HEADQUARTERS, US NORTHERN COMMAND  
250 Vandenberg Street  
Petersen AFB, CO 80914-3270  
16 May 2008

SUBJECT: USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08

SEE DISTRIBUTION  
(Annex 2)

References: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 08

1. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, is attached.

2. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08 fulfills a requirement established in the JSCP 08. The CDRUSNORTHCOM was directed to prepare a plan to support the employment of DOD forces providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) IAW applicable DOD directives and policy.

3. The plan was coordinated with other Combatant Commands, Component and Supporting Component Commands, and Subordinate Commands during the preparation of the plan.

4. Supporting plans must be prepared and forwarded to this headquarters for review within 60 days after plan approval.

FOR THE COMMANDER

CHRISTOPHER D. MILLER  
Brig Gen, USAF  
Director of Plans, Policy and Strategy
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

HEADQUARTERS, US NORTHERN COMMAND
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016
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24 August 2008

USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08 CH 3, DSCA
SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS AND RECORD OF CHANGES

1. Plan Title.


b. Short title: USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08, DSCA.

2. This document is classified UNCLASSIFIED/ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) to ensure ease of use by both military and interagency organizations and personnel whose official duties require specific knowledge of this plan, including those required to develop supporting plans. The Department of Defense will limit dissemination of operational plans both inside and outside of the Department of Defense to those personnel and activities with a "need-to-know."

3. Release of this Plan to activities outside of the Department of Defense must be formally requested via Director, Joint Staff to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

RECORD OF CHANGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGE NUMBER</th>
<th>COPY NUMBER</th>
<th>DATE OF CHANGE</th>
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</table>
CONPLAN 3561-08, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)
PLAN SUMMARY

1. **Purpose.** Natural or man-made disasters and special events can be so demanding that local, tribal, state and non-military federal responders are temporarily overwhelmed by the situation. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a long history of supporting civil authorities in the wake of catastrophic events. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) will respond quickly and effectively to the requests of civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 2008 (JSCP) directs CDRUSNORTHCOM to prepare a plan to support the employment of Title 10 DOD forces providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in accordance with (IAW) the National Response Framework (NRF), applicable federal law, DOD Directives (DODD), and other policy guidance including those hazards defined by the National Planning Scenarios that are not addressed by other JSCP tasked plans. DSCA is a subset of DOD civil support that is performed within the parameters of the NRF.

2. **Conditions for Implementation**

   a. **Politico-Military Situation**

      (1) USNORTHCOM was established in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. USNORTHCOM’s dual mission is to conduct Homeland Defense (HD) and civil support operations. When directed by the President or the SecDef, USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations IAW the NRF by responding to Requests for Assistance (RFA) from civil authorities.

      (2) The NRF is a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards response. This plan aligns with the NRF coordinating framework and applies to all forms of support that DOD could provide to civil authorities under the NRF. In addition to large-scale disaster responses, DOD has long provided smaller scale support for wildland firefighting, National Special Security Events (NSSE), such as political conventions, and special events (SE) such as major sporting events.

   b. **Statement.** This summary provides military decision makers with a brief recapitulation of the major aspects of this plan. It is based on planning
factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and is subject to modification in the context of a specific contingency.

c. Legal Considerations. The NRF provides the coordinating framework for support provided under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121, et. seq.). The Stafford Act and the Economy Act (Title 31 United States Code Section 1535) are the primary sources of statutory authority which govern the federal response. Support under these acts range from small-scale efforts to large-scale operations involving thousands of DOD personnel. DODD 3025.dd, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, is currently in draft, but when finalized, will supersede the current DODDs describing DOD support of civil authorities. Civil support under this plan does not include direct support to law enforcement. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) (Title 18 United States Code Section 1385) and DOD policy place limitations on direct involvement in law enforcement activities by Title 10 military personnel. Direct support to civilian law enforcement authorities requires specific statutory or Constitutional authority to not violate the PCA. While providing DSCA, DOD forces will conform to the CJCS Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) and any supplemental guidance provided by USNORTHCOM.

3. Operations To Be Conducted

a. Force Requirements. USNORTHCOM force requirements to conduct DSCA operations are based upon the nature of support requested by civil authorities and approved by the SecDef or the President.

(1) Based on the nature of the DSCA operations, USNORTHCOM can request the forces necessary to conduct DSCA missions in accordance with the SecDef-approved standing DSCA Execute Order (EXORD) or via a Request for Forces (RFF) processed through the Joint Staff.

(2) Friendly forces include other Combatant Commands: USJFCOM, USPACOM, USOUTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, USTRANSCOM, USEUCOM; USCENTCOM; USAFRICOM; Component and Supporting Component Commands: Army North (ARNORTH), Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH); Marine Forces North (MARFORNORTH), and U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF); Subordinate Commands: Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-AK), Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), Joint Force Headquarters – National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR); the Military Services; the Department of Homeland Security; The National Guard Bureau (NGB); Joint Forces Headquarters-State (JFHQ-S), and supporting Defense Agencies such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Contract
Management Agency (DCMA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

b. Deployment

(1) USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations in the 48 contiguous states, Alaska, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. When directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM can deploy DSCA forces from subordinate commands, or forces OPCON to USNORTHCOM via an RFF.

(2) USNORTHCOM DSCA in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands is limited to natural disaster response operations only.

c. Employment

(1) The Joint Staff annually issues a SecDef-approved DSCA Execution Order (EXORD) that delineates DSCA response forces and CDRUSNORTHCOM's authorities to deploy and employ them within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(2) The USNORTHCOM Commander's Intent is to anticipate and execute a timely and effective response in support of the primary agency during special events and to mitigate the effects of a disaster. Provide appropriate DOD capabilities in a timely manner to assist civil authorities to provide necessary services and recover as quickly as possible.

(3) USNORTHCOM provides DSCA when directed by the President or SecDef, which is typically after local, tribal, state, and other federal resources are overwhelmed and civil authorities have requested DOD assistance. Support can be provided to prevent, protect, respond, and/or recover from a potential or actual incident. If SecDef approves the request, CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported combatant commander for the DSCA response for those areas within the USNORTHCOM AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM determines the appropriate level of C2 for DOD forces based on the magnitude of the DOD response.

(4) For a small-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can deploy a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), who serves as DOD's single point of contact in the Joint Field Office (JFO) and validates requests for assistance. If designated as a Joint Force Commander (JFC), the DCO can provide C2 for the entire DSCA effort so long as the response force does not exceed the DCO's C2 capability. However, if a larger C2 structure is needed, a DCO will still deploy to serve in the JFO.
(5) For a medium-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can use a single-service Task Force (TF) or a Joint Task Force (JTF) to manage supporting military activities. As directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, a JTF commander exercises OPCON over attached DOD forces in the JOA with the following exceptions: U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) assets, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) resources, National Guard forces operating under state control, and in some circumstances, DOD forces in support of the Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI) or the United States Secret Service (USSS).

(6) For a large-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can: (a) Establish or expand an existing JTF with multiple subordinate JTFs, and/or (b) Utilize U.S. Army North (ARNORTH) as the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), or appoint other domain component commander(s), to provide C2 of the forces.

(7) Immediate Response Authority. Immediate Response is any form of immediate action taken by a DOD Component or military commander, under the direction of DOD directives and any supplemental guidance, to assist civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. When such conditions exist and time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from the DOD Components and Agencies are authorized to take necessary action to respond to requests from civil authorities consistent with existing law and regulations. As soon as practical, the military commander or responsible official shall make a report through their chain of command to the National Military Command Center (NMCC), which will then notify the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center. This notification should reach the NMCC within a few hours of the decision to provide immediate response. Army commands require notification within two hours of the decision to provide immediate response assistance. Upon SecDef approval and CJCS EXORD execution, CDRUSNORTHCOM may request OPCON of any forces that remain at the incident.

(8) Because DSCA supports civil authorities in the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, no enemy forces are expected to oppose these missions. However, like any military operation, forces performing DSCA remain vulnerable to degradation caused by man-made events or natural conditions.

(9) CONPLAN Structure. This is a six phase plan:

(a) Phase 0, Shape. Phase 0 is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. Actions in this phase include inter-agency coordination,
planning, identification of gaps, exercises, and public affairs outreach. These activities continue through all phases.

(b) **Phase I, Anticipate.** Phase I begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, a no notice event, or when directed by the President or SecDef. The phase ends with assigned response forces deployed or when the determination is made that there is no event requiring DSCA response. Phase I success equals deployment of Defense Coordination Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordination Element (DCE), Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPL), and other selected response forces. These forces will be postured to facilitate quick response after coordination with PA/PFO/JFO and coordination with state, local and tribal officials.

(c) **Phase II, Respond.** Phase II begins with the deployment of initial response capabilities. The phase ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Phase II success equals forces deployed with enough capability to support civil authorities in accomplishment of the mission. DSCA operations are based on requests for assistance which will be made at different times, and for missions that will be completed at different times. Consequently, forces will likely deploy into and out of the DSCA JOA for the entire length of the DSCA operation.

(d) **Phase III, Operate.** Phase III begins when DSCA response operations commence. Phase III ends when Title 10 forces begin to complete mission assignments and no further requests for DOD assistance are anticipated from civil authorities. Phase III success is achieved when currently deployed DOD capabilities are sufficient to support civil authorities.

(e) **Phase IV, Stabilize.** Phase IV begins when military and civil authorities decide that DOD support will scale down. Phase IV ends when DOD support is no longer required by civil authorities and transition criteria are established. Phase IV success is achieved when all operational aspects of mission assignments are complete.

(f) **Phase V, Transition.** Phase V begins with the redeployment of remaining DOD forces. The phase ends when response forces have been relieved, redeployed and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands. Phase V success is achieved when DOD forces have transitioned all operations back to civil authorities.

d. **Supporting Plans.** Commander, Army North (CDRAR/NORTH), Commander, Air Forces Northern (CDRA/NORTH), Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF), Commander, Joint Task Force-Alaska (CJTF-AK), Commander, Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (CJFHQ-NCR) will develop and maintain supporting plans to CONPLAN 3501.
e. **Collateral plans.** The following plans comprise the USNORTHCOM “Family of Plans” that could be implemented before, during or after USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, DSCA.

(1) USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 0300 (Classified Title)
(2) USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3400, Homeland Defense (S)
(3) USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500, CBRNE CM
(4) USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3502, Civil Disturbance Operations
(5) USNORTHCOM FUNCPLAN 3505, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Plan
(6) USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3591, Pandemic Influenza
(7) USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3600, Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital Region
(8) USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3900, Strategic Communication

4. **Key Assumptions**

   a. An incident severe enough to trigger a DSCA response will occur with little to no warning and temporarily exceed local, state and tribal civil authorities response capabilities.

   b. Title 10 forces in the vicinity of the incident will respond under immediate response authority. Upon SecDef approval and CJCS EXORD execution, CDRUSNORTHCOM will request OPCON of any forces that remain at the incident.

   c. The National Guard will normally respond in a State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 status.

   d. Agreements between and among the states, to include EMAC, will be used for state to state assistance for large scale or catastrophic events.

   e. Media coverage will be significant and comprehensive.

   f. Adversaries will monitor the DSCA response and could exploit perceived vulnerabilities.

5. **Operational Limitations**

   a. Federal forces can only be placed under the command of Title 10 authorities.
b. In accordance with United States Code, Title 18, Section 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act), Title 10 military personnel shall not be employed to enforce or execute civil law, except as otherwise provided by law.

c. DOD forces shall not procure or maintain any supplies, material, or equipment exclusively for providing DSCA, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

d. Intelligence collection on U.S. persons is restricted by Executive Order 12333 and DoD policy.

e. There are four mobilization sections contained in Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 12301 thru 12304. These Sections, however, provide few practical means to rapidly mobilize reserve component forces, including the National Guard, for DSCA events, unless the event involves the actual use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, or involves a terrorist attack or threat of terrorist attack.

6. **Time To Commence Effective Operations.** All DSCA is time sensitive because speed of response is directly related to the top three priorities of saving lives, preventing human suffering, and reducing great property damage. The specific circumstances of the DSCA operation and resources available affect the time it takes to deploy into the JOA and commence operations.

7. **Command Relationships.** USNORTHCOM is the DOD principal planning agent for DSCA and will C2 any DSCA operation within the OA. At execution, USNORTHCOM will determine the appropriate C2 for the DSCA response forces OPCON to execute the mission.

8. **Logistics Appraisal.** The USNORTHCOM Service or Supporting Components are responsible for administrative, logistical, medical, and communication support for forces employed in DSCA operations. Component Commanders will comply with their respective Service instructions, existing plans, agreements, and legal authorities. DLA, DCMA, USTRANSCOM, and other defense agencies will continue to provide the logistics backbone in the JOA to include: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services and other combat service support to DOD forces. Efforts must be directed at leveraging the existing infrastructure, contracts, and support relationships with civilian services. See Annex D and Annex Q.

9. **Personnel Appraisal**

   a. The services will retain administrative responsibility for forces OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM.

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xi
b. The appropriate USNORTHCOM Service or Supporting Component will assume administrative responsibility for Title 10 military personnel assigned to the USNORTHCOM subordinate units.

c. Personnel accountability and direct management of military and DOD civilian resources (e.g., casualties, replacements, additional forces, etc.) will be the responsibility of the Service Component.

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16 May 2008

CONPLAN 3501-08, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)  
CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE

1. **General.** The overall classification of this Concept plan is UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO.

2. **Specific guidance.** Classification guidance provides users with specific subjects requiring protection, specific levels of protection and establishes the period during which the protection must be continued.

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</tbody>
</table>
# USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08 CH 3
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letter of Transmittal</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Instructions and Record of Changes</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan Summary</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification Guidance</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Plan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ANNEX A, TASK ORGANIZATION

- Appendix 3 – Catastrophic Incident Baseline Capabilities Package A-3-1

## ANNEX B, INTELLIGENCE

- B-1

## ANNEX C, OPERATIONS

- C-1
  - Appendix 3 – Information Support Capabilities for Civil Authorities C-3-1
  - Tab B – Electronic Support & Protect (ES&P) C-3-B-1
  - Tab C – Operations Security C-3-C-1
  - Tab D – Civil Authorities Information Support Element (CAISE) C-3-D-1
  - Appendix 8 - Rules For The Use Of Force C-6-1
  - Appendix 11 - Combat Camera C-9-1
    - Tab A – COMCAM Customer Support Requirements C-9-A-1
    - Tab B – Communication Support Requirements for Each Joint and Component Combat Camera Team C-9-B-1
  - Appendix 15 – Force Protection C-15-1
  - Appendix 16 – Critical Infrastructure Protection C-16-1
    - Tab A – Task Critical Assets Classified, Published Separately C-16-A-1
    - Tab B – Points of Contact for Critical Infrastructure Protection C-16-B-1
  - Appendix 18 – Postal Augmentation C-18-1
    - Tab A – Force Package Options C-18-A-1
  - Appendix 19 – Severe Weather C-19-1
    - Tab A – Major Hurricane C-19-A-1
  - Appendix 20 – Wildland Fire Fighting C-20-1
    - Tab A – Force Package Options C-20-A-1
  - Appendix 21 – National Special Security Events (NSSE) C-21-1
    - Tab A – List of NSSE(s) C-21-A-1
  - Appendix 22 – Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement C-22-1
  - Appendix 25 – Defense Coordinating Officer C-25-1
  - Appendix 26 – Safety C-26-1
    - Tab A – Sample Disaster Relief Risk Assessment C-26-A-1
### UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

| Appendix 27 – Search and Rescue | C-27-1 |
| Appendix 28 – Major Earthquake | C-28-1 |
| Appendix 29 – Caribbean Mass Migration | C-29-1 |
| Tab A – Naval Air Station Key West | C-29-A-1 |
| Tab B – Homestead Air Reserve Base | C-29-B-1 |
| Tab C – Avon Park Air Force Base | C-29-C-1 |
| Tab D – Expected branch and sequels | C-29-D-1 |

| ANNEX D, LOGISTICS | D-1 |
| Appendix 3 – Mortuary Affairs | D-3-1 |
| Appendix 6 – Engineering Support Plan | D-6-1 |

| ANNEX E, PERSONNEL | E-1 |
| Appendix 4 – Legal | E-4-1 |
| Appendix 5 – Military Postal Service | E-5-1 |
| Appendix 6 – Chaplain Activities | E-6-1 |
| Appendix 9 – Emergency Family Assistance Center (EFAC) CONOPS | E-9-1 |

| ANNEX F, PUBLIC AFFAIRS | F-1 |

| ANNEX J, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS | J-1 |

| ANNEX K, COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS | K-1 |
| Appendix 1 – Information Assurance | K-1-1 |
| Tab A – Information Security | K-1-A-1 |
| Tab B – Theater COMSEC Management | K-1-B-1 |
| Tab C – Cryptographic Instructions | K-1-C-1 |
| Appendix 2 – Satellite Communications Planning | K-2-1 |
| Appendix 3 – Defense Courier Service | K-3-1 |
| Appendix 4 – Foreign Data Exchanges | K-4-1 |
| Appendix 5 – Spectrum Management | K-5-1 |
| Tab A – Electromagnetic Interference Reporting | K-5-A-1 |
| Tab B – JTF JCEOI Concept | K-5-B-1 |
| Tab C – Frequency Deconfliction | K-5-C-1 |
| Appendix 6 – C4 Planning | K-6-1 |
| Tab A – Collaborative Tools | K-6-A-1 |
| Tab B – Interagency Communications | K-6-B-1 |
| Tab C – Network Operations | K-6-C-1 |
| Tab D – Recovery and Reconstitution | K-6-D-1 |
| Tab E – MCCC | K-6-E-1 |
| Tab F – TNCC Network Communications Reporting | K-6-F-1 |
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

Tab G – Common Operating Picture ........................................ K-6-G-1
Tab H – Mobile Consolidated Command Center ............................. K-6-H-1

ANNEX Q, HEALTH SERVICES .......................................................... Q-1

Appendix 1 – Joint Patient Movement System ............................. Q-1-1
Appendix 2 – Joint Blood Program .................................................. Q-2-1
Appendix 5 – Medical Logistics System ........................................ Q-5-1
Appendix 6 – Force Health Protection ............................................ Q-6-1
Appendix 8 – Medical Planning Responsibilities & Task Identification . Q-8-1

ANNEX V, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ........................................ V-1

ANNEX W, CONTINGENCY CONTRACTORS AND CONTRACTING .......... W-1

ANNEX Y, STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION ........................................ Y-1

ANNEX Z, DISTRIBUTION ................................................................. Z-1
HEADQUARTERS, US NORTHERN COMMAND  
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16 May 2008

USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08  
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)

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v. SecDef-approved CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD, DTG  
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1
1. Situation

   a. General

   (1) Natural or man-made disasters and special events can be so demanding that local, tribal, state and non-military federal responders are temporarily overwhelmed by the situation. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a long history of supporting civil authorities in the wake of catastrophic events. DOD brings unique and specialized skills and assets that can rapidly stabilize and improve the situation until civil authorities can again effectively respond to the needs of their populace. Per Joint Publication 3-28 "Civil Support," Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is a subset of Civil Support (CS) that is specifically provided within the auspices of the National Response Framework (NRF). It does not include a wide range of CS provided by DOD outside of the NRF such as sensitive support, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) activities, local mutual aid agreements, counterdrug operations, and National Guard activities while under the command and control (C2) of the governors of their respective states.

   (2) When approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or directed by the President, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is prepared to respond quickly and effectively to provide DSCA to the primary agency under the NRF in order to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. In addition to large-scale disaster response, DOD has long provided smaller scale support for wildland firefighting, National Special Security Events (NSSE), such as political conventions, and Special Events (SE) such as major sporting events.

   (3) USNORTHCOM was established in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. USNORTHCOM's mission is to anticipate and conduct HD and CS operations within the assigned AOR to defend, protect and secure the US and its interests. One part of USNORTHCOM's civil support mission is to provide DSCA, which is the term used in the NRF to describe DOD support IAW the NRF. When directed by the President or the SecDef, USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations in response to Requests for Assistance (RFA) from civil authorities.

   (4) The NRF provides the coordinating framework for support provided under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121, et. seq.). The Stafford Act and the Economy Act (Title 31 United States Code Section 1535) are the major pieces of legislation that govern the federal response, which includes DOD. Support under these acts range from small-scale efforts to large-scale
operations involving thousands of DOD personnel. This plan covers the full spectrum of DSCA from small to large-scale operations.

(5) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 08 sets forth DSCA planning requirements for CDRUSNORTHCOM that include preparation of an all-hazards plan to support civil authorities including those hazards defined by the National Planning Scenarios that are not addressed by other JSCP tasked plans. CONPLAN 3501 was developed to fulfill this requirement. In accordance with Joint Staff direction, CONPLAN 3501 is periodically reviewed and updated as necessary to maintain accuracy.

(6) In addition to this plan, USNORTHCOM has other DSCA-related plans that may be executed in conjunction with CONPLAN 3501, such as CONPLAN 3500, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management (CM). CONPLAN 3500 specifically covers DSCA performed as consequence management in the aftermath of a CBRNE event. CONPLAN 3505, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Plan (NARP), and CONPLAN 3502, Civil Disturbance Operations (CDO) may also be executed in conjunction with this plan.

(7) Because DSCA supports civil authorities in the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, no enemy forces are expected to oppose these missions. However, like any military operation, forces performing DSCA remain vulnerable to degradation caused by man-made events or natural conditions.

b. Area of Concern

(1) Area of Responsibility (AOR). USNORTHCOM’s geographic AOR is the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, the Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic Ocean and other islands (excluding Greenland).

(2) Area of Interest (AOI). The area of interest for USNORTHCOM is its assigned air, land, and sea areas including the United States, its territories, and possessions as defined above, and any adjacent foreign territory where a natural or man-made disaster, emergency, or event may cause an adverse impact on the United States.

(3) Operational Area (OA). The USNORTHCOM OA for DSCA is the 48 contiguous States, Alaska, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and any possession of the United States within the USNORTHCOM AOR. Areas of operation can be established within the operational area as necessary. Areas of operation should be large enough to accomplish DSCA missions and should not typically encompass the entire
operational area. USNORTHCOM DSCA in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands is limited to natural disaster response operations only.

(4) Joint Operations Area (JOA). USNORTHCOM will designate appropriate JOAs for air, land, and maritime operations within the USNORTHCOM OA for the execution of DSCA operations. Alaska and the National Capital Region are specifically designated as standing JOAs within the USNORTHCOM DSCA OA.


d. Enemy

(1) Enemy forces are not expected during the conduct of DSCA operations. If a situation with enemy forces should arise, it would trigger CONPLAN 3400, Homeland Defense, or other plans in the USNORTHCOM family of plans.

(2) When planning and conducting DSCA operations, commanders should consider the following issues: Adversaries could monitor the DSCA response and exploit perceived weaknesses; force protection; and environmental factors ranging from weather to contamination and disease could significantly impact the DSCA force.

