/24/
332 FI SQ/McGuire/F-102A/28/4/9/15/0-0-0/0/0/29/0/
339 FI SQ/McGuire/F-86L/23/10/2/11/1-1/0/0/29/19/
354 FI SQ/McGhee-Tyson/Negative due to inactivation.
432 FI SQ/Minn-St. Paul/F-89H/1/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/8/4/
433 FI SQ/Minot/No aircraft and/or aircrews assigned.
437 FI SQ/Onward/F-89H/6/5/1/0/1-1/0/0/0/0/
437 FI SQ/Onward/F-89J/24/19/0/5/0-0/0/0/29/25/
438 FI SQ/Kinross/F-102A/23/16/0/7/0-0/0/0/26/21/
444 FI SQ/Charleston/F-86L/23/21/3/4/0-0/0/0/34/28/
456 FI SQ/Castle/F-86L/27/19/0/8/0-0/0/0/31/23/
460 FI SQ/Portland/F-89D/23/15/0/8/0-0/0/0/28/25/
482 FI SQ/Seymour Johnson/F-102A/19/13/2/4/0-0/0/0/19/0/
483 FI SQ/K. I. Sawyer/No aircraft and/or aircrews assigned.
497 FI SQ/Gliger/F-86D/28/17/2/9/0-0/0/0/31/27/
498 FI SQ/Gliger/F-102A/22/11/0/11/0-0/0/0/29/19/
518 FI SQ/Klamath/No aircraft and/or aircrews assigned.
538 FI SQ/Larson/F-86L/21/13/4/1/1-1/0/0/29/24/
551 AEWG/Otis/RC-121/31/13/0/18/18-18/0/0/47/44/
552 AEWG/McClellan/RC-121/32/12/1/14/12-7/0/0/59/7/
ADGST-0
COMDR ADC

4777 REV FT/Hill/Misc/6/3/0/3/3/0/0/0/0/0/5/5

4713 REV FT/Griffiss/Misc/10/4/1/5/0/0/0/0/0/8/8

4739 REV FT/Goose/No aircraft assigned pending reassignment.

4754 REV FT/Hamilton/Misc/8/5/1/1/1-0/0/0/0/5/5

17 TOW SQ/Vincent/Misc/23/25/0/3/3/0/0/0/36/29

23 TOW SQ/Tyndall/Misc/15/12/2/1/0-0/0/0/24/24

37 FI SQ/Ethan Allen/F-102A/4/3/0/1/0-0/0/0/0/0/0

37 FI SQ/Ethan Allen/F-86D/8/7/0/1/0-0/0/0/31/20

This report reflects complete coverage. Following supplemental
information correction to 2-AF-V14 as of 23 Dec 57.

64 FI SQ/McChord/F-102A/25/9/1/15/30/0

76 FI SQ/Pinecastle/F-89H/28/12/6/10/26/0

322 FI SQ/Larson/F-86L/24/18/0/5/34/31
MESSAGE IN FOUR PARTS. PART I. REFERENCE IS MADE TO MESSAGE, THIS
HEADQUARTERS, AFPR 1548757 TO ALMAJC01 DATED 23 AUGUST 1957. PART
II. (A) KEN CASTLE AFB, DELAWARE - 95TH, 97TH FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR
SQUADRON AND 287 TH FIGHTER GROUP (AIR DEF) INACTIVATE JANUARY 1958,
BASE INACTIVATE JANUARY 1958. (B) MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, 4520 FIS AND
475TH FIGHTER GROUP (AIR DEF) INACTIVATE JANUARY 1958. BASE TRANSFERS
TO COMAC JANUARY 1958. (C) KEIGHRE-tyson - 354TH, 467TH FIS AND
355TH FIGHTER GROUP (AIR DEF) INACTIVATE JANUARY 1958. BASE UTILI-
ZATION TENTATIVELY PROGRAMMED BY AIR NATIONAL GUARD BEGINNING 2/58.
PAGE TWO RJEPQ 110
YOUR MESSAGE ADC ALPS 7016 (SECRET) 20 AUGUST 1957, PREVIOUS SPAIN COMMITMENT OF 459TH BEING FILLED BY USAF. PART III. IN ORDER TO EFFECT MAXIMUM ECONOMY IN OAK FUNDS FOR FY 58, FLYING HOURS WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED IN THE QUARTER PRECEDING THE INACTIVATION DATE. OFFICER PERSONNEL RECOGNIZING SURPLUS TO COMMAND REQUIREMENTS WILL BE REPORTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS UNDER PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 6E, PART 5, CHAPTER 5, AFH 35-11E. SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE ISSUED ON DISPOSITION OF WARRANT OFFICERS AND AIRMAN PERSONNEL. SECERTARIAL FINDING TO PERMIT SECOND PCS IN A FISCAL YEAR WILL BE OBTAINED PRIOR TO MOVE OF INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED. REQUEST FOR SECRETARIAL FINDING WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, DCS/P, THIS HQ. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE BY YOUR COMMAND TO ALLEVIATE ANY PERSONNEL HARDSHIPS THAT MAY RESULT FROM THIS ACTION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 7, PART I, chapter 1, AFH 35-11D, AT LEAST 30 DAYS ADVANCED NOTICE WILL BE GIVEN TO PERSONNEL RECEIVING PCS ASSIGNMENT. INSTRUCTIONS ON DISPOSITION OF AIRCRAFT HARDWARE WILL FOLLOW SEPARATELY. LOGISTIC SUPPORT FUNCTION OF ABOVE BASES IN SUPPORT OF ACAU STATIONS WILL BE HANDLED AND THIS HQ ADVISED OF DESIRED CHANGES AT THE EASIEST PRACTICABLE DATE FOR INCLUSION IN FUTURE PROGRAMMING DOCUMENTS.

PAGE THREE RJEPQ 110
PART IV. YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING INACTIVATION OF THE 75TH AT PREQUE ILLE AND CLOSURE OF THE BASE IS NOT FAVORABLY CONSIDERED. THIS HEADQUARTERS IS OF THE OPINION THAT ADEQUATE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY IS ESSENTIAL AND SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN THE NORTHEAST. YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING O'HARE IS STILL UNDER STUDY. YOU WILL BE ADVISED.

BT
2013492 SEP RJEPQ

A--- PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY 2 ENCRYPTION---
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES TO DATE-TIME-GROUP
PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION
CONNOCO
HCA-004
RR RJDEN RJEDUP RJDEN
DE RJEPOC 155
R 25 0216 Z
FM HEJUSAP WASH DC
TO RJDEN/COMP/RECON ENT AFOS GOL
INFO RJDEN/CINCSAC ENT AFOS GOL
RJDEN/CINCSAC MITCHEL AFW NV
RJDEN/COMP MPAFB OHIO
RJDEN/CINCSAC OFFITT AFOS NEBR
RT

[Redacted] FROM PROOF-OP-9, 513-77

YOUR MESSAGE NP-075 7025 09-10 97, THE NOOD FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR
SQUADRON, GREATER PITTSBURGH AIRPORT WILL REDUCE TO ONE FIGHTER JANNING
JANUARY 1992 AND MOVE WITH OUT PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT TO STEWART JFE.
JAN BY 12/91. GJHANE JURISDICTION OF GREATER PITTSBURGH WILL
TRANSFER TO CONAC JANUARY 1992, THE NOOD FIGHTER INTERCEPTER
SQUADRON WILL INACTIVATE AT STEWART 4NOV JULY 1992. PART III OF
MESSAGE AFGH-075 29 SEE 8/1-009. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS ON
TRANSFER AND DISPOSITION OF BASES CONTAINED IN YOUR MESSAGE MA9.
10031, 1 OCT 91, WILL BE PROVIDED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. THIS MESSAGE
WILL BE DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED WHEN PUBLIC RELEASE MADE BY THIS
HEADQUARTERS.
RT
25/0216 Z OCT.

A PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY-3 ENCRYPTION—

CIA CRYPTO BEAÇÃO CRYPTO INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DIRECT TIME-ZONE
ADVANCE COPY HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO CCI.
CONAD

199

ACTIVITY

AF

COPY OF INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of CONAD Adjunct.

SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

CONAD HIST FILE

409

ACTION: MOSAB

802-57

N7-11917

FROM APAPA

29JAN63

THIS MESSAGE IS SUBJECT TO PARTS II, III AND IV. PLEASE HAVE PERSONAL FILE OF THIS
HEADQUARTERS ACTIV 199/1/63 ON HAND AT ALL TIMES.

PART II. THE GAY FATHER INFORMATION CENTER (GAIN FC) OFFICE WILL CLOSE AT MONTREAL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, E.G, BEGINNING JANUARY 1968.

PART III. THE GAIN FC OFFICE WILL BE RELAUNCHED ON JANUARY 1968.

PART IV. THE GAIN FC OFFICE WILL BE RELAUNCHED ON JANUARY 1968.

PAGE TWO PREPARED 199

PCS IN A FISCAL YEAR WILL BE ISSUED PER THOUSAND OF INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED. REQUEST FOR EXCEPTIONAL RIGHTS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, O fficE PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL STANDING IN CONFLICT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE REPORTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS UNDER PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 196, PART 3.

OFFICERS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE ADMITTED TO MONTREAL, APPF 10351, DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 1967. ANY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO AVOID ANY PERSONAL HARDSHIP THAT MAY RESULT FROM THIS ACTION. IF ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPHS 196, PART 3, CHAPTER 1, APPF 10351, AT LEAST 30 DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE WILL BE GIVEN TO PERSONNEL RECEIVING PCS REASSIGNMENTS. PART IV. YOUR RECOGNITION IS CONSIDERED REDUCING ACTIVITY STATUS OF 909 AND 909A ARE NOT UNDER STUDY AT THIS TIME. YOU WILL BE NOTIFIED. IN CONNECTION WITH PART III ABOVE, THE PROVISIONS OF HEADQUARTERS US AIR FORCE MESSAGE 196177/18, DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 1967, ARE APPLICABLE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
2h July 1957

SUBJECT: USAF Air Defense Command Reprogramming to Adjust to Deficient Fiscal Year 1958 Funds

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
as Executive Agent for CONAD
Washington 25, D.C.

1. The USAF Air Defense Command has advised this headquarters that the approved USAF Fiscal Year 1958 OLM Appropriation Financial Plan provides the Air Defense Command with a FY 58 OLM budget which is approximately 96 million below stated requirements. To absorb this reduction in funds, the Air Defense Command plans to place at least five currently operational fighter interceptor squadrons on a non-operational basis. In addition, certain vital air defense programs are being recommended for deferment, at least through FY 58.

2. The force reductions and program deferrals being recommended by the Air Defense Command cannot be concurred in by this headquarters. CADOF 56-46 establishes a requirement for immediate expansion of our national air defense forces to a level necessary to counter the current and projected threat. The proposed action will result not only in a failure of Air Force elements to meet this program, but will, in fact, effect a serious current reduction in the combat readiness of the Air Defense Command and of the Continental Air Defense Command.

3. In the interests of national security, it is strongly recommended that the Air Defense Command be provided with adequate OLM funds with which to support at least currently established forces.

E. R. FYFE
General USAF
Commander in Chief

COPY from ADC

NR Not Required

COPY
General Thomas B. White  
Chief of Staff  
United States Air Force  
The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D.C.  

Dear Tommy:  

Less than a month ago the Air Defense Command recommended, with respect to the ADC Fighter Program through Fiscal year 1961, proposals with respect to the improvement of air defense atomic capability. These recommendations included two alternative proposals with respect to the improvement of air defense atomic capability. The first involved increased production of F-102 aircraft, the second a retrofit of the F-102 to provide it an atomic capability. Comments with regard to the latter proposal are offered.  

In 1958 the National Security Council directed that an atomic air defense capability be provided as a matter of priority. Two vehicles were considered, the F-102 and the F-106. To meet time scales established by General Spaatz, the F-106 was selected. To the credit of all concerned, this capability was established on schedule. Although today the F-106 is capable of our most effective destruction system, the aircraft was under performance limitations. Repeated efforts have been made to develop an atomic capability on the F-102 while this aircraft was still in production. These efforts have failed. The F-102 has been in an operational inventory for nearly a year and it is still non-atomic. The Air Defense Command recommends to retrofit the F-102 to attack the F-1 have been abandoned. The problems involved with the F-102 and plans on force reduction considerations have vitiated any action in favor of the F-102.  

Conclusions of the Stanford Research Institute with respect to operational reliability, and our experience with the F-102 and F-106 delays have convinced us that we cannot expect quantitative F-102 and F-106 forces until perhaps 1961 or 1962. In the meantime, quantities of atomic armament are being produced at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. To make effective use of this armament, we will be forced to keep an obsolete fighter interceptor weapons system through this time period for the lack of the few millions required to modify the F-102. The F-102, performance-wise, is barely able to cope with today's subsonic...
bombers. It will be hopelessly inadequate to meet the supersonic air breathing threat of tomorrow.

General Atkinson and I are convinced that irrespective of these negative arguments, that the F-102 must be provided an atomic capability without further delay. We are willing to make any concession with respect to numbers of aircraft, easing of other modernization programs, to achieve this capability.

Sincerely,

E. C. Partlow
General, USAF
Commander-in-Chief

[Redacted]

The paper is signed by a person in red ink.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCS/Plans and Operations

SUBJECT: Conversions from One Type of Aircraft to Another

1. As far as I know COMAD Headquarters has never expressed any policy on how conversions of units should be handled either intra or interaircraft or fighters are concerned. Perhaps this is a deficiency, and in any event I should like for you to give the matter your attention.

2. This subject is brought to mind because of my inquiries regarding the F-102 conversions at George AFB. This change-over was started about April of last year and the first aircraft of the 102 type arrived at George about the first of May. By now some 8 or 9 months have passed and the conversion is not yet completed. In fact, in my opinion, I won't stay in the Air Force long enough to see the day when any F-102 unit will be fully operational. The aircraft itself seems to be a great improvement over the types we have previously used but there is a critical shortage of supporting equipment and I doubt that this situation can be remedied in the life of the aircraft.

3. In spite of these deficiencies it is possible for the first squadron, i.e. the 327th at George, to operate some of its airframes and in fact on the 15th of January, they are going to undertake the alert duty with the 102. Even the aircraft available are, in my opinion, non-operational. The weapons have never been fired by the people at George and there is no assurance that they could hit anything if they did shoot them. Nevertheless, I fear in placing this squadron on alert because I believe it is expedient for them to get the practice necessary to find out what the aircraft can do in an operational situation.

4. However, we are continuing to convert from operational to non-operational, aircraft in other squadrons throughout the country, and I am not sure that we should allow this to continue. It occurs to me that our operational capability is decreasing at a great rate and that we might want to put on the brakes in order to force the Air Force to meet its obligations insofar as support of the F-102 program is concerned.

/s/ E. R. Partridge
General, USAF
Commander-in-Chief
27 January 1958

General Thomas D. White
Chief of Staff, USAF
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Tommy:

In my letter of 18 October 1957, I informed you of General Atkinson and my feelings on the urgency to provide the F-102A with a nuclear capability. In your reply of 6 January 1958, you stated you did not feel that the F-102A should be modified to give it an NB-1 capability. On 28 December 1957, General LeMay indicated in a personal letter to General Atkinson that an F-102A/NB-1 modification would not be accomplished, but that a nuclear capability for the F-102A might be possible by equipping it with nuclear Falcons.

As a result of an AEDC study and presentation given to ADC and my staff a few days ago and subsequent evaluation, I am impressed with the potential capabilities of the proposed GAR-IY and GAR-JY missiles.

The GAR-IY proposal appears to provide the only practical approach to fulfilling the nuclear requirement for the F-102A at an early date and at a minimum cost. Further, the GAR-IY and GAR-JY proposals are favored over other proposed air-to-air guided nuclear missiles being considered for the F-101 and F-106 aircraft respectively. Because these nuclear Falcons are basically improved Falcons, their introduction into the air defense system will have a minimum impact on interceptor modifications at a relatively low cost. Also, these missiles can be introduced into the air defense inventory by mid-1960, providing an early approval of these Falcon proposals is made by your headquarters.

For your personal information, I have been informed that ADC will present the nuclear Falcon evaluation to your staff on 30 January 1958.

I therefore urge that your headquarters support the development of GAR-IY and GAR-JY nuclear Falcon proposals for the F-102, F-101, and F-106 aircraft so that these weapons may be introduced into the air defense system at the earliest possible date.

Sincerely,

E. E. Partridge
General, USAF
Commander-in-Chief
TO: AOC CANAIRCD ST NUBSET QUEBEC CANADA

From NOOP-T X036.

For Canadian addresses only. CANUSSECURITY.

Following information requested by L/Col. Brady SP Leaf, your headquarters. Coordinates of AGW Sqs., 10th Air Division, Alaska. WAC Chart 118; Fire Island 610915013,
Sparrowhawk 610715536. WAC Chart 119 Cape Romanoff 61h616552
Bethel 603716161h. WAC Chart 135 Cape Newenham 58301620h. WAC
Chart 136 King Salmon 58h2156hB. Homer 59h315132. WAC Chart
137 Middleton Island, 59261h619. Fighter Interceptor Squadrons
are 33rd and 317th at Elmendorf F-102A aircraft and 449th at
Ladd F-89J aircraft.

READING FILE

NOOP-T

Maj. Schiebel
2008

R. E. GRAYEY, JR.
Major, USA
Asst Adjutant

UNCLASSIFIED
General Thomas D. White
Chief of Staff, USAF
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Tommy:

I have just returned from an interesting tour of Alaska, and while there, noted a weak link in our air defense system which is of great concern to me and which I wish to bring to your attention.

Recent permanent construction under the Fiscal Year 1957 and 1958 Military Construction Program at King Salmon Air Force Station has provided modern alert shelters, barracks, a new PCL system, and GAR missile buildings, but has failed to provide a usable runway for year-round operations. This means that King Salmon is currently limited to winter operations for F-102 aircraft and, in fact, the fighter complement of 100's was flown into King Salmon from Elmendorf on the 16th of December, the earliest date at which the existing runway would take them. The present runway will not withstand continued operation with the heavy tire pressures unless the field is frozen, and this means that solely because of lack of suitable runways, the F-102's must be withdrawn to Elmendorf for six to eight months of the year.

The location of King Salmon makes it one of the key air defense positions in Alaska. Without this base we have limited area defense within Alaska and no intercept-identification capability for the Aleutian extension to the DEW Line. Since one of the most likely routes for enemy attack through that area lies across the eastern end of the Aleutian radar chain, this deficiency in intercept-identification capability is a serious one. Furthermore, lacking interceptor aircraft at King Salmon on a year-round basis, the GCI site at this station and the GCI
The runway project at King Salmon Airport has been changed from the Military Construction Program to a 1958 M&G Project (Number Elmdorf 177-8). The 1959 program provides for a 1,000 foot extension to the runways plus over-runs. I am not in a position to evaluate the adequacy of these proposals, but I do know that the present situation is unsatisfactory from many points of view. The Air Force has a great deal of money invested in support facilities at King Salmon, yet has failed to provide for a usable runway and, as a result, we not only are failing to keep our UCI sites in that area at a high level of effectiveness during part of the year, but we also have a major hole in the defenses which could be readily plugged by the expenditure of a relatively modest amount of money.

I strongly recommend that the King Salmon runway project be given a priority of such a nature that early favorable funding action may be accomplished.

Sincerely,

E. E. Partridge
General, USAF
Commander-in-Chief

M/R not required
CON020BV002

00 RJEDES RJEPEB RJEDEH
DE RFEMVB 4/01
O 011530Z
FM CANAIRDEF COC
TO RJEDES/NORAD COC ENTR AF8 COLORADO
RJEPEB/CFECR COC NEWBURGH NY
RJEDES/CFCCR COC RICHARDS GEBAIR AF8 GRANDVIEW NY

AC730 1 JAN

64 AD 3 SEC 1 SEC 2 SEC 64 AD
QQ 15/0 YB 22/0 HU 21/0 CH 31/0 JT 10/0
OV 29/0 BG 13/0 YM 13/0

BT
1/16 142

A-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION--
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE TIME GROUP PRIOR
TO DECLASSIFICATION

/// ADVANCE COPY OF THIS HAS BEEN DETAINED TO COC ///

QRU FKE

DUP (2)

409
15 Jan 58

REGISTERED MAIL
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Commander Naval Forces, Continental Air Defense Command
TO: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Status and Location of Naval Forces Fighter Aircraft Report:
      Forwarding of

Encl: (1) Copy of subject report

1. Enclosure (1) is the latest status and location of Naval Forces
   Fighter aircraft based ashore in the United States.

2. Totals of Available aircraft of combat units only, excluding
   aircraft aboard carriers, R&D aircraft, pool aircraft and Naval Bases
   aircraft.

3. This letter may be downgraded to unclassified upon removal of
   enclosure (1).

COPY TO:
CINCONAD

G. L. KGR
Chief of Staff
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
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<th>ALL WEATHER</th>
<th>DAY FIGHTER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td>San Diego</td>
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<td>31 14 4</td>
<td>27 7 47</td>
<td>67 6</td>
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<th>DAY FIGHTER</th>
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<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>St Louis</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 17 7</td>
<td>10 17 7</td>
<td>3 16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

a. Examination of the proposed package output schedule transmitted by reference a reveals that:

   a. Only two-thirds of the ANATCOM units planned for conversion under FY 1958 force structure contained in reference b will be operational by 30 June 1959 and, of the nine FY 59 HERCULES battalions programmed for new areas, only the battalion for Thule AB will be operational at end FY 59;

   b. By end FY 59, one-half of the operational US Army HERCULES battalions will be overman.

   c. Alaska, Greenland, Okinawa and Europe are given priority for HERCULES deployment over CONUS high-value metropolitan areas. This is in a parent conflict with stated policies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. In consideration of the limited availability of HERCULES...

USD

J. L. YOUNG, Colonel, US

3/5/64

UNCLASSIFIED

X7-13854  S 3539-57
world-wide under the reduced FY 58 force structure SAC bases in 
Alaska, Greenland and Okinawa would not, in the opinion of this 
headquarters, warrant HERCULES defense over critical CONUS targets.
However, because of the early completion of construction, reduction 
in other air defense means and the need for air defense of these 
areas, this headquarters recommends that interim defenses consisting 
of battalions minus two firing batteries be provided these areas until 
the effectiveness levels at existing defenses in CONUS are raised 
to a minimum acceptable level. It should be noted that small 
vital target areas in CONUS such as SAC bases will thru FY '58 be 
provided defense by a battalion minus two firing batteries.

1. In accordance with the above, the following output 
schedule for active Army HERCULES packages is recommended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1958</td>
<td>1 Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>1/2 conversion, 1 Greenland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>1 Alaska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>2 Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>1 Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>1 Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1959</td>
<td>2 Conversions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>2 Conversions, 1 Greenland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>3 Conversions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>2 Conversions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1 Conversion, 1 Greenland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Squadron Constellations</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1 Conversion, 1 New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>1 Conversion, 2 New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td>2 New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>2 New, 1 Alaska, 1 Okinawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>1 Conversion, 1 New</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. As stated in reference a, conversion to HERCULES of 18 equivalent CONUS battalions in FY 59-61 is considered inadequate. Reallocation of non-tactical allocation of HERCULES equipment appears necessary in view of the apparent overall reduction in the HERCULES program.