(3) While every DSCA operation will encounter unique environmental factors, certain recurring operations, such as natural disaster relief, will face similar environmental conditions repeatedly. For example, hurricanes typically occur in the Gulf of Mexico and the mid to lower Atlantic seaboard. Earthquakes most frequently occur along the Pacific Coast and in Alaska. Wildland firefighting missions often occur in the Western States. Commanders should consider these likely environmental conditions when they plan DSCA operations.

e. Friendly

(1) Department of Defense (DOD). When requested by civil authorities and directed by the President or SecDef, USNORTHCOM is the supported combatant commander providing DSCA IAW the NRF. DOD is a supporting agency to all Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). DOD is a primary agency for ESF #3 Public Works and Engineering (USACE) and ESF #9 Search and Rescue (Air Force Rescue Coordination Center).

(2) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD (HD&ASA)). The ASD (HD&ASA) provides policy oversight for DSCA.
(3) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS communicates SecDef guidance to the Combatant Commanders, Services, and DOD Agencies. On SecDef’s behalf, the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) communicates and coordinates the policy guidance and execute directions of the SecDef. JDOMS is responsible for identifying and coordinating available resources for DSCA requests and releasing related execute and deployment orders when approved by the SecDef.

(4) Commander, US Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM). Upon receipt of a Joint Staff validated Request for Forces (RFF) or Request for Capability (RFC), and in accordance with Global Force Management Guidance document of May 2005, CDRUSJFCOM as the Primary Joint Force Provider of conventional forces provides a recommended global sourcing solution and associated sourcing risk assessment to the Joint Staff for SecDef approval. When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSJFCOM, provides assigned military resources and forces to CDR USNORTHCOM in support of DSCA.

(5) Commander, US Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM). When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSPACOM is a supporting Combatant Commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM for DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM AO.

(6) Commander, US Southern Command (CDRUSOUTHCOM). When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSOUTHCOM is a supporting Combatant Commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM for DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM AO.

(7) Commander, US Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM). When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM is a supporting Combatant Commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM for DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM AO.

(8) Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM). When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSSTRATCOM supports CDRUSNORTHCOM by conducting space operations, information operations, planning support, situational awareness, and space control support during DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM AO.

(9) Commander, US Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM). When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSTRANSCOM provides deployment, employment, and redeployment common-user air, land, and sea transportation, terminal management and aerial refueling for forces engaged in DSCA operations and provides aeromedical evacuation as required. As directed, CDRUSTRANSCOM deploys military resources and forces, and supports USNORTHCOM DSCA operations within the USNORTHCOM AO.
(10) **Commander, Air Forces Northern (CDRAFNORTH).** When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, and upon receipt of forces, CDRAFNORTH deploys military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the USNORTHCOM AO.

(11) **Commander, Army North (CDRAR NORTH).** When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRAR NORTH deploys a tailored Response Task Force or Joint Task Force, accepts operational control (OPCON) of military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the USNORTHCOM AO.

(12) **Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF).** When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, USFF deploys military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the USNORTHCOM AO.

(13) **Commander, Marine Forces North (COMMARFORNORTH).** When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, COMMARFORNORTH assists with coordination of military resources and forces in order to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the USNORTHCOM AO.

(14) **Commander, Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (CJFHQ-NCR).** When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CJFHQ-NCR transitions to JTF-NCR and accepts OPCON of military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal and local authorities within the National Capital Region (NCR) JOA.

(15) **Commander, Joint Task Force-Alaska (CJTF-AK).** When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CJTF-AK accepts OPCON of military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the Alaska JOA.

(16) **Commander, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (CJTF-CS).** When directed by USNORTHCOM (JFLCC after IOC date), CJTF-CS deploys a tailored JTF headquarters, accepts OPCON of military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the USNORTHCOM AO.

(17) **Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North (SJFHQ-N).** As an operational level C2 element with USNORTHCOM Staff Directorate responsibilities, SJFHQ-N is a primary employment option for the CDRUSNORTHCOM during DSCA operations. When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM to establish a stand alone JTF, SJFHQ-N accepts OPCON of military resources and forces, and conducts DSCA operations to assist
federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the USNORTHCOM AO. When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, SJFHQ-N provides the core element of a newly established JTF or provides augmentation to an existing JTF.

(18) Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). The DCO is DOD's single point of contact at a Joint Field Office (JFO). The JFO is the multi-agency coordination center established in or near the incident site for coordinating incident-related prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions under the NRF. Requests for DSCA originating at the JFO are coordinated, processed, and validated through the DCO. For a small-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can designate the DCO as a Joint Force Commander (JFC). If a larger C2 structure is needed, a DCO will still deploy to serve in the JFO. The DCO may also be supported by an administrative and support staff element called a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). See Annex C, Appendix 25.

(19) Military Services. When directed by the President or SecDef, and through the appropriate Service component commanders, the military Services provide forces, facilities (Federal Operations Support Areas (FOSAs) and/or mobilization centers) in support of (ISO) requests from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and assets to CDRUSNORTHCOM as part of the DOD response to approved Requests for Assistance (RFAs) from civil authorities. When directed, the Services will provide installations based on Service Components nominations of appropriate installations as Base Support Installations (BSIs). BSIs provide military-to-military support to DOD assets. FEMA does not request BSIs and therefore, support provided by a BSI may not be reimbursable under the Stafford Act. Services provide unit data to CDRUSJFCOM via the USJFCOM Service Components for use in developing the recommended global sourcing solution and associated force sourcing risk in accordance with the current Global Force Management (GFM) guidance and policy.

(20) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). USACE is a public engineering organization within DOD providing engineering support and services to DOD activities around the globe, as well as to the nation's civil works, flood protection, and navigation infrastructure. USACE performs emergency support activities under separate authorities provided in Public Law 84-99. USACE also provides support as a primary agency and coordinating agency for ESP #3, Public Works and Engineering, and is a support agency to other ESPs as specified in the NRF annexes. When USACE conducts operations as an NRF primary or coordinating agency, there is a coordination relationship with USNORTHCOM and a JTF activated for DSCA. USACE does not operate under USNORTHCOM C2 when conducting operations IAW the NRF.
(21) **Reserve Components (RC).** The Reserve Components provide an important source of trained manpower and expertise. DOD Reserve Components include the Army National Guard (ARNG), Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard (ANG), and Air Force Reserve (AFR). They are increasingly relied upon to balance our nation's commitments and DOD mission requirements. ARNG and ANG may operate under state control, unless called to federal duty.

(22) **Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs).** Each Service selects highly qualified senior-level officers (Reserve Officers primarily in the grades of O6/O5) to serve as EPLOs and enlisted personnel to serve in support assignments. EPLOs are service assets and may be activated and employed by their services. Once activated EPLOs are OPCON to the service component commander. Those EPLOs requested by and allocated to CDRUSNORTHCOM are TACON to the DCO. Services ensure their EPLOs are trained, equipped and remain current on the NRF, National Incident Management System (NIMS), DSCA procedures, and their service component's regionally available resources. They are trained in disaster preparedness and DSCA operations. EPLOs advise DOD and civil authorities on service resources and capabilities, and facilitate coordination between civil authorities and DOD during state or federal exercises or DSCA operations. Once activated, EPLOs may work at various locations based on DOD needs. Four primary locations are:

(a) **FEMA Headquarters/Regions.** EPLOs and support personnel can be assigned to FEMA Headquarters and/or FEMA Regional locations. Personnel assigned at the FEMA Region are known as Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (REPLOs). When activated, they report to the FEMA Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC), TACON to the DCO, to advise FEMA and other Federal agencies and provide situation reports (SITREPS) to their respective service components.

(b) **State locations.** At the State level, EPLOs, known as State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (SEPLOs) and support personnel can perform duty in the Governor's (State) Emergency Operation Center (EOC) or The Adjutant General JOC's, TACON to the DCO. Their function is to advise state-level civil authorities on military issues, obtain and coordinate information, proactively assess the situation from a state and State National Guard perspective and provide SITREPS to the established chain of command.

(c) **Joint Field Office (JFO) locations.** EPLOs can be activated to perform duty in the JFO as service representatives and to support the DCO.
(d) Joint Task Force (JTF) locations. EPLOS can be activated to perform duty in JTF headquarters as service representatives and to support the JTF CDR.

(23) National Guard Bureau (NGB). The NGB coordinates with National Guard forces and assets through the States’ Adjutants General on civil support operations to assist local, state, and tribal authorities. NGB will coordinate with USNORTHCOM in synchronizing and integrating federal and state military operations to avoid duplication and achieve unity of effort. Annex J contains amplifying guidance for coordination with National Guard forces during DSCA operations.

(24) National Guards of the States and Territories. All states and territories have National Guard forces that will respond to DSCA events. They will most likely respond in a Title 32 or State Active Duty status. USNORTHCOM will coordinate with the states and NGB (i.e. JFO Unified Coordination Group) to ensure the response has a unified effort.

(25) Supporting Defense Agencies. When directed by SecDef, these agencies may provide resources and capabilities:

(a) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA is the DOD lead for all intelligence activities supporting COMCOS operations.

(b) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Provide DSCA support and technical expertise to include 24 hours a day/7 days a week technical reach back assistance to federal, state and local agencies.

(c) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). DISA ensures USNORTHCOM, supporting commands and agencies receive timely and effective command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and other support.

(d) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). DLA coordinates with USNORTHCOM, JDOMS, Service Components and NRF primary agencies for subsistence, clothing, individual equipment, petroleum, construction materials, personal demand items, medical materials and repair parts support. DLA provides integrated material management and supply support for all DLA managed material. DLA provides property and hazardous material (HAZMAT) disposal services.

(e) Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). DCMA provides worldwide contract management services in times of peace, crisis, and war, to include administering Civilian Augmentation Program contracts. DCMA procures contracting officers, or a buying activity may delegate to
DCMA any or all contract management functions listed in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 42.302. DCMA responds within 48 hours to provide an initial response team to the JOA to perform contract administration services.

(i) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). NGA provides imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial products ISO DSCA operations for DOD, primary agencies, coordinating agencies, and supporting organizations. NGA will coordinate intermodal transportation network assessments with UTRANSCOM.

(26) Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Secretary of Homeland Security is the Principal Federal Official (PFO) for domestic incident management. The Secretary is responsible for coordinating federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The Secretary may delegate this responsibility and appoint a representative to serve as PFO on-site during a disaster, emergency, incident, or event. DHS uses the NRF and NIMS structure to coordinate the federal response. The FEMA Administrator plans, coordinates, and conducts the federal disaster response and recovery efforts with local, state, and tribal authorities. (See Annex V for other federal government departments and agencies).

(a) The NRF aligns federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all hazard approach to domestic incident management. DOD and 31 other federal Departments and Agencies have a role under the NRF. SecDef retains approval authority for RFAs, and all RFAs are evaluated for their impact on readiness, cost, legality, lethality, risk and appropriateness.

(b) Under the NRF, the federal agency designated as a primary agency is the federal executive agency responsible for the ESF mission. When requested by civil authorities and approved by the SecDef, DOD provides DSCA and is a support agency to all ESFs.

(c) The NRF Support Annexes identify federal Coordinating and Cooperating Agencies responsible for supporting DHS domestic incident management. DOD is a cooperating agency for five of the eight support annexes.

(d) The NRP Incident Annexes identify federal Coordinating and Cooperating Agencies responsible for implementing the processes detailed in the incident annexes. When requested by civil authorities and directed by the President or SecDef, DOD provides DSCA and is identified as a cooperating agency for the majority of Incident Annexes.
f. Assumptions

(1) An incident severe enough to trigger a DSCA response will occur with little to no warning and temporarily exceed local, state and tribal civil authorities response capabilities.

(2) Title 10 forces in the vicinity of the incident will respond under immediate response authority until USNORTHCOM assumes OPCON with the establishment of a JOA.

(3) The National Guard will normally respond in a State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 status.

(4) Agreements between and among the states, to include Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC), will be used for state to state assistance for large scale or catastrophic events.

(5) Media coverage will be significant and comprehensive.

(6) Adversaries will monitor the DSCA response and could exploit perceived vulnerabilities.

g. Operational Limitations

(1) Federal forces can only be placed under the command of Title 10 authorities.

(2) In accordance with United States Code, Title 18, Section 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act), Title 10 military personnel shall not be employed to enforce or execute civil law, except as otherwise provided by law.

(3) DOD forces shall not procure or maintain any supplies, material, or equipment exclusively for providing DSCA, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

(4) Intelligence activities, particularly the collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence, are governed by DOD intelligence oversight rules.

(5) There are four mobilization sections contained in Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 12301 thru 12304. These Sections, however, provide few practical means to rapidly mobilize reserve component forces, including the National Guard, for DSCA events, unless the event involves the
actual use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, or involves a terrorist attack or threat of terrorist attack.

(6) CDRUSNORTHCOM can approve RFAs to deploy and employ assigned forces and certain pre-identified forces as defined by the SecDef-approved Joint Staff DSCA EXORD. SecDef approval is required for the deployment of additional forces.

h. Legal Considerations

(1) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121, et seq.), authorizes the federal government to help state and local governments alleviate the suffering and damage caused by disasters. This act provides authority for disaster preparedness, Presidential grants for planning, Presidential declarations of major disaster or emergency, formation of immediate support teams, reimbursement to agencies (including DOD), and major disaster assistance programs to help state and local governments mitigate the suffering and damage caused by disasters, emergencies, and other incidents.

(2) The Economy Act (Title 31 United States Code Section 1535) concerns federal agencies reimbursing each other for federal to federal department or agency support. Prior to the declaration of a major disaster or emergency under the Stafford Act, most DOD support will be in accordance with the Economy Act, which generally requires full reimbursement of all DOD costs, including personnel pay and allowances. Post-declaration funding, in accordance with the Stafford Act, normally captures only incremental costs.

(3) Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) (Title 18 United States Code Section 1385) and DOD policies prohibit the direct, active participation of Title 10 military forces in civilian law enforcement, unless specifically authorized under the Constitution or statute. Title 10 forces may, however, provide substantial indirect support to civilian law enforcement agencies. Such support includes use of facilities, training, advice, maintenance and operation of equipment. Such support is appropriate as long as federal troops do not directly participate in traditional law enforcement roles, such as search, seizure and arrest.

(4) The Insurrection Act (Title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 331-335) is an exception to the PCA. Operations IAW this act are conducted under USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3502, Civil Disturbance Operations.

(5) Standing Rules for the Use of Force (Enclosures L through Q of CJCSI 3121.01B of 13 Jun 05) establishes fundamental policies and
procedures that govern the actions to be taken by Title 10 forces during all
DSCA operations. CDRUSNORTHCOM may submit requests to the SecDef,
through CJCS, for mission-specific RUF, as required.

(6) Use of Defense Intelligence Component assets ISO DSCA missions
must be specifically approved by SecDef. The use of these intelligence assets
for non-intelligence purposes is called Incident Awareness and Assessment
(IAA). Currently, the 2007 DSCA EXORD authorizes the use of Defense
Intelligence Component assets for IAA for the following missions: situational
awareness, damage assessment, evacuation monitoring, search and rescue,
and CBRNE assessment. (See reference v.)

Authorities operations within the Operational Area to support civil authorities
during special events and to mitigate the effects of a disaster.

3. Execution

a. Commander's Intent. Anticipate and execute a timely and effective
response in support of the primary agency during special events and to
mitigate the effects of a disaster. Provide appropriate DOD capabilities in a
timely manner to assist civil authorities to provide necessary services and
recover as quickly as possible.

(1) Strategic Objectives

(a) Anticipate USNORTHCOM requirements to respond to RFAs
from the primary agency.

(b) Achieve Unity of Effort with local/tribal, state (including
National Guard), and other federal responders.

(c) Collaborate with DOD, interagency, and intergovernmental
partners.

(d) Establish interoperable, flexible, and scalable C2 for deployed
USNORTHCOM assets.

(e) Coordinate closely with the primary agency to keep the
American people informed.

(2) End State. National authorities (in consultation with local, state
and tribal authorities) have determined that military assistance is no longer
required, civil authorities are conducting necessary sustainment operations,
and OPCON of deployed assets is transferred back to their respective commands.

b. Concept of Operations

(1) The NRF is the nation's all-hazard approach to domestic incident management. Its purpose is to integrate the efforts and resources of federal agencies in support of state and local organizations. The NRF uses the term DSCA to describe DOD support during domestic emergencies and other events. DOD support includes federal military forces, the Department's career civilian and contractor personnel, and DOD agency and component assets. DSCA does not include CS provided by DOD outside of the NRF.

(2) USNORTHCOM provides DSCA when directed by the President or SecDef, which is typically after local, state, tribal and other federal resources are overwhelmed and civil authorities have requested DOD assistance. Support can be provided to prevent, protect, and respond to potential or actual incidents. If SecDef approves the request, CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported combatant commander for the DSCA response. CDRUSNORTHCOM determines the appropriate level of C2 for DOD forces based on the magnitude of the DOD response.

(3) For a small-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can deploy a DCO, who will be the senior military officer in the JFO. If designated as a Joint Force Commander (JFC), the DCO can provide C2 for the entire DSCA effort so long as the response force does not exceed the DCO's C2 capability. However, if a larger C2 structure is needed, a DCO will still deploy to serve as DOD's single point of contact in the JFO.

(4) For a medium-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can use a single-service Task Force (TF) or a Joint Task Force (JTF) to manage supporting military activities. As directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, a JTF commander exercises OPCON over DOD forces in the JOA with the following exceptions: USTRANSCOM assets, USACE resources, state controlled National Guard forces, and in some circumstances, DOD forces in support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the United States Secret Service (USSS). The JTF should, if feasible, collocate with the JFO. At a minimum, the JTF should establish robust communications infrastructure to support close coordination with the JFO.

(5) For a large-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can:

(a) Establish or expand an existing JTF with multiple subordinate JTFs.
(b) Appoint the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), or other domain component commander(s), to provide C2 of the forces.

(c) Consistent with operational requirements, the JTF command and control element will be co-located with the senior on-scene leadership at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity of effort.

(6) On the opposite end of the response scale from the JTF are DSCA operations that do not require CDRUSNORTHCOM designated C2. These DSCA operations, such as military working dog teams, typically involve small-scale specialized support with organic C2, reporting to USNORTHCOM or Service Components and supported by the Service Components.

(7) **Immediate Response Authority (IRA).** Any form of immediate action taken by a DOD Component or military commander, under the authority of DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, and any supplemental guidance prescribed by the Head of a DOD Component, to assist civil authorities or the public to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. When such conditions exist and time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from the DOD Components and Agencies are authorized to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities consistent with existing law, and regulations. All such necessary action is referred to as “Immediate Response.” In accordance with references (t) and (u), any commander acting under IRA must advise the National Military Command Center (NMCC) through the chain of command (for Department of the Army commands, also notify Army Watch within two hours) of the decision to provide IRA assistance and seek SecDef approval or additional authorization as needed. NMCC will notify the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center as soon as practicable. Upon SecDef approval and CJCS EXORD execution, CDRUSNORTHCOM may request OPCON of any forces that remain at the incident.

c. **CONPLAN Structure.** This is a six phase plan: Phase 0, Shape; Phase I, Anticipate; Phase II, Respond; Phase III, Operate; Phase IV, Stabilize; Phase V, Transition. Phases may overlap, or more than one phase can be underway at the same time. See Annex C, Operations, for more detailed information on the major tasks contained in each phase.

(1) **Phase 0, Shape.** Phase 0 is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. Actions in this phase include inter-agency coordination, planning, identification of gaps, exercises, and public affairs outreach. These activities continue through all phases.
(2) **Phase I, Anticipate.** Phase I begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, a no notice event, or when directed by the President or SecDef. The phase ends with assigned response forces deployed or when the determination is made that there is no event requiring DSCA response. Phase I success equals deployment of Defense Coordination Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordination Element (DCE), Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO), and other selected response forces. These forces will be postured to facilitate quick response after coordination with PA/PFO/JFO and coordination with state, local and tribal officials.

(3) **Phase II, Respond.** Phase II begins with the deployment of initial response capabilities. The phase ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Phase II success equals forces deployed with enough capability to support civil authorities in accomplishment of the mission. DSCA operations are based on requests for assistance which will be made at different times, and for missions that will be completed at different times. Consequently, forces will likely deploy into and out of the DSCA JOA for the entire length of the DSCA operation.

(4) **Phase III, Operate.** Phase III begins when DSCA response operations commence. Phase III ends when Title 10 forces begin to complete mission assignments and no further requests for DOD assistance are anticipated from civil authorities. Phase III success is achieved when currently deployed DOD capabilities are sufficient to support civil authorities.

(5) **Phase IV, Stabilize.** Phase IV begins when military and civil authorities decide that DOD support will scale down. Phase IV ends when DOD support is no longer required by civil authorities and transition criteria are established. Phase IV success is achieved when all operational aspects of mission assignments are complete.

(6) **Phase V, Transition.** Phase V begins with the redeployment of remaining DOD forces. The phase ends when response forces have been relieved, redeployed and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands. Success in Phase V is achieved when DOD forces have transitioned all operations back to civil authorities.
**DSCA Phasing Construct**

Phases I & II may be merged for a no notice event such as an earthquake

**Figure 3-1**

d. **Tasks**

(1) **CDRUSJFCOM.** CDRUSJFCOM serves as the Primary Joint Force Provider and in this capacity provides recommended global sourcing solutions and associated force sourcing risk assessments for SecDef approval. When directed by SecDef, CDRUSJFCOM sources GFM assigned conventional forces and resources to assist civil authorities within the USNORTHCOM OA.

(a) Be Prepared To (BPT) deploy DSCA response forces and equipment as directed by SecDef.

(b) When directed by SECDEF, deploy assigned forces and upon their entering the JOA relinquish OCON of those forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM.
(c) BPT accept return of personnel and equipment from CDRUSNORTHCOM, when CDRUSNORTHCOM or SecDef determine that the DSCA response is complete.

(d) BPT identify and provide any additional individual augmentation as required in coordination with (ICW) CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(2) CDRUSTRANSCOM. When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSTRANSCOM supports CDRUSNORTHCOM by providing deployment, employment, and redeployment common-user, air, land, and sea transportation, terminal management and aerial refueling for forces in support of DSCA operations and provides aero medical evacuation as required.

(a) BPT provide air, sea, or ground transportation support to deploy DSCA forces, including non-DOD assets, in response to formal requirements established IAW CJCSM 3122.02C, by the most expeditious means.

(b) BPT provide required air, sea, and ground transportation to redeploy forces when they are released from the JOA.

(c) BPT expeditiously deploy other DOD response assets IAW CJCSM 3122.02C as directed by SecDef.

(d) BPT provide deployable distribution assistance (LNO, NDDOC augmentation, DDOC-Forward, DIRMOBFOR Air and Surface, JTF Port Opening capability, etc.) ISO USNORTHCOM. NDDOC is USNORTHCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center.

(e) BPT provide/coordinate aero medical evacuation transportation resources.

(f) BPT gain and maintain situational awareness of the status of the distribution network within the affected OA. Provide this information as an input to the USNORTHCOM Common Operating Picture (COP).

(g) BPT provide transportation support to DSCA operations as directed by the SecDef including terminal management and aerial refueling operations.

(h) BPT provide up to 8 MAFFS capable C-130 aircraft and crews, with appropriate C2 and support personnel and equipment to augment support to NIFC in conducting WFP operations.
(3) CDRUSPACOM, CDRUSOUTHCOM, CDRUSOCOM. When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSPACOM, CDRUSOUTHCOM and CDRUSOCOM are supporting Combatant Commanders to CDRUSNORTHCOM for DSCA operations executed in the USNORTHCOM OA. BPT attach requested forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM upon entrance to the USNORTHCOM JOA. CDRUSNORTHCOM will exercise OPCON over attached forces while in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(4) CDRUSSTRATCOM. When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSSTRATCOM supports CDRUSNORTHCOM by conducting space operations, information operations, planning support, situational awareness, and space control support during USNORTHCOM DSCA operations.

(5) CDR JTF-DSCA EVENT or JFLCC CDR. Whoever is designated by CDRUSNORTHCOM as operational commander of the DSCA operation will be designated CDR JTF (i.e. JTF-KATRINA) or JFLCC CDR. Upon activation for a DSCA event, CDR JTF-DSCA or the JFLCC CDR will perform the following Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) tasks:

(a) OP 5.3 Prepare Plans and Orders during Phases 0-V.

(b) OP 5.7.4 Coordinate plans with non-DOD organizations during phases 0-V.

(c) OP 2.1 Direct Operational Intelligence Activities during phases 0-V.

(d) OP 2.4.1.1 Identify Operational Issues and Threats during phases 0-IV.

(e) OP 4.7.3 Provide support to DOD and other government agencies during phases I-IV.

(f) OP 5.5.2 Develop joint force liaison structure during phases I-II.

(g) OP 5.8.1 Manage media relations in the joint operations area during phases I-IV.

(h) OP 5 Provide Operational Command and Control during phases I-IV.

(i) OP 5.5.5 Establish command transition criteria and procedures during phases II and III.
(j) OP 1.1.3 Conduct joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) in the joint operations area during phases II-IV.

(k) OP 5.1.3 Determine Commander’s Critical Information Requirements during phases 0-V.

(l) OP 5.1.7 Coordinate Combat Camera Activities during phases II-IV.

(m) OP 4.8 Acquire, Manage and Distribute Funds during phases 0-V.

(n) OP 6 Provide Operational Force Protection during Phases 0-V.

(6) Commander, Air Forces Northern (CDRAFNORTH)

(a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, DSCA. Conduct planning for likely USNORTHCOM DSCA contingencies. Planning should include, but is not limited to, the following capabilities; Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems (MAFFS), medical, imaging, civil engineering activities, weather, and airlift capabilities.

(b) Coordinate deployment of forces and resources with USJFCOM.

(c) Develop TPFDD requirements for both deployable and in-place personnel and/or equipment; ensure capabilities/forces are loaded into the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JPEGS) prior to issuance of an execute order (EXORD).

(d) After receipt of an EXORD, notify USNORTHCOM and/or the JTF (if applicable) of planned deployments and prioritization of forces and resources flow via JPEGS execution/issuance of appropriate orders/modifications.

(e) As the USNORTHCOM designated theater JFACC, BPT provide theater support to CDRUSNORTHCOM, and localized support for established JTF(s)/CCs or JFLCC (to include the DCO) in conducting DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM JOA. BPT coordinate with JFLCC and JPMCC for DSCA support operations. DSCA operations include, but are not limited to:

1. Natural and man-made disasters including Catastrophic Incident Response (hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, other disasters, pandemics, and terrorist attacks).
2. Support the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) during Wildland Fire Fighting (WFF) operations.

3. Defense support to law enforcement.


5. Conduct Critical Infrastructure Protection for National Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources.

(f) Provide administrative, logistical, and communications support for deployed service component forces.

(g) BPT provide SecDef approved support to the White House Military Office, and NSSEs when informed of approval by CJCS.

(h) BPT act as Airspace Control Authority (coordinate with NORAD and the FAA), Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Coordinator (ISRC), establish the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), and Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) ISO DSCA operations as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM for any and all task forces (to include the DCO in the USNORTHCOM JOA except Alaska where 11th AF serves as the Airspace Control Authority.

(i) BPT accept OPCON of Air Force Forces ISO DSCA operations in the JOA when approved by SecDef and as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(j) BPT provide an Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) representative ISO of the Joint Task Force and USNORTHCOM’s Command Assessment Element (CAE) when requested to provide Air assessment inputs to CAE.

(k) BPT receive individual augmentees when activated as a JTF.

(l) BPT nominate the Commander, Task Force (CTF) (except in the case of accidents involving DOD nuclear weapons/resources) or Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) to CDRUSNORTHCOM for approval, as appropriate.

(m) Coordinate with Air Force organizations to nominate BSIs and submit them for CDRUSNORTHCOM approval.

(n) Coordinate with AF organizations (Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC)) and Major Commands (MAJCOMS) as appropriate for possible
deployment of forces and resources (i.e. theater air mobility via the Director Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) thru Air Mobility Command) ISO of DSCA operations for CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(o) BPT provide recommended mission specific Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) ICW USNORTHCOM to include the use of lethal and nonlethal capabilities for DSCA operations.

(p) BPT account for and report on OPCON personnel supporting DSCA operations.

(q) BPT accept OPCON of EPLOs upon their activation.

(7) **Commander, Army North [CDRARNORTH]**

(a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, DSCA.

(b) BPT deploy two OCPs to provide appropriate C2 based on the magnitude of the DSCA response, to include C2 as a geographic or functional JTF when augmented by other services.

(c) BPT serve as a 3-Star JTF or the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) to C2 DSCA response forces for the USNORTHCOM AOR excluding the JTF-AK and JTF-NCR JOAs.

(d) BPT deploy a CAE to provide incident awareness and early identification of potential DSCA requirements.

(e) BPT accept OPCON of forces ISO DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(f) BPT receive NC SJFHQ-N enabling cell and/or service component augmentees when required to conduct DSCA operations. Coordinate with NC SJFHQ-N for the development of a training/exercise schedule and administrative requirements IOT ensure rapid integration into JTF.

(g) BPT provide a Commander’s assessment identifying the likely primary agency requests for DSCA.

(h) BPT execute DSCA operations including, but not limited to:
1. Supporting the response to natural and man-made disasters including catastrophic incidents (hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, other disasters, pandemics, and terrorist attacks).

2. Defense support of the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) during Wildland Fire Fighting (WFF) operations.

3. Defense support to law enforcement. See Annex C,

Appendix 22.

4. United Nations General Assembly support.

5. State of the Union Address (SOTUA).


8. Defense support during domestic civil disturbances.


10. State Funerals ISO JFHQ-NCR.

11. Conduct Critical Infrastructure Protection for National Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources.

   (i) Maintain continuous situational awareness for possible DSCA response incidents and events.

   (j) Develop Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) for deployable C2 elements.

   (k) Determine required training and qualifications for DCOs.

   (l) When directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, BPT deploy DCO and DCE ISO DSCA operations.

   (m) BPT provide a prioritization of force flow recommendation to USNORTHCOM/J3.

   (n) BPT nominate the Commander, Task Force (CTF) or Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) to CDRUSNORTHCOM for approval.
(o) Coordinate with Service organizations to nominate BSIs and submit them for CDRUSNORTHCOM approval.

(p) Coordinate with Army organizations for possible deployment of forces and resources.

(q) BPT to receive individual augmentees when activated as a JTF or JFLCC.

(r) Maintain a resource database for DSCA operations.

(s) Develop after-action reports on DSCA operations.

(t) IAW with reference (w), establish Force Protection Conditions (FPCON) measures as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(u) BPT provide recommended mission specific Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) ICW USNORTHCOM to include the use of lethal and nonlethal capabilities for USNORTHCOM DSCA operations.

(v) BPT accept OPCON of forces ISO DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(w) BPT accept OPCON of EPLOs upon their activation.

(x) Provide Training Readiness Oversight for the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD CST). Establish standards for readiness, training, and evaluation guidance in coordination with USNORTHCOM.

(y) Develop relationships with national-level agencies and organizations to support DSCA operations.

(z) Conduct the Defense Support of Civil Authorities Course.

(8) **Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF)**

(a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 DSCA.

(b) BPT provide Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) support to the JTF(s) and coordinate with the JFLCC conducting DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM JOA.
(c) BPT provide administrative, logistical, and communications support for deployed service component forces.

(d) BPT designate a TF/JTF Commander when directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM for approval.

(e) BPT provide Space Recovery, Presidential, and NSSE/SE support as required.

(f) BPT coordinate the joint activities of the Coast Guard and Navy ISO DSCA operations.

(g) BPT to receive individual augmentees when activated as a JTF.

(h) BPT accept OPCON of EPLOs upon their activation.

(i) When requested by USNORTHCOM, coordinate with Navy organizations to select BSIs.

(9) Commander, Marine Forces North (COMMARFORNORTH)

(a) Develop and maintain a current CONOPS for supporting USNORTHCOM during DSCA operations.

(b) BPT coordinate administrative and logistics support required for deployed component forces with other Marine Service authorities.

(c) BPT coordinate communications support required for deployed component forces with other Marine Service authorities.

(d) BPT nominate the Commander, Task Force (CTF) or Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) to CDRUSNORTHCOM for approval.

(e) BPT coordinate with JFLCC and JFMCC for DSCA support operations.

(f) BPT attach EPLOs upon their activation.

(g) Coordinate with Headquarters, US Marine Corps to review nominated BSIs.

(10) JFHQ-NCR
(a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, DSQA, for operations in the JFHQ-NCR JOA. Conduct planning for likely DSQA contingencies ICW DHS, USSS, FEMA, NCR civil authorities, Service Components in the NCR, JTF-CS, and other federal agencies.

(b) BPT transition to a JTF headquarters tailored to provide the appropriate C2 based on the magnitude of the DSQA response.

(c) BPT deploy a CAE to provide incident awareness and early identification of potential DSQA requirements.

(d) BPT provide a Commander's Assessment identifying the likely primary agency as soon as possible after JTF-NCR personnel arrive at the incident site.

(e) BPT receive NC S.JFHQ-N enabling cell and/or service component augmentees when required to conduct DSQA operations. Coordinate with NC S.JFHQ-N for the development of a training/exercise schedule and administrative requirements IOT ensure rapid integration into JTF.

(f) BPT support the designated primary agency for DSQA operations including, but not limited to:

1. Natural Disasters (hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, other disasters, and terrorist attacks), including catastrophic incident response.

2. Defense support of law enforcement.


4. Presidential Inaugurations.

5. State of the Union Address.

6. State Funerals (other funeral services are not DSQA missions unless support is requested by a primary agency and approved and directed by the SecDef to execute as DSQA).

(g) Maintain continuous situational awareness for possible DSQA operations and events in the NCR JOA.
(h) BPT accept OPCON of forces ISO DSCA operations in the NCR JOA.

(i) BPT receive augmentees when required to conduct DSCA operations.

(j) BPT receive AFNORTH ACCE/OCP to coordinate air tasking operations and conduct airspace control.

(k) BPT provide prioritization of force flow recommendation to USNORTHCOM/J3.

(l) Develop relationships with agencies and first responders in the NCR JOA to support DSCA operations.

(m) BPT provide recommended mission specific RUF ICW USNORTHCOM to include the use of lethal and nonlethal capabilities for DSCA operations.

(11) CJTF-AK

(a) Develop and maintain a Level 2 supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, DSCA, for DSCA operations within the JTF-AK JOA. Conduct Level 1 planning for likely Alaska contingencies.

(b) BPT receive augmentees when required to conduct DSCA operations.

(c) Coordinate logistical and communications support for deployed service component forces.

(d) BPT to provide general incident awareness and early identification of potential DSCA requirements.

(e) BPT provide a Commander's assessment identifying the likely primary agency and expected requests for assistance as soon as possible after the incident.

(f) BPT receive NC SJFHQ-N enabling cell and/or service component augmentees when required to conduct DSCA operations. Coordinate with NC SJFHQ-N for the development of a training/exercise schedule and administrative requirements IOT ensure rapid integration into JTF.
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

(g) Plan DSCA in support of a primary agency. DSCA includes, but is not limited to:

1. Natural Disasters (volcanic eruptions, floods, severe weather, earthquakes and other disasters) including catastrophic incident response.

2. Defense support of the National Interagency Firefighting Coordination Center (NIFCC) for Wildland Firefighting (WFF) missions.

3. Defense support of law enforcement.

(h) Develop relationships with agencies and first responders to support DSCA operations.

(i) Maintain continuous situational awareness for possible DSCA operations and events in the Alaska JOA.

(j) BPT accept OPCON of forces ISO DSCA operations in the Alaska JOA.

(k) BPT establish Alaska-specific FPCON and sustainment guidance.

(l) Provide a force flow recommendation to USNORTHCOM/J3.

(m) BPT provide recommended mission specific RUF ICW USNORTHCOM to include the use of lethal and nonlethal capabilities for DSCA operations.

(12) CDR SJFHQ-N (When designated by CDRUSNORTHCOM):

(a) Provide a joint enabling cell to a DCO/E in support of DSCA Operations, in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(b) Establish liaison with JFHQ-State. On order, support the designated state in JTF-State operations in either a dual-status Title 10 and Title 32/State Active Duty (SAD) command structure or a parallel Title 10 and Title 32/SAD command structure.

(c) O/O deploy the Commander’s Assessment Element (CAE) within 4 hours of notification.

(d) O/O deploy (as a unit) with or without notice, within N+12 hours of notification or 6 hours after CAE has been deployed.

28 -UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO-
(e) BPT provide the joint core element (CE) for a service component-led or designated JTF.

(f) Prior to execution provide analytical support for effects development and assessment and political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, and terrorism (PMESII-T) summaries to subordinate JTFs, service component HQ, and USNORTHCOM Battle Staff, as directed.

(13) Secretary of the Army (SECARMY), Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), and Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF)

(a) BPT deploy service-controlled forces and equipment, as directed by SecDef, to support DSCA operations.

(b) BPT provide forces and equipment to CDRUSNORTHCOM for DSCA operations.

(c) BPT deploy trained EPLOs ISO DSCA operations.

(d) BPT provide BSIs, based on Service Component nomination, in order to provide installation, logistics and Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) support to deployed forces. Primary and alternate BSIs are designated via the EXORD.

(e) See Annex D for more on BSIs.

(f) BPT provide mobilization center(s)/staging base(s) as requested by FEMA and approved by SecDef.

(g) BPT accept return of personnel and equipment from CDRUSNORTHCOM, when DSCA response is complete.

(h) BPT identify and provide any additional individual augmentation as required in coordination with (ICW) CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(14) Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB)

(a) BPT provide daily SITREPS to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center on National Guard activities in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(b) BPT assist USNORTHCOM and subordinate Headquarters with integrating/synchronizing federal and non-federal military planning, response, deployment/redeployment, and transition efforts.

29
(c) BPT coordinate, assist, and facilitate JFHQ-State(s) in forming capabilities packages.

(d) If required for DSCA operations, request NGB coordinate, assist, and facilitate JFHQ-State(s) in providing BSI/JRSOI to Title 10 and other federal response assets.

(e) BPT establish liaison with the USNORTHCOM TF/JTF to avoid on-site duplication of missions, ensure unity of effort, and share FPCON and a COP.

(f) BPT provide an NGB Public Affairs representative for the USNORTHCOM Public Affairs Joint Information Center.

(15) Supporting Defense Agencies. As directed by SeeDef, provide the following resources and/or capabilities:

(a) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Provide DSCA support and technical expertise to include 24 hours a day/7 days a week technical reach back assistance to federal, state, and local agencies.

(b) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). Ensure USNORTHCOM, supporting commands and agencies receive timely and effective command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) support, and other support as required.

(c) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Coordinate with USNORTHCOM and Service components for subsistence, clothing, individual equipment, petroleum, construction materials, personal demand items, medical materials and repair parts support. Provide integrated material management and supply support for all DLA managed material. Provide property and hazardous material (HAZMAT) disposal services.

(d) Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). Provide worldwide contract management services to include administering Civilian Augmentation Program contracts. Procure contracting officers, or a buying activity may delegate to DCMA any or all contract management functions listed in FAR Part 42.302. Provide an Initial Response Team (IRT) to the DSCA Area of Operations to perform contract administration services.

(e) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). Provide imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial products in support of DSCA response activities for DOD, primary/coordinating agencies, and supporting organizations.
f. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA provides specialized support to USNORTHCOM in DSCA missions which may include situational awareness, damage assessment, evacuation monitoring, search and rescue, and CBRNE assessments.

e. Coordinating Instructions

   (1) This plan is effective for planning upon receipt, and for execution upon notification.

   (2) Direct liaison is authorized (DIRLIAUTH) among subordinate units and with JFHQ-States.

   (3) Medical and communications support for deployed forces remain a Combatant Command Service or Supporting Component responsibility; however, the parent unit retains certain responsibilities, such as administrative control and logistical support.

   (4) All service casualties will be reported via both the operational and Service chains of command.

   (5) Service and functional components will capture costs during all phases of the operation for ultimate reimbursement from the primary agency.

   (6) If DOD members (military and civilian) supporting civil authorities under Immediate Response Authority (IRA) are to remain at the incident site at the request of civil authorities, CDRUSNORTHCOM may request OPCON of any forces that remain at the incident.

   (7) Any service forces responding under IRA must notify the National Military Command Center (NMCC) IAW DepSecDef's 25 Apr 05 guidance on Reporting Immediate Response Requests from Civil Authorities. Army commands will require notification within two hours of the decision to provide immediate response assistance IAW DA message 051914ZJul05. NMCC will notify the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center as soon as practicable.

   (8) All DSCA will be provided on a reimbursable basis unless reimbursement is waived by the President or the SecDef. Immediate response should be provided to civil authorities on a cost-reimbursement basis, if possible.

   (9) Installation support provided initially by MOA/MOU or under DODD 2000.18, Installation CBRNE CM response, will be completed or may be incorporated into the USNORTHCOM led response as OPCON to the
established C2 organization (TF/JTF) and incorporated via the BSI and JRSOI process.

(10) All forces arriving in the USNORTHCOM JOA will be received via the JRSOI process.

(11) Establish Force Protection Conditions (FP CON) guidance, measures, and sustainment as directed by CDR USNORTHCOM.

(12) JTF-CS will remain the JFLCC primary coordinating subordinate for CM planning efforts consistent with its USNORTHCOM role as the center of excellence for CBRNE CM. JTF-CS will remain a subordinate headquarters to USNORTHCOM until ARNORTH becomes the standing JFLCC for USNORTHCOM and declares IOC.

(13) Commander’s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR)

(a) Are there indicators of emergencies, disasters, or other events that could overwhelm local, state or tribal capabilities?

(b) Has the President issued a Major Disaster Declaration or Emergency Declaration?

(c) Has a State Governor requested federal assistance for which DOD may be tasked to provide DSCA?

(d) Has another Federal Agency requested DOD assistance?

(e) Are DOD actions being portrayed accurately in the media?

(f) Has a DSCA responder been seriously injured or killed?

(g) Have Standing Rules for Use of Force (SRUF) been violated by a DSCA responder?

(h) Has a DSCA responder caused serious injury or death?

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Concept of Support. The concept for support is to utilize the designated BSI (or multiple installations) as the hub for supporting the JTF. The JTF is responsible for planning all aspects of the logistics concept of support for DSCA forces responding. See Annex D for more detail.
b. Logistics. The BSI provides the majority of common logistics items, and each service remains responsible for providing service-unique logistics support to their forces deployed for DSCA operations. The JTF is responsible for integrating logistics support provided from service channels and commercial sources. In all cases, delivery will be pushed as far down the supply chain as feasible, to the nearest retail distribution point, typically at the designated BSI.

(1) Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services. The JTF may either modify existing BSI service contracts, or leverage local or regional contract capability to meet logistics support requirements.

(2) Civil Engineering. USACE is the Primary and Coordinating Agency for ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering. Planning and Response Teams (PRTs) are trained to respond to typical mission areas providing ice and water, emergency power, temporary roofing and housing, debris clearance and removal, contaminated debris removal, support to urban search and rescue, and infrastructure assessment. USACE also provides technical assistance and emergency repair of public works and infrastructure. A limited number of deployable tactical operations centers provide emergency communications during a disaster. Engineering support to deployed Title 10 forces would most likely be provided through contracting or by engineer forces deployed in support of the DSCA operation. (See Appendix 6 to Annex D of this plan.)

(3) Environmental Responsibilities. DOD forces employed in DSCA operations are responsible for protecting our environment. Commanders will employ environmentally responsible practices that minimize adverse impacts on human health and the environment. The DOD goals are to initiate actions as soon as possible to curtail further environmental damage and to resolve environmental impacts. During all operations, strategies will be developed to reduce or eliminate negative impacts on the environment. DOD will be in support of a primary agency, and environmental responsibilities will remain with the primary agency. However, this does not release DOD from responsibility to plan and conduct operations in a manner responsive to environmental considerations. Timely DSCA response in crisis circumstances may make it necessary to take immediate action without preparing the normal environmental planning documents. Close coordination with local, state, and federal agencies during DSCA actions is needed to avoid negative environmental consequences. The DOD goal is compliance with all applicable laws to the maximum extent possible.

(4) Environmental Conditions and Transfer to Civil Authorities. Documenting conditions and actions as soon as possible before, during, and after operations in the JOA will facilitate resolution and closure of environmental issues. An active environmental review of DOD DSCA
operations should be accomplished to identify possible environmental issues before a negative impact occurs. Close liaison/communication with the applicable DOD Regional Environmental Coordinator (REC) will also aid in ultimate resolution of environmental issues with local, state, tribal and federal agencies. Environmental impacts will be addressed as soon as possible once operations have stabilized. Emergency exemptions may be needed for disposal of contaminated and hazardous material. DOD forces should direct their efforts to properly identify, contain, document, and transfer environmental issues to civil authorities as soon as possible.

c. **Personnel.** JTF Commanders will develop and submit a Joint Manning Document (JMD) to USNORTHCOM for validation. The JMD will comply with the format and process established in CJCSI 1301-01C. CDRUSJFCOM, ICW Service Components, will source USNORTHCOM validated and SecDef approved requirements and notify the JTF of individual augmentee information and arrival dates. The designated C2 HQ will be responsible for coordinating the Joint Reception Center (JRC), maintaining accountability of deployed DOD personnel, and reporting personnel information to USNORTHCOM via Joint Personnel Status (JPERSTAT) report (See Annex E).

d. **Public Affairs.** The media will play an important role in reporting events and shaping public opinion concerning DSCA operations. Any DOD response must take into account possible media contributions and repercussions. The JFO Joint Information Center (JIC) will provide information to the media. The OASD-PA is the DOD focal point for all media inquiries concerning DOD DSCA operations. Delegation of release authority to the USNORTHCOM Public Affairs Office, and in turn to the appropriate C2 HQ, is allowed ISO this plan (See Annex F).

e. **Medical Services.** During DSCA operations, medical and public health needs will be significant factors. The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), which includes DOD coordination with participating non-federal fixed hospitals and DOD provided patient movement, is the primary federal-level medical response element. Other DOD medical capabilities external to NDMS should be requested if it is determined necessary to augment or sustain the NDMS/local response in order to save lives and minimize human suffering. The time sensitive nature of the requirements necessitates early and rapid interagency coordination to be effective. Restrictions on the use of military medical stockpiles and on the military vaccinating civilians may need to be addressed in mission planning (See Annex Q).

f. **Funding Requirements and Tracking.** Funding of DOD units participating in DSCA operations in support of other government agencies will be IAW law and within the established FAR, DOD Directives, policy, and guidance and the NRF. Each DOD component is responsible for capturing
and reporting costs to Service/Defense Agency Comptrollers. CDRUSNORTHCOM will ensure compliance by Service Components and will report to the SecDef when reimbursement is completed for all DSCA operations. Standard interagency billing procedures will be followed.