5. NORAD concurs in our recommendations in paragraph 3 above, as far as Greenland and Alaska are concerned. NORAD has, however, expressed concern over the planned deployment of HERCULES to Europe and Okinawa prior to deployment at critical new areas as approved by the JCS and as recommended to the JCS by NORAD.
UNCLASSIFIED

DUPLICATE

NO. 3

SUBJECT: Classification of Nuclear Missiles

TO: Chief of Staff

The Secretary of Defense for Industry

Dated: 31 December 1966

31 December 1966, established the nuclear missile designation as Command (Command CONAD) for the Fiscal Year 1967. This period, it was determined by the Secretary of Defense for Industry, that the designation CONAD be expanded to the nuclear missiles for these CONAD were designed. Specifics of type, quantity, and desired distribution are contained in paragraphs below.

1. These batteries will affect the current industrial and fiscal impact on the nuclear missiles listed below. This first emphasis the need for a position that is consistent with atomic weapon. If the proposed missile design are to be approved for the expansion of the list of nuclear weapon, it is suggested that sufficient memory from the CONAD be provided at the missile locations listed as indicated above.

In event the above requested agreement 31 December 1966 is approved, it is further requested that these missile and nuclear missiles be positioned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEFENSE AREA</th>
<th>MISSILE DESIGNATION</th>
<th>NUCLEAR DESIGNATION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>MX 7 MONA</td>
<td>106-DE</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>MX / MFIN 20</td>
<td>190-DE</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEFENSE USA</th>
<th>TYPE OR HEIPE</th>
<th>TYPE NUCLEAR CAPSULES</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>NK 7 MOD 2E</td>
<td>190-2E</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>170-2E</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington-Baltimore</td>
<td>NK 7 MOD 2E</td>
<td>190-2E</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>170-2E</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>170-2E</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The ratio of nuclear to non-nuclear warheads in the basic load of a MARESLES battery is 1 to 3. The ratio of one medium to six small yield nuclear warheads shown in paragraph 4 above will provide each battery with an atomic capability using medium yield weapons against several targets at long range (as well as a slightly capability against single targets) when using the small yield warhead. In addition, the small yield warhead will be available for use against relatively low-altitude targets.

6. It is emphasized that this request is over and above the allocation contained in FY 1958–59.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-ChIEF:

M. SCOTT N. CARVER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff
HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AF Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT

NOTICE OF IMPORTANT INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE

30 September 1957
(Date)

TO: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
CHIEF OF STAFF
SECRETARY OF THE JOINT STAFF

For your information, the following correspondence has been received:

From: JMC-039
Dated: 30 Sep 1957

Classification: SECRET
Page: 17-11476
Suspense: None

Action Office: JMC

SUMMARY: USARADCOM is concerned because SM-1025-66 does not allocate to NCAAD any nuclear warheads for NKE HERCULES missiles for FY 58. They request we initiate action to have the 4th qtr FY 58 allocation of nuclear warheads amended to provide the warheads and nuclear capsules required for operational on-site NKE Hercules missiles. They list what they think is necessary by number and models and explain why.

J. W. BACHULIT
JMC
Adjutant
UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Allocation of NIECE HERCULES Warheads (U)

TO: Commander-in-Chief
North American Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. References:
   a. SM-1025-56.
   b. SM-71-57.

2. Reference 1a does not allocate to NORD nuclear warheads for NIECE HERCULES missiles for FY 1958.

3. NIECE HERCULES is planned to be operational by end FY 1958 at four battery sites which will require a total of 28 nuclear warheads. These sites will be located in the New York, Washington-Baltimore, Chicago, and Philadelphia defense areas. The number of nuclear warheads is based on the number of NIECE HERCULES missiles which will initially be deployed at sites selected to receive NIECE HERCULES.

4. It is requested that your headquarters initiate action to have the fourth quarter FY 1958 allocation of nuclear warheads (reference 1a) amended to provide the following warheads and nuclear capsules which are required for operational on-site NIECE HERCULES missiles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warheads</th>
<th>MK 7 Mod 2E</th>
<th>Nuclear capsules</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170-DE</td>
<td>2b</td>
<td>170-DE</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
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</table>

5. The distribution of capsules is based on a six-to-one ratio of small to medium yield warheads. This ratio will provide each battery with one medium yield warhead and six small yield warheads. The medium yield warhead will provide a capability against massed formations at
SUBJECT: Allocation of NIKE HERCULES Warheads (U)

long range, as well as providing an enemy weapon kill potential at long range. The small yield warheads will provide a capability against single aircraft at all ranges, enemy weapon kill potential at shorter ranges, and will allow the use of atomic warheads against low-altitude targets.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copy furnished:
DCSOPS, DA

Chief of Staff

UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
CORAADOM ENTAFB COLO

DCSOPDA WASH DC

INFO: COWSCONNAC FTMONROE VA
CINCONAC (Courier)
COIRAADOM FITOTTOM NY
COIRAADOM FITMAO MD
COIRAADOM FITSHERIDAN ILL
COIRAADOM FITBAKER CALIF
COIRAADOM RICHARDSOFOBAURAPB MO

430 ADOAA-3 PMO. YOUR TA 927877. NICAL

1. Following is inactivation schedule in order of priority.

a. Own battalions to be inactivated on 31 December 1957:
   69th New York, 518th Hamford, 550th Norfolk, 710th New York, 606th
   Buffalo-Miages, 77th Los Angeles, 501st Hamford, 35th Washington-
   Baltimore, 701st Pittsburgh. Units become nonoperational 15 Nov-

   a. Own battalions to be inactivated on 30 June 1958:
   11th New York, 70th Washington-Baltimore, 16th Boston-Providence,


2. Reference message not considered to include Gun battalion and Skysweeper batteries in Greenland, in accordance with information received in a message from Major Hindman, HQ CONERTA and Major Sewman, this headquarters, 13 August 1957.

3. Considered essential to augment appropriate group and brigade headquarters tables of organization with qualified personnel to furnish training support to National Guard on-site and A-Day units. Specific augmentation will be requested by separate message.

4. This headquarters is concerned over public reaction to withdrawal of all Army air defense units at St. Mary and Savannah River, where defenses are required and have existed for considerable periods of time. Recommend retention in FY 59 force structure of 8th Skysweeper battalion at Seattle St. Mary and 33rd Gun battalion at Savannah River. A minimum of two M1A1 AJAX batteries would be deployed at each of these areas during FY 59. Personnel of the two units mentioned, together with school trained technicians assigned to ARADCOM who are not eligible for HERCULES conversion training, would man M1A1 AJAX equipment to be made
available in June and August 1968 by programmed AJAX to HERCULES
conversions. Field type emplacements on government owned or leased
land would be used. Modified emergency housing is available at
Savannah River and existing troop housing at Sault Ste Marie can be
utilized adequate pending construction of facilities for planned FY 60 WHE
deployment.

5. Recommend early press release and declassification of
inactivation schedule.

6. This message coordinated with CINCPAC.
1. Request paragraph 1 of referenced message be changed to indicate proposed inactivation dates of the 16th AAA Battalion to be 31 December 1957 and the 35th AAA Battalion to be 30 June 1959.

2. The 16th AAA Battalion is a W + 12 High Priority and STRAC Unit. The 35th AAA Battalion in a W + 31 High Priority and STRAC Unit. Special missions assigned to the 16th Battalion should be assigned to the 35th Battalion.

3. Requested change in activation dates due to termination of site lease on 31 December 1957 of Battery G, 16th AAA Battalion.
ADONA-3 P&O 322, HQ USAFACC, 18 Sep 57, Subj: Replacement Units for STRAC and High Priority Units (U)

MOORE

1st Ind


TO: Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

This headquarters concurs in the assignment of National Guard replacement units for high priority and STRAC units as outlined in Enclosure 1 to basic communication.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

1 Enc

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

Lt Col O E Griest
2845
25 Sep 57
rg
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

1. References in basic communication:

a. Letter ADGAA-3, P60 322, USARADCOM, 14 August 1957, subject, "Deployment of Army Air Defense Units to Overseas Areas (U)" lists the ARADCOM units assigned High Priority and Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) missions.

   (1) High Priority units are placed in preferential status to insure their readiness for deployment early in a general war, or to meet an emergency short of a general war.

   (2) STRAC units are in Ready Force A (30-Day) and Western Hemisphere Reserve and maintained in high degree of readiness to meet a limited emergency short of general war.

b. JCS 1899/327 establishes procedures for the Services to coordinate with CONAD on deployment of CONAD forces to overseas areas to counter local aggression.

c. Letter ADGAA-3, P60 322, USARADCOM, 27 August 1957, subject, "Revised FY 58 Force Structure for USARADCOM" schedules the inactivation of Regular Army Gun and Skyweaver units in two increments (31 December 1957 and 30 June 1958). ARADCOM has since informally advised this office that D/A was directing that all these Gun and Skyweaver units would be inactivated by 31 December 1957, which means they will become nonoperational during October 1957.

2. ARADCOM has advised this office, informally, that D/A plans for National Guard Gun and Skyweaver units to be relieved from their operational mission on 30 September 1957 to start Mikes training.

3. The proposed substitution of National Guard units for Regular Army units sent overseas in an emergency is sound and desirable for accomplishing of NORAD's mission. Therefore this headquarters should concur. If the National Guard Gun and Skyweaver units become nonoperational in September 1957 and the Regular Army Gun and Skyweaver units become nonoperational in October 1957, the significance of this correspondence will soon be negated.
UNCLASSIFIED

16 September 1957

ADOAA-3 P&A 322

SUBJECT: Replacement Units for STRAC and High Priority Units (U)

TO:

Command-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. References:

a. Letter ADOAA-3 P&A 322, this headquarters, 11 August 1957, subject: "Deployment of Army Air Defense Units to Overseas Areas", (U)

b. JCS 1899/327


2. Reference 1a notified your headquarters of active Army AFADCOM units designated either to the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) or that have been assigned a High Priority mission. Units involved are the same except that one High Priority Unit, the 23d AAA Group is not listed in STRAC.

3. National Guard units have been designated by Department of the Army as on-site replacements for STRAC Units, (See Enclosure 1). All units have been designated Special Security Forces (SSF) except as noted in Enclosure 1. Deployment of AFADCOM STRAC Units would result in the designated National Guard replacement unit reporting on-site.

4. In the event an AFADCOM Unit is deployed overseas because of its High Priority mission, this headquarters will request that the STRAC National Guard replacement unit be ordered into Federal Service and assigned to that defense. In the case of the 23d AAA Group, it is planned to recommend to Department of the Army that the 212th AAA Group, New York National Guard, be designated as the replacement unit.

5. As indicated in reference 1a, AAA gun units assigned to this command will be inactivated by 30 June 1958. The provisions of this letter will then no longer apply.

6. Request your concurrence.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/r/ D. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen
Chief of Staff

1 Incl
STRAC NO Replacement List
## Strategic Army Corps

### National Guard Replacement Units (U)

#### AAA Group, HBB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Defense</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>211th Mass</td>
<td>Boston-Providence</td>
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<tr>
<td>212th, N.Y.</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>234th, Calif</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AAA Det (Opr)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>173d, Mass</td>
<td>Boston-Providence</td>
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<td><strong>AAA En (90mm Gun)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>210th, H</td>
<td>New York</td>
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<td>286th, Wash</td>
<td>Seattle</td>
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<td>337th, Pa</td>
<td>Pittsburg</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>356th, Mass</td>
<td>Boston-Providence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>373d, Pa</td>
<td>Pittsburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405th, Wash</td>
<td>Seattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>420th, Ga</td>
<td>Savannah River</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Recommended Units  
** Non ASF
DISPOSITION FORM

NO. 11

SUBJECT

DATE

COMMENT NO. 1

1. This memorandum was prepared and sent by the Department of Defense to the Secretary of Defense via SECNAV on 7/20 as folows:

Seyewep Batteries were flown to 31 June 1968.

2. The message refers to the resumption of development on 20 December 1961. The operations, now located at Enewetak R5 and Seyewep Batteries, were flown to 31 June 1968. 

3. It is a plan to develop a strategic and missile defense system.

a. The United States, Secretary of Defense, is dated 10 December 1961.

i. The 10 December 1961 message was transferred to CONAD on 20 December 1961.

b. The plan was not transferred to CONAD on 20 December 1961.

4. It is a plan to develop a strategic and missile defense system.

a. The United States, Secretary of Defense, is dated 10 December 1961.

b. The 10 December 1961 message was transferred to CONAD on 20 December 1961.

5. The United States, Secretary of Defense, is dated 10 December 1961.

a. The 10 December 1961 message was transferred to CONAD on 20 December 1961.
PRIORITY

COGRAACOON FTMEAD COLO
COGRAACOON FTFTOPEE NY
COGRAACOON FTMADE MD
COGRAACOON FTSHERIDAN ILL
COGRAACOON FTSHERIDAN CALIF

INFO CINCHORAD (COURIER)

521 ADDQCH.

1. The following SECRET message DA 930657, 5 October 1957 is transmitted for your information and compliance: Quote

[Signature]

[Table]

ADDQCH

I. L. YARNALL, Colonel/ed

2314

UNCLASSIFIED
Ref your 157 AFSS-A-14 1580

1. (UNCLASS) Vol 11 UNDMTC units are relieved of Opn Visn off b Oct 57.
   a. 12, 16, 20, 33, 35, 43, 69, 70, 77, 78, 79, 60A, 70A, 71A and 71B
      AAA Dnu, 90mm Gun.
   b. 106, 501, 51B and 519th AAA Dnu, 120mm Gun.

2. (UNCLASS) Units listed para 1 will be in active off 20 Dec 57.
   Confirming orders Fol.

3. (UNCLASS) Form contained in para 2, ref mag, is under study.
   You will be notified of decision by separate mag. Pending final decision
   no rpt no action will be taken concerning AAA Dnu, 75mm Gun.

4. (SECRET) All ARADCM units are relieved of STRAC men with the
   exception of the fol units which will remain, temporarily, ass to STRAC
   1st AAA Tp, HNB
   AAA Dnu, 75mm Gun
   125 AAA Tp, 75 mm Gun
   178 AAA Tp, 75 mm Gun
   515 AAA Ope Det
   61 8X Dtc Radar Maint
   25 8X Dtc Radar Maint

5. (SECRET) Request DA be furnished prior to 9 Oct 57 the desired
   equipment of the AF/PM-10 Radar Sec of inactiv units, and the design
   of 8X to which the Radar Sec will be ass Unquote
Quote Ref your LTR ATM 139 MO NCAL.

1. (SECRET) Ref 1 Plaucow units are relieved of cpm Vom off 9 Oct 57.
   a. 12, 14, 33, 35, 41, 69, 70, 77, 51B, 60B, 701 and 719
      AAA Bn, 90mm Gun.
   b. 186, 301, 319, and 519th AAA Bn, 120mm Gun.

2. (SECRET) Units listed hereafter will be inactivated off 20 Dec 57.
   Confirming orders on:

3. (SECRET) Item contained in para 2, ref msg, is under study.
   You will be notified of decision by separate msg. Pending final decision
   no sys no action will be taken concerning AAA Bn, 75mm Gun.

4. (SECRET) All ARAVOM units are relieved of STRAC men with the
   exception of the fol units which will remain temporarily, eg to STRAC
   i. AAA 1p, AVO
      AAA Bn, 75mm Gun
   ii. 225 AAA Bn, 75 mm Gun
   iii. 278 AAA Bn, 75 mm Gun
   iv. 325 AAA Ope Det
   v. 31st Inf Regt Radar Maint
   vi. 25th Inf Regt Radar Maint

5. (SECRET) Request IA be furnished prior to 9 Oct 57 the desired
   equipment of the AW/TH-10 Radar Sec of inactive units, and the design
   of IA to which the Radar Sec will be assigned.
2. This headquarters will furnish Department of the Army the information requested in paragraph 5 of above quoted message. Therefore, no repeat no action by your command on paragraph 5 is requested.

3. That part of my 501, ADOCR pertaining to non-operational status of Sky sweener battalions is rescinded pending resolution of proposals in my 497 ADOAA-3 WC.
UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Elimination of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skywetter Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (S)

TO: Commander-in-Chief
   Continental Air Defense Command
   Ent Air Force Base
   Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. The enclosed draft letter, subject Elimination of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skywetter Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (S), has been referred for forwarding to Department of the Army.

2. Your concurrence in the recommendations listed in paragraph 7 of the draft letter is requested.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

D. B. JOHNSON
Big Gen GS
Chief of Staff

Enc:
Draft ltr, subj, Elimination of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skywetter Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (S).
UNCLASSIFIED


TO: Commanding General, United States Army Air Defense Command, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.

This headquarters concurs with the recommendations listed in paragraph 7 of the attached draft letter, subject, A Proposal for National Guard K-Day, Ground, and Sky-Peaker Units from the CONUS Air Defense Test Organization (ADGCL 126).

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

[Signature]
MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

INFORMATION FOR RECORD:

1. Recommendations of the Joint Task Force:

   a. "National Guard K-Day Ground, and Sky-Peaker Units from the CONUS Air Defense Test Organization (ADGCL 126)"

   b. "Proposal for National Guard K-Day, Ground, and Sky-Peaker Units from the CONUS Air Defense Test Organization (ADGCL 126)"

   c. "Concurrent for the Joint Task Force"

   d. "Recommendations"

   e. "Attachment"

   f. "Copy"

   g. "Attached"

   h. "W/R"
To: Chief of Staff
   Assistant Chief of Staff

   FOR INFORMATION THE FOLLOWING CORRESPONDENCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED:

   From: NORADCOM
   Date: 22 Nov 57
   Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
   Reference: DOD-37-13942
   Subject: 6 Dec 57

   Action Office: XXXX

   SUMMARY:

   USARCOM prepared a draft letter, Subject: Elimination of National Guard M-40 Gun and Skysweeper Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (1), for forwarding to DA, they have asked for our concurrence in the recommendations listed in paragraph 7 of the draft letter. These recommendations are:

   (1) National Guard M-40 Gun and Skysweeper units be eliminated from the CONUS Army air defense task organization.

   (2) National Guard group and brigade headquarters and supporting units or detachments not required in support of the revised Department of Army Mobilization Plan be eliminated from the CONUS Army air defense task organization.
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ft. Bliss Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ADGCL 325

SUBJECT: Elimination of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skyesweeper Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (5)

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

1. References:
   a. Letter NO-ADGOT 325-A (AAA) dated 7 Sep 1955, Subject: Task Organization for National Guard AAA Units w/changes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
   b. DA, Mobilization Troop Program (U) of the Army, Fiscal Year 1957, dated 1 Sep 1956.

2. The missions presently assigned National Guard M-Day gun and Skyesweeper units are to provide replacement for active Army gun and Skyesweeper units, to augment established defenses, or to establish new defenses. All CONUS active Army gun units will be deactivated by 20 December 1957 and therefore the National Guard M-Day units are no longer needed as replacements for active Army gun units.

3. It is the opinion of this headquarters that the National Guard M-Day gun and Skyesweeper units will not contribute sufficiently to the air defense effort to warrant the expenditure of funds and manpower required to maintain them for the following reasons:

UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: Elimination of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skysweeper Units from the CONUS Air Defense Year Organization (S)

a. The addition of gun units to a MKE defense would increase the effectiveness of these defenses only slightly against the modern threat and then only at lower altitudes.

b. In the establishment of new defenses, guns and/or Skysweepers will provide inadequate defense against modern enemy aircraft or missiles. At most, such weapons serve only to reduce the accuracy of bombers.

c. The time required for an M-day unit to attain an on-site operational capability after alert is too great to permit the units to participate in the critical phase of the air battle.

A. It is recognized that it may be desirable for the National Guard to retain certain gun or Skysweeper battalions, where suitably located geographically, for the purpose of providing organizational integrity until later conversion to missile units. The detailed deployment plans on which the National Guard can base this determination are now under preparation by this headquarters.

5. In view of the recent directive to inactivate all ARADCOM gun battalions in the Continental United States, it appears that the Department of Army Mobilization Plan requires a revision to indicate a greatly decreased number of gun battalions to be redeployed overseas on MKE and MKEA. Such revision will also lead to a considerable cutback in the scheduled redeployment overseas of ARADCOM group and brigade headquarters.
UNCLASSIFIED

AFDL 325
SUBJECT: Elimination of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skysweeper Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (3)

which, in turn, decreases the requirement for National Guard group and brigade headquarters in being on M-Day.

6. Although not specifically a part of this problem, a related item is the training support for National Guard units. The deactivation of all active Army gun units has eliminated the ARADCOM source of personnel for training support of any National Guard gun units. Such personnel would have to be provided to this command by Department of the Army. The relief of National Guard gun and Skysweeper units from the Continental Air Defense task organization would eliminate the requirement for ARADCOM training support.