5. **Command and Control**

a. **Command.** USNORTHCOM is the DOD principal planning agent for DSCA and will C2 any DSCA operation within the OA. At execution, USNORTHCOM will determine the appropriate C2 for the DSCA response forces OPCON to execute the mission.

   (1) **Command Relationships.**

      (a) **Organizational Structure.** See Annex J.

      (b) **Changes During Execution.** DSCA response forces will be provided to USNORTHCOM by force providers IAW SecDef orders.

      (c) **Command Agreements.** JFHQ-NCR. IAW reference (x), JFHQ-NCR is OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM.

   (2) **Command Post.**

      (a) The USNORTHCOM Command Center, USNORTHCOM’s primary incident awareness center, is located in Building 2 on Peterson AFB, CO. The USNORTHCOM Command Center oversees current operations. The NORAD USNORTHCOM Command Center could be operated from either a fixed or mobile facility. In the field, the JFC or JTF C2 element should, if feasible, collocate with the JFO. At a minimum, the JFC or JTF field C2 element should establish robust communications to support close coordination with the JFO.

      (b) **Component Commanders / Supporting Component Commanders.**

         1. ARNO cords, Fort Sam Houston, TX
         2. AFRNORTH, Tyndall AFB, FL
         3. USFF, Naval Support Activity, Norfolk, VA
         4. MARFORNORTH, Naval Supt Activity, New Orleans, LA

   (c) **Functional Components.**
1. JFLLCC (ARNORTH), Fort Sam Houston, TX
2. JFACC (AFNORTH), Tyndall AFB, FL
3. JFMCC (USFF), Naval Support Activity, Norfolk, VA

(d) Subordinate Commands.
1. JFHQ-NCR, Fort McNair, Washington, DC
2. JTF-AK, Elmendorf AFB, AK
3. JTF-CS, Fort Monroe, VA
4. JTF-N, Fort Bliss, TX
5. SJFHQ-N, Peterson AFB, CO

(3) Succession of Command. As specified in the UCP, if there is a vacancy in the office of CDRUSNORTHCOM, or a temporary absence or disability, the Deputy Commander, USNORTHCOM shall act as the Combatant Commander and perform the duties of the Combatant Commander until a successor is appointed, or the absence or disability ceases. If a Deputy Commander has not been designated, or is absent or disabled, interim command shall pass to the next senior officer present for duty and eligible to exercise command regardless of Service affiliation.

b. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems.
See Annex K.

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Annexes:
A - Task Organization
B - Intelligence
C - Operations
D - Logistics
E - Personnel
F - Public Affairs
G - Civil Affairs - Not Used
H - Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations - Not Used
J - Command Relationships
K - Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems
L - Environmental Considerations - See Basic Plan paragraph 4.b.(3) & (4)
M - Geospatial Information and Services - Not Used
N - Space Operations - Not Used
P - Host-Nation Support - Not used
Q - Medical Services
R - Reports - Not Used
S - Special Technical Operations - Not Used
T - Consequence Management - Not Used
U - Notional CP Decision Guide - Not Used
V - Interagency Coordination
W - Contingency Contractors and Contracting
X - Execution Checklist - Not Used
Y - Strategic Communication
Z - Distribution
ANNEX A TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501

TASK ORGANIZATION

c. National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement, September 2005

1. Task Organization Planning

a. Response forces are not dedicated to CDRUSNORTHCOM for use prior to an approved request for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). A Request for Federal Assistance (RFA) may be received from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a Primary or Coordinating Agency, or a State Governor. In anticipation of forthcoming DSCA requirements, USNORTHCOM can submit a Request for Forces (RFF). Upon Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approval of either the RFA or RFF, USNORTHCOM receives OPCON of forces to conduct DSCA operations. Actual forces received depend upon:

1. Scope of mission.
2. Threat during deployment, employment, and redeployment.
3. Reaction time.
4. Geographic location, size, and nature of the situation.
5. Special requirements, e.g. equipment, training, or technical expertise.
6. Availability and readiness of forces.
7. Other worldwide commitments.

b. When CDRUSNORTHCOM is designated the supported combatant commander for DSCA operations, forces may be tasked or requested
through the Joint Staff from any Service, combatant commander, or DOD agency.

2. Task Organization

a. Components

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>US Fleet Forces</td>
<td>USFF</td>
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<td>US Marine Forces North</td>
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<td>Joint Task Force – Civil Support</td>
<td>CJTF-CS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Force Headquarters – National Capital Region</td>
<td>CJFHQ-NCR</td>
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c. Supporting Commands

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<tr>
<td>US Transportation Command</td>
<td>CDRUSTRANSCOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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General, USAF
Commander

Appendixes

3 - Catastrophic Incident Baseline Capabilities Package

OFFICIAL

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Major General, USA
Director of Operations
APPENDIX 3, TO ANNEX A TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT BASELINE CAPABILITIES PACKAGE

References: See Base Plan.

1. General. This appendix lists force capabilities intended as a single, catastrophic incident baseline package, applicable to any catastrophic incident that may be immediately requested for response. The capabilities in this package are focused on saving lives, preventing human suffering, and mitigating great property damage. At the incident occurrence, several factors will further define the actual capabilities package requested. These include: USNORTHCOM Mission Analysis, State response capabilities, National Guard (including EMAC) response, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) response, and Federal Agency requested assistance. Several of the capabilities listed below are pre-identified as part of the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF), as indicated.

2. Catastrophic Incident Baseline Capabilities Package.

a. Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF). Able to Command and Control multiple maneuver units (up to 3 organizations, equivalent to Army Brigade / Air Force Wing in size), operating within a large geographical area potentially subdivided into smaller operations areas each under C2 of subordinate TF or JTF. The JTF is expected to be supported by USTRANSCOM's USNORTHCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (NDDOC), a Civil Authority Information Support Element (CAISE), a Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), a Joint Search and Rescue Coordination Center (JSRCC), augmentation from the JFCOM JFHQ Core Element (JTF-CE) and from SJFHQ-North, a Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR), and with a Defense Coordinating Officer with supporting element (DCO / E) under their Tactical control.

b. Supporting Installations. FEMA (or appropriate Federal Primary Agency) will identify to USNORTHCOM desired military installations and required capabilities to serve as either Mobilization Centers or Operational Staging Areas. USNORTHCOM will coordinate with services/agencies and designate installations to support the operation. If DOD forces are deployed, USNORTHCOM will coordinate (if feasible under the circumstances) support from Base Support
Installations (BSIs) that will not interfere with recovery efforts and appropriate ports of embarkation/debarkation with USTRANSCOM. See Annex D for more information.

c. **Rotary Wing Aviation.** In any large-scale DSCA response (disaster) rotary wing aviation support is a critical asset and must be employed early on.

1. U.S. Army Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) with its supporting Aviation Support Battalion and General Support Battalion provide air transport of emergency response personnel and supplies, conduct aerial damage assessment and reconnaissance, provide emergency Medical Evacuation, and to provide Command and Control aircraft.

2. The USNORTHCOM designated JFACC, ICW the FAA and NORAD, BPT provide Airspace Control in the disaster relief area.

3. Weather Service support (METOC Team) to provide air weather service in support of the Aviation Brigade. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

4. Medium Lift Helicopter Company (CH-47). Recommended from the CAB's General Support Aviation Battalion (12 CH-47). Provides air movement of emergency personnel and supplies; augments air medical evacuation operations; can be equipped for fire fighting operations (fire bucket).

d. **Airfield / Fixed Wing Aircraft / Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR).**

1. Air Force Contingency Response Group (CRG) to rapidly assess and reopen airfields and to perform initial airfield / air base operations to include air traffic control.

2. Request one (1) fixed wing search aircraft with crew, capable of conducting aerial reconnaissance (visual observation, still photography, video download) of damage in the affected area (recommend asset is a P-3 aircraft or National Guard C-130 Scathe View).

3. Request U.S. Air Force, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), E-3 Sentry aircraft. To provide all weather surveillance, command, control, and communications.
(4) Digital Topographic Support System – Deployable (DTSS-D), to provide the ability to quickly create (generate and print) map products from commercial and national imagery and to perform terrain analysis based on the attribute inspection of the available imagery. Recommended source from CCMRF designated unit.

e. **Maritime Capabilities.** (location dependent)

(1) Three Vessel Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) with embarked aviation and Disaster Relief Teams (DRT). To provide the capability to launch and recover DOD helicopters and deploy landing craft as well as, providing inland and inter-coastal waterway search and rescue ops and transportation of supplies and equipment.

(2) Underwater survey capability and underwater salvage assets (situation dependent) may also be required.

f. **Engineer Capabilities.**

(!) Engineer battalion sized unit capable of:

(a) Constructing, repairing/opening and maintaining emergency routes and/or landing strips.

(b) Building structures and repairing or providing utilities (water, gas, sewer, heating/AC, electrical) to critical facilities in the affected area.

g. **Medical Capabilities.**

(1) Medical Brigade Headquarters (Commander and Staff) to provide Command and Control of DOD Medical Forces in the JOA / AO. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(2) Epidemiology Team to provide subject matter expertise to the TF / JTF Commander to plan and evaluate strategies to prevent illness to assist in the management of patients when disease is present. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(3) Special Medical Augmentation Response Team, Sanitation and Preventive Medicine (SMART-PM) to provide sanitation and entomological support with the capability to support mass temporary housing areas. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.
(4) Special Medical Augmentation Response Team, Trauma and Critical Care (SMART-TCC) to provide initial emergency medical treatment until a more robust capability is established. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(5) SMART-MC3T (Medical Command, Control, Commo and Telemedicine) to provide military coordination with civil emergency medical personnel on behalf of the TF/JTF and to provide communications and telemedicine capability. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(6) USTRANSCOM Joint Patient Movement Team (JPMT), Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Teams (AELT), and Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility (MASF), to facilitate the movement of patients via the patient movement system operated by the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC) at Scott AFB, providing overall patient transportation coordination.

(7) U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) + 25, 25 bed medical capability. This package provides an initial Level III (Theater Hospital) Health Service Support (HSS) capability which can expand to an Air Force Theater Hospital if required. This capability includes a Small Portable Expeditionary Aero medical Rapid Response (SPEAR) team (Module 1), and EMEDS Module 2 providing added personnel (15) and equipment (2 463L pallets). Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

(8) Two Medical Companies, with similar capabilities as Army Area Support Medical Companies (ASMC), including treatment and ambulance platoons. Recommended source is from CCMRF designated unit.

h. Public Affairs.

(1) Public Affairs detachments (2 each minimum with 8 pax each). Recommend sourcing one of the two from CCMRF designated units.

(2) Digital Imagery Distribution System Team to provide imagery collection and analysis.

(3) Combat Camera teams (2 each teams with 5 pax each) with digital and still photography capabilities.

(4) Civil Authority Information Support Element (CAISE) with capabilities to include a command and control element,
ANNEX B TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
INTELLIGENCE

References:  

a. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3400 -Annex B, 29 July 2005 (S/NF)

c. Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 June 2007
d. Joint Pub 2-01.2, Counter Intelligence and Human Intelligence, 13 June 2006 (S)
e. DIAM 58-11 (Draft), Department of Defense HUMINT Policies and Procedures, 7 May 2002 (S)
f. DOD Directive 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities, 25 April 1988
g. DOD Regulation 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, December 1982
h. Sustained Vigilance, Intelligence Support for North America’s Homeland Defense —A Strategic Direction for the NORAD-USNORTHCOM J2, January 2003
j. See additional references in base plan

1. Situation

a. Characteristics of the Area. When directed by the Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM will execute DSCA operations within the USNORTHCOM OA to respond quickly and effectively to the requests of civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. In order to accomplish planning and execution of DSCA operations, USNORTHCOM will ensure that timely, relevant intelligence is provided to CDRUSNORTHCOM, combatant commanders, and Component/Subordinate Commands.
b. **Enemy.** DSCA missions in response to natural disasters will not likely face an enemy force. However, if an enemy attack occurred with weapons of mass destruction, radiological dispersal devices, or a coherent campaign of improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, conventional attacks, etc., could lead to the conduct of DSCA operations in an environment with a capable enemy element. As such, deployed DOD forces in support of civil disaster relief efforts are potentially vulnerable to a variety of adverse affects. The specific nature of the vulnerability will be assessed as the situation develops. Access to the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Intelligence Directorate webpages are: NIPRNET: https://operations.noradnorthcom.mil/sites/NNCJ2/NNCJ22/DSCA/default.aspx; and SIPRNET: http://j2web.northcom.smil.mil, both will provide the most current assessment concerning impacts to deployed DOD forces. Some potential threats to the DSCA force are:

(1) Foreign intelligence services and terrorists will likely monitor how the military responds to natural disasters and emergencies in order to assess USNORTHCOM's operational capabilities. See reference (a) for additional current intelligence assessments concerning the threat to U.S. Forces in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(2) Intelligence support to force protection operations is addressed in reference (c). In general, however, the majority of operational and tactical information governing operations in support of JSIO this plan will be derived from the cognizant local, state and federal law enforcement agencies.

c. **Friendly.** The following national-level organizations provide intelligence support: Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. Also, Subordinate, Component, and Joint Task Force Intelligence activities will provide intelligence information. USSTRATCOM, through the SCC-WMD, will provide situational awareness of WMD aspects concerning DSCA, as required.

d. **Legal Considerations.** Use of Defense Intelligence Component assets ISO DSCA missions must be specifically approved by SecDef. The use of these intelligence assets for non-intelligence purposes is called Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA). Currently, the 2007 DSCA EXORD authorizes the use of Defense Intelligence Component assets for IAA for the following missions:
situational awareness, damage assessment, evacuation monitoring, search and rescue, and CBRNE assessment. (See reference (v) in Basic Plan).

2. **Mission:** The JIOC-N will operate as the Command’s lead for conducting intelligence operations, providing warning of worldwide threats, threat characterization, and leveraging of intelligence capabilities, to support NORAD and USNORTHCOM missions.

3. **Execution:**

   a. **Concept of Intelligence Operations.** JIOC-N will provide intelligence support to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Battle Staff and JTF DSCA, via the Operational Intelligence Watch (OIW), which operates a 24-hour intelligence watch at Cheyenne Mountain Air Station. The OIW will be the theater level focal point for intelligence flow and is responsible for the coordination between theater and subordinate intelligence activities required to support execution of this plan. N-NC/J2 and NC/J3 will coordinate to provide appropriate dissemination of non-foreign intelligence information in accordance with IAW governing legal constraints.

   b. **Tasks.** JIOC-N ensures seamless, dynamic, and collaborative intelligence and information exchanges within the intelligence and counterintelligence/Law Enforcement communities.

      (1) Provide real-time and near-real-time Indications and Warnings (I&W)

      (2) Conduct Fusion and Analysis

      (3) Satisfy Counterintelligence; planning, intelligence policy and programming requirements

      (4) Satisfy information, physical, automated data processing, and industrial security.

   c. **Priority Intelligence Requirements.** The following PIRs support this plan:

      (1) When will a natural disaster occur requiring USNORTHCOM support to Civil Authorities? (CCIR 5)

      (2) Has a man-made disaster occurred requiring USNORTHCOM support to Civil Authorities? (CCIR 5)

   d. **New Requirements.** Requests for specific national agency support and Intelligence requirements needed to support planning
and execution should be directed to the JIOC-N Intelligence Policy, Plans, and Programs Division (J25X).

e. Collection.

(1) All collection requirements in support of this plan will be coordinated through the Collection Management Branch, Operations Division, JIOC-N. As the Command’s Collection Management Authority (CMA), Collection Management Branch coordinates all collection requirements for submission to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for imagery intelligence, signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurements and signatures intelligence, human intelligence (HUMINT), and open source intelligence (OSINT). As Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) resources are apportioned to the Command for Joint Staff-directed missions, Collection Management Branch will continue to execute CMA, however Collection Operations Management (COM) for apportioned ISR resources will be performed by the NORTHCOM Joint Component Command that is assigned the mission. COM must be closely coordinated with the NORTHCOM’s JIOC Production Manager, to ensure efficient federated product in order to properly support operations.

(2) As required, USSTRATCOM through Joint Functional. Component Command for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance will assist USNORTHCOM to plan, integrate and employ ISR assets, including associated Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination capabilities through the Geographic Combatant Commanders, Services, federated analytical and production centers, and mission partners. Integration and coordination of ISR activities with Combat Support Agencies (CSA), DOD, and other government agencies, allies, and friends is essential.

(3) If unable to contact the JIOC-N, the Operational Intelligence Watch, conduct 24/7 operations in Cheyenne Mountain and is available to accept intelligence requests/requirements. Utilization of the group e-mail addresses: cifs@cheyennemountain.af.mil (UNCLASS), uncj230iw@cheyennemountain.af.mil (SIPRNET), cmoci2@norad.cas.spacecom.af.mil (RELCAAN), or cmoci2@northcom.ic.gov (JWICS) will route the request to the appropriate OIW personnel. OIW STE/STU-III capable
numbers are: Commercial: (719) 474-4508, or 474-4524; and DSN: 268-4508, 268-3979, or 268-4524.


g. Processing and Evaluation. All requirements ISO USNORTHCOM subordinate and component forces will be coordinated between component and subordinate J2s or JTF J2, if operational, and the JIOC-N. See reference (c). The Joint Force Headquarters State is requested to submit requests for information/intelligence (RFI) through the National Guard Bureau (NGB) Joint Operations Center (JOC) RFI process. The NGB JOC will validate, coordinate, and answer; however, RFIs that concern a threat to the USNORTHCOM OA should be forwarded to N-NC/J2 for resolution.

h. Analysis and Production. Data derived from law enforcement information; and all-source strategic and asymmetric capabilities is fused, analyzed, and assessed. Using various analytical techniques, the information is collated into tailored products that provide predictive and actionable threat characterization; and timely warning of threats to the USNORTHCOM AOR. The fundamental precepts to this process are: know the enemy, know ourselves (critical infrastructure and vulnerabilities), know the environment, and know what the enemy knows about us. Products are made available to customers via NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and JWICS common operation environment capabilities.

i. Dissemination and Integration. Information for support to DSCA is disseminated in the most expeditious manner available, with the priority of five networks going to that which is of primary use by the forces supporting the operation. The JIOC-N model is a federated, web-based approach with a subscription service which, allows the customers to receive an e-mail immediately after any new DSCA product is posted to the website.

(1) During a DSCA event, tactical units will be required to forward status information on a 12- to 24-hour basis, depending upon the operation.

(2) To every extent possible, information is provided at the Secret Releasable to Canada level or below; this is accomplished by the “Write for Release” program.
j. NCJ2 uses a federated approach to mission support. Tasking, collection, processing, exploitation and dissemination (TCPED) is done by partners within the intelligence community, with NCJ2 orchestrating the process.

(1) JIOC-N hosts video teleconferences and teleconferences for TCPED coordination with the various partners; periodicity as required. Coordination is further supported by a federated matrix which delineates responsibilities.

(2) Domestic information is reviewed to ensure the intelligence oversight rules are followed.

k. Coordinating Instructions. Contact the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Director of Intelligence and Information Operations Systems Lawyer at Commercial (719) 554-2229 or DSN: 692-2229 or the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Staff Judge Advocate at Commercial: (719)554-9193, if additional information is needed.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Orders to Subordinate and Supporting Units.

(1) Joint Task Force (JTF) DSCA J2

(a) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure portable voice communications.

(b) Conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(c) Identify requirements for national and theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Identify JTF intelligence shortfalls.

(e) Monitor JIOC-N threat assessment and R&W reporting.

(2) Commander, JTF-Alaska. The JTF-Alaska/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support JIOC-N in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 3501 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.
(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common threat picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor JIOC-N threat assessment and Indications and Warnings (I&W) reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analysis support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(3) Commander, JTF-Civil Support (CS). The JTF-CS/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support JIOC-N in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 3501 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common threat picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor JIOC-N threat assessment and I&W reporting

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analysis support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(4) Commander, JFHQ-National Capital Region (NCR). The JFHQ-NCR/J2 will:

B-7
(a) Be prepared to support JIOC-N in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 3501 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common threat picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor JIOC-N threat assessment and I&W reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analysis support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(5) Commander, ARNORTH. The ARNORTH/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support JIOC-N in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 3501 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common threat picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor JIOC-N threat assessment and I&W reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analysis support to federal agencies as required.
(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(6) Commander, MARFORNORTH. The MARFORNORTH/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support JIOC-N in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 3501 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common threat picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor JIOC-N threat assessment and I&W reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analysis support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(7) Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF). The USFF/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support JIOC-N in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 3501 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common threat picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.
(e) Monitor JIOC-N threat assessment and I&W reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analysis support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(8) Commander, AFNORTH. The AFNORTH/J2 will:

(a) Be prepared to support JIOC-N in the preparation and execution of CONPLAN 3501 missions as directed; and conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(b) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM with secure voice communications.

(c) Identify requirements for theater level collections and production assets.

(d) Disseminate the common threat picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor JIOC-N threat assessment and I&W reporting.

(f) Be prepared to provide intelligence analysis support to federal agencies as required.

(g) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

(9) Joint Intelligence Operations Center – Transportation

(a) Operate through reachback to USNORTHCOM via secure communications.

(b) Conduct intelligence activities IAW base plan (paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 specifically) and references.

(c) Coordinate and consolidate reporting and production of the status of distribution networks in the affected area.
(d) Disseminate the common threat picture to USNORTHCOM and all supporting commands, agencies, and JTFs.

(e) Monitor JIOC-N threat assessment and I&W reporting.

(f) Participate in the preparation and review of annexes to supporting plans.

a. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units.

Request for intelligence and information support to address DSCA related domestic disasters, emergencies, incidents or events will be made, via appropriate channels, to the following national-level organizations: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

5. Command and Control.

a. No unique command relationships.

b. See ANNEX K to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, Command, Control, Communications, And Computer (C4) Systems for command systems and procedures to be used to carry out intelligence functions.