7. In view of the foregoing it is recommended that:

a. National Guard M-Day gun and Skysweeper units be eliminated from the CONUS Army air defense task organization.

b. National Guard group and brigade headquarters and supporting units or detachments not required in support of the revised Department of Army Mobilization Plan be eliminated from the CONUS Army air defense task organization.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copy furnished:

CINCPAC

UNCLASSIFIED
CON021 HQACO01ACO12
FR RJEDEL
DE RJEDEL AG 12C
R 3103207
FM CINCL ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
TO RJEDEL/CINCONAD ENT AFB COLORADO
ZEN/CONAACC ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
DT

FROM OPW 5309

PART 1 & D/0 A/A HAS INFORMED THIS HC THAT TENTATIVE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF US ARMY ALASKA WILL BE REDUCED TO 12023 BY END FY 53 X PRESENT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH IS 15260 X PHASED REDUCTION OF ARMY FORCES IS PLANNED TO BEGIN OCT 57 X ANTIACRAFT FORCES NOW 2640 X PLANNED REDUCTION WILL REDUCE THESE FORCES TO 1200 X AA REDUCTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY INACTIVATION OF TWO AAA BATTALIONS (75MM SKYSWEEPER) OCT 57, ONE AAA BATTALION (120MM GUN) FEBRUARY 58, AND TWO AAA GROUP HEADQUARTERS APRIL 58 X AAA REMAINING IN ALASKA AFTER PLANNED REDUCTION WILL CONSIST OF TWO 120 MM GUN BATTALIONS: ONE AT ELMENDORF AND ONE AT EIELSON X D/0 PLANS REPLACEMENT OF THESE TWO 120MM BNS
PAGE TWO RJKBG 12C

WITH TWO NIKE S30s BY NOV 56 X DEA CONV NON DELETIBLE IT MAY BE IN WHICH HAS PROGRAMMED TO OCCUPY SITE LOVE FOX AND SUGAR IN DEFENSE OF LADD AFB IN NOV 56 X CINCAL CONCERN IN PLANNED AA REDUCTION IN ALASKA. WITH ONE EXCEPTION, NIKE SITE LOVE NU OF LADD SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTED TO COMPLEMENT THE FOUR NIKE SITES AT EIELSON AFB. ONE NIKE BTRY AT SITE LOVE WILL RAISE LEVEL OF EIELSON DEFENSES TO ACCEPTABLE STANDARD OF 10 AIRCRAFT KILL PROBABILITY X LADD-EIELSON DEFENSES WERE ORIGINAL DESIGNED AS AN INTEGRATED DEFENSE X ELIMINATION OF SITE LOVE WOULD SERIOUSLY DEGRADE EFFECTIVENESS OF SITES AT EIELSON X SITE LOVE AND THE

REPTING ABOVE AND ALL AFTER SITE LOVE WOULD SERIOUSLY DEGRADE EFFECTIVENESS OF SITES AT EIELSON X SITE LOVE AND THE FOUR EIELSON SITES WILL PROVIDE ALL THE AA DEFENSES APPROPRIATE FOR LADD UNDER CURRENT AND FORESEEN BUDGETARY CONDITIONS X PART II X SUMMARIZED BELOW IS AA FORCE STRUCTURE RECOMMENDED FOR ALASKA BY CG USAF AND CONCURRED IN BY THE CINCAL:

A. ELMENDORDNA FID
   1 120 MM GUN ON
   1 OPERATIONS DET
   1 RADAR MAINT DET
   1 RCAT DET

B. EIELSON AFB AREA
   1 120 MM GUN ON
   1 OPERATIONS DET
   1 RADAR MAINT DET
   21 SPACES REQUIRED FOR NIKE CONVERSION
Page Three RJKDAC 12C

2. FY 59 (Nov 58)
   a. ELMENDORF AFB AREA
   1. AAA BN HQ (AUGMENTED)
   1. OPNS DET
   1. RCAT DET
   1. NIKE BATTERY, DUAL (AUGMENTED)
   2. NIKE BATTERIES, SINGLE (AUGMENTED)
   3. EIELSON AFB AREA
      1. AAA BN HQ (AUGMENTED)
      1. OPNS DET
      4. NIKE BATTERIES, SINGLE (AUGMENTED)

3. FY 60 (Nov 59)
   ADD 1 NIKE BTRY TO EIELSON BY (SITE LOVE NW OF LADD) X
   PART III. X REQUEST YOUR APPROVAL OF FORCE STRUCTURE CONTAINED IN
   PART II X THIS STRUCTURE SUPERSEDES THAT SHOWN IN ADRP 57-66X
   BT
   31/036Z AUG RJKDAC

A-- PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION--
PHYSICALLY REMOVES ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME-GROUP
PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION
//ADVANCE COPY HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO COC//
SECRET FROM 10012021

Chief of Staff, USAF, as Executive Agent for CHCS. Reference CHCS
message OPP 5309, 31 August. This message is three parts. Part I.

Considering threat, 55 per cent nucleus of USA forces against 19 per
cent reduction of other USAR forces considered disproportionate.

Part II. Consequence in Part III based on understanding that
Department of Army plans third Mike battalion to be operational in
FY 61 rather than FY 60. If not correct, this headquarters memorandum
in deletion of third Mike battalion. Part III. This headquarters
will comply with USARAL's proposed plan following USARAL force
reduction outlined in reference message to: A. Inactivate two
skyscraper battalions and one of three gun battalions in February 92.

B. Inactivate two Group Headquarters in April 92. C. Convert two

ROOFER

LT COL O E CAINBROTH

1977
remaining gun battalions to Mike by November 59. D. Construct and man LOVE site on Ladd defense by November 59 as originally planned for third Mike battalion. E. Establish AA force structure as indicated in Part II of reference annex.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: Self-Explanatory
MECHANISM TO AID DEFENSE:

SUBJECT: Redesign of Hypersonic Ballistic Missiles

1. CINCS are advised that the weapon study has shown an abundant of missile, and that the weapon system is in receipt of the report.

2. CINCS are also advised that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that the weapon system is in receipt of a report.

3. CINCS are also advised that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that there is no harm done by what is happening in this field and that it is not a guarantee that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that the weapon system is in receipt of a report.

4. CINCS are also advised that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that there is no harm done by what is happening in this field and that it is not a guarantee that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that the weapon system is in receipt of a report.

5. CINCS are also advised that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that there is no harm done by what is happening in this field and that it is not a guarantee that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that the weapon system is in receipt of a report that the weapon system is in receipt of a report.

In September 1957

The Office Division
1. This headquarters has received a message from CINCPAC (Tab 309 at Tab A) which states that CINCPAC plans the following Army force reductions in accordance with Department of Army's tentative authorized strength for the fiscal year 1958:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total U.S. Army Alaska</th>
<th>AA Forces</th>
<th>Other Army Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present Strength</td>
<td>15,960</td>
<td>2,560</td>
<td>12,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Strength</td>
<td>12,023</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>10,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Reduction</td>
<td>3,937</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>1,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Reduction</td>
<td>24.66%</td>
<td>53.16%</td>
<td>18.74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. In accordance with these strength reductions, CINCPAC plans:
   a. The two Skysweeper battalions (activated in February 1958).
   b. One of the three 120mm gun battalions (activated in February 1958).
   c. The two B-60 Headquarters to be deactivated in April 1958.

3. The remaining two 120mm gun battalions (one at Elmendorf, one at Eielson) are planned for occupation of firing sites by November 1958. CINCPAC states that U.S. plans to deploy the third Nike Battalion programmed to occupy sites in the Alaska region in November 1959. Headquarters has learned informally from U.S. that plans are to program this third Nike Battalion to be deployed in 1961 rather than by 1959. CINCPAC formerly planned for recommending that LOVE site of the third battalion be constructed and manned, probably as a fifth battery for the Nike Battalion at Eielson AFS (Tab B).

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 1999/248, 19 November 1956, approved three Nike Battalions for Alaska to be operational by 1960.

5. CAPP 56-16 establishes a requirement for three Nike Battalions in Alaska. Two battalions (one at Elmendorf and one at Ladd-Eielson) to be operational in FY 1959 and the third battalion at Ladd-Eielson to be operational in FY 1960.
TO: C/S
FROM: DCS/P&O

SUBJECT: Reduced Army Strength in Alaska

6. At Tab C, for approval, is a proposed reply to CINCAL which concurs with CINCAL's proposed plan and the resulting force structure (Part II, CINCAL message OPN 5309 at Tab A) if the Department of Army plans for the third Nike Battalion to be operational in FY 61, but nonconcurs in the "deletion" of the third Nike Battalion.

HARVEY T. ALNESS,
Major General, USAF
DDE/Plans & Operations
FROM GMN 5309.

PART I. D/A HAS INFORMED THIS HQ THAT TENTATIVE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF US ARMY ALASKA WILL BE REDUCED TO 12003 BY END FY 58. PRESENT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH IS 15960. PHASED REDUCTION OF ARMY FORCES IS PLANNED TO BEGIN OCT 57. ARTIACraft FORCES NOW 2640. PLANNED REDUCTION WILL REDUCE THESE FORCES TO 1200. AA REDUCTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY INACTIVATION OF TWO AAA BATTALIONS (75MM SKYKiller), OCT 57, ONE AAA BATTALION (120MM GUN) FEBRUARY 58, AND TWO AAA GROUP HEADQUARTERS APRIL 58. AAA REMAINING IN ALASKA AFTER PLANNED REDUCTION WILL CONSIST OF TWO 120MM GUN BATTALIONS: ONE AT ELMENDORF AND ONE AT EIELSON. D/A PLANS REPLACEMENT OF THESE TWO 120MM BNS WITH TWO NIKE BNS BY NOV 58. D/A PLAN NOW DELETES THREE NIKE BNS WHICH WAS PROGRAMMED TO OCCUPY SITES GEORGE, LOVE, AND SUGAR IN DEFENSE OF LADD AFB IN NOV 59. CINCAL CONCEIVES IN PLANNED AA REDUCTION IN ALASKA, WITH ONE EXCEPTION: NIKE SITE LOVE NW OF LADD SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTED TO COMPLEMENT THE FOUR NIKE SITES AT EIELSON AFB. ONE NIKE SITE AT SITE LOVE WILL RAISE LEVEL OF EIELSON DEFENSES TO ACCEPTABLE STANDARD OF 10 AIRCRAFT KILL PROBABILITY. LADD-EIELSON DEFENSES WERE ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AS AN INTEGRATED DEFENSE. ELIMINATION OF SITE LOVE WOULD SERIOUSLY DEGRADE EFFECTIVENESS OF SITES AT EIELSON. SITE LOVE AND THE FOUR EIELSON SITES WILL PROVIDE ALL THE AA DEFENSE APPROPRIATE FOR LADD UNDER CURRENT AND FORESEEN BINARY CONDITIONS. PART II. SUMMARIZED BELOW IS AA FORCE STRUCTURE RECOMMENDED FOR ALASKA BY CC USARAK AND CONCERNED IN BY THE CINCAL:

COPI
1. FY 58

A. ELMENDORF AFB
   1 120MM GUN BN
   1 OPERATIONS DET.
   1 RADAR MAINT DET.
   1 RCAT DET.

B. EIELSON AFB AREA
   1 120MM GUN BN
   1 OPERATIONS DET.
   1 RADAR MAINT DET.
   21 SPACES REQUIRED FOR NIXE CONVERSION

2. FY 59 (NOV 58)

A. ELMENDORF AFB AREA
   1 AAA BN HQ (AUGMENTED)
   1 OPNS DET.
   1 RCAT DET.
   1 NIXE BATTERY, DUAL, (AUGMENTED)
   2 NIXE BATTERIES, SINGLE, (AUGMENTED)

B. EIELSON AFB AREA
   1 AAA BN HQ (AUGMENTED)
   1 OPNS DET.
   4 NIXE BATTERIES, SINGLE (AUGMENTED)

3. FY 60 (NOV 59)

ADD 1 NIXE BN TO EIELSON BN (SITE LOVE NW OF LADD). PART III. REQUEST YOUR APPROVAL OF FORCE STRUCTURE CONTAINED IN PART II. THIS STRUCTURE SUPERSEDES THAT SHOWN IN APPR 57-66X

UNCLASSIFIED
A-337-19
P 1903002
FM CINCPACFLT TO USRAL FT RICHARDSON ALASKA
INFO CINCPACFLT INFO COL
TO COL CINCPACFLT USG ALASKA
ACTION: 180000
INFO: 150000
HT-32356

FM OPN 5354. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO RELIEVE THE IMMEDIATELY TO PERMIT PREPARATION FOR INACTIVATION.

ST--PARAPHRASED NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY "B" ENCRYPTION.

PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES TO DECLASSIFICATION--NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF DATE-TIME-GROUP IS CANCELED.
JPD 0006-4 6055  C.055 USAFRICOM

This message is in two parts. Part I: Reference JPD 0006-4, 19 May 57. In addition to the two bases mentioned in referenced message Part I, the following bases not have NB-1 capabilities: Rafael AFB, NY; Otis AFB, Mass.; Grissom AFB, Ind.; Barksdale AFB, La., Prince AFB, Wash., and Lackland AFB, Tex. Part II: Previous operational restrictions pertaining to the employment of the NB-1 rocket are cancelled effective this date. NB-1 may now be flown in the U.S. during condition of CONUS Air Defense Readiness or higher conditions of alert at the discretion of CONUS Division or higher commanders and will be employed in accordance with CONUS Regulation 55-6 which states Rules of Engagement unique. Pending further agreements between the Commands, the NB-1 will be employed...
in or over Canada only during periods of Air Defense Warning
Yellow or Red. All Commanders have been advised to use extreme
caution in employing the MA-1 below 5000 feet to minimize
damage and hazard to ground installations and personnel.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

M R Letter received from the Chief of Staff USAF
re: Subj (Confidential) Authorization for Employment
of the MA-1 Rocket dated 10 Nov 17. Filleli 10-7-17-4
signed by L. General, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans
and Programs, authorizes the removal of previous re-
strictions relative to use of the MA-1. Previous
restrictions were: Scramble against known hostile A C
only employed against known hostile A C only not to be
fired below 1000 feet above the ground. This letter
advises that the JCS have been informed of this authority
given CINCNOAD.
SECRET FROM NOIF-T X 056 . For Chief of Staff, USAF, as Executive Agent
for NORAD. Previous operational restrictions as contained in Para
3b(2f). Annex E, ADDS 1-57, with respect to use of MB-1 rockets are
rescinded effective this date. In lieu thereof the following
instructions apply. MB-1 weapons will be flown on fighter interceptor
A/C only during conditions of Air Defense readiness or higher conditions
of alert at the discretion of the CONAD Division Commander or higher
authority and will be employed in accordance with CONAD Regulation
55-6, Quote Rules of Engagement Unquote, for destruction of hostile
targets. Pending receipt of further authority from Canada, the flight
of A/C armed with MB-1 weapons over Canada will be only during periods,
of Air Defense Warning Yellow or Red. All commanders are directed
to exercise extreme caution in employing the MB-1 below 5000 feet to
minimize damage and hazard to ground installations and personnel.

M/R Letter received from the Chief of Staff USAF ref Subj dated
19 Nov 57. Fanfold #C7-265b, signed by L/Gen Gerhart USAF Dep Chief
of Staff, Plans & Programs, authorized the removal of previous
restrictions relative to use of the MB-1. Previous restrictions
were: Scrambled against known hostile A/C only, employed against
known hostile A/C only, not to be fired below 5000 ft. above the
ground.
28 October, 1957

SBDG

SUBJECT: Employment of the MR-1 Guided-Missile Rocket in NORAD Operations

TO: Chief of the Air Staff, RCAF
   as Executive Agent for NORAD
   Ottawa, Canada

1. Reference is made to the Tripartite Overflight Agreement dated 28th June, 1957, between Canada and the United States, regarding the terms and conditions under which the MR-1 air-to-air rocket may be carried by United States military aircraft over Canadian territory. The present agreement is effective until 1 July, 1958.

2. Since the MR-1 entered the inventory such experience has been gained over the past eight months in employment of this weapon. Scientific advisory discussions and studies have been carried out and the results of various tests conducted regarding contamination and decontamination in case of an accident involving the MR-1 have been reviewed. The conclusions of all this effort have been highly satisfying and no evidence has emerged which reflects doubt on the effectiveness of the weapon or the safety of its handling and operation, subject to safety precautions now in effect.

3. The MR-1 aircraft at present comprise the MR-1 defensive force, and increasing numbers of MR-1 armed aircraft are steadily coming into service. When the above-mentioned agreement was negotiated the USAF MR-1 equipped aircraft were concentrated mainly in the territory bordering on the Great Lakes and this fact was mentioned in the Agreement. Now, however, MR-1 equipped squadrons are being deployed throughout the continental United States and Alaska, including the territory extending along the Canada — United States international boundary. Consequently, it is now desired to obtain Canadian agreement to the operation by NORAD of RCAF aircraft in the territory bordering the entire length of the international boundary. In accordance with the present agreement, MR-1 armed aircraft will be flown only on the declaration of a state of Air Defence Readiness and thus would enter Canadian air space only in the event of a Yellow or Red Warning.
4. NORAD also now desires that Canadian approval be given for the USAF air defense squadron of F-104G fighters based at Goose Bay in Labrador to be armed with the ML-1 rocket. This request is made because of the availability now of ML-1 armed aircraft to defend this highly important northern base which is particularly vulnerable to air attack due to its isolated location beyond the contiguous air defense combat zone. It is pointed out that the ROAF Air Defense Commander exercises operational control over this USAF air defense fighter squadron at Goose Bay, the operational employment of which is in accordance with NORAD agreed procedures. It is also pointed out that storage facilities for atomic weapons already exist at Goose Bay in connection with USAF Strategic Air Command operations already agreed between Canada and the United States.

5. This Command fully appreciates the natural sensitivity with respect to the employment of atomic weapons in or over Canadian territory, but this request is advanced with confidence based on the adequate and satisfactory experience now accumulated with the ML-1 weapon, not only with respect to its high degree of effectiveness generally but also with respect to its safety. In short, to arm the USAF air defense aircraft at Goose Bay with the ML-1 rocket will significantly increase the security of this important operational base, to the common interests of Canada and the USA in the air defense of North America.

6. With the creation of the North American Air Defense Command recently by Canada and the USA, it is the hope of this Command that the matters raised in this letter can be finalized directly with the Canadian military authorities rather than by resort to the Canadian External Affairs – US State Department channels previously followed.

7. Your early consideration of this request would be much appreciated by the Commander-in-Chief.

[Signature]

C.G. BEAUVY
Air Marshal, RCAF
Deputy Commander-in-Chief

oc: C/S, USAF
as Exec Agent for NORAD

UNCLASSIFIED
OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 6
19 April 1957

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

STATES OF ALERT


2. General. Continental Air Defense Command has established states of alert which apply to all air defense units. This directive delineates the states of alert and establishes their application to specific anti-aircraft units.

3. Definitions.
   a. INCREASED INTELLIGENCE WATCH — A condition of command alertness directed by the Commander-in-Chief, CONAD (CINCONAD), when closer scrutiny and evaluation of intelligence is required.
   
   b. States of Preparedness.
      
      (1) NORMAL PREPAREDNESS — A degree of preparedness specified in current operational orders whereby measures are taken to provide a sustained air defense potential.
      
      (2) INCREASED READINESS — Any degree of preparedness greater than NORMAL PREPAREDNESS but less than AIR DEFENSE READINESS whereby measures are instituted to provide increased air defense potential against an unknown or doubtful threat.
      
      (3) AIR DEFENSE READINESS — The maximum degree of preparedness whereby all available forces are placed in a state of immediate combat readiness for a relatively short period of time.
      
      d. AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY — Any state of events which indicates to CONAD, or higher authority, that hostile action is in progress or is imminent or is sufficiently probable as to require, in the interest of national security, the implementation of any portion of approved plans and agreements for the defense of the United States. AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY provides the legal authority for implementation of approved plans and agreements and, once established, will remain in effect for the duration of hostilities or until terminated officially by appropriate authority. Within the legal framework, the jurisdiction of AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY, imminence of attack will be specified by conditions of air defense warning.


Operations Directive Number 6  

19 April 1957

(1) **WARNING YELLOW** - Attack by hostile aircraft is probable. (This means that hostile aircraft are enroute toward an air defense sector, or that unknown aircraft suspected to be hostile are enroute toward or are within an air defense sector.)

(2) **WARNING RED** - Attack by hostile aircraft is imminent or is taking place. (This means that hostile aircraft are present, or are within the immediate vicinity of an air defense sector, with a high probability of entering the sector.)

(3) **WARNING WHITE** - Attack by hostile aircraft is improbable. (All Clear.) NOTE: The initial declaration of an AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY will automatically establish a condition of WARNING WHITE for purposes of Security Control of Air Traffic (SCATEN), provided no higher degree of warning has been specified.

e. States of Alert. Annexes 1, 2 and 3 define, in detail, the states of alert for NIKE, gun and skysweeper units, respectively.

(1) **RELEASED.** A status that indicates that an interceptor or fire unit has been released from an air defense commitment.

(2) **1-HOUR ALERT.** A degree of preparedness that requires an interceptor or fire unit to be capable of coming to "Battle Stations" alert within three hours of receipt of an alert, warning, or order.

(3) **3-HOUR ALERT.** A degree of preparedness that requires an interceptor or fire unit to be capable of coming to "Battle Stations" alert within one hour of receipt of an alert, warning, or order.

(4) **30-MINUTE ALERT.** A degree of preparedness that requires an interceptor or fire unit to be capable of coming to "Battle Stations" alert within thirty minutes of receipt of an alert, warning or order.

(5) **15-MINUTE ALERT.** A degree of preparedness that requires an interceptor or fire unit to be capable of coming to "Battle Stations" alert within fifteen minutes of receipt of an alert, warning, or order.

(6) **5-MINUTE ALERT.** A degree of preparedness that requires an interceptor or fire unit to be capable of accomplishing a tactical scramble or an effective engagement within five minutes of receipt of an alert, warning, or order.

(7) **BATTLE STATIONS.** A degree of preparedness that requires
Operations Directive Number 6
19 April 1957

an interceptor or fire unit to be capable of immediately initiating a tactical scramble or an effective engagement.

b. Procedures. a. The state of alert for individual antiaircraft fire units will be prescribed by the antiaircraft defense commander, except that the CONAD division commander concerned may direct the antiaircraft defense commander to bring antiaircraft fire units to BATTLE STATIONS upon declaration of WARNING RED. Commanders will exercise sound judgment to preclude maintaining, unnecessarily, an excessive number of fire units at the higher states of alert. The antiaircraft defense commander is authorized to prescribe varying states of alert within the AA defense depending upon the air defense situation. (For example, 25% might be at BATTLE STATIONS, 25% might be at 5-MINUTE ALERT, and 50% at 15-MINUTE ALERT.) Where practicable, fire units equipped with similar type weapons and at like states of alert should form a balanced defense.

b. The state of alert "BATTLE STATIONS" will be used only in the event an actual attack is imminent or in progress.

c. The state of alert of AN/TPS-1D (AN/FFS-16) radars will be as prescribed by the antiaircraft defense commander. Adequate radar coverage will be maintained from midnight to daylight. During other periods, a sufficient number of these radars to provide adequate radar coverage will be maintained on a 15-MINUTE ALERT status. In event of declaration of an increased state of preparedness or an INCREASED INTELLIGENCE WATCH, a sufficient number of AN/TPS-1D (AN/FFS-16) radars will be maintained "on-the-air" to provide adequate radar coverage. Upon declaration of WARNING YELLOW or WARNING RED, the number of AN/TPS-1D (AN/FFS-16) radars "on-the-air" should be increased to provide overlapping radar coverage and to increase the traffic handling capacity of the system.

d. Detailed Manning requirements will be as prescribed by APACOM regional commanders; the prime requisite is that fire units must be capable of accomplishing the assigned mission within the time limits specified.

e. In event of communication failure between a fire unit and its AAOC, the fire unit commander will assume an appropriate state of alert commensurate with the tactical situation.

f. Antiaircraft units at firing ranges, or away from the on-site positions for other non-tactical purposes, will be ordered to return to their tactical on-site positions, in the most expeditious manner upon declaration of an AIR DEFENSE READINESS, AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY or a WARNING RED. Antiaircraft units may be ordered to return to their tactical
Operations Directive Number 6  

19 April 1957

on-site positions at the discretion of the ARADCOM regional commander upon declaration of a lesser state of air defense preparedness.

g. On-site National Guard Special Security Force antiaircraft units normally will be maintained at 4-HOUR ALERT until ordered into Active Federal Service. Thereupon, these units will be directed to assume the appropriate state of alert.

5. ARADCOM-CONAD Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARADCOM Action</th>
<th>CONAD Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain states of alert prescribed in present directives and increase intelligence watch as per implementing directives.</td>
<td>INCREASED INTELLIGENCE WATCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain states of alert prescribed in present directives.</td>
<td>NORMAL PREPAREDNESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-MINUTE ALERT*</td>
<td>INCREASED READINESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-MINUTE ALERT*</td>
<td>AIR DEFENSE READINESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-MINUTE ALERT*</td>
<td>AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-MINUTE ALERT*</td>
<td>WARNING WHITE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-MINUTE ALERT*</td>
<td>WARNING YELLOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BATTLE STATIONS**</td>
<td>WARNING RED</td>
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* - After the nature of the tactical situation is ascertained, the antiaircraft defense commander may order an appropriate number of fire units to a lesser state of alert, if such is warranted.