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General, USAF
Commander

OFFICIAL

M.A. NOLL
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Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270
16 May 2008

ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
OPERATIONS

References:

a. Title 10, United States Code, Sections 12301-12304
   (Statutes Affecting Reserve Components)
b. Title 10, United States Code, Section 377,
   Reimbursement
c. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1385, Posse
   Comitatus Act
d. Title 31, United States Code, Section 1535, Economy Act
e. Title 32, United States Code, National Guard
f. Title 42, United States Code, Section 5121 et. seq.
   (Stafford Act, Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act)
h. National Incident Management System (NIMS), March
   2004
i. National Response Framework (NRF), January 2008
j. National Response Plan - Catastrophic Incident
   Supplement (NRP-CIS), September 2005 (FOUO)
k. National Military Strategy of the United States of America,
   July 2002
l. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY-04
m. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY-05
n. Unified Command Plan (UCP), 5 May 2006 (FOUO)
o. Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), Fiscal Years 2006-
   2011, 1 March 2004
p. CJCSI 3111.01F, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY
   2006 (JSCP FY06), with change 1 (TS)
q. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement /
   Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, 13 June
   2005 (S)
r. CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operations Planning and
   Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, 17 August 2007
s. DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support,
   June 2005
t. DOD Homeland Security Joint Operations Concept (DOD
   HLS JOC), February 2004
u. DOD Directive 5200.27, Acquisition of Information
   Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the
   Department of Defense, 7 January 1980

C-1
v. DOD Instruction 3025.dd, Processing Requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (draft)
w. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3400, Homeland Defense, 22 November 2005
x. USNORTHCOM Civil Support Concept of Employment (CONEMP), 20 August 2004
y. DepSecDef's 25 Apr 05 memorandum, "Reporting Immediate Response Requests from Civil Authorities"
a. DA Message, DTG 051941ZJUL05
aa. CJCS Standing DSCA EXORD, DTG 081823ZJUN07
bb. Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support, 14 September 2007

1. General.

a. **Purpose.** This annex provides direction for the conduct of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). USNORTHCOM executes DSCA missions by providing support (military forces, DOD civilians, contractor personnel, and or DOD agency and component assets) when directed by the President or as approved or delegated by the Secretary of Defense.

   (1) Likely DSCA missions include:

      (a) Assistance provided by DOD, when requested, in response to disasters (natural and man-made, including acts of terrorism) that may require support as outlined in the Catastrophic Incident Annex and Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the NRF.

      (b) Assistance provided by DOD, when requested, to support Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated National Special Security Events (NSSE) and approved Special Events (SE) and supporting Law Enforcement in certain circumstances.

(2) General process for requesting DOD support. Federal Agencies or State Governors request DOD capabilities to support their disaster response efforts by using a formal Request for Assistance (RFA) Process. Requests flow to DOD through various means, depending on the nature of the incident (whether the rules of the Stafford Act apply or not), how much time has elapsed since the incident occurred (Immediate Response, JFO established, PFO appointed, JTF deployed), and the level at which the request is generated (Incident command, State, Regional, or National).

   (a) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121, et seq.), authorizes the federal government to help state
and local governments alleviate the suffering and damage caused by disasters. This act provides authority for disaster preparedness, presidential grants for planning, presidential declarations of major disaster or emergency, formation of immediate support teams, reimbursement to agencies (including DOD), and major disaster assistance programs to help state and local governments mitigate the suffering and damage caused by disasters, emergencies, and other incidents. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is normally the Primary Agency for responses covered by the Stafford Act. A typical scenario includes the requirement being identified at the event site, Incident Command Post, through situational awareness and assessment. If the local responders are capable of meeting the requirement, they do so. If not, State resources are checked. If they cannot provide the necessary capability, Joint Field Office (JFO), once established, is queried. The ability to fill the requirement is checked against multiple, potential sources. These include checks with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, other FEMA ESF managers, the State National Guard capabilities, other States National Guard capabilities (supporting under Emergency Management Assistance Compact / EMAC), and confirmation that contractor support is not available to meet the requirement. If there is no capability to meet the requirement, then the RFA is passed to the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). All RFA from FEMA, including Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs), should be processed through the DCO tasked to support the involved FEMA Region.

1. Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO) are provided to each FEMA regional office from ARNORTH. In this role, these personnel provide the conduit to flow information (planning efforts, regional concerns, pre-event RFA, and pre-scripted RFA/MA) into USNORTHCOM. As a DCO, they review, validate, and provide a recommendation for FEMA and NIPC submitted RFAs to the CDRUSNORTHCOM. CDRUSNORTHCOM will then review, coordinate, and provide recommendations to Joint Staff Director of Military Support (JDOMS). JDOMS will send the RFA to the office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Secretariat (DOD ExecSec) and OASD (HD/ASA) for review and subsequent SecDef decision. The DCO has the authority to determine if an RFA is appropriate for DOD to fill using the following criteria:
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i. Legality. Is this request in compliance with applicable laws? Does DOD, active component, have authority to do this (i.e., Posse Comitatus Act)?

ii. Lethality. Potential use of lethal force by or against DOD personnel likely or expected?

iii. Risk. Can the request be met safely, or can concerns be mitigated by equipment or training? Will DOD forces be safe while providing the support?

iv. Cost. Who pays, is there a fund cite provided?

v. Appropriateness. Is it in the best interest of DOD to conduct the requested mission? Who normally performs and is best suited to fill the request (USACE, National Guard, USCG, contractors)? Is there a determinations and finding statement stating that providing this support is in the best interest of the government and that the requested support cannot be provided as conveniently or economically by other means (or similar wording)?

vi. Readiness. What is the effect of this mission on the ability of DOD to perform its primary National Defense mission? Are the force capabilities requested preparing for other deployments or significant training events (if known)?

2. If the DCO determines the request is not appropriate, the request may be rejected and sent back to the requesting agency.

3. The DCO also ensures the request is readily understandable and generally matches a DOD capability. If it is not, the DCC / E attempt to clarify and provide recommended language to the requestor.

4. EPLOs are service assets and may be activated and employed by their services. Once activated EPLOs are OPCON to the service component commander. Those EPLOs requested by and allocated to CDRUSNORTHCOM are TACON to the DCO.

5. The DCO / E coordinates with the USNORTHCOM Operational Headquarters (JTF, Contingency Support Group, Response Support Group, Operational Command Post, Joint

C-4

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Force Commander, etc.), supporting the mission. The Operational Headquarters assesses the following:

i. Whether additional operational or logistics support is required due to the anticipated increase in forces under their span of control. If added support capabilities, facilities, or additional staffing are required, the Operational Headquarters provides notification to USNORTHCOM and its appropriate Service Component Command (ARNORTH, AFNORTH, USFF, and MARFORNORTH).

ii. To determine the potential of already deployed forces to meet the requirement. If so, the forces are provided a WARNORD and the assessed ability to support is reported to the DCO, the Service Component Command, and USNORTHCOM.

iii. Impact on planned force flow and JRST.

iv. The expected mission of the requested capability and an analysis to determine the Measures Of Performance (MOP) appropriate for the anticipated capability to enable reporting to support the Measurement Of Effectiveness (MOE) towards the desired effects.

v. Any additional considerations, or recommendations in regards to how best to support the request are provided to the DCO, the Service Component Command, and USNORTHCOM.

6. If the DCO determines that the RFA is an appropriate DOD mission, he / she provides the RFA to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center along with a recommendation. Additional information such as points of contact, updated assessment, and refined costing data can be provided after the RFA has gone forward.

7. In some circumstances, Stafford Act requests may originate from the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), FEMA Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) or the FEMA National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) and pass directly to the JDOMS or the DOD Executive Secretary, vice though a DCO. This may occur for initial requests in accordance with the NRF, or when a DCO is not assigned or available to the FEMA regional office, or when the request is thought to be Non-Stafford Act. These
RFAs are processed the same as Non-Stafford Act requests, with JDOMS and USNORTHCOM conducting parallel coordination and providing a recommendation to OASD(HD) and the SecDef for approval or disapproval.

(b) When a RFA is received at USNORTHCOM, a copy is immediately provided to JDOMS (and vice versa) to begin parallel coordination and planning efforts. USNORTHCOM conducts coordination with appropriate stakeholders depending on the nature of the incident and the requested support. Stakeholders may include the Supporting Service Command Headquarters (ARNORTH, AFNORTH, MARFORNORTH), the Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF), USTRANSCOM, USPACOM, the National Guard of the affected state, the National Guard Bureau, DOD Agencies, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Coast Guard, the National interagency Fire Center (NIFC), subordinate units, and other Federal organizations and agencies as appropriate. This stakeholder coordination is done quickly, utilizing teleconferencing, video teleconferencing, and automated collaborative tools. Based upon the results of stakeholder coordination, USNORTHCOM provides a recommendation to JDOMS on how best to support the needs of the requestor.

(c) The recommendation goes forward through OASD (HD) to the SecDef for decision.

1. Upon SecDef approval, the Joint Staff releases an Execute Order (EXORD) to designate supported, supporting commands and to task Commands, Services, and DOD agencies to provide support.

2. USNORTHCOM provides a supporting EXORD, implementing this CONPLAN and establishing command relationships, providing task and purpose, and providing coordinating instructions to the supporting force.

(d) RFAs that are non-Stafford Act requests may originate from a State Governor, Federal Agency, or other approved entity. These RFA are provided in writing to the DOD Executive Secretary. The RFA is made under the terms of The Economy Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

1. Parallel coordination occurs as described above, by USNORTHCOM and JDOMS.
2. The RFA is reviewed under the criteria of legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and readiness. Recommendations based on these criteria are consolidated and a final recommendation is provided through OASD HD to the SecDef for decision. If the RFA is determined inappropriate for DOD, the recommendation is made to the SecDef for disapproval.

3. If approved by the SecDef, an EXORD is published by the Joint Staff and USNORTHCOM as described above.

4. USNORTHCOM may direct a DCO/E to deploy in support of the requestor to assess and process subsequent RFAs.

(e) The following flow diagram, Figure C-1 outlines the RFA decision process in general.

![RFA Process Decision Matrix](image)

**Figure C-1, RFA Process Matrix**
b. **Mission.** See Basic plan.

c. **Alliance Plans.** On order, the Canadian-US Civil Assistance Plan (CANUS CAP) and/or the Canadian-US Civil Defense Plan (CANUS CDP) will be implemented to respond to requests for mutual assistance.

d. **Theater.** See Base Plan for descriptions of the Area of Operations (AO).

2. **Concept of Operations.** USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA in six (6) phases: Shape; Anticipate; Respond; Operate; Stabilize; and Transition.

   a. **Phase 0, Shape.** Phase 0 is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. Actions in this phase include inter-agency coordination, planning, identification of gaps, exercises, and public affairs outreach. These activities continue through all phases. Situational awareness and preparedness are constant, ongoing actions. Plans are established, specific preparations for events and incidents are made, and focused Intelligence, Information Operations and public affairs tools are employed to shape the environment for successful support.

   b. **Phase I, Anticipate.** Phase I begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, a no notice event, or when directed by the President or SecDef. The phase ends with Tier 1 pre-identified forces deployed. Phase I success equals deployment of Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordinating Element (DCE), Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO), and other selected response forces. These forces will be postured to facilitate quick response after coordination with PA/FPO/JFO and coordination with state, local, and tribal officials. Possible actions during this phase include:

   (1) Identification of mission;
   (2) Inter-agency coordination;
   (3) Deployment of Theater Enablers;
   (4) Deployment of Tier 1 Forces;
   (5) Establishment of Base Support Installation;
   (6) Tier 2 Forces on Prepare to Deploy Orders;

   c. **Phase II, Respond.** Phase II begins with the deployment of initial response capabilities. The phase ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Phase II success equals forces deployed with enough capability to support civil authorities in accomplishment of the mission. DSCA operations are based on requests for assistance which will be made at
different times, and for missions that will be completed at different
times. Consequently, forces will likely deploy into and out of the
DSCA JOA for the entire length of the DSCA operation. Possible
actions during this phase include

(1) Enhancement of Command and Control elements (JTF, JFC,
etc.);
(2) Deployment of Tier 2 and 3 Forces;
(3) Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
Operations;
(4) Establishment of Rules on the Use of Force;
(5) Establishment of the JOA.

d. Phase III, Operate. Phase III begins when DSCA response
operations commence. Phase III ends when Title 10 Forces begin to
complete mission assignments and no further requests for DOD
assistance are anticipated from civil authorities. Phase III success is
achieved when currently deployed DOD capabilities are sufficient to
support civil authorities. Possible actions during this phase (III)
include:

(1) Conduct of DSCA Operations;
(2) Inter-agency integration;
(3) Assessment;
(4) Reporting of Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
(CCIRs);
(5) Cost reporting;
(6) Transition planning.

e. Phase IV, Stabilize. Phase IV begins when military and civil
authorities decide that DOD support will scale down. Phase IV ends
when DOD support is no longer required by civil authorities and
transition criteria are established. Phase IV success is achieved when
all operational aspects of mission assignments are complete. Possible
actions during this phase include:

(1) Scale down of operations, forces, command and control, and
logistics;
(2) Inter-agency coordination;
(3) Assessment
f. **Phase V, Transition.** Phase V begins with the redeployment of remaining DOD forces. The phase ends when response forces have been relieved, redeployed and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands. Success in Phase V is achieved when DOD forces have transitioned all operations back to civil authorities. Possible actions during this phase include:

1. Transition of DSCA mission to civil authorities;
2. Redeployment of DOD forces and capabilities;
3. Release of OPCON of deployed forces;
4. Cost Reporting;
5. Inter-agency coordination;

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**DSCA Phasing Construct**

Phases I & II may be merged for a no-notice event such as an earthquake.

Figure C-1, DSCA Phasing Construct

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3. **Conduct of Operations.**
a. Readiness, Alert, and Marshaling

(1) **Readiness.** There is no increased readiness posture associated with this CONPLAN. USNORTHCOM will publish EXORDS adjusting Force Protection Condition levels (FPCONs), Notice to Deploy Timelines, and Response Posture Levels as the threat warrants. USNORTHCOM will recommend changes to the SecDef.

(2) **Alert.** USNORTHCOM Commander's Standing Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) set the conditions of warning likely to precede an order to implement this plan. See Basic plan Coordinating Instructions for standing CCIRs. See Appendixes to this Annex for situational CCIRs.

(3) **Marshaling or Dispersal.**

(a) Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSMI) will be established as soon as practical in the Operations Area / Joint Operations Area (JOA). All forces arriving in the JOA will be received into the area via the JRSMI process. Arriving units must provide a roster of their involved personnel, a unit description, and a listing of their critical equipment with quantity (e.g. 5 UH-60 aircraft), and their command leadership names and method of communication (radio frequencies / cell phone numbers / email / etc.).

(b) The RTF / TF / JTF assigned responsibility for the operations area / JOA will provide arriving units with command, control, communications, and life support information (billeting, maintenance, fuel, messing, etc.).

(c) Units arriving in the operations area are required to be as self-sufficient as possible for a minimum of 3 days of operations.

(d) All units will process out of the operations area upon release by the operational commander by providing a summary of mission accomplishment, After Action Review (AAR) input for critical issues, and positive accountability of sensitive items. Units will provide a closure report to the supported operational RTF / TF / JTF (up to NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center) upon arrival at home station.

(4) **OPSEC.** Federal, state, and local agencies conduct emergency response operations in an unclassified forum. USNORTHCOM and subordinate commands will be active participants in the unclassified forum to ensure consistency and expeditious flow of information. In general, units may acknowledge receipt of deployment orders and commanders may confirm obvious movements, but should not disclose operational details.
b. Air Operations.

(1) USNORTHCOM will coordinate with 1st Air Force (AFNORTH) as USNORTHCOM's designated JFACC for the 48 contiguous states, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands on pre-positioning of U.S. military aircraft to support DSCA operations. For DSCA support; active component, reserve component, and National Guard aircraft are anticipated to be required to provide reconnaissance, search and rescue, airlift, command and control, aerial refueling, etc. aircraft requirements will be written into an Air Tasking Order (ATO). To optimize air operations the overall intent is to have all participating military and other federal aircraft placed onto an Air Tasking Order (ATO).

(2) JFACC will coordinate with FAA for the movement of air traffic IAW existing FAA/DOD publications.

(3) The Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) is the primary agency for aeronautical search and rescue, coordinating response to aviation-related incidents and aeronautical search and rescue.

(4) USNORTHCOM will coordinate with applicable CCDRs for assets required for the DSCA operations.


d. Maritime Pre-positioning Force Operations.

(1) In accordance with the established Maritime Alert Posture (MAP) Level, the U.S. Navy, Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) will place on 96 hour Prepare To Deploy status, a three ship Amphibious Strike Group to provide a command, control and communications package, a helicopter platform, SAR aircraft, and an air component coordinating element to support DSCA operations and inform USNORTHCOM.

(2) USNORTHCOM will coordinate with USTRANSCOM, Military Sealift Command (MSC) for the use of US Naval Ship (USNS) vessels for DSCA operations.

(3) A Maritime Component Commander will be designated when necessary to provide overall C2 of maritime forces.

e. Antisubmarine Warfare Operations. Not applicable.

f. Counterinsurgency. Not applicable.

g. Nuclear Operations. Not applicable.

i. Information Operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network Operations (CNO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Operations Security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. While few IO capabilities are directly connected to DSCA in their traditional applications, some capabilities may be able to support non-IO missions through non-traditional application of IO equipment and skill sets. Support equipment assets of psychological operations (PSYOP) units (portable printing presses, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasting stations) have great utility in response and consequence management operations. Since normal civilian facilities may be disrupted and personnel may not have the necessary individual protection equipment, capabilities normally found in PSYOP units may be employed as alternative emergency communication systems until civilian facilities can be restored. PSYOP personnel can provide commanders and civilian agencies leaders with real-time analysis of the perceptions and attitudes of the civilian population and feedback concerning the effectiveness of the information and support being disseminated. See Appendix 3.

j. Special Operations. Not applicable.


m. Reconnaissance. Not applicable.

n. Air Base Operability. During response operations, USNORTHCOM anticipates the requirement to open and operate civil airports for a limited time to allow the movement of forces and supplies into the incident area. When necessary, CDRUSNORTHCOM will task the JFACC with this mission. JTF Port Opening can provide a joint expeditionary capability to rapidly establish and initially operate an Air Port of Debarkation (APOD) and distribution node, facilitating port throughput in support of CDR executed contingencies. CDRUSNORTHCOM may task the JFACC with this mission as well.


q. Escape and Evasion Operations. Not applicable.

r. Counterattack. Not applicable.
s. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). Employment of EOD units not responding as Immediate Response per DODD 3025.15, will be requested and when approved, directed by USNORTHCOM. EOD units will operate IAW their organic Standard Operating Procedures. EOD and Explosives Detection Dog (EDD) Teams are anticipated requirements for NSSE and SE support.

t. Amphibious Operations. Not applicable.
w. Additional Appendixes provided for specific DSCA missions.

4. Operational Constraints.

a. Competing demands will exist for Low Density/High Demand units.

b. Current Intelligence oversight law and policy define domestic intelligence collection and fusion rules.

c. Existing statutes restrict offensive Information Operations (IO) against US citizens.
14 -- Amphibious Operations – Not used
15 -- Force Protection
16 -- Critical Infrastructure Protection
17 -- Incidents of National Significance
18 -- Postal Augmentation
19 -- Severe Weather
20 -- Wild land Fire Fighting
21 -- National Special Security Events and Special Events
22 -- Law Enforcement Support
23 -- Military Assistance During Civil Disturbances-Not Used
24 -- Non-Lethal Weapons
25 -- Defense Coordinating Officer
26 -- Safety
27 -- Search and Rescue
28 -- State Funeral Support (TBP)

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO CONPLAN 3501
INFORMATION SUPPORT CAPABILITIES FOR CIVIL AUTHORITIES
(ISCCA)

1. Situation

   a. General. See Basic plan.

      (1) The employment of information capabilities in other operations
          has been focused on the adversary decision makers, information
          and information-based systems. In DSCA operations, there is no
          adversary to influence. Instead, operators and civil authorities
          require information capabilities to enable their missions. These
          capabilities will be referred to in this document as information
          support capabilities. The focus of these capabilities is to support
          civil authorities in their mission or protect or aid domestic
          population and mitigate further consequences to those affected
          during a time of need.

      (2) Primary Concept
          The primary concept of the planning and use of information
          support capabilities in support of DSCA operations is that no
          capabilities will be planned used to influence a domestic audience.
          Information support capabilities will only be used to support or aid
          civil authorities.

          Understanding that DSCA operations demand the timely delivery of
          select capabilities, all capabilities will be examined for how they
          support or aid DSCA operations. This support is provided after a
          request by civil authorities and approval by the Secretary of
          Defense, and is executed under military command and control but
          with the oversight and direction of civil authorities. Because
          information support capabilities will never be used to influence
          domestic audiences, certain information support capabilities are
          not likely to ever be used for DSCA operations.
          However, most capabilities have both traditional military and
          DSCA uses, so no information support capability will be
          automatically disqualified when DoD considers how it will respond

          C-3-1
          UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
to a request for assistance to support or aid civil authorities and domestic population.

b. Enemy. Not applicable.

c. Friendly

(1) USNORTHCOM information objectives and capabilities must be integrated into overall planning based on the primary concept captured in paragraph 1. a. (1). USNORTHCOM information planners will ensure all friendly information objectives and capabilities to ensure optimal support to this plan and subsequent operations. Forces assigned are listed in Appendix 3 to Annex A.

(a) Augmenting Organizations. Special Staff to the Commander, USNORTHCOM must be included in information support capability planning and approval.

1. Public Affairs (PA). PA is the coordinating element for media relations, command information, community relations and the single point for domestic and foreign press. PA is the key participant in the Strategic Communication process. Information support capabilities must be coordinated with USNORTHCOM PA for deconfliction, synergy and optimal informational effect. See Annex F.

2. Civil Affairs (CA). TBD.

3. Judge Advocate General (JA). N-NC/JA will review information support capabilities employment to ensure U.S. laws, policy and regulations are followed.

4. Interagency Coordination (IC). N-NC/J3 will coordinate with interagency partners to ensure that civil authorities understand the information support capabilities of USNORTHCOM. For deployment, N-NC/J3 will coordinate and take necessary actions to effectively employ information support capabilities for DSCA.

(b) Other Supported Commands, Supporting Commands and Services. The complexities inherent in the execution of information support capabilities require the integrated coordination of Unified Command; the Services; and several Government Agencies. The information support capabilities, plans, programs and activities of other Combatant Commanders' and Agencies might have an effect on DSCA.
Other combatant commands include U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Their information support capabilities and activities will contribute to DSCA operations and must be coordinated and synchronized to ensure unity of effort.

d. Assumptions. See Basic plan.
(1) USNORTHCOM will not plan or employ information support capabilities to influence the domestic population; information support capabilities will support civil authorities in the dissemination of life-saving messages and information produced and approved by civil authorities. Some potential capabilities are Civil Authorities Information Support Element (CAISE) discussed in Tab D to this appendix.
(2) USNORTHCOM will employ information support capabilities in accordance with all laws, policy, and regulations.
(3) Any information support capability will be requested by civil authorities and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

2. Mission. CDRUSNORTHCOM will optimize and execute the employment of information support capabilities in support of DSCA operations.

3. Execution
a. Strategic Concepts. USNORTHCOM will develop, maintain and conduct a long-term relationship with the Interagency to facilitate the planning and employment of information support capabilities or other related capabilities to address their priorities, objectives and desired effects in DSCA operations.

(1) Strategic Objectives. For USNORTHCOM, the following strategic objectives will define the broad spectrum of events:

(a) Evaluate the use of all information support capabilities to support civil authorities.
(b) Respond with a spectrum of information support capabilities at the request of civil authorities.
(c) Actively support the Primary Agency efforts as requested with the full spectrum of relevant information support capabilities.
(d) Deploy information support capabilities to forward staging areas to expedite their use if requested.
b. Concept of Operations. This appendix provides for the planning and coordination of information support capabilities based on the strategic desired effects tailored to support distinct DSCA operations as discussed in the base plan. These capabilities will be focused on supporting civil authorities in their mission, protecting the domestic population or mitigating further consequences to those affected during a time of need. These capabilities will be employed when requested by civil authorities and approved by the Secretary of Defense and will operate under the command and control of military authorities. For each distinct type of operation mentioned in the base plan, USNORTHCOM and supporting military organizations will evaluate all information support capabilities in concert with civil authorities to select the capability best-suited for the particular DSCA operation. Once identified, each capability will be planned and coordinated to provide the optimal and timely support and force generation.

(1) DSCA phases. Information support capabilities can be critical to DSCA mission areas. Phase 0 is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. USNORTHCOM will inform civil authorities about DoD information support capabilities that might augment the capacity of civil authorities to provide critical information to affected domestic population. Phase I begins with identification of a potential DSCA mission, or when directed by Secretary of Defense. Many DSCA missions can potentially save lives or mitigate great damage to property if executed quickly. Therefore, USNORTHCOM may pre-position information support capabilities, execute planning on fielding information support capabilities, or continue coordinating with civil authorities on how information support capabilities might support DSCA operations. Phase II begins when the deployment of main response force deploys. USNORTHCOM will coordinate the deployment and execution of approved information support capabilities for DSCA operations. Phase III begins when DSCA operations commence. Information support capabilities and assets are coordinated with civil authorities and employed as requested and approved to support civil authorities. USNORTHCOM will, in concert with civil authorities, continually assess the need for redeployment of the information support capability. Phase IV begins when major operations transition back to execution by civil authorities. Information support capabilities personnel will redeploy once they completed the mission assigned to them by civil authorities. Phase V begins when civil authorities assume control with no degradation of operations. USNORTHCOM will engage in redeployment of information support capabilities once the mission is complete.
(2) Disaster/Catastrophic Response. Since disaster and
catastrophe response can be immediate with little or no warning or
preparation time, contingency plans, interagency coordination,
regularly scheduled exercises, training and education are vital to
the success of DSCA operations. USNORTHCOM J3 is responsible
for examining all information support capabilities with utility for
DSCA operations, exploring ways information support capabilities
might support DSCA operations, and to direct their activities once
deployed. As an event approaches or occurs, USNORTHCOM J3
staff will inform the defense coordination officer (DCO)/defense
coordination element (DCE) of potential applicability of information
support capabilities for the specific DSCA operation. Once
deployed, USNORTHCOM will ensure select information support
capabilities are meeting the needs of the civil authority. Finally,
USNORTHCOM will redeploy the information support capability
when released by the civil authorities.

(3) Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.
Support to law enforcement spans the spectrum from pre-planned
support to immediate needs during a crisis. Under these
circumstances, contingency planning, interagency cooperation,
regularly scheduled exercises, training and education are vital for
success. USNORTHCOM J3 will be responsible for examining with
other military organizations and civil authorities all information
support capabilities with utility for supporting civil law
enforcement agencies. USNORTHCOM J3 will seek to educate civil
and military authorities about information support capabilities and
how control is exercised during their employment. During
employment of the information support capability for support to
law enforcement, USNORTHCOM will ensure the capability is task-
organized to the requirement and is meeting the needs of the civil
authorities. Finally, USNORTHCOM will redeploy the capability
when released by the civil authority.

(5) National Special Security Event (NSSE). NSSEs are events
which require significant planning and thorough execution.
USNORTHCOM J3 will plan and coordinate information support
capability in support of NSSEs. The execution is vested in either a
JTF or provided to the JTF as supported command.
USNORTHCOM J3 will be responsible for reviewing and making
recommendations as to the applicability of information support
capabilities for each NSSE and for educating the Primary Agency
and military authorities about information support capabilities
prior to an event, and how control is exercised once they are deployed. During the execution and or employment of information support capability for NSSEs, USNORTHCOM will ensure the capability is task-organized to the requirement and meets the needs of the civil authority. Finally, USNORTHCOM will redeploy the capability when released by the civil authority.

(6) Wildland Fire Fighting (WFF). WFF occurs on a regular basis and USNORTHCOM supports as requested. While no information support capabilities are typically needed in connection to WFF, USNORTHCOM J3 will be responsible for examining information support capabilities which might support these events and carrying through with the appropriate process for employment.

c. Information Support Capability Objectives

(1) Phase 0 (Shape)

(a) Maintain situational awareness and coordination with others that may be involved in affecting or facilitating communication in a DSCA operation, such as PA.

(b) Plan and coordinate the use of the spectrum of information support capabilities as directed.

1. Information support capability utility for DSCA is understood by military authorities and applicable civil authorities.

2. Use of an information support capability for DSCA is approved by the Secretary of Defense.

3. Information support capability is coordinated for forces, logistics and positioning.

(2) Phase I (Anticipate)

(a) All actions mentioned in Phase 0 are considered for Phase 1

(b) Be prepared to support the Primary Agency efforts with information support capabilities as requested.

1. Use of an information support capability for DSCA is requested by civil authorities and approved by the Secretary of Defense.
2. Information support capability LNO is provided to civil authorities.

3. Information support capability is coordinated for DSCA support requirements and positioning.

(3) Phase II (Respond)

(a) All actions mentioned for Phase I are considered for Phase II.

(b) Respond with the information support capabilities as requested by civil authorities and directed by the Secretary of Defense.

1. Information support capabilities are deployed and positioned as requested.

2. Information support capabilities are responsive to USNORTHCOM C2.

3. Information support capabilities execute as directed.

(4) Phase III (Operate)

(a) All actions mentioned for Phase II are considered for Phase III.

(b) Current phase activities are executed, coordinated and deconflicted with previous phase activities.

(c) Respond with information support capabilities as directed.

1. Information support capabilities are integrated with or supportive of all DSCA operations.

2. Information support capabilities are assessed for utility and continued effectiveness.

(5) Phase IV (Stabilize)

(a) All actions mentioned for Phase III are considered for Phase IV
(b) Continued support of Primary Agency efforts as requested with information support capabilities.

1. Information support capabilities are examined for continued utility.

2. Information support capabilities are operating as requested, reduced as appropriate.

(6) Phase V (Transition)

(a) All actions mentioned for Phase IV are considered for Phase V.

(b) Discontinue support of Primary Agency efforts as appropriate.

1. Information support capabilities are examined for continued utility.

2. Information support capabilities are redeploying as directed.

(c) Lessons learned are developed to help transition back to Phase 0 and Phase 1.

d. Coordinating Instructions. See Tabs B, C and D to this Appendix; the tabs set forth specific coordination for general application of each informational capability.

(1) Public Affairs Coordination. Public affairs coordination will occur during all operations. Public affairs should be prepared to discuss the use of information support capabilities in DSCA operations.

(2) Interagency Coordination. Interagency coordination is vital to the success of information support capabilities in support of DSCA operations. Interagency coordination will occur via the normal staff or adaptive headquarters processes. Interagency will aid in coordinating and informing about the capabilities and their utility to civil authorities.

(3) Strategic Communications. To be promulgated in accordance with National, Defense and USNORTHCOM guidance. All
information support capabilities will be coordinated and synchronized with USNORTHCOM Strategic Communication.

4. **Administration and Logistics.** See Annexes D and E

5. **Command and Control.** See Basic plan, Annex A and J

   a. USNORTHCOM will plan, coordinate and monitor the execution of information support capabilities through the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center.

   b. Supporting CCDR/S/As are identified in Annex A with information support capabilities. They will be tasked through USNORTHCOM/J3 authority to support USNORTHCOM DSCA operations.

   c. Component Commanders will execute coordinated and synchronized information support capabilities in support of USNORTHCOM's DSCA operations.

   d. Within USNORTHCOM, information capabilities are directed by the NC/J3 with support from all USNORTHCOM directorates, as required in accordance with (LAW) reference e.

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Tabs
B – Electronic Support and Protect (ES&P)
C – Operations Security (OPSEC)
D – Civil Authorities Information Support Element (CAISE)
HEADQUARTERS, US NORTHERN COMMAND
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16 May 2008

TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO CONPLAN 3501
ELECTRONIC SUPPORT AND PROTECT (ES&P)

References: See Basic plan.

1. Situation


b. Enemy. Not applicable.

c. Friendly. See Basic plan and Annex A, Task Organization.

d. Assumptions.
   (1) Electronic Support and Protect (ES&P) will not be used to degrade or disrupt the EM spectrum.
   (2) Electronic Protect and Support (ES&P) systems will be available to ensure friendly use of the Electromagnetic (EM) Spectrum if directed by civil authority.
   (3) ES&P systems are not limited to U.S. military assets only.
   (4) ES&P assets from non-DOD agencies may be available for use for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations.


3. Execution.
   a. Concept of Operations. Employment of ES&P capabilities will enable DSCA by utilizing Electronic Protection (EP) to ensure the friendly use of the EM Spectrum; utilizing ES&P Support (ES) to search for identifying, and localize intentional or unintentional emissions in the EM spectrum. ES&P capabilities will work in concert with all other information support capabilities to ensure their effectiveness.

   (1) ES&P actions will not be solely a DOD activity. ES&P actions within the AOR will have to be coordinated extensively with members of the interagency (IA) community and approved by civil authorities. At a minimum USNORTHCOM must plan to
coordinate with U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), FCC, FBI, DOS, DOT, DHS, DOC, U.S. Customs Service and FAA authorities.

(2) ES&P support the civil authority objectives.

b. Operational Tasks

(1) Phase I

(a) Refine AOR-wide Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) for specific missions in a given Joint Operations Area (JOA) as needed or directed.

(b) Coordinate ES&P execution with appropriate members of the interagency community for use in the AO.

(2) Phase II

(a) Continue ES&P tasks from the previous phase.

(b) Identify ES&P capabilities requested by civil authorities.

(3) Phase III

(a) Continue ES&P tasks from the previous phases.

(b) Employ ES&P as requested by civil authorities to prevent degradation or impedance to the flow of information for DSCA operations.

(c) Employ ES&P/EP as requested by civil authorities to take pre-emptive measures to protect and defend the integrity of information, information systems and the related infrastructure.

(4) Phase IV

(a) Continue ES&P tasks from the previous phases.

(b) ES&P will prevent degradation or impedance to the flow of information for DSCA operations as directed by civil authorities.
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

(c) ES&P/EP will protect and defend the integrity of information, information systems and the related infrastructure as directed/authorized by civil authorities.

(d) Protect by using ES&P, as directed/authorized by civil authorities, the C3 of civil authorities and DOD forces and operations including the leadership, information, information links/nodes and the supporting infrastructure.

(5) Phase IV

(a) Continue ES&P tasks from the previous phases as appropriate.

(b) Validate the ES&P tasks for use in transition phase in support of efforts by civil authorities.

(6) Phase V

(a) Redeploy ES&P capabilities as appropriate.

(b) OPCON is transferred to their respective commands.

c. Specified Tasks

(1) CDR, AIR FORCES NORTH (AFNORTH) will be prepared to conduct ES&P operations as requested by civil authorities.

(2) CDR, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (FFC) will be prepared to conduct ES&P operations as requested by civil authorities.

(3) CDR, ARMY NORTH (ARNORTH) will be prepared to conduct ES&P operations as requested by civil authorities.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Special Instructions (SPINS) and the Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) will be developed by NORAD USNORTHCOM J6 to deconflict ES&P capability actions in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(2) Use of ES&P in the AOR must be coordinated with members of the IA community and approved by the appropriate civil authority for DSCA operations. USNORTHCOM J3 is responsible for ensuring that all coordination is complete prior to execution.

C-3-B-3
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
(3) Coordinate with USNORTHCOM J6 to accomplish the Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL).

(4) USNORTHCOM J6 will develop the Joint Communication and Electronic Operating Instruction (JCEOI) for each DSCA event to support DSCA operations.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Administration. Provide inputs to the JRFL and SPINS as required through USNORTHCOM J3.

b. Logistics. Provide logistical support for DOD and non-DOD personnel that may be required to accomplish the stated mission objectives.

5. Command and Control

a. Command

   (1) Feedback. Provide any feedback inputs to USNORTHCOM J39.

   (2) After-Action Reports. Provide inputs to USNORTHCOM J39 following each phase of the operation.

b. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information. Provide any special or unusual ES&P-related capability C4I requirements to USNORTHCOM J3.
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16 May 2008

TAB C TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO CONPLAN 3501
OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC)

            Operations Security Program, 22 January 1988

            b. CJCSI 3213.01B, Joint Operations Security, 27 June 2007

            c. DOD Directive 5205.2, DOD Operations Security (OPSEC)
            Program, 6 March 2006

            d. DOD Directive 5200-1, Information Security Program
            Regulation, 13 December 1996, Certified current, 24
            November 2003

            e. NORAD-USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-100

1. **General.** The Operations Security (OPSEC) Tab provides guidance
   ensuring secure and effective Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
   operations for the USNORTHCOM AOR. OPSEC will be key to the
   success of DSCA operations. For the purposes of CONPLAN 3501,
   OPSEC processes discussed within are the doctrinally accepted terms
   and practices. CONPLAN 3501 is based on a permissive environment
   and all OPSEC practices will support the operations security of
   USNORTHCOM DSCA operations.

   a. **OPSEC Scope.** OPSEC, unlike traditional security programs
      specifically designed to protect classified information, is concerned
      with identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified
      information associated with sensitive operations and activities.
      However, OPSEC and designated classified security programs must
      work in conjunction with one another to ensure all aspects of
      operations are protected.

   b. **Responsibility for OPSEC.** OPSEC is a command responsibility.
      At each level of command, the operations officer, or his equivalent,
      has staff responsibility for coordinating overall OPSEC planning.
      Each headquarters in preparing a supporting plan will appoint an
      OPSEC officer to ensure OPSEC considerations are effectively carried
out. Each and every individual assists in safeguarding the security of operations.

2. Situation

a. **Enemy.** Not applicable.

b. **Friendly.** See Appendix 3 to Annex C, Information Support Capabilities for Civil Authorities.

c. **Assumptions.**

(1) OPSEC will be integral to all USNORTHCOM operations in support of CONPLAN 3501. It will be used as a force multiplier within conventional and all other authorized forces.

(2) USNORTHCOM will have an OPSEC plan and will execute it at all times. It will be a comprehensive plan that shapes and protects the planning, coordination and execution of operations at all levels.

(3) Any DOD agency working with USNORTHCOM will have appropriate OPSEC plans and procedures in-place. Non-DOD agency OPSEC status will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and adjustments made to reflect the needs of the mission.

(4) Additional assumptions include: classified information protection, procedures, and systems are working, orders (WARNORD, OPORD, PLANORD, EXORD, etc.) have not been compromised, and unclassified communication systems are subject to possible compromise.

3. **Mission.** See Appendix 3 to Annex C, Information Support Capabilities for Civil Authorities (ISCCA).

4. **Execution.**

a. **Concept of Operation.** Based on an analysis of the friendly vulnerabilities, identify critical information, assess risk to mission success, and then implement appropriate OPSEC measures to increase mission effectiveness. OPSEC must be used at all levels of operations and during all phases of the basic plan.

b. **Employment.**
(1) **Operations Security (OPSEC) Process.** OPSEC is a continual process and focuses on identifying, controlling, and protecting sensitive but unclassified information associated with any operation. OPSEC is not a security system; it is not a collection of rules or instructions. OPSEC is a function of planning and will follow the process as outlined in reference f.

(2) **Critical Information.** In any operation, it is vital to achieve "essential secrecy" which is the condition achieved as a result of the denial of critical information. Because of requirements to share operational information across many agencies and to other governments, care must be taken to define what is critical information and to emphasize the need to protect it. This may include privileged or proprietary information USNORTHCOM may have from interagency sources such as:

(a) Missions in planning.

(b) Unit identification for possible deployment.

(c) Specifics on planning to include schedules, routes, and destinations.

(d) Current alert status and locations.

(e) Locations, itineraries and travel modes of key military and civilian leadership.

(f) Current capabilities and requirements.

(g) New systems or technology significantly impacting mission effectiveness.

(h) Single points of failure to include C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), logistics, networks and commercial infrastructure.

(i) Network logins, passwords, and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.

(j) Open source indicators (financial reports, logistics requests) which when inadvertently released to adversaries could support targeting of personnel, operations or facilities.
(k) Details of military ties, agreements, or arrangements between U.S., Canada, other allies and coalition partners.

(l) Details of agreements or arrangements between USNORTHCOM and lead federal Agencies and Law Enforcement Agencies and their equivalents.

(m) Current force protection measures and shortfalls for forces assigned to USNORTHCOM.

c. Specified Tasks. Sound OPSEC practises are a function of leadership and individual responsibility. All headquarters directorates and Component Commanders must ensure USNORTHCOM personnel are trained in OPSEC and that OPSEC awareness remains at highest possible level during all phases of DSCA operations.

1. **USNORTHCOM J2**

   (a) Assist J3 in developing Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

   (b) Provide input to and review plans as necessary.

   (c) Support multi-directorate effort to identify friendly force vulnerabilities.

2. **USNORTHCOM J3**

   (a) Provide OPSEC management, planning, and execution guidance to component and subordinate commands and staffs. Coordinate effort to identify friendly force vulnerabilities.

   (b) Coordinate OPSEC concerns with appropriate DOD, State, local, and tribal governments, and other federal agencies.

   (c) Disseminate enactment of OPSEC measures to all personnel, commensurate with positions and security clearances.

   (d) Develop training programs to identify vulnerabilities, critical information, and heighten OPSEC awareness.

   (e) Identify in writing all USNORTHCOM component OPSEC managers and coordinating agencies points of contact.
(3) USNORTHCOM Component and Subordinate Commands and OPSEC Managers. Compile a list of essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) and identify information critical to success of the mission using guidance established within this Tab.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Ensure OPSEC is integrated into planning, coordination, execution, operations, exercises and training at all levels.

(2) Ensure OPSEC planning addresses C2 protection and is coordinated with operations plans.

(3) Components will coordinate specific OPSEC actions through USNORTHCOM J3, or designated representative.

(4) All personnel using radios will adhere to established military and local communications protocol.

(5) All personnel will use burn bags or shredders for disposal of all printed material, with exception of newspapers.

(6) Components and subordinates will coordinate with USNORTHCOM J3 or designated representative to consolidate a comprehensive list of critical information, develop associated code words/call signs, and disseminate to all subordinate units.

(7) All USNORTHCOM personnel have responsibility to avoid discussing sensitive but unclassified information as well as classified information, critical information, or EEFI with personnel not having proper security clearances and a need-to-know.

(8) Unsecure phone and cell phone use will be operational appropriate and will be in accordance with paragraph 4 above.

5. Administration and Logistics. Dissemination of information throughout the command demands the support of both administrative and logistics organizations. Additionally, all administrative and logistics elements will actively train its staff in OPSEC principles and maintain membership on OPSEC working groups. Administrative and logistics are particularly vulnerable to lapses in OPSEC due to the generally unclassified nature of their communications and interaction with
commercial organizations. All administrative and logistics plans will be coordinated with USNORTHCOM OPSEC officer or designee.

6. Command and Control

a. Command

(1) USNORTHCOM J39 has the primary responsibility for planning, coordinating, integrating, and executing IO strategy supporting the mission and concept of operations.

(2) See also Annex D (Logistics/ Combat Service Support) of Basic Plan.

b. Feedback

(1) OPSEC Procedures. Conduct periodic reviews and evaluations of OPSEC procedures to assist in improvement of USNORTHCOM OPSEC process.

(2) OPSEC Concerns. Develop procedures to allow all personnel to raise OPSEC concerns and provide suggestions for improving the process.

(3) OPSEC Working Group. Establish OPSEC working groups consisting of representatives from all USNORTHCOM components, as well as other DOD and non-DOD agencies. The USNORTHCOM OPSEC representative will also participate in the IO Cell.

(4) OPSEC Surveys. Conduct Command and formal OPSEC surveys annually or as determined by Commander, USNORTHCOM.

(5) After-Action Reports. OPSEC managers shall provide OPSEC lessons learned, to include doctrine, organization, training material, leadership, education, strengths, vulnerabilities, and recommended corrective actions. Lessons learned should be prepared at the conclusion of each measurable phase of operations.
CIVIL AUTHORITIES INFORMATION SUPPORT ELEMENT (CAISE)

References:
   a. PDD 68, International Public Information, 30 April 1999
   c. Hurricane Andrew Lessons Learned, 24 August 1992, DOD Protection Lesson Learned

1. Situation

   a. Overview. Refer to Appendix 3 to Annex C, Information Support Capabilities for DSCA Operations [ISC-DO]. Based on previous operational employment for DSCA events, CAISE can be used in a supporting role to the civil authorities. In these types of events, CAISE can assist by conducting area assessments, evacuation operations, general assistance, information dissemination, military civic action, emergency services and support for requesting civil authorities. CAISE forces create a small footprint while being a force multiplier to the first responders as a part of CDRUSNORTHCOM's response in support of civil authority requirements. CAISE can support the Civil Authority in the dissemination of life-saving messages and information produced and approved by the Civil Authorities only. The use of CAISE in support of DSCA operations shall be conducted pursuant to an approved CAISE program. CAISE may be used to support informing U.S. persons with truthful information approved by civil authorities. CAISE capabilities that could be used for DSCA operations include Commando Solo, Mobile Radio Broadcasting systems, entire family of loudspeakers, Face to Face communication, Area Assessments, Print and Media production sections. CAISE must be responsive to the varied levels of accessibility to key audiences relative to the scope and requirements in order to maximize their utility for DSCA events.


       (1) Augmenting Organizations. US Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM).

(2) Legal Situation. To be promulgated as necessary by USNORTHCOM JA based on the situation and scope. USNORTHCOM CAISE for DSCA will adhere to all regulations, policy and laws concerning the use of CAISE.

c. Neutral Perspective. Non-influence CAISE capabilities, in a supporting role, can be used in DSCA operations to assist civil authorities by conducting area assessments, evacuation operations, general assistance, information dissemination, military civic action, emergency services and support to the civil authorities.

d. Assumptions

(1) USNORTHCOM will not plan or employ information support capabilities to influence the domestic population.

(2) USNORTHCOM will employ information support capabilities in accordance with all laws, policy, and regulations.