** - After the nature of the tactical situation is ascertained and, with the concurrence of the CONAD division commander, the antiaircraft defense
Operations Directive Number 6

commander may decrease an appropriate number of fire units to a lesser state of alert, if such is warranted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

D. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen, GS
Chief of Staff

R. N. NEWBILL
Major, AOC
Asst Adjutant General

3 Annexes
1. States of Alert for NIKE Fire Units
2. States of Alert for Gun Units
3. States of Alert for Skysweeper Units.

DISTRIBUTION: B, N, NG & X
CGUSCONARC (2)
Dept of State & Def, Mil Info
Control Committee, DA (20)
CGUSARAL (5)
Each NIKE, 90mm, & 120mm Btry (3)
Each 75mm Btry (12)
Annex 1
Operations Directive Number 6

STATES OF ALERT FOR NIKE FIRE UNITS

1. RELEASED: Fire units in this state of alert are those which are temporarily released from air defense commitment; for example, units at firing ranges of participating in local disaster relief activities. Appropriate local security of the area will be maintained. Communications to AAOC (sector of defense) need not be manned. Estimated time of return to an air defense commitment will be included in the report of units in this status.

2. 3-HOUR ALERT: All fire control and launcher control equipment is operable, or capable of becoming operable within three hours. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. NIKE ready missiles are in the magazine. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within three hours.

3. 1-HOUR ALERT: All fire control and launcher control equipment is operable, or capable of becoming operable within one hour. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. NIKE ready missiles are in the magazine. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within one hour.

4. 30-MINUTE ALERT: All fire control and launcher control equipment is operable. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. NIKE ready missiles are in the magazines. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within thirty minutes.

5. 15-MINUTE ALERT: WHITE STATUS - All fire control and launcher control equipment is energized. Intrabattery communications and communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. Radars are prepared for operation (low voltage only) and periodically checked. WHITE STATUS requirements are completed in the LC area. YELLOW STATUS requirements are completed in the launcher area. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS in fifteen minutes.

6. 5-MINUTE ALERT: YELLOW STATUS - All communications, fire control and launcher control equipment is manned and in operation. YELLOW STATUS requirements are completed. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within five minutes.

7. BATTLE STATIONS: BLUE STATUS (ON DECK) - All communications, fire control and launcher control equipment is manned and in operation. NIKE ready missiles are completely prepared for launching. BLUE STATUS requirements are completed. Unit is prepared to fire within 30 seconds.
Annex 2
Operations Directive Number 6

STATES OF ALERT FOR GUN FIRE UNITS

1. RELEASED: Fire units in this state of alert are those which are temporarily released from air defense commitment; for example, units at firing ranges and units participating in local disaster relief activities. Appropriate local security of the area will be maintained. Communications to AAO (sector or defense) need not be manned. Estimated time of return to an air defense commitment will be included in the report of units in this status.

2. 1-HOUR ALERT: All gun and fire control equipment is operable or capable of becoming operable within three hours. Communications to AAO (sector or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within three hours. (On-site National Guard Special Security Force units will not be required to man AAO communications and will be permitted a four-hour time limit for their initial alert in event they are called to Federal Service.)

3. 1-HOUR ALERT: All gun and fire control equipment is operable or capable of becoming operable within one hour. Communications to AAO (sector or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within one hour.

4. 30-MINUTE ALERT: All fire control equipment and guns are operable. Communications to AAO (sector or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within thirty minutes.

5. 15-MINUTE ALERT: All fire control equipment is energized (low voltage only) and periodically checked. Communications to AAO (sector or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is ready to assume BATTLE STATIONS within fifteen minutes. (Units equipped with SCR-581 will man fire control platoon communications.)

6. 5-MINUTE ALERT: All guns, fire control equipment and communications equipment are manned and in operation. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within five minutes.

7. BATTLE STATIONS: All guns, fire control equipment and communications are manned and in operation. Ready ammunition containers are open and rounds partially withdrawn. Unit is prepared to engage target immediately.
States of Alert for Skysweeper Fire Units

1. RELEASED: Fire units in this state of alert are those which are temporarily released from air defense commitment; for example, units at firing ranges and units participating in local disaster relief activities. Appropriate local security of the area will be maintained. Communications to AOC (sector or defense) need not be manned. Estimated time of return to an air defense commitment will be included in the report of units in this status.

2. 3-HOUR ALERT: Gun and fire control equipment is operable or capable of becoming operable within three hours. Communications to AOC (sector or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within three hours.

3. 1-HOUR ALERT: Gun and fire control equipment is operable or capable of becoming operable within one hour. Communications to AOC (sector or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within one hour.

4. 30-MINUTE ALERT: Gun and fire control equipment is operable. Communications to AOC (battery or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within thirty minutes.

5. 15-MINUTE ALERT: Gun and fire control equipment is energized (low voltage only) and periodically checked. Communications to AOC (battery or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE stations within fifteen minutes.

6. 5-MINUTE ALERT: Gun, fire control equipment and all communications are manned and in operation. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within five minutes.

7. BATTLE STATIONS: Gun, fire control equipment and all communications are manned and in operation. Gun ammunition racks are loaded. Unit is prepared to engage target immediately.
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY ATM DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

CHANGE 1
OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 6

12 August 1957

STATES OF ALARM

Operations Directive Number 6, 1957, is changed as follows:

5. ABACOM-GOMAD Actions (superseded) A guide for determination of minimum anti-aircraft alert requirements for varying conditions is attached as Annex 4.

3 Annexes


J. A. PONCONIS
Colonel, AOC
Adjutant General

1 Inc1
Guide for Determination
of AAA Min Alert Rqr

DISTRIBUTION: B, N, NG & I
CGUSCOMARC (2)
Dept of State & Def, Mil Info
Control Committee, DA (20)
CGUSARAL (5)
Each MINE, 90mm, & 120mm
Bry (3)
Each 75mm Btry (12)
## Guide for Determination of Minimum Antiaircraft Alert Requirements

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<tr>
<td>Red Yellow White</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Increased Readiness</td>
<td>BS 5 Min</td>
<td>15 Min 25% (1) 25% (2) 75%</td>
</tr>
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<td>30 Min 25% 25% 25%</td>
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<td>1 hr 25% 25% 25%</td>
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<td>3 hr 25% 25% 75%</td>
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**NOTE 2** Applies to missile units in Mia-Raf, Pits, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee, Ellsworth, also all gun units.

**NOTE 3** As appropriate.
UNCLASSIFIED

CINCINNATI, OHIO, WIEBAD, GERMANY

Reference: Your message 10154. Reference your message OTD 14071/X dated 25 August 1957. This message is in four parts.

Part I. On-site experience by USAADCOM units has proven the capability of the NIKE-Ajax system to effectively operate over extended periods of time. USAADCOM units have been on-site with their original equipment for over three years and these same units are effectively contributing to the present air defense role. Experience factors are available on the failure rate of various components of the NIKE-Ajax system; however, these failures are no different than those encountered in other electronic equipment.

Part II. USAADCOM Operations Directive Number 6 prescribes the states of alert for the NIKE units of this command and is in consonance with CONAIR 55-0 (States of Alert). Both of these publications will furnish guidance on the alert status for NIKE batteries.

UNCLASSIFIED
The ARADCOM directive is a workable one and provides maximum time for maintenance and training. It should be noted that with an Air Defense Warning Red, 100 percent of the NIKE units are placed on a state of alert of Quote Battle Stations Unquote. This immediate action status can be maintained over prolonged periods of time provided sufficient personnel are available for crew relief and time is made available for periodic maintenance of the system. However, to preclude personnel fatigue and excessive wear on the system components, it is desirable that a lesser status of alert be maintained whenever the air situation will permit. Part III. In view of the close similarity between the NIKE-AJAX and the NIKE-HERCULES systems, the planning factors used for the AJAX are considered valid for HERCULES. Part IV. Reference your message CPLO 12466. We are sending under separate cover a number of directives which may be of interest to you, including copies of CONAIR 55-8 (States of Alert) and ARADCOM Operations Directive Number 6 (States of Alert) which implements CONAIR 55-8.
CON0057
BV001
RN RFENGK RJDNN RJPNNB
DE RFEMV 09/07
R 0614002
FM CANAIRDEF
TO RFENGK / USAF 64TH AIR DIV
ZEN / STN UPLANDS
ZEN / STN BAGOTVILLE
ZEN / STN SAINT HUBERT
ZEN / STN CHATHAM
ZEN / STN NORTH BAY
ZEN / STN COLD LAKE
ZEN / STN COMOX
ZEN / CANAIRVAN
ZEN / STN LAC SAINT DENIS
ZEN / STN ST MARGARETS
ZEN / STN EDGAR
INFO RJDNN / CINC NORAD
RJPNB / CFECP
ZEN / CANAIRHED
ZEN / SPLANSO GC-GPG
378 06 DEC
THE OPERATIONAL READINESS STATES FOR AIR DEFENCE FIGHTER ORCES WILL
BE ALTERED FROM THE STATES SPECIFIED IN ADC OPS PLAN 2 SLANT 57 PD
THE STATES SPECIFIED IN ADC OPS PLAN 1 SLANT 58 CM EFFECTIVE 0001
HOURS 7 1 JAN 56 ARE CLN
A. TWO SDN STATIONS PAREN RCAF PAREN WILL MAINTAIN CLN
   (1) TWO CF100 AIRCRAFT AT TEN MINUTES READINESS PD
   (2) TEN CF100 AIRCRAFT AT SIXTY MINUTES READINESS PD
B. COMOX WILL MAINTAIN CLN
   (1) ONE CF100 AIRCRAFT AT TEN MINUTES READINESS PD
   (2) FIVE CF100 AIRCRAFT AT SIXTY MINUTE READINESS PD
C. Station Chatham will maintain four Sabre aircraft at six minutes readiness from dawn to dusk PD.

D. 64th CONAD Division will maintain two aircraft at five minutes readiness at each base and the maximum number of training aircraft at sixty minutes PD.

E. Station Cold Lake will maintain six CF100 aircraft at three-hour readiness PD. RCAF ADC AU FICTER TWO SQN STATIONS WILL MAINTAIN A MINIMUM OF SIX AIRCRAFT C/W LOADED BUT UNARMED CMM IN EXCESS OF THE TEN MINUTE AIRCRAFT PD. A ONE SQN STATION WILL MAINTAIN A MINIMUM OF THREE AIRCRAFT C/W LOADED BUT UNARMED IN EXCESS OF THE TEN MINUTE AIRCRAFT PD. AIRCRAFT C/W WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THOSE AT TEN MINUTE READINESS CAN MAY BE EMPLOYED FOR SQN TRAINING.

3T
06/2200Z DEC RFEMV3

A. PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY 3 ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME-GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION.

ADVANCE COPY OF THIS MSG HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO C&C. //

UNCLASSIFIED
This message is in two parts: Part One. Following message was sent to ADC and to AOC CAMARIEF with info/CONOPSEC. Quote USAF Headquarters has developed a schedule for the modernization of the F-89Ds in the 64th CHNAD Division area to F-89Js. These aircraft being modernized under Project Quote Bell Boy Unquote are scheduled into the aircraft production line at Northrop Aviation, Hawthorne, Calif. on a predetermined schedule to meet factory input requirements. This schedule requires that aircraft be furnished from the three 64th Air Division squadrons during the period March thru October 1957. The aircraft availability at Thule and Goose will be reduced; however, these units will still be capable of meeting their established alert commitments.

The Harmon Squadron is scheduled to lose aircraft to Project Bell Boy through October, at which time they are programmed...
to receive the F-102 aircraft. The monthly loss of the F-89D prior to receipt of operationally ready F-102s at Harmon will prohibit this unit from meeting its present scheduled alert commitments for a period of approximately 45 days commencing 1 October 1957. The 64th CONAD Division, by message to ADC, has stated that they cannot meet the Project Bell Boy schedule and maintain alert commitment concurrently. In order to modernize the forces at earliest practicable date, the established schedule for aircraft input to the factory must be met. This Headquarters is willing to accept a reduced air defense capability in the 64th area during the aforementioned phasing period. Commander, 64th CONAD Division is being directed to coordinate with you to establish mutually agreed upon plans for alert commitments during this phasing period. Commander CONAD Forces ERC will be apprised of the reduced alert commitments during the phasing period by Commander, 64th CADD, Unquote. Part Two: Commander 64th CONAD Division will coordinate with ADC CANAIR in accordance with Part One above and will keep the Commander, CONAD Forces Eastern CONAD Region apprised of the resulting alert commitments.
M/R Part One of the message repeats to the Comdr. 64 CCNAD Div. the
information sent to the AOC RCAF/ADC and OFSR. (Following M/R was
attached to message: "Capt Colling, ADC aircraft Distribution Section,
brought a copy of the attaching message from 64th CCNAD Division to
us seeking our assistance. The schedule of aircraft input to the factory
under project Bell 14B must be get. RCAF established the schedule and
the factory is geared to the established input. ADC must provide the
aircraft and by this message to AOC RCAF/ADC we can tell him of reduced
aircraft availability at Harmon during the phasing period until combat-
ready P-102s are available. The 59th at Goose merely exchange aircraft
in the modernization project while the 51st at Harmon lose the aircraft
completely and must wait for the arrival of the P-102s.

Part Two. Places the responsibility for coordination with AOC RCAF/ADC
and OFSR on the 64th CCNAD Division Commander.
PP RJECPF RJECPF RJECPF
DE RFEVD 14/21
P2115537
WN CANAIRDEF
TO RJECPF CONDR 64 AIR DIV PEPPERELL AFD HFLD
INFO RJECPF CINCINNATI AFD COLO
RJECPF CANAIRDEF

PRIORITY

ACTION COPY

PP RJECPF RJECPF RJECPF
DE RFEVD 14/21
P2115537
WN CANAIRDEF
TO RJECPF CONDR 64 AIR DIV PEPPERELL AFD HFLD
INFO RJECPF CINCINNATI AFD COLO
RJECPF CANAIRDEF

APR 21 AUG 57

TO WP RJECPF RJECPF RJECPF
WE AND/OR HANMIN AT EARLY DATE TO EXAMINE ADMINISTRATIVE CHI
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND TO PREPARE DRAFT OPERATIONS
ORDER FOR EXERCISE PD ADVISE PD PARA 2 PD FOR AFHQ PD TELECOM AOC
AT 21/430Z AUG RFEVD

A

A-- PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY

UNCLASSIFIED
PARACHUTE ATTACK
AIR DEFENSE SCAFFOLDING WERE PRINCIPALLY USED. THE
WIND ROCKET LAUNCHER, AN (L) 50MM PARTICIPANTS IN FOUR AIR DEFENSE
SYSTEMS INVOLVED OPERATIONS HIGH ALTITUDES, HIGH WIND, MULTIPLE
TARGETS. CIRCULARITY
DT
01/31/52 N.V. Rgency

--- PARACHUTE AIR EQUILIB DIPED PRIOR TO CATEGORY. AEROCHO
PHYSICALLY REMOVED ALL INFORM. RELA DICES AT AAD-THE-SEW
PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION
//ADVANCE COPY HAS BEEN PUBLISHED TO C.C.//
CONAD MOST FILE

CONRAD AIR SPACE

FILE

READ FILE

DATE: 16 SEPT 55

ACTION: HOOP
INFO: HOOP

FROM: CINCPAC
TO: CINCINNATI AFB

SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT PATROL

CONCERNING THE USE OF THE F-516 THE ALASKAN AIR COMMAND IS MAINTAINING ONE F-516 ON 15-MINUTE ALERT LOADED WITH ONE R-21 ROCKET AND ONE R-21 ROCKET. THE F-516 IS 15-MINUTE ALERT READY FOR INSTANT LOADING WITH ONE R-21. THIS IN EFFECT PROVIDES TRO F-516'S ON 15 MINUTE ALERT WITH 15 R-21'S AND IS IN RESPONSE TO ALASKAN COMMAND REGULATION 55-11. DATE DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 55.

SR: 24/22 OCT 55 ADK

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

From: OPD
To: COOP

ACTION COOP

ACTION COOP

X7-1828

A--PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED.--ACCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY 5 DESTRUCTION--

PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCE BY DATE-TIME GROUP prior to

declassification.

UNCLASSIFIED
Reference your AP 47. Publishing of Annex B of COMAD Regulation 55-6 is not possible at this time. The subject of signals to be used to force an intercepted aircraft to change course or land has been under discussion between this headquarters and other interested agencies for over two years. Adoption and concurrence of these signals by all concerned has not been obtained. Presentation of this subject as an off-agenda item will be made at the next NCAF Board Meeting at this headquarters 24-25 September 1957. Additional information on this subject may be available subsequent to this meeting. Consideration of incorporating these signals into any COMAD regulations as Rules of Engagement promulgated in the near future should be made. Your headquarters will be kept advised.
W/R Major Schiebel talked with G/C Weiser regarding the signals to force an aircraft to change course or land. G/C Weiser advised us that their signals that are a part of ASI2/5 have not been accepted by the Dept of Transport or by Civil Aviation agencies and therefore signals should be deleted until such time as both CONAD and ROAP/ADC and/or NOAD obtain DVT and CAA or TCAD concurrence of the signals. CONAD has been unable to obtain concurrence of CAA on these signals and the necessity of having signals is continually under study. This subject to be presented to the SCAT board meeting 26-25 Sept 57.
SUBJECT: Rules of Engagement - Guided Missiles

TO: Air Officer Commanding
Air Defence Command
RCAF Station, St. Hubert
Province of Quebec, Canada

1. Reference is made to your letter 536-126 (File No. 30)
8 October 1957.

2. The NORAD staff is conducting a study of Operational
RCAF/ADC Air Staff Instructions and NORAD regulations to determine
pertinent instructions or regulations to be revised as NORAD
regulations.

3. The suggestion as outlined in your paragraph 2 is well
met and is being considered for inclusion under "Rules of Engage-
ment" in the new series of NORAD regulations. Prior to publi-
cation of these regulations, coordinated action will be taken
with your headquarters.
Commander-in-Chief,  
North American Air Defence Command.,  
Ent Air Force Base,  
Colorado Springs,  
Colorado. U.S.A.

Rules of Engagement -soldier status

(b) (1)

3 Prior to further consideration of this matter at this HQ, your comments on the possibility of amending the present rules of engagement will be appreciated. If you consider that such amendment action is required, it is suggested that co-ordinated action between our two HQs be undertaken so that related amendments can be issued simultaneously.

UNCLASSIFIED
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Reference: This reference was quoted in the report. The regulation 5-6, dates of engagement dated 1957, subject regulation under study for revision.

**Reading List** |

**Major Greene**

**Security Classification**

UNCLASSIFIED
These provisions exclude those missiles operating in authorized missile ranges, or missiles for which provisions have otherwise been made. This procedure in no way changes the deed policy issued in our message 2200-P of 18 July 1974 which is quoted in part: Quote: Commanders of components of CEHAD will not request participating in any inter-service or inter-service agreements concerned with destruction or supporting destruction of hardened objects by friendly services. End quote. Desire forces be prepared to implement the aforementioned inter-service procedures by November 1974.
Rules of Engagement and Recognition Procedures for Interceptors in Air Defense for the Purpose of Alaska is changed as follows:

Paragraph

1. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR ALL AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO THE ALASKAN COMMAND AND OPERATING IN A COASTAL ADIZ PRIOR TO A DECLARATION OF WAR.

a. Prior to a declaration of a state of war, aircraft bearing military insignia of the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.), operating within the Alaskan Coastal ADIZ, and not committing an act of a hostile aircraft will not be considered hostile unless because said U.S.S.R. aircraft bears the insignia thereof.

(b) (1)

(1) [Blank]

(2) Take necessary evasive action.

(3) [Blank]
2. REPORTS. Immediately upon attack a MAYDAY report will be transmitted on a prescribed emergency channel, relating particulars as time allows. Immediately upon landing, a flash report, with full particulars, will be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Alaska, exempt from Reports Control under provisions of paragraph 7 c (3), APR 174-1A. (UNCLASSIFIED)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:  

T. R. STOUGHTON  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff

JOHN S. LINN  
Major, USAF  
Dep Adj Gen

DISTRIBUTION  
DARAL - 2  
AAC - 2  
J-1, ACOM - 2  
CONAD - 2  
AG File - 1
UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS, ALASKAN COMMAND

(0) (1)

(0) (1)

ALCOM SUPPLEMENT

CONAD RESOLUTION NO. 1-9

Dated 15 May 1957

OPERATIONS

Rules of Engagement

CONAD Regulation 1942-1 (May 1957) is supplemented for the Alaskan Theater as follows:

1. ENGAGEMENT OF HOSTILE AIRCRAFT.

b. (c) (UNCLASSIFIED) In the course which, if continued, would fly to within three miles of any Alaskan land mass area of responsibility. (Note: If the Little Diomede Island (U.S.) and the Big Diomede Island (SSR) are only two and three-quarters miles apart, the above applies over the Little Diomede. The within three miles to the North, South, or East of that island.)

b. (d) (UNCLASSIFIED) Prior to a declaration of a state of war, aircraft bearing military insignia of the Soviet Union (SSR) operating within the Alaskan Coastal ADR and not constituting an act of a hostile aircraft will not be considered hostile until bearing said SSR aircraft bears the insignia thereof.

*This Supplement supersedes ALCOM Supplement 1, dated 15 May 1952, to CONAD Regulation 35-6, 15 May 1952.

UNCLASSIFIED
7. (UNCLASSIFIED) Reports submitted in accordance with CONADEL 200-2 will be immediately relayed by telephone to the Commander-in-Chief, Alaska, Elmendorf extension 29103, 23100 or 23200.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:  
E. D. BYRSON  
Major, AGC  
Adjutant General

T. E. STOUGHTON  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:  
NORAD - 2  
IRARAL - 2  
AAC - 2  
COMAIRAPRON - 2  
J-3, ALCOM - 5  
AG - 1
HEADQUARTERS
64TH AIR DIVISION (DEFENSE)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO 862, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

ADONW

SUBJECT: Rules of Engagement and Recognition Procedures, Thule Air Defense Complex

TO: Commander in Chief
Contiguous Air Defense Command
East Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

22 MAR 1957

1. Inclosed herewith for your review, approval and/or concurrence is a copy of the "Rules of Engagement and Recognition Procedures" for the Thule Complex, 64th Air Division (Defense)

2. Letter authority, Headquarters, Northeast Air Command, dated 20 December 1956, tentatively authorizes adoption and execution of these "Rules of Engagement" on a temporary basis. However, as soon as can be determined by your headquarters, final negotiations at Department of State level have never been resolved and concluded.

3. Due to limited and unreliable communication facilities with the Thule Complex, the Commander, 931st Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron has been designated as Deputy Commander, 64th Air Division (Defense), for the Thule Complex. This designation includes delegation of authority to execute these "Rules" after every possible attempt to contact the Division Commander, has been exhausted within a reasonable time period.

4. The scheduled disestablishment of Headquarters, Northeast Air Command, 1 April 1957, and the ultimate retirement of official records, will negate the authority for these "Rules of Engagement".

5. In view of the above, request your approval of the "Rules", at least on a temporary basis, or until such time as State Department negotiations can be finalised.