(3) Civil authorities will provide all information for CAISE development and approve all information and messages prior to dissemination.

(4) USNORTHCOM will identify, inform, and coordinate the use of CAISE with civil authorities and upon SecDef approval.

(5) Civil authorities will be provided a CAISE planner deployed by USSOCOM upon CDRUSNORTHCOM request in conjunction with the DCO/DCE deployment for DSCA operations.

2. Mission. USNORTHCOM plans, coordinates and employs CAISE to develop and disseminate critical information for DSCA operations.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Employment. CAISE in DSCA operations will support civil authorities with critical information dissemination. USNORTHCOM will plan, coordinate, and synchronize CAISE in preparation for and in support of DSCA operations. CAISE in support of DSCA will be coordinated and synchronized by phases to maximize effects of dissemination in designated locations within the joint operations
area (JOA). During all phases of the operation the objective for CAISE use is to disseminate critical information that supports the civil authorities and their desired end state. USNORTHCOM will establish a strategy of engagement with SecDef and USSOCOM (force provider), to address a deliberate, long-term approach for use of these forces. USNORTHCOM will also coordinate with civil authorities on the use of CAISE for DSCA operations. Civil authorities will be able to communicate their critical information with these capabilities in adverse conditions to the necessary populations.

(2) **Phases.** USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA in six (6) phases: Phase 0 - Shape; Phase I - Anticipate; Phase II - Respond; Phase III - Operate; Phase IV - Stabilize; and Phase V - Transition.

(3) **Themes to stress.** These themes will be approved and promulgated by the civil authority. CAISE may suggest themes to stress to the civil authority, which have been used in similar operations, but will not create or approve themes.

(4) **Themes to avoid.** Any themes not approved and promulgated by civil authorities will not be used or disseminated by CAISE for DSCA operations.

(5) **CAISE Actions**

(a) Guidance for the use of CAISE in support of civil authority’s requirements.

(b) Guidance for avoiding military operations.

(6) **Operational Tasks**

(a) **Phase 0:** This phase is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. It involves planning, interagency coordination, preparations, exercises, and situational awareness of events occurring in the area of operations. For the shaping phase, USNORTHCOM will coordinate with civil authorities on the utility of capabilities to ensure CAISE capabilities are understood.

(b) **Phase 1:** Phase 1 begins with the clear identification of a DSCA mission. In this phase, USNORTHCOM will coordinate within DOD on the use of CAISE capabilities needing approval by SecDef. Due to extreme lead time for proper deployment.
and execution of these capabilities, some of USNORTHCOM’s CAISE capabilities may be deployed at this phase to be in place and if requested and if called upon to support civil authorities. A CAISE capabilities planner may be deployed in advance of other CAISE assets to help civil authorities understand and effectively utilize CAISE capabilities, if needed. The CAISE Planner will coordinate with USSOCOM and USNORTHCOM to ensure that CAISE capabilities will be available and effective. The USSOCOM CAISE planner will coordinate an approval process for DSCA operations with ultimate product approval to be made by a designated civil authority.

(c) Phase II: CAISE assets begin deploying and executing in this phase, utilizing the product approval process developed in Phase I. USSOCOM and USNORTHCOM will monitor and assess the effectiveness of these operations.

(d) Phase III

1. CAISE forces operate within their designated area using the product approval process developed in Phase II, as part of DSCA operations. Current phase activities are coordinated and deconflicted with previous phase activities.

2. CAISE capabilities are assessed for utility and continued effectiveness.

3. The deploying CAISE unit commander will coordinate with the JTF CAISE Planner and JTF CDR to ensure that CAISE capabilities and forces are integrated into their supporting units. The deploying CAISE unit commander will submit a daily SITREP, Product Dissemination Matrix and copies of all products to USSOCOM and USNORTHCOM J39.

(e) Phase IV: CAISE unit commanders will assess capabilities and operations for utility and appropriateness. CAISE operations will continue if necessary and reduce as appropriate. Redeployments will begin at this time.

(f) Phase V: CAISE force redeployment continues and concludes. PSYOP LNO, JTF CAISE Planner and CAISE unit commander will provide an After Action Reports with Lessons Learned to the Civil Authority, DCO/DCE, USNORTHCOM J39,
USSOCOM and the JTF CAISE Planner within 48 hour of redeployment or end of mission. Actions resume to transition to Phase 0 and Phase I.

(7) Specified Tasks

(a) USNORTHCOM. TBD

(b) USSOCOM. TBD

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Logistics

(1) See Annex D.

(2) Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) (ARSOF) unique CAISE support requirements are arranged for through USSOCOM logistic channels. Army common supply, maintenance and facilities support is provided or arranged through standard Army logistic channels.

b. Administration

(1) Requirements for special reports. During all phases of the operation, all component commands/TF’s conducting CAISE will submit a daily SITREP to USNORTHCOM J3 and the N-NC J5 that include copies of any approved civil authority critical information products.

5. Command and Control

a. USNORTHCOM will coordinate with Civil Authority Information Support Element (CAISE) from USSOCOM for planning and execution of information production and dissemination capability objectives.

b. Command Relationships

(1) Commander, US Special Operations Command will designate the CAISE Commander.

(2) The CAISE is a functional component of USSOCOM.
(3) The CAISE is OPCON to USNORTHCOM, when activated.

(4) USNORTHCOM executes CAISE, when activated. Additionally, under ideal circumstances the civil authorities would request CAISE for planning before a pending event occurs or immediately after occurrence through the proper channels to DOD. Such a proactive strategy will create awareness for susceptibilities and acceptability to critical information dissemination actions.

c. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers. See Annex K.
APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE

References:

a. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (S), 13 June 2005
b. National Guard Rules for the Use of Force
c. Additional References see Basic plan

1. Purpose. To provide guidance on the Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) during Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations. Commanders are responsible for force protection and will not conduct DSCA operations without proper equipment and training. Unit commanders always retain the inherent right of and the obligation to exercise unit self defense in response to a hostile act or a demonstrated hostile intent.

2. Situation

a. Enemy. See Base plan.

b. Friendly. See Base plan.


4. General

a. Reference a applies to Title 10 Forces performing DSCA operations.

b. National Guard (NG) soldiers performing duty in a non-federalized duty status are governed by their state Rules for the Use of Force.

c. Requests for mission specific RUF for Title 10 forces will be staffed through the local Judge Advocate (JA) through operational channels and forwarded to USNORTHCOM JA for submission to CDRUSNORTHCOM. CDRUSNORTHCOM may forward such requests for mission specific RUF to the CJCS for SecDef approval.

d. Commanders may restrict SecDef approved RUF. Commanders shall notify the SecDef, through the CJCS, as soon as practical, of
restrictions (at all levels) placed on SecDef approved RUF. In time
critical situations, notify SecDef concurrently with the CJCS. When
concurrent notification is not possible, notify the CJCS as soon as
practicable after SecDef notification.

e. If foreign military support personnel are involved in DSCA
operations within the U.S., RUF should be specified and coordinated
through DOD, Department of State and Department of Justice prior to
the receipt of foreign military personnel support.
APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
COMBAT CAMERA (COMCAM) OPERATIONS

References:

a. DOD Directive 5040.2, Visual Information Policy, 10 May 1999
b. DOD Directive 5040.4 Joint Combat Camera Program, 13 August 2002
c. DOD Directive 5040.5, Alteration of Official DOD Imagery, 29 August 1995
d. CJCS Instruction 3205.01A, Joint Combat Camera, 11 April 2003
e. AFI 33-117, Multimedia Management, 1 April 2004
f. OPNAV Instruction 3501.320A, Navy COMCAM ROC & POE, 3 April 1997

I. Situation

a. **Enemy.** See Base plan and Annex B, Intelligence

b. **Friendly.** Sources of Combat Camera (COMCAM) documentation outside this command are provided by Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps resources.

c. **Assumptions**

   1. **Resources Availability.** COMCAM resources residing within the homeland can be utilized for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) COMCAM operations. Request for forces messages will be used to task component COMCAM units for support.

      (a) Component COMCAM units are standing by to deploy active duty personnel upon receipt of deployment orders.

      (b) COMCAM teams deploy with enough imaging supplies to operate self-sustained for a minimum of 30 days.

      (c) COMCAM personnel are weapons qualified.
(2) The USNORTHCOM Operations Officer (NC/J3) will delegate operational responsibility for Combat Camera to the Information Operations (IO) Officer (NC/J3).  

(3) All COMCAM teams' activities within the USNORTHCOM joint operations area (JOA) will respond to documented operational assignments initiated by the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center (NC/J3/NC/J39).  

(4) A Joint Combat Camera Management Team, if required, shall assist the USNORTHCOM J39 in the tasking and direction of COMCAM video and still imagery documentation operations to meet objectives provided by USNORTHCOM, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), OSD, and the White House.  

(5) All COMCAM forces in the USNORTHCOM AO or Joint Operations Area (JOA) will be OPCON to USNORTHCOM, TACON to the appropriate joint subordinate command and will be tasked to meet USNORTHCOM and subordinate COMCAM requirements. This requirement is key to maintaining USNORTHCOM and joint subordinate visibility on all DOD forces within the AO or JOA as applicable to ensure proper force management, logistics, transportation and protection.  

(6) The fundamental difference between COMCAM and Visual Information (VI) lies in the level of support provided and the specialized training required to operate in austere environments. VI forces supply base level support to include still photography, limited videography, and graphic support while COMCAM provides combat trained photojournalists, videographers, and still and video editing services.  

2. Mission. To ensure that visual information documentation is provided during all phases of USNORTHCOM DSCA operations. COMCAM imagery provides situational awareness information for use by military commanders, and a valuable visual record of still and video imagery used as historical evidence of military operations. COMCAM documentation of DSCA operations supports operational briefings, status reports, intelligence activities, information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and the historical record. COMCAM imagery may be used to counter disinformation programs in support of sensitive operations. Imagery will be used to evaluate concepts and the results of operations or campaigns. An expanded list of COMCAM documentation mission areas is listed in Tab A.  

3. Execution
a. **Concept of Operations.** During all phases of DSCA operations, the general objective of COMCAM is to document all activities of DOD forces and as requested by other government agencies. Success of COMCAM documentation is dependent on three primary factors.

1. COMCAM must receive coordinated mission assignments via the chain of command. It is critical that COMCAM teams are included in troop movements and mission planning.

2. Access must be given to document significant events as they occur, regardless of classification or sensitivity.

3. Rapid transmission of COMCAM products both inside and outside the theater of operations is essential for effective support of information operations, public affairs and other mission objectives.

b. **COMCAM documentation mission assignments.** Assignments for Combat Camera forces can be generated at any point in the chain of command and will be coordinated via the IO chain of command. In addition to mission assignments from within the AO, assignments may be directed down the chain of command from the highest levels.

1. **Organization.** Deployed COMCAM forces will be organized into teams responsible to USNORTHCOM and JTF or other designated joint element as assigned, normally via the Information Operations directorate. The responsibilities of COMCAM documentation forces are in support of the plan. All COMCAM forces will support Joint COMCAM taskings in the JOA.

2. **Employment.** COMCAM forces will be employed throughout the USNORTHCOM AO.

3. **Imagery Dissemination**

   (a) Key customers for COMCAM imagery are the White House, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), JCS, USNORTHCOM, Component Commanders, JTF Commanders, on-scene commanders, and other government agencies. Imagery must be provided to these customers simultaneously and as rapidly as possible. Immediate movement of imagery to the following locations will ensure all mission requirements are met. Note: There may be special circumstances that require different paths for movement of critical imagery. In the case of special interest imagery that will be cleared for public release, Public Affairs will
provide specific guidance via published Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) or in Annex F of this plan.

1. JTF or On-Scene Commander.

2. Joint Combat Camera Management Team.

3. Joint Combat Camera Center (Pentagon).

(b) Imagery (including captions and run sheets) will be distributed electronically (see Tab B), with the following exception, original videotapes or copies of original videotapes will be shipped as quickly as possible to the Joint Combat Camera Center (Pentagon), and Joint Combat Camera Management Team.

(c) When electronic dissemination is impossible or when videotapes must be moved (as above), ship COMCAM imagery (including complete captions and run sheets):

1. Via traceable means.

2. Packaged and marked per DOD and service directives. Ensure classification authority and downgrading instructions are provided.

c. Tasks and Responsibilities

(1) USNORTHCOM COMCAM Support. USNORTHCOM J3 is the executive agent for Combat Camera operations. Once directed, typically by JTF COMCAM coordinator/planner, Combat Camera Teams will be established and located as directed.

(2) The Joint Combat Camera Management Team (as required) shall

(a) Assist the USNORTHCOM, JTF and as designated other joint elements in developing documentation requirements and implementing the use of COMCAM resources.

(b) Coordinate logistical support requirements for the mobilization of COMCAM and their movement into the USNORTHCOM AO.

(c) In support of mission assignments, coordinate COMCAM team logistical issues with commanders in the field.
(d) Coordinate with component commands to ensure detailed documentation of the entire scope of operations. This includes coordinating network and telecommunications connectivity to meet the requirements for transmission of imagery as detailed in Tab B.

(e) Manage day-to-day COMCAM operations and administrative/logistical support.

(f) Ensure rapid movement of imagery to priority customers (see “3. a. (3) Imagery Dissemination”).

(g) Coordinate review of imagery for possible public release. To meet priority mission requirements, appropriate imagery must be immediately cleared for public release. Clearance for public release is normally conducted by PA Officers, and is accomplished at the lowest possible level (for most operations JTF level). Imagery designated “not cleared for public release” by clearing authorities will be properly annotated. Imagery that cannot be reviewed for public release in a timely manner (same day) must not be delayed. Such imagery will be transmitted to designated customers and annotated as “not cleared for public release”. If appropriate, such imagery can be reviewed for possible clearance at a later time.

(3) USNORTHCOM and Component Commands shall:

(a) Execute tasking procedures in support of this plan.

(b) Provide trained and equipped mobile COMCAM assets consistent with the forces they are tasked to support.

(c) Provide direction to ensure subordinate units support COMCAM mission requirements, and provide technical communications support for immediate transmission and movement of still and video imagery.

(d) Maintain movement authorization of COMCAM products, both public releasable and non-public releasable, prior to transmission to the JCCC [IAW Combat Camera Imagery Flow/Dissemination, Figure C-9-2].

(e) Ensure that COMCAM imagery, both public releasable and non-public releasable, is immediately reviewed and approved for movement clearance to the JCCC/public, as detailed in 3. c. (2)
4. **Administration and Logistics.** Security classification or political sensitivity must not be used as a basis to deny operational COMCAM documentation. COMCAM teams are trained to properly label, handle and safeguard classified material. COMCAM teams are not releasing agents (see paragraph 3.c.(2)(g)).

5. **Command and Control**

   a. **Command Relationships**

      (1) The Joint Combat Camera Management Team and support personnel are under operational control (OPCON) of the USNORTHCOM J39 or as delegated to JTF J39.

      (2) Command and control (C2) of COMCAM forces in the JOA is depicted by the solid lines in the following diagram (Figure C-9-1: Command Relationships). Dashed lines depict COMCAM imagery product flow from COMCAM forces through the deployed Joint Combat Camera Management Team to the Joint Combat Camera Center (Pentagon).

      (3) In certain cases, COMCAM units will be task organized to tactical level units. Tasking and requirements will continue to occur as described in this appendix and these units will accomplish this as practical with priority to tactical unit mission and operations.

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![Figure C-9-1: Command Relationships](image-url)
Tabs
A -- COMCAM Customer Support Requirements
B -- COMCAM Communication Support Requirements
COMCAM Customer Support Requirements

References:

a. AF Instruction 33-132, Armament Delivery Recording (ADR) Program, 1 December 1998
b. SECNAV Instruction 3104.1 DOD Visual Information and Combat Camera Program 22 April 1999
c. OPNAV Instruction 3104.1 Naval Information and Combat Camera Program (NAVIP) Policy and Responsibilities 9 February 2001
d. OPNAV Instruction 3104.3 Naval Combat Camera (COMCAM) Program Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures 15 April 2002
e. OPNAV Instruction 3104.4 Naval Visual Information (VI) Imagery Management Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures 16 April 2002

1. Mission Priorities. COMCAM forces provide USNORTHCOM and subordinate commanders with trained personnel, equipment, and logistics expertise to document military operations in the AOR when this CONPLAN is executed. As the CDRUSNORTHCOM’s priorities shift and the battle rhythm changes, COMCAM forces must maintain the capability to provide responsive support for different types of missions and requirements.

2. Request Procedures. Requests for COMCAM imagery are routed to the USNORTHCOM J39, or at USNORTHCOM discretion, Joint Combat Camera Management Team, which assists in tasking for COMCAM imagery support. USUSNORTHCOM/J39 consolidates Crisis Action Team and staff COMCAM imagery requirements and coordinates with the Joint Combat Camera Management Team.

3. Distribution Procedures. See Paragraph 3. a. (3) of Appendix 9 to Annex C, Imagery dissemination, of this plan.

4. Documentation Requirements
a. **DSCA Air Operations Documentation.** The following are important subjects for documentation of air operations throughout the USNORTHCOM areas of operation.

(1) **Aircraft Operations**

(a) Arrival of mission aircraft, crews, support personnel, and supporting equipment.

(b) Aircraft generation, loading/unloading and turnaround.

(c) Aircraft ramp operations, taxi in and out, take-offs, and landings.

(d) Crew briefings and mission planning.

(e) Damage to affected aircraft and airfield repair.

(f) Air-to-air photography, including allied aircraft.

(g) Service members, both on and off duty.

(h) Inter-theater delivery and offload of mission-critical cargo and military personnel supporting DSCA.

(i) Troop preparations and loading.

(j) Low-Altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES) cargo delivery.

(k) Tanker/Airlift Control Element (TALCE) operations, such as cargo handling, maintenance, and flight following.

(l) Deployed aircrew briefings, crew boarding aircraft, and in flight aerial refueling and air drop operations (aerial-qualified photographers).

(m) Aircraft battle damage and repair.

(3) **Search and Rescue (SAR)**

(a) Survivor pick-ups (aerial-qualified photographers).
(b) Helicopter and fixed wing SAR flight operations, such as generation, launch, in flight, and recovery (aerial-qualified photographers).

(c) Aircraft generation and repair.

(d) Deployed aircrew briefings, aircrews boarding aircraft, and in flight (aerial-qualified photographers).

(e) Night operations as imaging equipment permits (aerial-qualified photographers).

(f) Interviews and debriefing of key personnel after a successful SAR operation.

(5) **Base Support Operations.** Base support will vary due to the bed down of different units and the phase of DSCA. The most common base support functions to be documented are:

(a) Civil Engineering, including base camp construction, tents, latrines, command centers, roads, and aircraft parking areas.

(b) Messing facilities, such as civilian and troops dining and food preparation facilities. If MREs are used, photograph civilians and troops consuming them.

(c) Marshaling area activities, including arrival and breakdown of pallets, equipment, and supplies.

(d) Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) handling operations and facilities, such as aircraft, ship, and ground vehicle refueling operations, fuel pits, and fuel trucks.

(e) Host nation support to DSCA efforts, including, transportation, supplies, security, or medical services.

(6) **Command and Control.** Document command and control actions, including planning, at all echelons of command.

(a) Arrival and stand-up of headquarters staffs, including set-up of operations centers, buildings, and plotting map boards.

(b) Arrival, set-up, and operations of communications systems, including antenna construction/erection.
(c) Interface of DOD and Inter-agency personnel in planning and mission execution.

(d) Periodic "video situation reports" where commanders describe recent operations, challenges, and lessons learned.

(e) Senior operational commander visits to deployed units.

b. **Ground Operations.** Key subjects for documentation of ground operations in the USNORTHCOM area of operations are:

1. Arrival of friendly forces in the area of operations.
2. Documentation of DSCTA efforts in the joint operating area.
3. Night operations as photo equipment permits.
4. Arrivals of mission equipment and supporting personnel.
5. Establishment of operations centers.
6. Briefings, mission planning with DOD forces and inter-agency personnel in the joint operating area.
7. Service members, both on and off duty.
8. Night operations as photo equipment permits.

c. **Maritime Operations.** Key subjects for documentation of maritime operations in the USNORTHCOM area of operations are:

1. Briefings and mission planning.
2. Employment of ship defensive weapons systems.
3. Ship-to-ship photography, including allied ships.
4. Night operations as photo equipment permits.

d. **Disaster Assistance (DA) Operations**

1. Establishment of deployed disaster assistance facilities.
(2) Arrival of aircraft, cargo, and troops in the area of operations.

(3) Documentation of the intensity of the operation, such as actions, efforts, emotion, fatigue, and the environment affecting deployed forces and refugees.

(4) Command and control centers.

(5) Logistical support, including messing, billeting, medical, engineering, POL, transportation, security, spare parts, and field maintenance support activities.

(6) When appropriate, obtain interviews from key personnel.

e. Civil Authorities Information Support Element (CAISE). COMCAM support of CAISE is described in Annex C, Appendix 3, Tab D of this plan. COMCAM will provide imagery support to CAISE print activities in coordination with the CAISE.

f. Mishap and Investigation Documentation. Document as directed in support of investigations and for use in “lessons learned” development.

g. Historical Records. COMCAM imagery may be used for historical purposes to provide a permanent visual record of military operations associated with this plan.

h. Combat Medical Documentation. COMCAM forces support combat medical documentation as required in Annex Q of the basic plan. This includes documentation of wounded or deceased personnel.
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Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270
24 April 2008

TAB B TO APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
COMMUNICATION SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH JOINT AND
COMPONENT COMBAT CAMERA TEAM

References: See Base plan.

1. LAN/WAN Connectivity Requirements (for connectivity supplied by
local commands and communications units in support of COMCAM
teams).

   a. NIPRNET

      (1) Ethernet LAN drops (RJ-45) with NIPRNET connectivity.

      (2) One to ten NIPRNET email accounts with 50 MB of mailbox
storage space.

      (3) Ability to send and receive email attachments of 10 MB or less
in size.

      (4) Installation's network firewall configured to permit incoming
and outgoing FTP traffic access (with RCP command support) to
one IP address (Telestream ClipMail Pro server).

   b. SIPRNET

      (1) One Ethernet LAN drop with SIPRNET connectivity.

      (2) One shared SIPRNET email account with 100 MB of mailbox
storage space.

      (3) Ability to send and receive email attachments of 10 MB or less
in size.

      (4) Installation's network firewall configured to permit incoming
and outgoing FTP traffic access (with RCP command support) to
one IP address (Telestream ClipMail Pro server).
2. Equipment

a. Attached to NIPRNET

(1) One Windows NT/2000 workstation with MS Office and Adobe PhotoShop. (Indigenous to COMCAM teams)

(2) One Telestream ClipMail Pro server. (Indigenous to COMCAM teams)

b. Attached to SIPRNET

(1) One Windows NT/2000 workstation with MS Office and Adobe PhotoShop. (Indigenous to COMCAM teams)

(2) One Telestream ClipMail Pro server. (Indigenous to COMCAM teams)

c. Stand Alone. M4 INMARSAT terminals for alternate communication with COMCAM field teams and movement of imagery. (Indigenous to COMCAM teams)

d. Direct DSN capable FAX and STU-III/STE phones.