6. Pending your concurrence, or until additional instructions are received from your Headquarters, the "Rules" as currently prescribed will continue as authorities for engagement and employment of weapons in the Thule Complex.

7. The classification of Secret on this letter will be cancelled when Inclosure #1 is withdrawn.

Incl:
Rules of Engage,
Macog Pro, Thule Air Defense Complex

GW: W. McColpin
Capt., USAF

UNCLASSIFIED
THULE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES

PURPOSE OF THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY

1. Purpose: This Annex establishes the intercept procedures and rules of engagement to be followed in the Thule Area, prior to the declaration of a military emergency.

2. Scope: This directive applies to all forces participating in air defense operations under the operational control of the Commander, 4th Air Division (Defense), Command, Thule Area.

3. Responsibility: The commanders of all organizations participating in air defense operations are responsible for insuring that:

   a. All personnel concerned with the contents of this directive are fully aware of its provisions and understand the extent of their authority.

   b. Interceptor and AAA crews gain maximum possible proficiency in recognition (including national markings) of multi-engine and jet aircraft, civil and military, of the United States, Canada, Britain, Western Europe, Russia, and Russian satellite nations.

   c. Training and proficiency of personnel is such that, within the capabilities of available equipment, hostile aircraft are prevented from reaching their targets and at the same time friendly aircraft are not inadvertently engaged.

4. Definitions: The following definitions are established for the purpose of this directive.

   a. Engage: This term is defined as action taken against hostile aircraft by means of interceptors, anti-aircraft artillery, or other ground-to-air weapons, and includes destruction.

   b. Close Control: The control of intercepting aircraft when the target and the interceptor aircraft positions are known to the director and radio contact can be effected between the director and the interceptor crew.

   c. Identification: The determination of an aircraft's friendly or enemy characteristics by any means or combination of means including...
6. Interception and Recognition: Any aircraft which cannot be identified by the ADFN system within prescribed time limits will be intercepted for recognition purposes. Practice intercepts will not be conducted against known civilian aircraft. The following procedures will be observed during intercepts:

a. Interceptors will fly no closer to the intercepted aircraft than is necessary for positive recognition.

b. At night or during conditions of restricted visibility, intercepts conducted by F-4, F-5 and E-6 fire control system equipped aircraft for identification purposes will be in accordance with current operating instructions.

c. Every effort will be made by the fighter-interceptor pilots to prevent startling the intercepted aircraft aircraff or passengers. The effort desired is one which assures personnel in the intercepted aircraft that the fighter-interceptor is making a routine investigation in the interests of properly conducting the action of this command.

d. The identification by inter-plane communications will not be attempted by fighter-interceptor pilots.

e. The fighter-interceptor pilot will keep the direction center advised of marginal conditions of visibility.

1. When visibility at intercept altitude is less than two miles, but more than one mile, the interception will be completed only when the fighter-interceptor is under close control or has all contact with the unidentified aircraft.

2. When the visibility is less than one mile, the interceptor must have all contact.

3. Under exceptional circumstances in which identification is deemed mandatory, the Commander, 31st AMC may waive limitations imposed in (1) and (2) above. The authority to waive limitations will be exercised only after every reasonable attempt to contact the division commander or his appointed deputy has failed.

f. When more than one fighter-interceptor is employed on an interception, only one pilot will effect recognition. The remaining aircraft will maintain surveillance from a position where attack could...
be made against the intercepted aircraft. One such surveillance aircraft will, where possible, record the recognition particulars as transmitted by the pilot effecting recognition.

g. The fighter-interceptor pilot effecting recognition, or the other member of the element, will immediately report the quantity, type, nationality, ownership, and any unusual behavior of the intercepted aircraft (or leader of an unidentified formation) to the Direction Center director or, aircraft serial numbers will be obtained and reported only when considered necessary by the director to effect identification and the pilot is so notified.

h. If the intercepted aircraft is positively identified as friendly, the fighter-interceptors will withdraw immediately, unless previous arrangements have been made for simulated attacks against the specific aircraft.

i. If the intercepted aircraft cannot be positively identified as friendly, the interceptors will maintain surveillance and await further instructions from the Direction Center director. During this period, the provisions of paragraph 7a(1) above will apply.

j. The Direction Center director, when unable to identify an aircraft through information passed by the interceptors, will immediately notify the control center giving all relevant information.

k. Aircraft under the control of this command may overfly the direction sector when such action is required for identification or operational purposes. Under these circumstances, Canadian rules of engagement as outlined in Annex 'F' will apply. (Act 2/5)

l. The employment of anti-aircraft weapons will follow the principle of simultaneous engagement in the destruction of hostile aircraft and/or missiles. Inner defense areas will not be designated. The only limiting factor will be the range of the anti-aircraft weapons.
SUBJECT: Rules of engagement within areas not sovereign to the United States

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
    As Executive Agent for CONAD
    Washington 25, D.C.

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff Document 101/26 establishes interception and engagement procedures within temporary sovereign to the United States and within the Coastal Air Defense Identification Zones.

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff Document 101/27 requires State Department negotiations to effect agreements in areas not sovereign to the United States.

3. The headquarters is unaware of any agreement which may have been established, relative to Rules of Engagement, between the United States and Germany. Similar on Greenland is concerned.

4. Request your concurrence in the use of the attached draft "Rules of Engagement" for the Inule complex for the interim period until official agreements between the United States and Denmark are finalized.

For the Command-in-Chief:

[Signature]

MARSHALL D. CANTER
Major General USA
Chief of Staff

CONAD X7

05/03

This letter was returned because of a minor administrative error.
M/2 Letter authority, Spg. "C" SAC, dated 29 Dec 1953, tentatively authorized adoption and execution of the attached "Rules of Engagement" for the Thule Complex, 41st Air Division. With the inclusion of the 41st CONAD Division into CINCCONAD's operational chain of command, it has become apparent that no U.S.-Denmark agreement at Department of State level exists which authorizes the engagement and employment of weapons in Greenland.

This letter is being initiated to request JCS concurrence with the "Rules of Engagement" on a temporary basis until U.S.-Denmark agreement can be obtained.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
3 July 1957

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Rules for Engagement Within Areas not Sovereign to the United States

TO: Commander-in-Chief  
Continental Air Defense Command  
Ent Air Force Base  
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. This is an Executive Agency letter in answer to your letter, subject as above, dated 10 May 1957.

2. Headquarters USAF does not have the authority to approve the "Rules of Engagement," for the Thule Complex enclosed in the above referenced letter. Present approved "Rules of Engagement" provide authority for the interception, identification, and engagement of aircraft within the boundaries of territory over which the United States exercises rights of sovereignty and the coastal Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ's).

3. The Department of Defense and the Department of State are currently working on a set of negotiating instructions which, when completed, will be submitted to the Danish Government for consideration. Approval of these instructions by the United States and Danish Governments will provide the authorization needed by COMAD for implementation of the "Rules of Engagement" in the Thule area.

4. This Headquarters will continue to monitor current action pertaining to negotiations with Denmark in an effort to obtain early approval of the Danish Government for establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the Thule area.

JACK H. SMART  
Major General, U. S. Air Force  
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff

UNCLASSIFIED
1. During the time period when the COMAAR (Connecticut Air Operations Area) was under the North-east Air Command, they were under the control of the United States Air Force. Since the COMAAR area was not under the control of the United States Department of State, it was not under the command authority of the British Government.

2. Now that the COMAAR area is under the operational control of COMAAR, the Commander-in-Chief COMAAR has requested to define the appropriate of the "rules" that are in effect for the area. The temporary rules or "rules" that were in effect prior to the area being under the control of the United States Department of State were finalized in a memorandum dated 15 May 1957.

3. This memorandum could not be finalized in the time frame rules submitted by the area without JCS or JCS approval. The final rules of the COMAAR area were requested until official approval was given. The final rules could be finalized. (End of 2).

4. Executive Agency Letter (Department of the Air Force) to (End of 2), in line with the areas of the Air Force, indicated that NAF could not approve the rules on a tentative basis, and that DOD and Department of State were working on an agreement to submit to the Danish Government for their consideration.

5. In that NAF could not, at the time, accept the "rules" and no intergovernmental agreement had been reached, COMAAR has no command authority in Greenland until official agreement is reached. It is therefore proposed that another letter be sent to NAF in an Executive Agency for approval requesting intergovernmental guidance for possible engagement in the area. The COMAAR area will intergovernmental agreements are finalized. Proposed letter is attached as End of 4 for your recommendations and comments.

7. No COMAAR cover letter "rules of Engagement" draft, 17 May 57.
8. No COMAAR cover letter "rules of Engagement" draft, 17 May 57.

UNCLASSIFIED
Chief of Staff, USAF, as Executive Agent for CONAD. Reference letter 44th Air Division (Defense) ADOC, to CINCONAD, Subject: Rules of Engagement and Recognition Procedures, Thule Air Defense Complex dated 22 March 1957. As previously indicated, CINCONAD does not have the authority to approve rules of engagement for Greenland. CINCONAD requested the Chief of Staff USAF as Executive Agent for CONAD to obtain approval. (Reference CONAD letter COOP-T to C/S USAF as Executive Agent for CONAD, Subject: Rules of Engagement Within Areas not Sovereign to the United States, dated 16 May 1957). The Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, has advised that Headquarters USAF could not approve your rules of engagement and that negotiations were in progress through the Department of State to obtain the
concurrence of the Danish Government (Reference HQ USAF Letter to CINCWAD, Subject: Rules of Engagement Within Areas not Sovereign to the United States, dated 1 July 1957). Until your proposed rules of engagement are formally approved, in the absence of interim instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you are directed to continue in force as an interim measure, the Rules of Engagement and recognition procedures for the Thule Air Defense Complex as outlined in your above referenced letter.
AIR DEFENCE COMMAND

AIR STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

AIR RAID WARNING

Purpose

1. This instruction defines the conditions of Air Raid Warnings, outlines circumstances under which these warnings are to be initiated, establishes procedures for notification of appropriate agencies, and specifies action to be taken.

Scope

2. This instruction is applicable to all units of Air Defence Command and Northeast Air Command in accordance with joint agreements, other agencies under the operational control of Air Defence Command, and is for the guidance of other commands having collateral responsibilities including the USAF Continental Air Defence Command and Alaskan Air Command.

Responsibilities

3. It is the responsibility of commanders of all units of this command to ensure compliance with applicable provisions of this instruction.

Definitions

4. A State of Air Raid Warning is a state of air attack probability relative to an Air Defence Sector and is limited to one of the following:

(a) "Air Raid Warning Red" - Attack by "hostile aircraft" is imminent. (This is interpreted to mean that "Hostile Aircraft" or "Unknown Aircraft Manifestly Hostile in Intent" are within or in the immediate vicinity of an air defence sector with a high probability of entering the subject sector).

(b) "Air Raid Warning Yellow" - Attack by "Hostile Aircraft" is probable. (This is interpreted to mean that "Hostile Aircraft" are en route toward the air defence sector, or unknown aircraft suspected to be hostile, are within the air defence sector).

(c) "Air Raid Warning White" - Attack by "Hostile Aircraft" is improbable. (This is interpreted to mean that no "Hostile Aircraft" or unknown aircraft, suspected to be hostile, are known to be within or on route toward the air defence sector).
UNCLASSIFIED

4.

NOTE:

Hostile Aircraft. An aircraft may be classified as "Hostile" if it commits a hostile act as defined in ADC ASI 2/5 (App "A" para 1 (b)).

Aircraft Manifestly Hostile in Intent. Aircraft may be classified "Manifestly Hostile in Intent" when the patterns or actions of incoming unknown aircraft indicate beyond a reasonable doubt that a hostile raid is in progress or, when current intelligence is available which indicates that aircraft are airborne and en route toward Canada, aircraft will be declared "Manifestly Hostile in Intent" only by the Air Officer Commanding, Air Defence Command, or representatives specifically appointed by him.

Operational Procedures

5.

These procedures are to be followed upon the declaration of states of air raid warnings for the Initial Attack and Subsequent Attack phases:

(a) Initial Attack - Air Defence Procedures. The initial attack procedure is based on the principle that this attack will be simultaneously launched by the units of the enemy's capability against principal targets throughout Canada and the United States. The first "Air Raid Warning Red or Yellow" will be initiated only by the ROC ADC or his appointed representative. In this regard, the declaration of a hostile act by an aircraft does not in itself constitute authority for a Sector Commander to declare an Air Raid Warning. In such instances, the Sector Commander in to be guided by ASI 2/14. During the initial attack phase, the following procedures will be adhered to:

1. When one Air Defence Sector is directed to initiate an "Air Raid Warning Red", all other Sectors will institute a warning of not less than an "Air Raid Warning Yellow".

2. When one Air Defence Sector is directed to initiate an "Air Raid Warning Yellow", all other Air Defence Sectors will initiate a warning of not less than an "Air Raid Warning Yellow".

3. An "Air Raid Warning White" may be used to release all agencies from an "Air Raid Warning Red" or an "Air Raid Warning Yellow". However, when an "Air Raid Warning Red" or an "Air Raid Warning Yellow" has been instituted in accordance with (a) (1) and (2) above, an "Air Raid Warning Yellow"
Warning White will not be declared until authorized by the Air Officer Commanding Air Defence Command or his appointed representative, who will determine when the initial attack phase is completed.

(b) Subsequent Attack Procedures. After the initial attack phase has been declared over by the Air Officer Commanding, Air Defence Command or his appointed representative, Air Defence Sector Commanders are to initiate the appropriate air raid warning at their own discretion depending upon the air defence situation within or in the immediate vicinity of their respective sectors, except when otherwise directed by higher authority.

Alerting Procedures

5. The following alerting procedures will be adhered to upon the declaration of an air raid warning:

(a) AOCNS, OCC will notify by the most expeditious communications available:

(1) #1 AOCNS.
(11) #2 AOCNS.
(111) #3 AOCNS.
(iv) #4 Air Division Headquarters.
(v) Headquarters North West Air Command, ANZSC.
(v11) Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ will notify all other commands and services).

(b) AOCNS will notify by the most expeditiously communications available:

(1) All Air Defence units within their Sector including ACGW Squadrons, Fighter Squadrons, Ground Observer Corps units and Filter Centres.
(11) AOCNS, OCC, if the Air Raid Warning is initiated by the AOCNS.
(111) Adjacent RCAF and USAF Sectors.
(iv) Civilian Air Defence Warning key points.
(v) The associated Department of Transport Area Control Centre(s).
(v1) COMEMLAD Alerting Stations.
(c) In addition, #2 ADCC is to notify the Maritime Commander Atlantic, Halifax, N. S.

Action Required Upon Initial Declaration of an Air Raid Warning

7. Appropriate Commanders are to take action to attain maximum combat potential with forces available for air defense. Such actions are to include any or all of the measures outlined below:

(a) Place all available fighter-interceptor aircraft on a state of alert consistent with the operational situation.

(b) Place all operational ADCC facilities on maximum operational status (only emergency maintenance should be performed on ADCC equipment).

(c) General all training of operational interceptor squadrons.

(d) Order all appropriate Emergency Communications Networks.

(e) Activate the ADCC on a full-time basis.

(f) Deploy forces as required.

(g) Coordinate with the appropriate Area Air Traffic Controller at DOT ATC Centres to ensure the most effective utilization of interceptor aircraft and implementation of approved plans.

(h) Institute internal security as required.

(i) Where applicable, request immediate augmentation of forces available from the Navy.

(k) Institute such other administrative, operational, and logistical procedures as are deemed advisable.

General

8. When an "Air Raid Warning White" is declared for the purpose of terminating an "Air Raid Warning Red or Yellow", action taken by units of Air Defence Command will be dictated by the existing situation. The following measures will be effected as required:

(a) As directed, maintain operational preparedness at a degree whereby maximum sustained combat potential is realized.

(b) Ensure that maintenance is performed on fighter-interceptor aircraft and ADCC equipment consistent with the operational situation.
(c) Redeploy forces.

(d) Maintain strict internal security.

(e) Analyze enemy capabilities, tactics, and techniques and disseminate recommended counter-measures to operational units.

(f) Institute such other administrative, operational, and logistical procedures as are deemed advisable.

Communications

9. Direct communication is authorized between appropriate agencies for the purpose of coordination and implementation of procedures outlined herein.

/s/h/ (L.E. Wray) A/V/M,
Air Officer Commanding,
Air Defence Command.

1 Dec 56
Purpose

1. This instruction prescribes measures for increasing the preparedness of the Air Defence System prior to hostilities, and establishes procedures for notification of appropriate agencies.

Scope

2. This instruction is applicable to all units of Air Defence Command and 94th Air Division in accordance with joining agreements, other military agencies under the operational control of Air Defence Command, and is for the guidance of other commands having collateral responsibilities including the USAF Continental Air Defence Command and Alaskan Air Command.

Responsibilities

3. It is the responsibility of the commanders of all units of this command to ensure compliance with applicable provisions of this instruction.

Definitions

4. Air Defence Readiness is a state of preparedness in which the Air Defence System is brought to maximum operational capability.

Operational Procedures

5. Air Defence Readiness may be declared by the Air Defence Commander or his appointed deputy as defined in AFI 2/5, Appendix 'A', paras 1 (a) and 1 (b).

Alerting Procedures

6. The following alerting procedures will be followed upon the declaration of an Air Defence Readiness:

(a) ADCGR COC will notify by the most expeditious communications available:

(1) #1 ADCR.

(11) #2 ADCR.
(ii) #3 ADCC.
(iv) #5 Air Division Headquarters.
(v) Headquarters 64th Air Division
(vii) Air Force Headquarters.

(b) When Air Defence Readiness is declared by the ADCC or by a Sector Commander for his own Sector, the ADCC shall notify the following units by the most expeditious communications available:

-{#--ADCC--GOG-(if-declared-by-Sector-Commander)}-

(1) All Air Defence units within their Sector including AAW Squadrions, Fighter Squadrons, Ground Observer Corps units and Filter Centres.

(ii) Adjacent RCAF and USAF Sectors.

(iii) The associated Department of Transport Area Control Centre(s).

NOTE: Air Defence Readiness is only to be used for alerting military formations concerned with air defence, and is not to be disseminated to civilian agencies, other than DOT Area Control Centre(s).

Actions Required Upon a Declaration of Air Defence Readiness

7 Appropriate Commanders are to take action to attain maximum combat potential of forces available for air defence. Such actions are to include any or all of the measures listed below:

(a) Place additional fighter aircraft on 2 minutes runway alert.

(b) Recall fighter aircraft from special missions (gunnery, tests, etc).

(c) Cancel training activities that affect combat potential.

(d) Place all other available fighter aircraft on readiness states consistent with the operational situation.

1 Dec 56
(e) Activate the M06C for the period required.

(f) Place all radar and communications facilities on maximum operational status.

(g) Co-ordinate with the appropriate Area Traffic Controller at
DOT ATC Centres to ensure the most effective utilization of
interceptor aircraft.

(h) Institute strict internal security measures.

(i) Institute such other administrative, operational, or
logistical procedures as may be deemed advisable consis-
tent with the existing air and/or intelligence
situation.

Communications

8 Direct communications is authorized between appropriate agencies
for the purpose of co-ordination and implementation of procedures outlined
herein.

/s/c/ (L.E. Wray) A/14/A,
Air Officer Commanding,
Air Defence Command.

1 Dec 56
CONADR 55-2

CONAD REGULATION
55-2

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado
11 September 1957

OPERATIONS
SCATER

1. Purpose. This Regulation establishes CONAD policies and responsibilities for appropriate CONAD military authorities and provides general instructions for planning and implementation of the Department of Defense/Department of Commerce Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations during an Air Defense Emergency -- Short Title: SCATER. (See Attachment 1.)

2. Scope.

a. This Regulation applies to all echelons of CONAD, including the air defense forces of the Alaskan Command and provides guidance for the 64th Air Division and other agencies having air defense responsibilities to CINCONAD.

b. CAA Air Defense Liaison Officer (CAA ADLO) participation described herein is for informational purposes and is consistent with directives issued by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA).

3. Definitions. Terms used herein are defined in paragraph 1 of Attachment 1.


a. Attachment 1 (SCATER) is designed to establish individual responsibilities of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics and appropriate military commanders for the security control of civil and non-tactical military air traffic, air navigation radio aids, and aeronautical communications (civil and military) during an Air Defense Emergency.

b. For the purpose of this Regulation, appropriate military commanders are defined as all designated CONAD commanders.

c. CINCONAD will develop and recommend military plans and regulations as required to implement Attachment 1 (SCATER).

d. CINCONAD, in coordination with CAA, has published a CONAD/CAA SCATER Plan. This Plan consists of Department of Defense/Department of Commerce (DOD/DOC) SCATER Plan and CONAD/CAA unclassified supplements. The unclassified supplements contain amplifying instructions relative to the movement of priority civil and non-tactical military air traffic. Appendices and Attachments to these supplements will be developed jointly by CINCONAD Regions and CAA Regions as prescribed for the supplement and will contain specific data on prior approved movements of air traffic, local flying areas (military and civil) and other pertinent instructions deemed necessary by the CINCONAD Region commanders.

e. Procedures and operating instructions related to the movement of tactical air traffic and certain requirements for the control of air navigation radio aids and/or aeronautical communications, authentication and other requirements of a classified nature will be published in a separate CONAD/CAA classified SCATER Plan. Appendices and/or attachments to this Plan will be developed jointly by CINCONAD Regions and CAA Regions as prescribed in the Plan.
CONADR 35-2

f. To insure standardization, no deviation will be made in the content or format prescribed in the CONAD/CAA SCATER Plan and classified SCATER Plan without prior approval by CINCONAD. Headquarters CONAD will coordinate any recommended changes in format with CAA.

5. Responsibilities.
   a. Commanders CONAD Regions will:
      (1) Insure compliance with this Regulation by all units of their command.
      (2) Coordinate with appropriate military and CAA agencies all matters pertaining to military and CAA participation in SCATER actions.
      (3) Insure that necessary classified appendices to the CONAD classified SCATER Plan relative to Emergency War Plans (EWP) traffic and other preplanned tactical traffic are prepared, coordinated, and distributed to all interested agencies.
      (4) Develop procedures for the periodic review of all appendices and attachments developed by the CONAD Region or Division to insure adequacy of instructions contained therein.
      (5) Effect coordination with other Department of Defense agencies and commands within their Region to insure adequacy of compliance and participation with the SCATER requirements.
      (6) Designate a SCATER officer at CONAD Region and CONAD Division level to work in collaboration with the CAA Air Defense Liaison Officer (ADLO) in order to fulfill SCATER requirements. (Due to the effect SCATER action has on the overall air defense capability, and the requirement for the SCATER officer to deal with civil agencies and other major service commands, it is considered desirable that the SCATER officer be well versed in all aspects of the Air Defense System.)

6. SCATER Tests.
   a. SCATER Testing will be accomplished as follows:
      (1) Communications Tests.
         (a) SCATER Communications Tests will be initiated by the CONAD Combat Operations Center (COC) through the CONAD Region and CONAD Division Control Centers to the Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTC). These tests will not exceed one a week or less than one a month and will not be disseminated beyond the ARTC Centers.
         (b) The CONAD Division will log the time the test messages are received from the CONAD Region COC and the time the ARTC Centers respond and authenticate the message. Reasons for delay of more than two minutes, for transmission of the message to the ARTCC and the ARTCC response and authentication, will be recorded with comments on corrective action taken. A copy of this information will be forwarded to the CONAD Division CAA ADLO within 24 hours.
         (c) Similar reports will be forwarded to the CAA ADLO by the ARTC Centers for consolidation into monthly SCATER communications test reports. A copy of this report will be forwarded to the CONAD Division commander, CONAD Region COC, CONAD COC, CAA Region, and CAA Washington offices.
(2) Operational Tests.

(a) SCATER Tests will be conducted in connection with CONAD National, Regional, or Division Exercises whenever practicable or may be initiated at other times by a CONAD Division. Normally, no more than six tests will be conducted during any one calendar year. SCATER tests will not be scheduled oftener than every 60 days, except that test may be held in conjunction with a national exercise less than 60 days after a regional or division test. Tests will include completion of fan-out notice by ARTC Centers to CAA and military towers, communications stations, air carrier operations, state aeronautical facilities, and other participating organizations, estimated time required for simulatinggrounding or diverting known air traffic, and estimated time required to shut down radio navigational aids. SCATER tests will not involve the actual grounding or diverting of aircraft nor the shutdown of radio navigation aids. Actual contact with air traffic and actual shutdown of navigation aids will only be accomplished during preplanned national air defense exercises and only when fully coordinated by CINCNAD and the Administrator of CAA, prior to those exercises. To insure maximum participation of air defense and aeronautical facility personnel, each test will be conducted in three phases -- a phase for each eight-hour tour of duty (0000-0800, 0800-1600, 1600-0000 local time). Each phase will be terminated after sufficient time has elapsed for the participating facilities to perform all test actions.

(b) Aeronautical facilities will participate in tests except where such participation will affect the safety of air traffic. In the event an ARTC Center is unable to participate, the ARTC Center will notify the Division Control Center "UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE." In such cases, the phase or phases of the test affected will be re-scheduled for the corresponding period the following day.

(c) SCATER Test Reports from participating aeronautical facilities (civil and military), will be submitted to the CONAD Division CAA ADLO on the standard SCATER test report card. The ADLO will evaluate the reports and prepare an analytical report of the test. A copy of this report will be provided the CONAD Division commanders, CONAD Region CEC, Headquarters CONAD, and CAA Region and CAA Washington offices.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

W. J. Burmele
Lt-Col, USAF
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
A.B.F. & CAA

1 Attachment
DOD/DOC SCATER Plan dated May 1957
Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations During an Air Defense Emergency

Short Title: SCATER

This plan supersedes "Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic During a Military Emergency" approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Defense July 15, 1952.

Foreword

This "Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations During an Air Defense Emergency" has been prepared jointly by Headquarters, United States Air Force, and the Civil Aeronautics Board and Department of the Navy. In the preparation of this plan, the suggestions, recommendations, and opinions submitted by representatives of the interested aviation organizations have been utilized to the maximum extent possible consistent with the capabilities of the defending forces to accomplish their assigned mission. In addition to the foregoing, maximum consideration has been given to the acknowledged contribution of nonmilitary aviation to the overall defense effort.

The development of this plan does not indicate the existence of an Air Defense Emergency nor does it forecast the probability of such an emergency. Therefore, it is imperative that all agencies involved in preparing for or undertaking the implementation of any part of this plan assure that their activities are not construed by the general public as cause for alarm or conjecture.

This plan establishes the individual responsibilities of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics and the appropriate military authorities for the security control of civil and nonmilitary military air traffic, and air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications (civil and military) during an Air Defense Emergency. This plan applies to all United States areas; however, it may be modified by the responsible commanders of overseas commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet their specific requirements. For purposes of clarity, the language of this plan refers to the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCNAD), and his subordinate echelons as the appropriate military authority.

Maximum utilization of aircraft under this plan will be accomplished in the following manner:

1. Limiting restrictions on air traffic to the absolute minimum consistent with the dictates of currently evaluated military intelligence.
2. Incorporating specific provisions for orderly processing of friendly air traffic. (Under certain conditions, portions of the air defense system might become saturated because of the quantity of flight activity, friendly and hostile. These circumstances, if permitted to exist, would dictate that a large portion of air defense capabilities be absorbed in distinguishing between friendly nonmilitary and hostile flights. To preclude this ineffective utilization of available forces, special provisions have been included for the orderly processing of friendly operations.)

From the suggestions and recommendations submitted by representatives of the civil aviation industry and military authorities a rating system based on the purpose of flight and communications capabilities has been developed for civil and nonmilitary military aviation. (See attachment 1.) This rating system will be utilized for the purpose of providing maximum operations and establishing priority for such operations when system capacity is reached.

In implementing this plan, it must be realized that routine arrangements for local types of flight activities (training, crop dusting, etc.) will generally be accomplished through the CAA Regional Organization.

The CAA will solicit the cooperation of State aviation agencies and local airport authorities in processing a request for such flight activities. Requests for special consideration will be submitted to the appropriate regional facility or office of the CAA for processing through established military and civil channels.

Execution of this plan will require certain immediate implementing actions by the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, and the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics prior to an actual Air Defense Emergency. In view thereof, such actions which have been taken, in accordance with existing plans, will be subject to immediate review and/or modification.

The Plan

1. Definitions

For the purpose of this plan, the following definitions apply:

- Air Defense Emergency (b) (1)
b) Air Defense Warning Conditions.

1. Warning Red—When hostile aircraft (includes missiles) are within a CONAD Division area or are in the immediate vicinity of a CONAD Division area with a high probability of entering the area.

2. Warning Yellow—When hostile aircraft (includes missiles) are en route toward a CONAD Division area, or unknown aircraft suspected to be hostile are en route to, or are within a CONAD Division area.

3. Warning White—When during a state of Air Defense Emergency an attack by hostile aircraft (includes missiles) is not considered immediately probable or imminent.

c) Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) Region. A major geographical subdivision of the continental United States which delineates the area of air defense responsibility of a CONAD Region Commander. (Example: WESTERN CONAD REGION).

d) CONAD Division. A geographical subdivision of a CONAD Region and those CONAD Forces within the Division area.

e) Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The airspace of defined dimensions designated by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics within which the ready identification, location, and control of aircraft is required in the interest of national security.

f) CAA Region. Area of responsibility of a CAA Regional Administrator.

g) Security Control of Air Traffic. Includes recognizing, requiring identification procedures, directing, diverting, restricting, prohibiting, or grounding of civil and non-tactical military air traffic in the interest of national security.

h) SCATER. The short title for the joint Commerce/Defense Department plan for the security control of air traffic and the control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications.

i) SCAT. The short title for the security control of air traffic. Current SCAT Rules are included in Part 820, Regulations of the Administrator. Emergency SCAT Rules are included in this plan.

l) CONELRAD. The short title for the program for the control of electromagnetic radiations. (However, the control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications is included in this plan.)

1) Tactical Air Traffic. Military flights actively engaged in operational missions against the enemy, flights engaged in immediate deployment for a combat mission, and preplanned combat and logistical support flights contained in Emergency War Plans.

m) Non-tactical Military Air Traffic. Military flights other than tactical air traffic, such as administrative, logistical, and training.

2) Defense Area. Airspace of defined dimensions designated by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics within which the ready control of aircraft is required in the interest of the national security during an Air Defense Emergency.

3) Open Area. An area within the continental United States not designated as an ADIZ or Defense Area.

4) United States. The several States, the District of Columbia, and the several Territories and possessions of the United States (including areas of land or water administered by the United States under International agreements), including the Territorial waters and the overlying airspace thereof.

3) Security Control Clearance. Authorization for an aircraft to proceed in accordance with security control instructions during an Air Defense Emergency.

4) Purpose. The purpose of this plan is to establish responsibilities, procedures, and general instructions for the security control of civil and non-tactical military air traffic, air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications during an Air Defense Emergency which will provide maximum utilization of aircraft by military and civil agencies engaged in essential operations.

5) Authority.

a) Joint Chiefs of Staff directives which outline the United States Air Force responsibilities for the development of plans and policies in concert with the CAA for the establishment of a system for identification and security control of air traffic within the continental United States.

b) Public Law 778, 81st Congress, which authorizes the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Secretary of Commerce to undertake security measures relating to the regulation and control of air commerce, and for other purposes.

c) Notice published by the Secretary of Commerce on January 4, 1951, in 16 F. R. 99 delegating to the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics Authority with respect to security control of air traffic (Public Law 778).

d) Executive Order 10312, December 10, 1951, which provides for emergency control over certain Government and non-Government facilities engaged in radio communications or radio transmission.

e) Subpart 9, Rules of Federal Communications Commission, concerning the alerting and operation of all radio stations in the aviation service.

3) Scope. This plan prescribes the joint action to be taken during an Air Defense Emergency by appropriate military authorities and the CAA:

a) To effect security control of civil and non-tactical military aircraft entering, departing, or moving within the United States and the coastal approaches thereto and

b) To effect control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications as may be required.

4) General Provisions.

a) Efficient security control of air traffic will be achieved by effective air surveillance, the identification and recognition of aircraft, the discipline of combat air units engaged in the interception and destruction of enemy aircrew weapons, the close coordination between military and civil agencies and the cooperation of all airspace users.

b) In carrying out assigned missions, the CONAD Division Commander will, based on the requirements of the existing military situation, direct the extent of security control of civil and military aircraft other than those engaged in tactical operations and the
control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications.

c. This plan is not applicable to military aircraft engaged in tactical operations with the exception that CONAD Division Commanders may advise and recommend rerouting of tactical air traffic for short distances to circumnavigate a battle or threatened area, during an Air Defense Emergency. Tactical operations will be coordinated with the CONAD Division Commander(s) concerned so as not to delay combat operations.

d. Under certain conditions of alert, in specific areas, the CONAD Division Commander may require a security control clearance for civil and non-tactical military aircraft prior to takeoff. Such security control clearance is different from and not to be confused with an operational or air traffic clearance. It will serve normally to insure that the pilot is informed of the current condition of alert and that his operation is of sufficient priority if any capacity restrictions are in effect.

e. Minimum interference to normal air traffic will be planned consistent with the requirements for effective operation of the air defense system.

6. Responsibilities

a. The Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, will—

   (1) Develop and recommend military regulations which contain rules and procedures to implement this plan.

   (2) Coordinate with the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics regarding the institution of procedures for accomplishment of SCATER.

   (3) Establish the military requirements for SCATER in designated areas dependent upon the existing military situation.

   (4) Issue amended directives or instructions for SCATER when the military situation permits relaxation of existing controls.

b. The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics will—

   (1) Promulgate the necessary civil regulations to implement this plan.

   (2) Coordinate with the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, prior to the establishment of procedures for SCATER.

   (3) Administer SCATER in accordance with requirements established by the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command.

   (4) Advise the civil aviation industry of the requirements for SCATER.

c. The CONAD Division Commanders will—

   (1) Direct the control of all air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications facilities in their areas, as required. (This will normally be accomplished through CAA.)

   (2) Issue security control instructions to appropriate CAA agencies as necessary to insure efficient performance of the air defense mission.

   (3) Maintain liaison with appropriate CAA Regional Administrators.

   (4) Conduct tests of SCATER in collaboration with the CAA.

   (5) Collaborate with the CAA Regional Administrators in making supplemental agreements to this plan.

   (6) The CAA Regional Administrators will—

      (1) Participate with the CONAD Division Commanders in the development of procedures for the implementing and testing of SCATER in the CONAD Division areas.

      (2) Insure proper dissemination of SCATER instructions to civil and military aeronautical facilities (including aircraft, airport operators, and State fallout systems) within their areas of responsibility.

      (3) Place in effect SCATER procedures in accordance with requirements established by the CONAD Division Commanders.

      (4) Maintain liaison with the appropriate CONAD Division Commanders.

      (5) Assist the CONAD Division Commanders in making supplemental agreements to this plan.

7. Air Defense Emergency Actions

In an Air Defense Emergency, the following actions will be taken with respect to the CONAD Division areas:

a. The CONAD Division Commander, dependent upon the situation in the area, will notify the appropriate CAA Regional Administrator(s) (this will normally be done by direct contact between the CONAD Division Control Center and the appropriate air traffic control centers):

   (1) That a state of Air Defense Emergency exists, and the current condition of Air Defense Warning;

   (2) The extent of implementation of this plan that is desired, and

   (3) The air traffic capacity of the air defense system and the maximum altitude permitted under the specified conditions.

b. CAA Regional Administrator(s), consistent with the information received from the CONAD Division Commander, will, to the limit of facilities available, impose any or all of the following conditions on air traffic (an air route traffic control center, with the approval of the CONAD Division Commander, has the prerogative to exempt certain categories of aircraft operations from compliance with one or more of these provisions):

   (1) ADIZ Operations

      (a) Require point-to-point flights entering, departing, or moving within the ADIZ, regardless of altitude, be equipped with functioning two-way radio and to conduct either an IFR operation or a DVFR operation, with the additional requirement that a continuous watch be maintained on an appropriate radio frequency. (Operators of agricultural and industrial aircraft, which normally operate in a localized area, may be exempted through an air route traffic control center from compliance with the two-way radio requirement while moving to a new base of operations.)
(b) Restrict point-to-point air traffic entering or operating within ADIZ's to the capacity of the air defense system.

(c) Require commanders of flights to make such additional position reports as considered essential. Reporting points will be determined by local coordination between the CONAD Division Commanders, other appropriate military commanders, and the FAA Regional Administrators.

(d) Place into effect authentication codes and approach and identification procedures, and designate landing points for aircraft prior to entry into the continental limits of the United States when procedures are established and forwarded by the CINCNAD.

(e) Require DVFR flights to operate below a specified maximum altitude. This maximum altitude will normally be stated as 15,000 feet above terrain.

(2) Defense Area and Open Area Operations

(a) Limit VFR and DVFR point-to-point flights to a maximum altitude. This maximum altitude will normally be stated as 15,000 feet above terrain. (All IFD flights will be identifiable and identified.)

(b) All Areas of Operation

(a) Divert and control air traffic to permit immediate takeoff and employment of military aircraft engaged in immediate tactical operations.

(b) Divert and/or ground flights as soon as possible after diversion and/or grounding instructions are received.

(c) Place into effect plans established in accordance with Executive Order 10512 for control of electronic emissions and/or radiations as directed by the CONAD Division Commander. These restrictions will be enforced except as determined by the CONAD Division Commander who may, under certain conditions, restrict all local nonmilitary air traffic in certain areas, or may increase limits as stated above as allowed by Air Defense requirements. Local flying areas will be designated by the appropriate Regional Administrators after coordination with the CONAD Division Commander, and will encompass the areas normally required for such local operations as flights to and from outlying training fields, crop dusting, and other industrial operations in the local areas. Local military flights will be restricted as provided for in the military directive for the Security Control of Military Aircraft.

(e) Place in effect any other restrictions or limitations on air traffic found necessary to assist the CONAD Division Commander to accomplish the mission. (Any such supplemental restrictions or limitations will be by direction of a CONAD Region Commander or higher authority.)

(c) In the event of an Air Defense Emergency the following emergency rules for the security control of air traffic (short title, Emergency SCAT Rules) shall apply immediately to aircraft operated anywhere in the United States or within the coastal approaches thereto. These rules shall remain in effect for the duration of the Air Defense Emergency unless superseded by revisions to Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics.

(1) General Rules

General. Aircraft shall be operated at all times in compliance with the following general rules and also in compliance with the Additional ADIZ Rules when applicable:

(a) No person shall operate an aircraft unless the aircraft is equipped with an operable radio receiver and a continuous watch is maintained on an appropriate radio frequency to insure receipt of any special security control instructions which may be issued, except that an ARTC center may exempt aircraft operating on point-to-point flights in the United States outside of an ADIZ, or on local flight anywhere in the United States, from compliance with this rule, provided that the flight is-

(1) Confined to altitudes, areas, and time limits prescribed by the appropriate ARTC center.

(2) Conducted in such a manner as to permit visual recall within time limits prescribed by the appropriate ARTC center.

Note: Altitudes, areas, and time limits will be as specified by the appropriate CONAD Division.

(b) No person shall operate an aircraft contrary to security control instructions in effect at time of takeoff or any additional security control instructions issued while the aircraft is airborne.

(c) No person shall operate an aircraft into the continental United States, except from departure points designated by the Administrator, and except in conformity with identification procedures established by the Administrator.

(d) A person shall operate an aircraft in an area of the United States or the coastal approaches thereto in which "Full SCAT" has been implemented unless the flight is in order by or coordinated with the appropriate CONAD Division.

Note: Normally, nonmilitary operations will be coordinated with the appropriate CONAD Division through a CONAD Division. The CONAD Division will effect coordination with other CONAD Divisions as required.

(e) No person shall operate an aircraft in an ADIZ without a security control clearance, if such clearance is required by the appropriate ARTC Center.

(f) Emergency situations. In emergency situations which require immediate decision and action for the safety of the flight, the pilot in command of the aircraft may deviate from the provisions of these rules to the extent required by such emergency. When a deviation is exercised, the pilot in command shall report such deviation to an appropriate aeronautical facility immediately.

NOTE: This report is for security control purposes to determine location of the flight. This report may be in addition to reports required by Civil Air Regulations Part 60.

(g) Radio failure.

(1) IFR flights for which an air traffic clearance is required. Normal IFR procedures will apply.
(2) VFR, DVFR, or IFR flights for which an air traffic clearance is not required. The pilot in command of the aircraft shall land as soon as practicable.

(2) Additional ADIZ Rules
(a) Point-to-point flights. No person shall operate an aircraft into or within an Air Defense Identification Zone on point-to-point flights in violation of the following additional rules:
(1) Flight plan. An appropriate flight plan containing the information required by Part 91, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, shall be filed with an appropriate aeronautical facility.
(2) Radio requirements for DVFR flights. Aircraft shall be equipped with functioning two-way radio.
(3) Routing restrictions. No person shall operate an aircraft into, within, or out of an ADIZ, except in approved corridors if and when such corridors have been established.
(4) Radio communications. (i) IFR operations on an air traffic clearance. Normal reporting procedures will apply.
(ii) DVFR operations and VFR operations for which an air traffic clearance is not required. The pilot in command of the aircraft shall observe that a continuous watch is maintained on the appropriate radio frequency and shall report by radio as soon as possible the time and altitude of passing a reporting point specified for security control purposes prior to entering an ADIZ and every reporting point specified for security control purposes within an ADIZ along the route of flight. Every such position report shall include an estimate over the next specified reporting point within the ADIZ.

(15) Adherence to flight plans or air traffic clearances. The pertinent provisions of Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, will apply.

(16) Local nonmilitary flights. Aircraft shall not be operated on a local military flight into or within an ADIZ, outside of a local flying area designated by the appropriate Regional Administrator, or if no local area has been designated, more than ten (10) miles from the point of takeoff and more than 1,500 feet above the terrain.

(c) Local military flights. Aircraft shall not be operated on a local military flight into or within an ADIZ, outside of the local flying area designated by the appropriate military authority.

(a) An ARTC center may exempt certain aircraft operations from compliance with any or all of these emergency rules. Flights which may be exempted, after approval has been obtained from CONAD Division Commanders, are: (1) local flights, (2) flights wholly within the boundaries of an ADIZ, (3) flights from points within an ADIZ to points outside thereof, (4) flights not currently of significance to the air defense system, or (5) military flights which are conducted in accordance with special procedures prescribed by CONAD Division Commanders. Flights may be exempted individually or by category.

4. Violations
(a) The penalty provisions of Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, will apply. Regardless of the penalty provisions of Part 620, it is imperative that all operators understand the tremendous importance of strict compliance with the provisions of this plan. Compliance lends itself to a higher degree of national security and also self-preservation. Ignorance of these rules could not only cause diversion of much-needed air defense weapons from a hostile threat, but also cause destruction of friendly aircraft. It is primarily for these two specific reasons that these rules are written.

8. Implementing Procedures
In the event of an Air Defense Emergency,
(a) Each CONAD Division will instruct the appropriate CAA ARTC center to accomplish one of the following:
(1) Apply Emergency SCAT Rules. These rules are the continuous restrictions applicable to the movement of civil and nonmilitary aircraft during an Air Defense Emergency. They will be automatically in effect from the original establishment of an Air Defense Emergency, and will remain in effect for the duration of an Air Defense Emergency, regardless of the changing requirements when "Full SCATER" is implemented or terminated.

(2) Implement Full SCATER. This will entail the grounding and/or diversion of air traffic and the shutting down of navigation aids and aeronautical communications. This action will normally be taken when hostile aircraft are en route to the continental United States or have penetrated the air defense system.

(3) Terminate Full SCATER. This will terminate the extreme restrictions imposed under Full SCATER. This action will normally be taken when an attack phase is considered over and the resumption of operations is authorized under the Emergency SCAT Rules.

(4) If ARTC centers are told to "Apply Emergency SCAT Rules," the CONAD Division will include, as necessary—
(a) Routing restrictions on flights entering any portion of an ADIZ within the CONAD Division area
(b) Limitations on air traffic in any portion of an ADIZ within the CONAD Division area to the identification capability of the system.
(c) Altitude limitations on DVFR and VFR operations within the CONAD Division area.
(d) Any other special instructions required by the immediate military situation.

b. CAA Air Route Traffic Control Centers will—
(1) Disseminate over the CAA communications system the instructions received from the CONAD Division.
(2) Apply Emergency SCAT Rules, imposing whatever restrictions are specified by the CONAD Division.

(3) Direct the landing or diversion of nonmilitary air traffic and the shutdown or controlled operations of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications when instructed to "Implement Full SCATER."

(4) Upon receipt of "Terminate Full SCATER," authorize resumption of air traffic in accordance with Emergency SCAT Rules.

C. Civil and military control towers and aeronautical communications stations (including licensees of air navigation radio aids) will—
(1) Maintain the current SCATER ACTION Form for that facility at appropriate operating positions.

(2) Upon receipt of "Implement Full SCATER," "Terminate Full SCATER," or "Apply Emergency SCAT Rules," take the actions indicated on the facility's SCATER ACTION Form.

(3) Comply with any special SCATER instructions issued by the appropriate notifying agency as shown on the SCATER ACTION Form.

a. Federal civil and military aeronautical facilities will participate in such tests.

b. Non-Federal civil aeronautical facilities, including licensees of air navigation radio aids, will be requested to participate in such tests.

to. Communications

Direct communication is authorized between appropriate agencies, and units, for the purpose of coordination and implementation of the procedures outlined herein.

Attachment 1

APPROVED:

C. E. WILSON,
Secretary of Defense.

SINCLAIR WEEKS,
Secretary of Commerce.

DATE: 7 May 1957.
ATTACHMENT I

Consolidated Priority Listing of all Nontactical Military and all Civil Air Traffic

GENERAL

Listings within Category I are of equal priority. Listings within Categories II through V are in order of priority as shown. Aircraft in distress are in a special category and may be assigned any priority at the discretion of the appropriate air defense commander as the seriousness of the tactical situation and the aircraft emergency warrant.

Listings herein are applicable to all aircraft, civil or military, large or small, single or multingine. The mission itself, and not the aircraft or the ownership, determines the priority which is applicable.

I

A. The air transport of military commanders, their representatives, and key civilian personnel which is of utmost importance to the national security, or which will have an immediate effect upon combat operations of the Armed Forces.

B. Flight operations necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the Plan for Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations During an Air Defense Emergency, including flight inspection of air navigation facilities.

C. Flight operations in connection with the activities of Federal, State, or local government agencies whose immediate flight is essential to the defense effort.

D. Transportation to, from, and within disaster areas of personnel, equipment, material, and supplies whose immediate movement by air is essential to the prevention, reduction, or alleviation of the effects of disaster.

E. Flight operations whose immediate flight involves the saving of human life in other than disaster areas, including air sea rescue, hurricane reconnaissance, air evacuation, and the transporting of medical personnel, equipment, and supplies.

F. Evacuation of tactical aircraft (including appropriate Civil Reserve Air Fleet) for their protection.

G. International flights originating overseas that have reached the point of no return.

II

A. The air movement of aircraft, personnel, equipment, and supplies for forces other than those immediately deploying for, in direct support of, or actually engaged in combat operations against the enemy which is essential to the timely accomplishment of assigned missions of vital necessity to the prosecution of the war effort. This includes AIR CARRIER transportation of persons, mail, and cargo essential to the defense effort.

B. Evacuation of nontactical aircraft for their protection.

C. Ferrying of AIR CARRIER flight equipment between operational stations.

D. Administrative flights of vital necessity to the prosecution of the war effort, but not bearing on the immediate conduct of combat operations against the enemy, including transportation of personnel, equipment, material, and supplies, whose expedient movement by this means is essential to the maintenance of sound air carrier operations.

E. Flight operations essential to the development, production, and delivery of equipment, materials and supplies, essential to the defense effort, including transportation of personnel, equipment, material, and supplies whose expedient movement by this means is essential to the above; prospecting activities in connection with mineral or other natural resources, whose development or exploitation is essential to the above.

F. Flight operations essential to the maintenance of facilities for the transmission of light, heat, power, and communications.
III.

A. Operational testing of air carrier aircraft and equipment or flight testing wherein the objective is the testing or development of new or modified equipment. This is applicable only to those organizations responsible for the testing, development, or modification of aircraft systems and equipment. The flight test priority for other than such organizations will be governed by the priority assigned to the type of flying being conducted by those organizations. For example, a flight test for a unit conducting operational training would be of the same priority as the transition or gunnery flights normally conducted by that organization.

B. Flight operations in connection with the maintenance of production of foodstuffs, critical fibers, and essential wood products.

C. Flight operations in connection with the activities of Federal, State, or local government agencies not essential to the defense effort.

D. Operational training flights of a tactical unit, such as transition, formation, gunnery, bombing, reconnaissance, navigation, instrument, and target towing, including ferrying of aircraft for units engaged in operational training.

E. Student training flights, the primary objective of which is the instruction and training of pilots and crews engaged in a formal course of instruction, including flight operations in connection with civil flight training.

F. Ferrying of aircraft for units engaged in student training.

IV.

A. Administrative and logistical flights in support of assigned missions other than those of exceptionally high priority which are in I A., or II B., Categories.

B. Reserve flying training wherein the objective is the training of reservists not on extended active duty.

C. Ferrying of aircraft to and from organizations engaged in reserve flying training.

D. Air evacuation wherein the saving of life or material is not involved.

E. Flight operations in support of the maintenance of the national economy, such as transportation of personnel, materials, equipment, and supplies whose expedient movement by this means is an aid to the development, production, and distribution of civilian goods, supplies, material, equipment or services, essential to the maintenance of the national economy.

V.

A. Ferrying of aircraft not included in paragraphs II A., II C., III F., and IV C., above.

B. Individual training wherein the objective is the attainment or maintenance of flying proficiency as specified by the respective military services, or civil agencies.

C. The transportation of nonpriority persons or goods.

D. All other flight operations not specifically listed above.
Plan for the
SECURITY CONTROL OF AIR TRAFFIC
AND ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATIONS
during an
AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY

SHORT TITLE: SCATER

11 SEPTEMBER 1957

CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION
(CONAD) (CAA)
FOREWORD

This document, known as CONAD/CAA SCATER Plan, consists of the Department of Defense/Department of Commerce SCATER Plan (hereafter referred to as Basic SCATER Plan) signed by the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce on May 7, 1957, and Supplements thereto developed by CONAD and CAA.

Appendices and/or Attachments to these Supplements will be developed and distributed by CONAD Regions and/or Divisions, as prescribed in these Supplements.

This Plan is effective at 0001 Greenwich Time, October 1, 1957, and supersedes the Department of Defense/Department of Commerce SCAT Plan dated July 15, 1952: Air Division (Defense) SCATER Plans, and all other SCATER instructions previously issued.

CAA and CONAD have distributed limited copies of this Plan to appropriate national organizations and commands. The CAA Air Defense Liaison Officer (ADLO) at each CONAD Division will, in collaboration with the Division Commander, distribute additional copies to all facilities, agencies and offices within the CONAD Division area concerned with SCATER actions. The CAA ADLO will also distribute SCATER Actions Forms and SCATER Test Report Forms to appropriate agencies within the CONAD Division area.

Particular attention is invited to the following major changes in the Basic SCATER Plan:

1. The term "Air Defense Emergency" has been substituted for "Military Emergency."
2. Air Defense Warning Conditions "Red", "Yellow" and "White" will no longer be disseminated for the purpose of initiating SCATER actions. Such actions will be effected by specific SCATER instructions to "IMPLEMENT FULL SCATER," "TERMINATE FULL SCATER" or "APPLY EMERGENCY SCATER RULES," as prescribed in the SCATER Actions Form.

3. SCATER Test Instructions have been made an integral part of the Basic SCATER Plan. Simulated Air Defense Warnings "APPLE JACK," "LEMON JUICE," "SNOWMAN," and "FADE OUT" will no longer be employed for such tests. SCATER Test Instructions and reporting procedures are prescribed in the SCATER Actions Form and Supplement V this Plan.

4. Emergency SCATER Rules have been established and are incorporated therein. The degree of application of Emergency SCATER Rules required in each CONAD Regional or Division area, depending upon the tactical situation, will be published by Air Defense Emergency NOTAM.

The importance of SCATER actions that may have to be performed in the event of an Air Defense Emergency cannot be over-emphasized. Therefore, it is incumbent on each supervisor to insure that all personnel under his jurisdiction are thoroughly indoctrinated in and capable of performing all required actions.
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Appendices to be distributed only on an immediate operational-need-to-know basis as prescribed in appropriate Supplement. Recipients should list Appendixes in INDEX above, where appropriate.

UNCLASSIFIED

**EFFECTIVE:** 1 October 1957
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SCATER
CONAD/CAA
Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations During an Air Defense Emergency

Short Title: SCATER

This plan supersedes "Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic During a Military Emergency" approved by the Secretary of Commerce and U.S. Department of Defense July 15, 1952.

Foreword

This "Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations During an Air Defense Emergency" has been prepared jointly by Headquarters, United States Air Force, and the Civil Aeronautics Administration in cooperation with the Civil Aeronautics Board and Department of the Navy. In the preparation of this plan, the suggestions, recommendations, and opinions submitted by representatives of the interested aviation organizations have been utilized to the maximum extent possible consistent with the capabilities of the defending forces to accomplish their assigned mission. In addition to the foregoing, maximum consideration has been given to the acknowledged contribution of nonmilitary aviation to the overall defense effort.

The development of this plan does not indicate the existence of an Air Defense Emergency nor does it forecast the probability of such an emergency. Therefore, it is imperative that all agencies involved in preparing for or undertaking the implementation of any part of this plan assure that their activities are not construed by the general public as cause for alarm or conjecture.

This plan establishes the individual responsibilities of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics and the appropriate military authorities for the security control of civil and nontactical military air traffic, and air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications (civil and military) during an Air Defense Emergency. This plan applies to all United States areas; however, it may be modified by the responsible commanders of overseas commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet their specific requirements. For purposes of clarity, the language of this plan refers to the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD), and his subordinate echelons as the appropriate military authority.

Maximum utilization of aircraft under this plan will be accomplished in the following manner:
1. Limiting restrictions on air traffic to the absolute minimum consistent with the dictates of currently evaluated military intelligence.
2. Incorporating specific provisions for orderly processing of friendly air traffic. (Under certain conditions, portions of the air defense system might become saturated because of the quantity of flight activity, friendly and hostile. These circumstances, if permitted to exist, would dictate that a large portion of air defense capabilities be absorbed in distinguishing between friendly nontactical and hostile flights. To preclude this ineffective utilization of available forces, special provisions have been included for the orderly processing of friendly operations.)

From the suggestions and recommendations submitted by representatives of the civil aviation industry and military authorities a rating system based on the purpose of flight and communications capabilities has been developed for civil and nontactical military aviation. (See attachment 1.)

This rating system will be utilized for the purpose of providing maximum operations and establishing priority for such operations when system capacity is reached.

In implementing this plan, it must be realized that routine arrangements for local types of flight activities (training, crop dusting, etc.) will generally be accomplished through the CAA Regional Organization.

The CAA will solicit the cooperation of State aviation agencies and local airport authorities in processing a request for such flight activities. Requests for special consideration will be submitted to the appropriate regional facility or office of the CAA for processing through established military and civil channels.

Execution of this plan will require certain immediate implementing actions by the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, and the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics prior to an actual Air Defense Emergency. In view thereof, such actions which have been taken, in accordance with existing plans, will be subject to immediate review and/or modification.

The Plan

1. Definitions

For the purpose of this plan, the following definitions apply:

a. Air Defense Emergency. A condition called by CINCONAD when his evaluation indicates that hostile action is in progress or is imminent, or is suffi-
ciently probable as to require in the interest of national security the nationwide and continuing implementation of emergency air defense measures.

b. Air Defense Warning Conditions.

1. Warning Red—When hostile aircraft (includes missiles) are within a CONAD Division area or are in the immediate vicinity of a CONAD Division area with a high probability of entering the area.

2. Warning Yellow—When hostile aircraft (includes missiles) are en route toward a CONAD Division area, or unknown aircraft suspected to be hostile are en route to, or are within a CONAD Division area.

3. Warning White—When during a state of Air Defense Emergency an attack by hostile aircraft (includes missiles) is not considered immediately probable or imminent.

c. Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) Region. A major geographical subdivision of the continental United States which delineates the area of air defense responsibility of a CONAD Region Commander. (Example: WESTERN CONAD REGION).

d. CONAD Division. A geographical subdivision of a CONAD Region and those CONAD Forces within the Division area.

e. Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The airspace of defined dimensions designated by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics within which the ready identification, location, and control of aircraft is required in the interest of national security.

f. CAA Region. Area of responsibility of a CAA Regional Administrator.

g. Security Control of Air Traffic. Includes recognizing, requiring identification procedures, directing, diverting, restricting, prohibiting, or grounding of civil and nontactical military air traffic in the interest of national security.

h. SCATER. The short title for the joint Commerce-Defense Department plan for the security control of air traffic and the control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications.

1. SCAT. The short title for the security control of air traffic. Current SCAT Rules are included in Part 620. Regulations of the Administrator. Emergency SCAT Rules are included in this plan.

2. CONERAD. The short title for the program for the control of electromagnetic radiations. However, the control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications is included in this plan.

b. Tactical Air Traffic. Military flights actually engaged in operational missions against the enemy, flights engaged in immediate deployment for a combat mission, and preplanned combat and logistical support flights contained in Emergency War Plans.

c. Nontactical Military Air Traffic. Military flights other than tactical air traffic, such as administrative, logistical, and training.

d. Defense Area. Airspace of defined dimensions designated by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics within which the ready control of aircraft is required in the interest of national security during an Air Defense Emergency.

3. Open Area. An area within the continental United States not designated as an ADIZ or Defense Area.

4. United States. The several States, the District of Columbia, and the several Territories and possessions of the United States (including areas of land or water administered by the United States under international agreement), including the Territorial waters and the overlying airspace thereof.


2. Purpose

The purpose of this plan is to establish responsibilities, procedures, and general instructions for the security control of civil and nontactical military air traffic, air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications during an Air Defense Emergency which will provide maximum utilization of aircraft by military and civil agencies engaged in essential operations.

3. Authority

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff directives which outline the United States Air Force responsibilities for the development of plans and policies in concert with the CAA for the establishment of a system for identification and security control of air traffic within the continental United States.

b. Public Law 778, 81st Congress, which authorizes the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Secretary of Commerce to undertake security measures relating to the regulation and control of air commerce, and for other purposes.

c. Notice published by the Secretary of Commerce on January 4, 1951, in 16 F. R. 99 delegating to the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics authority with respect to security control of air traffic (Public Law 778).

d. Executive Order 10312, December 10, 1951, which provides for emergency control over certain Government and non-Government facilities engaged in radio communications or radio transmission.

e. Subpart 9. Rules of Federal Communications Commission, concerning the alerting and operation of all radio stations in the aviation services.

4. Scope

This plan prescribes the joint action to be taken during an Air Defense Emergency by appropriate military authorities and the CAA:

a. To effect security control of civil and nontactical military aircraft entering, departing, or moving within the United States and the coastal approaches thereto and

b. To effect control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications as may be required.

5. General Provisions

a. Efficient security control of air traffic will be achieved by effective air surveillance, the identification and recognition of aircraft, the air discipline of combat air units engaged in the interception and destruction of enemy airborne weapons, the close coordination between military and civil agencies and the cooperation of all airspace users.

b. In carrying out assigned missions, the CONAD Division Commander will, based on the requirements of the existing military situation, direct the extent of security control of civil and military aircraft other than those engaged in tactical operations and the
control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications.

c. This plan is not applicable to military aircraft engaged in tactical operations with the exception that CONAD Division Commanders may advise and recommend rerouting of tactical air traffic for short distances to circumnavigate a battle or threatened area during an Air Defense Emergency. Tactical operations will be coordinated with the CONAD Division Commander(s) concerned so as not to delay combat operations.

d. Under certain conditions of alert, in specific areas, the CONAD Division Commander may require a security control clearance for civil and non-tactical military aircraft prior to takeoff. Such security control clearance is different from and not to be confused with an operational or air traffic clearance. It will serve normally to ensure that the pilot is informed of the current condition of alert and that his operation is of sufficient priority if any capacity restrictions are in effect.

e. Minimum interference to normal air traffic will be planned consistent with the requirements for effective operation of the air defense system.

f. The CONAD Division Commanders, in collaboration with the Civil Aeronautics Administration Regional Administrators, will supplement this plan, as required, with agreements to provide less restrictions for special non-tactical military and civil air traffic operations within CONAD Division areas. In developing these agreements, they will take into consideration the peculiar requirements of organized civil defense and disaster relief flights, agricultural and forest-fire patrol flight operation, and other essential civil air operations to the extent that maximum utilization of these aircraft, consistent with air defense requirements, will be made. With respect to civil aviation, these supplemental agreements will be made through the CAA Regional Administrators.

b. Responsibilities

a. The Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, will—
   (1) Develop and recommend military regulations which contain rules and procedures to implement this plan.
   (2) Coordinate with the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics regarding the institution of procedures for accomplishment of SCATER.
   (3) Establish the military requirements for SCATER in designated areas dependent upon the existing military requirements.
   (4) Issue amended directives or instructions for SCATER when the military situation permits relaxation of existing controls.

b. The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics will—
   (1) Promulgate the necessary civil regulations to implement this plan.
   (2) Coordinate with the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, prior to the establishment of procedures for SCATER.
   (3) Administer SCATER in accordance with requirements established by the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command.
   (4) Advise the civil aviation industry of the requirements for SCATER.

c. The CONAD Division Commanders will—
   (1) Direct the control of all air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications facilities in their areas, as required. (This will normally be accomplished through CAA.)
   (2) Issue security control instructions to appropriate CAA agencies as necessary to insure efficient performance of the air defense mission.
   (3) Maintain liaison with appropriate CAA Regional Administrators.
   (4) Conduct tests of SCATER in collaboration with the CAA.
   (5) Collaborate with the CAA Regional Administrators in making supplemental agreements to this plan.

d. The CAA Regional Administrators will—
   (1) Participate with the CONAD Division Commanders in the development of procedures for the implementing and testing of SCATER in the CONAD Division areas.
   (2) Insure proper dissemination of SCATER instructions to civil and military aeronautical facilities (including aircraft, airport operators, and State traffic systems) within their areas of responsibility.
   (3) Place in effect SCATER procedures in accordance with requirements established by the CONAD Division Commanders.
   (4) Maintain liaison with the appropriate CONAD Division Commanders.
   (5) Assist the CONAD Division Commanders in making supplemental agreements to this plan.

7. Air Defense Emergency Actions

In an Air Defense Emergency, the following actions will be taken with respect to the CONAD Division area:

a. The CONAD Division Commander, dependent upon the situation in his area, will notify the appropriate CAA Regional Administrator(s) (this will normally be done by direct contact between the CONAD Division Control Center and the appropriate air route traffic control centers):
   (1) That a state of Air Defense Emergency exists, and the current condition of Air Defense Warning;
   (2) The extent of implementation of this plan that is desired; and
   (3) The air traffic capacity of the air defense system and the maximum altitude permitted under the specified conditions.

b. CAA Regional Administrator(s), consistent with the information received from the CONAD Division Commander, will, to the limit of facilities available, impose any or all of the following conditions on air traffic in an air route traffic control center, with the approval of the CONAD Division Commander, has the prerogative to exempt certain categories of aircraft operations from compliance with one or more of these provisions:
   (1) ADIZ Operations
      (a) Require point-to-point flights entering, departing, or moving within the ADIZ, regardless of altitude, be equipped with functioning two-way radio and to conduct either an IFR operation or a DVFR operation, with the additional requirement that a continuous watch be maintained on an appropriate radio frequency. (Operators of agricultural and industrial aircraft, which normally operate in a localized area, may be exempted through an air route traffic control center from compliance with the two-way radio requirement while moving to a new base of operations.)
(b) Restrict point-to-point air traffic entering or operating within ADIZ's to the capacity of the air defense system.

(e) Require commanders of flights to make such additional position reports as considered essential. Reporting points will be determined by local coordination between the CONAD Division Commanders, other appropriate military commanders, and the CAA Regional Administrators.

(d) Place into effect authentication codes and approach and identification procedures, and designate landing airports for aircraft prior to entry into the continental limits of the United States when procedures are established and forwarded by the CINCONAD.

(e) Require DVFR flights to operate below a specified maximum altitude. This maximum altitude will normally be stated as 15,000 feet above terrain.

(2) Defense Area and Open Area Operations

(a) Limit VFR and DVFR point-to-point flights to a maximum altitude. This maximum altitude will normally be stated as 15,000 feet above terrain. All IFR flights will be identifiable and identified.

(3) All Areas of Operation

(a) Divert and control air traffic to permit immediate takeoff and employment of military aircraft engaged in immediate tactical operations.

(b) Divert and or ground flights as soon as possible after diversion and or grounding instructions are received.

(c) Place into effect plans established in accordance with Executive Order 10832 for control of electronic emissions and or radiations as directed by the CONAD Division Commander.

(d) Local Operations—Restrict all local nonmilitary air traffic to designated local area, or, if no local area has been designated for such flights, to within ten (10) miles to takeoff point and to an altitude of not more than 3,000 feet above the terrain. Such flights will be conducted in a manner as to permit ready recall within time limits prescribed by the CONAD Division Commander. These restrictions will be enforced except as determined by the CONAD Division Commander who may, under certain conditions, restrict all local nonmilitary traffic in certain areas, or may increase limits as stated above as allowed by Air Defense requirements. Local flying areas will be designated by the appropriate Regional Administrators after coordination with the CONAD Division Commander, and will encompass the areas normally required for such local operations as flights to and from outlying training fields, crop dusting, and other industrial operations in the local areas. Local military flights will be restricted as provided for in the military directive for the Security Control of Military Aircraft.

(e) Place in effect any other restrictions or limitations on air traffic to assist the CONAD Division Commander to accomplish his mission. (Any such supplemental restrictions or limitations will be by direction of a CONAD Region Commander or higher authority.)

In the event of an Air Defense Emergency the following emergency rules for the security control of air traffic (short title, Emergency SCAT Rules) shall apply immediately to aircraft operated anywhere in the United States or within the coastal approaches thereto. These rules shall remain in effect for the duration of the Air Defense Emergency unless superseded by revisions to Part 609, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics.

(1) General Rules

General. Aircraft shall be operated at all times in compliance with the following general rules and also in compliance with the Additional ADIZ Rules when applicable:

(a) No person shall operate an aircraft unless the aircraft is equipped with an operable radio receiver and a continuous watch is maintained on an appropriate radio frequency to insure receipt of any special security control instructions which may be issued, except that an ARTC center may exempt aircraft operated on point-to-point flights in the United States outside of an ADIZ, or on local flight anywhere in the United States, from compliance with this rule, provided that the flight is—

(1) Confined to altitudes, areas, and time limits prescribed by the appropriate ARTC center, or

(2) Conducted in such a manner as to permit visual recall within time limits prescribed by the appropriate ARTC center.

Note: Altitudes, areas, and time limits will be as specified by the appropriate CONAD Division.

(b) No person shall operate an aircraft contrary to security control instructions in effect at time of takeoff or any additional security control instructions issued while the aircraft is airborne.

(c) No person shall operate an aircraft into the continental United States, except from departure points designated by the Administrator, and except in conformity with identification procedures established by the Administrator.

(d) No person shall operate an aircraft in an area of the United States or the coastal approaches thereto in which "Full SCATER" has been implemented unless the flight is ordered by or coordinated with the appropriate CONAD Division.

Note: Normally, non-tactical operations will be coordinated with the appropriate CONAD Division through a CAA air route traffic control center. The CONAD Division will effect coordination with other CONAD Divisions as required.

(e) No person shall operate an aircraft in an ADIZ without a security control clearance, if such clearance is required by the appropriate ARTC center.

(f) Emergency situations. In emergency situations which require immediate decision and action for the safety of the flight, the pilot in command of the aircraft may deviate from the provisions of these rules to the extent required for such emergency. When a deviation is exercised, the pilot in command shall report such deviation to an appropriate aeronautical facility immediately.

Note: This report is for security control purposes to determine location of the flight. This report may be in addition to reports required by Civil Air Regulations Part 60.

(g) Radio failure.

(1) IFR flights for which an air traffic clearance is required. Normal IFR procedures will apply.
(2) VFR, DVFR, or IFR flights for which an air traffic clearance is not required. The pilot in command of the aircraft shall land as soon as practicable.

(2) Additional ADIZ Rules
(a) Point-to-point flights. No person shall operate an aircraft into or within an Air Defense Identification Zone on point-to-point flights in violation of the following additional rules:

(i) Flight plan. An appropriate flight plan containing the information required by Part 60, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, shall be filed with an appropriate aeronautical facility.

(ii) Radio requirements for DVFR flights. Aircraft shall be equipped with functioning two-way radio.

(iii) Routing restrictions. No person shall operate an aircraft into, within, or out of an ADIZ, except in approved corridors if and when such corridors have been established.

(iv) Radio communications. Normal reporting procedures will apply.

(v) DVFR and IFR operations for which air traffic clearance is not required. The pilot in command of the aircraft shall report the continuous watch is maintained on the appropriate radio frequency and shall report by radio as soon as possible the time and altitude of passing a reporting point specified for security control purposes prior to entering an ADIZ and every reporting point specified for security control purposes within an ADIZ along the route of flight. Every such position report shall include an estimate over the next specified reporting point within the ADIZ.

(b) Local nonmilitary flights. Aircraft shall not be operated on a local nonmilitary flight into or within an ADIZ, outside of a local flying area designated by the appropriate Regional Administrator, or if no local area has been designated, more than ten miles from the point of takeoff and more than 1,500 feet above the terrain.

(c) Local military flights. Aircraft shall not be operated on a local military flight into or within an ADIZ, outside of the local flying area designated by the appropriate military authority.

(3) Exceptions
(a) An ARTC center may exempt certain aircraft operations from compliance with any or all of these emergency rules. Flights which may be exempted, after approval has been obtained from CONAD Division Commanders are: (1) local flights, (2) flights wholly within the boundaries of an ADIZ, (3) flights from points within an ADIZ to points outside, (3) flights not currently of significance to the air defense system, or (4) military flights which are conducted in accordance with special procedures prescribed by CONAD Division Commanders.

(b) Civil and military control towers and aeronautical communications stations (including licensees of air navigation radio aids) will stand the tremendous importance of strict compliance with the provisions of this plan. Compliance lends itself to a higher degree of national security and also self-preservation. Ignorance of those rules could not only cause diversion of much-needed air defense weapons from a hostile threat, but also could cause destruction of friendly aircraft. It is primarily for these two specific reasons that these rules are written.

8. Implementing Procedures
In the event of an Air Defense Emergency:
(a) Each CONAD Division will instruct the appropriate CAA ARTC center to accomplish one of the following:

(1) Apply Emergency SCAT Rules. These rules are the continuous restrictions applicable to the movement of civil and nontactical military aircraft during an Air Defense Emergency. They will be automatically in effect from the original establishment of an Air Defense Emergency, and will remain in effect for the duration of an Air Defense Emergency, regardless of the changing requirements when “Full SCATER” is implemented or terminated.

(2) Implement Full SCATER. This will entail the grounding and/or diversion of air traffic and the shutting down of navigation aids and aeronautical communications. This action will normally be taken when hostile aircraft are en route to the continental United States or have penetrated the air defense system.

(b) CAA Air Route Traffic Control Centers will—

(1) Disseminate over the CAA communications systems the instructions received from the CONAD Division.

(2) Apply Emergency SCAT Rules, imposing whatever restrictions are specified by the CONAD Division.

(3) Direct the landing or diversion of nontactical aircraft and the shutdown or controlled operation of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications when instructed to “Implement Full SCATER.”

(4) Upon receipt of “Terminate Full SCATER,” authorize resumption of air traffic in accordance with Emergency SCAT Rules.

b. Each CONAD Division will instruct the appropriate CAA ARTC center to accomplish one of the following:

(1) Apply Emergency SCAT Rules. These rules are the continuous restrictions applicable to the movement of civil and nontactical military aircraft during an Air Defense Emergency. They will be automatically in effect from the original establishment of an Air Defense Emergency, and will remain in effect for the duration of an Air Defense Emergency, regardless of the changing requirements when “Full SCATER” is implemented or terminated.

(2) Implement Full SCATER. This will entail the grounding and/or diversion of air traffic and the shutting down of navigation aids and aeronautical communications. This action will normally be taken when hostile aircraft are en route to the continental United States or have penetrated the air defense system.

(b) CAA Air Route Traffic Control Centers will—

(1) Disseminate over the CAA communications systems the instructions received from the CONAD Division.

(2) Apply Emergency SCAT Rules, imposing whatever restrictions are specified by the CONAD Division.

(3) Direct the landing or diversion of nontactical aircraft and the shutdown or controlled operation of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications when instructed to “Implement Full SCATER.”

(4) Upon receipt of “Terminate Full SCATER,” authorize resumption of air traffic in accordance with Emergency SCAT Rules.
(1) Maintain the current SCATER ACTION Form for that facility at appropriate operating positions.

(2) Upon receipt of "Implement Full SCATER," "Terminate Full SCATER," or "Apply Emergency SCAT Rules," take the actions indicated on the facility’s SCATER ACTION Form.

(3) Comply with any special SCATER instructions issued by the appropriate notifying agency as shown on the SCATER ACTION Form.

(4) It is desired that the several States participate in SCATER by disseminating SCATER instructions to airports and other aeronautical facilities not served by the CAA communications system.

9. Testing Procedures

To ensure that implementing actions can be taken expediently, SCATER Tests will be conducted periodically in accordance with procedures developed by CONAD and CAA.

a. Federal civil and military aeronautical facilities will participate in such tests.

b. Non-Federal civil aeronautical facilities, including licensees of air navigation radio aids, will be requested to participate in such tests.

10. Communications

Direct communication is authorized between appropriate agencies and units, for the purpose of coordination and implementation of the procedures outlined herein.

Attachment 1

APPROVED:

C. E. WILSON,
Secretary of Defense.

SINCLAIR WEEKS,
Secretary of Commerce.

DATE: 7 May 1957.
ATTACHMENT 1

Consolidated Priority Listing of all Nontactical Military and all Civil Air Traffic

GENERAL

Listings within Category I are of equal priority. Listings within Categories II through V are in order of priority as shown. Aircraft in distress are in a special category and may be assigned any priority at the discretion of the appropriate air defense commander as the seriousness of the tactical situation and the aircraft emergency warrant.

Listings herein are applicable to all aircraft, civil or military, large or small, single or multi-engine. The mission itself, and not the aircraft or the ownership, determines the priority which is applicable.

I

A. The air transport of military commanders, their representatives, and key civilian personnel which is of utmost importance to the national security, or which will have an immediate effect upon combat operations of the Armed Forces.

B. Flight operations necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the Plan for Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations During an Air Defense Emergency, including flight inspection of air navigation facilities.

C. Flight operations in connection with the activities of Federal, State, or local government agencies whose immediate flight is essential to the defense effort.

D. Transportation to, from, and within disaster areas of personnel, equipment, material, and supplies whose immediate movement by air is essential to the prevention, reduction, or alleviation of the effects of disaster.

E. Flight operations whose immediate flight involves the saving of human life in other than disaster areas, including air/sea rescue, hurricane reconnaissance, air evacuation, and the transporting of medical personnel, equipment, and supplies.

F. Evacuation of tactical aircraft (including appropriate Civil Reserve Air Fleet) for their protection.

G. International flights originating overseas that have reached the point of no return.

II

A. The air movement of aircraft, personnel, equipment, and supplies for forces other than those immediately deploying for, in direct support of, or actually engaged in combat operations against the enemy which is essential to the timely accomplishment of assigned missions of vital necessity to the prosecution of the war effort. This includes AIR CARRIER transportation of persons, mail, and cargo essential to the defense effort.

B. Evacuation of nontactical aircraft for their protection.

C. Ferrying of AIR CARRIER flight equipment between operational stations.

D. Administrative flights of vital necessity to the prosecution of the war effort, but not bearing on the immediate conduct of combat operations against the enemy, including transportation of personnel, equipment, material, and supplies, whose expedient movement by this means is essential to the maintenance of sound air carrier operations.

E. Flight operations essential to the development, production, and delivery of equipment, materials, and supplies, essential to the defense effort, including transportation of personnel, equipment, material, and supplies whose expeditive movement by this means is essential to the above, prospecting activities in connection with mineral or other natural resources, whose development or exploitation is essential to the above.

F. Flight operations essential to the maintenance of facilities for the transmission of light, heat, power, and communications.
III.

A. Operational testing of air carrier aircraft and equipment or flight testing wherein the objective is the testing or development of new or modified equipment. This is applicable only to those organizations responsible for the testing, development, or modification of aircraft systems and equipment. The flight test priority for other than such organizations will be governed by the priority assigned to the type of flying being conducted by those organizations. For example, a flight test for a unit conducting operational training would be of the same priority as the transition or Gunnery flights normally conducted by that organization.

B. Flight operations in connection with the maintenance of production of foodstuffs, critical fibers, and essential wood products.

C. Flight operations in connection with the activities of Federal, State, or local government agencies not essential to the defense effort.

D. Operational training flights of a tactical unit, such as transition, formation, Gunnery, bombing, reconnaissance, navigation, instrument, and target towing, including ferrying of aircraft for units engaged in operational training.

E. Student training flights, the primary objective of which is the instruction and training of pilots and crews engaged in a formal course of instruction, including flight operations in connection with civil flight training.

F. Ferrying of aircraft for units engaged in student training.

IV.

A. Administrative and logistical flights in support of assigned missions other than those of exceptionally high priority which are in I A., or II D., Categories.

B. Reserve flying training wherein the objective is the training of reservists not on extended active duty.

C. Ferrying of aircraft to and from organizations engaged in reserve flying training.

D. Air evacuation wherein the saving of life or material is not involved.

E. Flight operations in support of the maintenance of the national economy, such as transportation of personnel, materials, equipment, and supplies whose expedient movement by this means is an aid to the development, production, and distribution of civilian goods, supplies, material, equipment or services, essential to the maintenance of the national economy.

V.

A. Ferrying of aircraft not included in paragraphs II A., II C., III F., and IV C., above.

B. Individual training wherein the objective is the attainment or maintenance of flying proficiency as specified by the respective military services, or civil agencies.

C. The transportation of nonpriority persons or goods.

D. All other flight operations not specifically listed above.
MOVEMENT OF PRIORITY CIVIL AND NON-TACTICAL MILITARY AIR TRAFFIC

WHEN FULL SCATER HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED

1. General.

   a. Civil or military agencies having a known requirement of sufficient importance to operate aircraft when Full SCATER has been implemented may obtain prior approval from the appropriate CONAD Division Commander. Prior approval will be granted, insofar as practicable, for pre-planned operations essential to the immediate protection of personnel, property and national resources such as bomb damage assessment; ground traffic control; urgently needed medical supplies and equipment; forest fire, pipe line and other national resources patrols; border patrols, etc. The requests for prior approval of such pre-planned operations, containing details of operations, should be forwarded through normal military channels, State Civil Defense Directors, State Directors of Aeronautics, or other governmental agencies, as appropriate, to the CONAD Division Commander for consideration.

   b. Other priority civil and non-tactical military flights, such as hurricane evacuation; evacuation of key personnel; airlifting of supplies and equipment; evacuating of transport fleets from probable target areas, etc., may be approved by the CONAD Division Commander if the immediate air defense situation permits. Requests for such approval will be by filing appropriate flight plan, including the purpose of operations and appropriate priority category as prescribed in Attachment I, SCATER, with the ARTC Center controlling the airport of departure.

   c. Approval of civil and non-tactical military flights will generally be limited to VFR operations at minimum safe altitudes above the terrain, so as to provide maximum identification. Navigation aids will not normally be available for such movements. In addition, flights will be conducted at pilot's discretion, as there can be no assurance that aircraft will not be inadvertently subject to anti-aircraft and/or airborne defense fire.

   d. Where nationwide standardization of prior approved movements is possible, appendices are prepared as CONAD/CAA Appendices. Prior approved movements of a more localized nature will be published as CONAD REGION or CONAD DIVISION Appendices, as appropriate.

2. Distribution. Appendices to this Supplement will be distributed only to the agency involved and to the air defense and air traffic control facilities/offices concerned.

UNCLASSIFIED

EFFECTIVE: 1 October 1957
1. General.

   a. Prior approval is hereby granted to the Assistant Regional Commissioner for Enforcement, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, having areas within the CONAD Regions for the movement of U.S. Border Patrol aircraft when full SCATER has been implemented, with the following understanding:

      (1) This approval is limited to flights necessary for:

         (a) Air surveillance of that portion of the U.S. Border within the CONAD Regions CONAD Divisions.

         (b) Apprehending aliens, saboteurs and/or enemy agents, including occupants of downed enemy aircraft.

         (c) Assisting the military forces in the rescue of occupants of downed friendly aircraft.

      (2) Flights will be made only upon direction of the appropriate Assistant Regional Commissioner for Enforcement.

      (3) Aircraft so used will bear appropriate U.S. Border Patrol markings for visual identification, and be equipped with a functioning two-way radio.

      (4) All movements will be conducted in accordance with VFR, and at an altitude of not more than 1000 feet above the terrain.

      (5) Navaids will not be made available for these operations.

      (6) Flight plans will be filed prior to departure. The aircraft identification will be prefixed with "U.S. Border Patrol," and estimated elapsed time to specific geographical points (towns, etc.) approximately every fifty (50) nautical miles along the route of flight will be specified in the "Remarks." Where operations are conducted from locations not served by an aeronautical facility, flight plan will be filed by telephone with the nearest CAA aeronautical facility. In such cases, departure must be made within five (5) minutes of the filed proposed departure, and the actual departure time reported to the CAA aeronautical facility as soon as air/ground communications can be established. Flight plans will be cancelled.
with the aeronautical facility serving the airport of landing
or, if there is no aeronautical facility, with the nearest CAA
facility by radio immediately prior to landing, or by telephone
immediately after landing.

(7) Flights will be conducted at pilot's discretion, as there can be
no assurance that aircraft will not be inadvertently subject to
defense fire.

(8) For the purpose of receiving recall or other instructions from ADC
radar or CAA facilities, aircraft will monitor on 121.5-meg., and
will maintain communications with U.S. Border Patrol mobile and
fixed ground units. In the event of radio failure, aircraft will
be landed at the nearest available airport.

(9) Deviations of more than five (5) nautical miles on either side of
the route of flight and/or more than five (5) minutes in elapsed
time to a geographical point specified in the flight plan will
require flight plan amendment.

(10) Position reports and other identifying information will be provided
only when requested by a CAA aeronautical facility or air defense
radar.

(11) Aircraft will assist and/or provide information, within operational
limitations, pertinent to paragraphs (1) (b) and (c) above, when
requested by air defense radar or CAA aeronautical facility.

(12) Prior approved operations may be suspended within a CONAD Division
area by the CONAD Division Commanders when required by the imme-
diate air defense situation. This will be accomplished by noti-
fying the appropriate Assistant Regional Commissioner for Enforce-
ment, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Burlington,
Vermont (Northeastern Region); Richmond, Virginia (Southeastern
Region); St. Paul, Minnesota (Northwestern Region); and/or San
Pedro, California (Southwestern Region), through the CAA tower at
designated places, that: "PRIOR APPROVED BORDER PATROL OPERATIONS
WITHIN CONAD DIVISION AREA ARE SUSPENDED UNTIL FURTHER ADVISE.
" Upon receipt of this notification, appropriate Assistant Regional
Commissioners for Enforcement will direct airborne aircraft to
land immediately at the nearest available airport. This approval
can subsequently be reinstated by the CONAD Division notifying
the Assistant Regional Commissioner(s) concerned that: "PRIOR APPROVED
BORDER PATROL OPERATIONS WITHIN CONAD DIVISION AREA MAY BE RESUMED."
The Assistant Regional Commissioners for Enforcement will provide appropriate CAA Control Tower at Burlington, Vermont; Richmond, Virginia and St. Paul, Minnesota with a current list of persons or persons and appropriate telephone numbers for forwarding the notification specified in (12) above. The Assistant Regional Commissioners for Enforcement at San Pedro, California, will provide the Long Beach, California CAA Control Tower, the nearest CAA facility, with similar information.

(14). This approval does not constitute authority to operate aircraft contrary to applicable Civil Air Regulations.

b. Request for approval of required movements not listed in 1a(1) above, or when this approval has been suspended, will be as prescribed in paragraph 1b, Supplement II.

c. All concerned are to be notified by a copy of this Appendix, as specified in 2 below, that flights authorized by this approval may be required to operate as prescribed herein.

2. Distribution.

a. Two (2) copies of this Appendix to each air defense and air traffic control facility/office within the CONAD Division area.

b. Assistant Regional Commissioners for Enforcement may effect reproduction and distribution to other Immigration and Naturalization Service Offices, as required.
1. General.

   a. Prior approval is hereby granted to Directors of Civil Defense of those states having areas lying within the CONAD Regions and CONAD Division Area for the movement of a sufficient number of aircraft when Full SCATER has been implemented to fulfill pre-planned operations essential to the immediate protection of personnel, property and national resources, with the following understanding:

   (1) This approval is limited to flights necessary to fulfill immediate requirements for bomb damage assessment; ground traffic control; fire detection and control; forest, pipe line and other national resources patrols; airlifting of urgently needed medical supplies and equipment, and the emergency evacuation of civil defense aircraft to avoid radio-active fall-out.

   (2) Flights will be made only upon direction of a responsible Civil Defense official.

   (3) Aircraft so used will be equipped with a functioning two-way radio.

   (4) All movements will be conducted in accordance with VFR, and at an altitude of not more than 1000 feet above the immediate terrain.

   (5) NavAide will not be made available for these operations.

   (6) A continuous listening watch will be maintained on the assigned Civil Defense frequency. In the event of radio failure, aircraft will be landed immediately at the nearest available airport.

   (7) Flights will be conducted at pilot's discretion, as there can be no assurance that aircraft will not be inadvertently subject to defense fires.

   (8) To preclude congestion of communications and other facilities essential to the immediate air defense requirements, flight plan and position reports will not be filed unless specifically requested by the CONAD Division Commander.
Prior approved operations may be suspended within a CONAD Division Area by the CONAD Division Commander when required by the immediate air defense situation. This will be accomplished by notifying the appropriate State Director(s) of Civil Defense that "PRIOR APPROVED CIVIL DEFENSE OPERATIONS WITHIN CONAD DIVISION AREA ARE SUSPENDED UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED."

Upon receipt of such notification, appropriate Civil Defense officials will direct airborne aircraft in the Defense Area concerned to land immediately at the nearest available airport. This approval may subsequently be reinstated by the CONAD Division notifying the State Director(s) of Civil Defense concerned that "PRIOR APPROVED CIVIL DEFENSE OPERATIONS WITHIN CONAD DIVISION AREA MAY BE RESUMED."

This approval does not constitute authority to operate aircraft contrary to applicable Civil Air Regulations.

b. Request for approval of required movements not granted herein or when this approval has been suspended will be as prescribed in paragraph 1b, Supplement II.

c. All concerned are to be notified by a copy of this Appendix, as specified in 2 below, that these flights authorized by this approval may be expected to operate without further notification.

2. Distribution.

a. Two (2) copies of this Appendix to each air defense and air traffic control facility/office, State Director of Civil Defense and State Director of Aeronautics within the CONAD Division Area.

b. State Directors of Civil Defense may effect reproduction and distribution to other Civil Defense offices, as may be required.
1. The Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD), may establish the requirement for corridors and reporting points to be used by approved air traffic to enter the United States or designated areas within the United States when Emergency SCAT Rules are in effect. The description and requirements of any such corridors and reporting points established within the CONAD Regions will be issued by NOTAM, and specific operating instructions for air defense and air traffic control personnel will be published by CONAD Region Appendices to this Supplement.

2. Distribution. Appendixes to this Supplement will be distributed only to air defense and air traffic control facilities/offices within the CONAD Division Area.
SCATR
CONAD/CAA
SUPPLEMENT IV

LOCAL OPERATIONS

1. General.
   a. When Emergency SCAT Rules are in effect and Full SCATR has not been implemented, local air traffic will be confined to the following local operating areas:

      (1) Civil Operations. Ten (10) nautical mile radius of the take-off point and to an altitude of not more than 1500 feet above the terrain, unless a larger local area has been approved, as prescribed in 1.c below.

      (2) Military Operations. An area designated by the Military Base Commander after coordination with the appropriate CONAD Division Commander.

   b. Local operations will not be conducted when Full SCATR has been implemented.

   c. Where normal local operations cannot be accomplished within an area as defined in 1.a above, a larger local area may be designated by the appropriate CAA Regional Administrator, after coordination with the CONAD Division Commander concerned. Request for larger local operating areas must include the details of operation and area required. Where the operations to be conducted will not permit maintaining a continuous listening watch on an appropriate aeronautical frequency, or involve aircraft not equipped with at least a functioning radio receiver, a visual signal for the recall of aircraft in the event Full SCATR is implemented must be available.

   d. Airport Managers and Military Base Commanders are requested to post a description of the designated local area and, where applicable, location and function of the visual recall signal at conspicuous locations.

   e. A description of military local operating areas as specified in 1a(2) above, and civil local areas designated as specified in 1c above, within each CONAD Division Area will be listed in CONAD Division Appendix 1 and Appendix 2, respectively, to this Supplement.

2. Distribution. Appendixes to this Supplement will be distributed only to air defense and air traffic control facilities/offices within the CONAD Division Area.

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SCATER
CONAD/CAA
SUPPLEMENT V

SCATER TESTING PROCEDURES*

1. To insure that SCATER actions can be taken expeditiously, SCATER tests will be conducted as follows:

   a. SCATER tests will be conducted in connection with CONAD National, Regional, or Division Exercises whenever practicable or may be initiated at other times by a CONAD Division. Normally, no more than six (6) tests will be conducted during any one calendar year. SCATER tests will not be scheduled oftener than every 60 days, except that a test may be held in conjunction with a national exercise less than 60 days after a regional or division test. To provide for maximum personnel participation, each test will be conducted in three (3) phases -- a phase for each 8-hour period of operations (0000-0800; 0800-1600; 1600-2400 local time). Each phase will be terminated after sufficient time has elapsed for participating facilities to complete all test actions.

   b. All Federal facilities concerned with SCATER actions will participate in SCATER tests, except where such participation will involve the safety of aircraft. Nonfederal facilities concerned with SCATER are requested to participate. In the event an ARTC Center is unable to participate, the phase or phases involved will be rescheduled for the corresponding period of the following day.

   c. Participation and reporting will be in accordance with procedures prescribed in Section 5, SCATER Actions Form, and CONAD Division Combat Center and ARTC Center Implementing Instructions.

   d. Participation or nonparticipation will be reported by use of the self-addressed SCATER Test Report Postcard supplied by the CONAD Division CAA ADLO. CONAD Divisions and ARTC Centers will report participation by use of the report form contained in the appropriate Implementing Instructions.

   e. A separate test report is to be submitted for each phase of the test. All items of the test report must be completed. Where the action item is either not received or not applicable, the abbreviation "NR" or "NA", as appropriate, is to be listed in lieu of the action. Where a facility is unable to participate, the reasons for nonparticipation should be recorded on the test report.

   f. The CONAD Division CAA ADLO will evaluate all test reports and prepare an analytical report of participation within the CONAD Division Area. This report will contain the number of SCATER action facilities, by category; list of non-participating facilities; action items; general review of any discrepancies noted, and recommended corrective actions. Specific discrepancies will be reported to the facility concerned by separate correspondence.

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g. A copy of the analytical report will be submitted to the
CONAD Division Commander; CONAD Forces and Headquarters CONAD, CAA
Region and Washington Offices.

- Although it is not mandatory that nonfederal facilities participate
  in SCATER tests, participation is requested to insure that appro- 
  riate action will be taken when actual implementation is necessary.