3. Minimum Daily Data Requirements

a. Over NIPRNET: approximately 640 MB per day.

(1) Still imagery (high-resolution JPEG files): 100 MB/day.

(a) Reception of 50 MB from COMCAM teams in the field per day.

(b) Transmission of 50 MB to USNORTHCOM and the Joint Combat Camera Center (JCCC) per day.

(2) Motion Imagery (MPEG-2 broadcast quality - 9 MBPS encoding): up to 540 MB per day.

(a) Reception of 270 MB (approximately four minutes of video) from COMCAM teams in the field per day.

(b) Transmission of 270 MB to USNORTHCOM and JCCC per day.
b. Over SIPRNET

(1) Use of SIPRNET for the transmission of COMCAM imagery is dependent directly on the requirement(s) for classified COMCAM imagery or when NIPRNET connectivity or other suitable transmission methods are unavailable for the transmission of unclassified imagery. In case of the latter, the requirements are the same as for over NIPRNET.
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
APPENDIX 15 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
FORCE PROTECTION

References:

b. (U) EXORD for Standup of USNORTHCOM CONUS AT-FP Responsibility, DTG 071710Z MAY 04.
g. (U) Joint Pub 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 14 April 2006 (U).
h. (U/FOUO) USD/SOLIC/CHAIRS Message, 071522Z SEP 01, “Force Protection Condition Implementation” (U).
i. (S) SecDef Memo, “Antiterrorism/Force Protection Responsibilities for Canada, Mexico, and the Russian Federation” 11 Jun 01 (U).
j. (U) DOD Directive 4500.54, Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad, May 91.
k. (U) DOD 4500.54-G, “DOD Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG)."

1. (U) Situation.

a. (U) Hazards: See Annex B, Intelligence.

b. (U) Friendly. DOD Elements supporting the USNORTHCOM DSCA mission address FP during all phases of the operation. FP is a command responsibility at all levels.

c. (U) Assumptions. DOD AT/FP policies, procedures, standards, assignment of responsibilities, and TTP outlined in References a. through k. remain in effect.
d. (U) **Resource Availability.** Resource constraints in both security forces and security funding may require Commanders to take stopgap measures or accept risks. Units should use established Service/Agency resource processes, procedures and channels to obtain necessary funding.

e. (U) **Planning Factors.** Designated Commanders and staff need to plan for the FP of their personnel, equipment and facilities during all phases of the DSCA operation. Additional consideration is given to the fact that DOD Elements executing DSCA will operate in an environment where DOD is not the Federal Agency with lead responsibility; and, Commanders must plan accordingly. As a minimum standard by which to judge FP capability, planners should review Refs a and b and judge their ability to implement basic physical security actions as well as those directed at each Force Protection Condition (FPCON).

2. (U) **Mission.** See Base Plan.

3. (U) **Execution.** The integration of FP operations is critical to the ultimate success of the Command’s DSCA mission. FP protects installations, forces, infrastructure and information within the USNORTHCOM AOR. USNORTHCOM DSCA strategy depends upon the ability to assess potential threats and the current security posture of the USNORTHCOM AOR, to integrate the efforts of DOD Elements within the AOR executing DSCA FP operations, and, when necessary, to influence operations to predict, deter, prevent and defeat potential threats. FP operations for USNORTHCOM are unique due to the presence of DOD assets and personnel in non-DOD controlled areas of the AOR.

a. (U) **Concept of Operation.** USNORTHCOM will conduct an all hazards approach to FP to gain and maintain situational awareness of the current security posture through the conduct of risk assessments and other supporting FP missions in a non-DOD-controlled environment. USNORTHOM develops detailed FP guidance for DOD Elements in support of the USNORTHCOM DSCA mission using the AT program standards (refs a, b and c) to ensure FP mission integration.

b. (U) **Tasks.** Reference (a).

(1) (U) **Supporting DOD Elements.**

(a) (U) Retain operational control (OPCON) of all assigned forces, unless otherwise directed, with
inherent responsibilities of command for FP of assigned forces IAW USNORTHCOM directives.

(b) (U) Execute FP responsibilities for all forces assigned.

(c) (U) Address FP during all phases of DSCA planning and operations.

(d) (U) Coordinate AT/FP issues with USNORTHCOM and civilian authorities as appropriate.

c. (U) **Coordinating Instructions.** All DOD Elements in support of USNORTHCOM have the following responsibilities:

(1) (U) It is imperative that all AT/FP matters, threat information and FPCONs, are well coordinated up and down all levels of military commands via organic command and control (C2) systems, as well as between military, civil, government, and inter-agency organizations.

(2) (FOUO) DOD Elements will report cases where the implementation of specific AT/FP measures will adversely impact or significantly hamper accomplishment of their assigned duties.

(3) (U) Submit emergent and/or emergency requirements in support of their Combatant Command mission to the CJCS for CfT RIF consideration and to submit FP requirements.

(4) (FOUO) Identify areas and assets that are vulnerable to identified threat attack means and communicate these vulnerabilities to USNORTHCOM through Anti-Terrorism Enterprise Portal (ATEP).

(5) (U) Coordinate with USNORTHCOM for FPCON changes.

(6) (U) Coordinate mission unique requirements in plans and orders and coordinate with NC/J34 to ensure consistency of FP guidance.

4. (U) **Administration and Logistics**
a. (U) **Logistics.** Services and agencies retain responsibility for funding AT requirements for DOD installations in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

b. (U) **Administration.** None.

c. (U) **Standard Reporting Criteria.** DOD Elements in support of Commander, USNORTHCOM or conducting independent operations directly under USNORTHCOM control, will submit reports per Annex R of Reference a as directed by Commander USNORTHCOM and by this CONPLAN.

   
   
   (3) (U) BLUE DART Reports. Annex R of Reference a.

   (4) (U) **Methods.** Use most expeditious means. Declared FPCON is UNCLASSIFIED. Rationale for changing FPCON may be classified; use secure communications when required.

   (5) (U) FPCON change reports. Refer to Annex R of reference (a).

5. (U) **Command and Control.**

   a. (U) Commander, USNORTHCOM exercises TACON (for FP) of all DOD Elements, whether Active Duty or Reserve Component (Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States and the Air Force Reserve and during time of war when directed by the President, the Coast Guard Reserve) that are assigned in support of USNORTHCOM.

   b. (U) **Command Relationships.** Responsibility and authority for AT/FP follow command lines. The unique inter-agency environment of HLS/DSCA operations may require modifications to traditional command relationships to allow proper execution of FP; inform the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center, with copy to NC/J34, of such requirements. C2 relationships will be based on the situation and the assigned mission.
HEADQUARTERS,
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24 April 2008

APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (CIP)

References:

a. (U) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, 17 Dec
03.
b. (U) DODD 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
(DCIP), 19 Aug 05.
c. DODD 3020.26, Defense Continuity Program (DCP), 8 Sep 04.
d. (U) DODI 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards, 14 Jun 01.
e. (U) Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Security
Classification Guide (SCG), 15 May 07 (FOUO).
f. (U) DCP SCG, 15 Dec 05 (FOUO).
g. (U) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) SCG For
Vulnerability Assessments, 6 May 05 (FOUO).
h. (U) U.S. Northern Command Instruction (NCI) 10-207,
USNORTHCOM Emergency Action Procedures, 1 Oct 04
(S/RELCAN).
i. NCI 10-211, Operational Reporting, 1 Dec 06.
j. Army Regulation (AR) 525-26, Infrastructure Risk Management
(Army), 22 Jun 04.
k. Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 3501.1,
Department of the Navy (DON) Critical Infrastructure Protection
(CIP), 16 Jun 02.
Infrastructure Protection, 28 Apr 06.
m. Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3501.36, Marine Corps Critical
Infrastructure Protection (MCCIP) Program, 5 Oct 04.

1. (U) Situation.

a. (U) Enemy. See Annex B, Intelligence.
b. (U) Friendly. To Be Published (TBP).
c. (U) Assumptions. TBP.

2. (U) Mission. See Base Plan.
3. **Execution.**

   a. **Concept of Operations.** TBP.

   b. **Criticality.** Task Critical Assets (TCAs) distributed in a separate classified attachment (Tab A).

   c. **Priorities.** TBP.

   d. **Tasks.** TBP.

4. **Administration and Logistics.** TBP.

5. **Command and Control.**

   a. **Critical Infrastructure Reporting Requirements:** All elements report (IAW Attachment 2, NCI 10-211) information on critical infrastructure where incapacitation or destruction of an asset, both DOD and non-DOD owned, would negatively affect DOD installations, operational capabilities, ongoing missions (both Civil Support and Homeland Defense) or operations. Report to USNORTHCOM J34 (NC/J34) Vulnerability Assessments OMB [NIPRNET: nc.j34.va.omb@northcom.mil; SIPRNET: nc.j34.va.omb@northcom.smil.mil], as applicable, specific critical infrastructure line numbers 2.1, 2.2, 2.8-2.13; 3.6-3.14, 3.19-3.30; 5.11-5.14, 5.28; 8.19-8.22; 10.5-10.8; all 12; 13.13.

Tabs:
A - **USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 Task Critical Assets (TCAs)** (S)
B - **Points of Contact (POCs)**

Distribution:
TAB A TO APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U)
TASK CRITICAL ASSETS (TCA) (U)

***CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT PUBLISHED SEPARATELY***
TAB B TO APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
POINTS OF CONTACT FOR USNORTHCOM CIP

1. USNORTHCOM Battle Staff Future Operations Center (FOC) CIP Planner (when operational).
   a. Telephone (Secure): 719-554-1555 (DSN 692).
   b. NIPRNET: nc.opg.atfp.omb@northcom.mil.
   c. SIPRNET: nc.opg.atfp.omb@northcom.smil.mil.

2. USNORTHCOM CIP.
   a. Organizational Mailbox (OMB).
      (1) NIPRNET: nc.j34.va.omb@northcom.mil.
      (2) SIPRNET: nc.j34.va.omb@northcom.smil.mil.
   b. Web Portal.
      (1) NIPRNET Operations (External):
      https://operations.noradnorthcom.mil/sites/ncj3/ncj34/assessments_branch/
      (2) SIPRNET Operations (External):
   c. CIP Lead.
      (1) Telephone: 719-554-7134 (DSN 692).
      (2) NIPRNET: patrick.paulsen@northcom.mil.
      (3) SIPRNET: patrick.paulsen@northcom.smil.mil.
      (4) JWICS: ncpaupc@northcom.ic.gov.
   d. CIP Assessments.
      (1) Telephone: 719-556-0789 (DSN 834).
(2) NIPRNET: peter.moosy.ctr@northcom.mil.

(3) SIPRNET: peter.moosy.ctr@northcom.smil.mil.

e. GIS Technician.

(1) Telephone: 719-554-6121/719-556-7003.

(2) NIPRNET: paul.heid.ctr@northcom.mil or clifford.mullen.ctr@northcom.mil.

(3) SIPRNET: paul.heid.ctr@northcom.smil.mil or clifford.mullen.ctr@northcom.mil.
APPENDIX 19 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
SEVERE WEATHER

References:  
b. Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum, 25 Jun 2004  
d. Joint Staff DSCA EXORD DTG 081823Z JUN07

1. Situation

a. **Purpose.** This Appendix provides USNORTHCOM guidance for the conduct of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations for severe weather.

b. **Background.** Each year portions of the USNORTHCOM AO are devastated by the effects of severe weather such as, thunderstorms, tornadoes, flash floods, riverine (inland) floods, coastal floods, extratropical/ tropical cyclones (hurricanes/typhoons), tsunamis, winter storms, excessive cold, fog, excessive heat, dust storms, wind storms, or fire weather storms. The effects of these severe weather events can destroy lives, property and critically impact infrastructure. The Department of Defense (DOD) possesses unique assets and capabilities that may be used to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage. USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations when requested by civil authorities and approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

c. **Interagency Plans.** USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA in accordance with the National Response Framework (NRF), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and DOD policy and guidance.

d. **Area of Operations (AO).** See Base Plan.

e. **Standing Joint Operations Areas (JOAs).** JOAs are established for the State of Alaska with Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-AK) and for the National Capital Region with Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR).
2. **Mission.** See Base Plan.

3. **Execution.** The three primary objectives of DSCA operations for severe weather are: Minimize casualties in the effected area, Restore vital infrastructure, and Maintain the public confidence in the US Government and the DOD.

   a. **Concept of Operations.** USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations for severe weather in six (6) phases: Shape, Anticipate, Operate, Stabilize, and Transition.

   (1) **Phase 0, Shape.** The Shaping Phase is continuous. It involves planning, interagency coordination, preparations, exercises, and maintaining situational awareness (SA) of events occurring in the AO.

   (a) USNORTHCOM’s severe weather Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) serve as triggers to initiate follow-on phases of this plan. These CCIRs keep the CDRUSNORTHCOM informed on the potential for, and current status of, DSCA operations for severe weather.

   1. Are there any potential weather systems (CAT 3 or greater Hurricanes) forming that may impact the United States?

   2. Has the President declared an Emergency or Major Disaster?

   3. Are there indications of a predicted or imminent emergency, disaster, or incident that has the potential to overwhelm civil authorities and impact DOD?

   4. Are there any impending threats to the Defense Industrial Base or DOD critical infrastructure to include communications and communications nodes?

   5. Are there any impending threats to transportation infrastructure (Road, Rail, Air, Maritime) due to severe weather?

   6. Have civil authorities issued guidance/warning to public?

   7. Has a Governor requested Federal assistance?
8. Has a Request for Assistance (RFA) been submitted?

9. Is there any negative reporting in media of the government response or actions?
   (b) Situational awareness is provided to the CDRUSNORTHCOM by the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center, USNORTHCOM Liaison Officers (LNOs) to other agencies and situation reports (SITREPs) provided by the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) teams and JTF Commander (when deployed).

(c) Responsibilities of the DCO include:

1. Validate requests from the FCO.

2. Request augmentation of the Defense Coordination Element (DCE).

3. Establish liaison among military, State, and other Federal Agencies for support.

4. Provide a liaison officer, as required, to each activated ESF.

5. Coordinate with the FCO and other ESFs for defense support.

6. Coordinate with the FCO and other ESFs for support of defense support providers.

7. Work with the FCO and SCO to integrate the taskings of National Guard on State Active Duty (SAD) with active units to maximize responses while avoiding duplication of effort.

8. Confirm relief priorities established by the FCO and SCO for the disaster area.

9. Develop a priority of work for supporting units.

10. Maintain an audit trail of mission requests to ensure each tasking is supported by a valid request and/or mission assignment number. The audit trail should include estimated and actual costs of support for each mission.

(d) Regionally aligned DCO/DCE teams are an integral part of the USNORTHCOM DSCA operations for severe weather. They
ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the DSCA operations by maintaining SA through developing and refining the following tasks:

1. Coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) for Regional Plans.

2. Coordinate with activated Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) in the Joint Field Office (JFO).

3. Coordinate with Joint Force Headquarters State (JFHQS-State) through the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for the non-Federalized National Guard (NG) capabilities and ongoing response activities in the JOA.


5. Conduct an assessment of DOD Installations within the region for use as a Base Support Installation (BSI).

6. Become Familiar with the DOD Installation’s immediate response plans and the MOAs /MOUs between the installation and the local communities within the region.

7. Review the local Disaster Response Plans for major population centers within the region.

8. Reviews Disaster Response Plans for Critical National Assets within the region.

9. Coordinate the training and integration for the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLIO) assigned to each state and region into the DSCA operations for severe weather.
DCO / E Regional Structure and Functions

Figure 19-1, DCO/DCE Regional Structure and Functions

(e) When an anticipated DSCA operation for severe weather is identified, Phase 0, Shaping situational awareness continues as a means to plan, prepare for, and identify other potential or follow-on incidents, but execution moves into Phase II, Respond for the anticipated DSCA operation for severe weather.

(2) Phase I, Anticipate. This phase begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, a no notice event, or when directed by the President or SecDef.

(a) During Phase I, Anticipate, key actions are:

1. Deployment of Command Assessment Element (CAE) to the event and or incident site.

2. Deployment of a DCO/DCE to FEMA Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC) or JFO when established.
3. Designation of military installations for use as BSIs for Title 10 Forces and mobilization centers by FEMA.

4. Deployment of LNOs, EPLOs, and JRMPOs.

5. Employment of C2 elements and assignment of JOA.

6. Deployment of Crisis Response Force Package Options (FPO), as appropriate, and as approved by SecDef (See Appendix 3 to Annex A, Force Package Options).

7. Repositioning of forces and supplies to avoid loss from the incident, or repositioning proximate to the incident site to speed response operations. (USNORTHCOM coordinates with owning services and with the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) Defense Distribution Center)

8. Alert Stabilization and Recovery / Reconstitution Force Package Option forces for deployment (request via Request For Forces (RFF) to Joint Director for Military Support (JDOMS) for SecDef approval).

9. Continued coordination with NG the Interagency, and State, local and Tribal governments to ensure unity of effort. Provide a USNORTHCOM planning team to FEMA, who is designated as the Coordinating Agency in the National Response Framework (NRF) for response and recovery.

10. Commanders in proximity to the event provide immediate response to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage. All immediate response actions must be reported as soon as possible (within hours) through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and concurrently to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center.

11. Installation Commanders may provide support for severe weather events as planned and directed by DOD Instruction 2000.18, Installation CBRNE Consequence Management (CM) response. This DOD Instruction requires Installations to identify emergency response personnel and assets that can provide support to the local community during emergency circumstances. This response will be reported through the appropriate chain of command to the NMCC and concurrently to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM.
Command Center within hours of the support being provided.

12. Installation Commanders may provide response per MOA and/or MOU with local first responders and civil authorities (search and rescue, fire fighting, ground ambulances, rotary wing medical evacuation, building damage assessment, emergency power generation, all-terrain vehicles, water purification, and emergency communications for example). These responses must be reported through the appropriate chain of command to the NMCC.

13. Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) may be provided by Air Force units under Air Force Regulation 64-1, and AFI 10-802, Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST). Army units may provide response as assets are available. MAST operations include emergency medical evacuation and patient transport.

14. USNORTHCOM and USTRANSCOM coordinate on response capabilities for; Air Movements, Military Sealift Command maritime transportation and logistics assets, and for USTRANSCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC) support to USNORTHCOM as the NDDOC.

15. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) locations are established (supporting forces deployed to the AO or JOA (if established)) and processing instructions are provided in EXORDs / DEPORDs to deploying units.

16. An damage assessment plan is developed and resources are requested to be placed on increased alert or given an event occurrence as an execute trigger. (e.g. 12 hours after hurricane land-fall)

17. Conduct response planning (Search and Rescue etc.) and war-gaming.

18. Identify additional force capabilities for response and place on alert.

19. Identify materials and supplies (rations, medical items, tents, cots, etc.) for response and preposition if required or conduct coordination to obtain.
20. Conduct coordination with the Interagency and State, local and Tribal governments for a mutually supporting response.

(b) Phase I ends with Tier 1 pre-identified response forces deployed.

(3) Phase II, Respond. The response phase begins with the deployment of initial response capabilities.

(a) Phase II, Respond, key actions include:

1. Command and Control (C2), medical, transportation, communications, power generation, water purification, and supply units are rapidly established and operational. Life support services (water, food, medical care, shelter) are the mission focus. Supplies are procured using established DOD process through the DLA purchasing and contracting with available local vendors.

2. Military forces provide public assurance of the national focus on response by being present in the stricken area.

3. Units and individuals reporting to the JOA process through JRSOI facilities.

4. Units responding under local command authority are incorporated into the USNORTHCOM C2 structure for the DSCA operation via the JRSOI process.

(b) Phase II, Respond, ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the JOA.

(4) Phase III, Operate. Phase III begins when DSCA response operations commence in the JOA.

(a) Key actions include:

1. Providing DSCA as requested by FEMA and approved by SecDef to execute Mission Assignments (MA).

2. Arranging for the procurement (through DLA and Defense Fuels) and distribution of supplies (rations, water, canvas, tents, cots, sandbags, bulk fuel, etc.) if requested by MA.
3. DSCA operations may include, but are not limited to: SAR, emergency medical, patient transport, life support functions, supply distribution, recovery support operations, use of DOD facilities, mortuary affairs, utilities restoration, infrastructure repair, debris removal, environmental, and debris clean-up.


(b) Phase III ends when Title 10 forces begin to complete mission assignments and no further requests for DOD assistance are anticipated from civil authorities.

(5) Phase IV, Stabilize. Phase IV begins when military and civil authorities decide that DOD support will scale down.

(a) Key actions include:

1. Scaling down operations, forces, C2, and logistics support.

2. Coordinating with interagencies.


4. Transition criteria is established.

(b) Phase IV ends when DOD support is no longer required by civil authorities and transition criteria are established.

(6) Phase V, Transition. Phase V begins with the redeployment of remaining DOD forces.

(a) Phase V, Transition key actions include

1. Transition of DSCA mission to civil authorities.

2. USNORTHCOM relinquishes OPCON of forces as they depart the AO.

3. Forces redeploy and report closure at home station to USNORTHCOM.

4. Costs are reported.

5. Lessons learned are captured.

C-19-9
(b) Phase V, Transition ends when response forces have been relieved, redeployed and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands.

e. **Tasks.** Per Base Plan and Annex C, specific tasking will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD for severe weather.

f. **Coordinating Instructions.** See Basic plan and Annex C

1. The annual Hurricane Season is from 1 June to 30 November.

2. Support period is not to exceed 60 days without review.

3. DSCA operations for severe weather are provided on a reimbursable basis IAW applicable laws and regulations for the type of incident.

4. Service ADCON will be exercised through service components of supporting commands.

g. **Force Protection (FP).** See Basic plan and Annex C, Appendix 15. Specific guidance will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD for severe weather.

1. Unit commanders are responsible for FP and will not conduct DSCA operations without proper equipment and training.

2. All deploying unit ground commanders will ensure that at least one (1)/Level II qualified anti-terrorism (AT) Officer/NCO deploys with the deploying element.

3. All deploying personnel must be level I trained and certified. The unit Commander and AT Officer/NCO are responsible for ensuring all deploying personnel are level I trained and certified.

4. Supporting commands and/or services ensure all forces deploying receive a threat briefing for the deployment area. Supporting commands and/or services will ensure forces complete service component required pre-deployment training certified by a Level II AT Officer/NCO, to include anti-terrorism awareness training IAW their parent service. Mission Commanders will ensure deployed forces receive an appropriate level of terrorist awareness training upon arrival and, as required, throughout the length of deployment. Ensure force protection measures include provisions for contractors that are involved in the operation.
(5) Consider deploying the AT Officer/NCO early in the deployment flow to execute AT/FP tasks that are requisite to the deployment, e.g., site survey or assessment and coordination of security requirements with the Primary Agency.

(6) Ensure the AT Officer/NCO is trained to employ methods to reduce risk or mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack. The AT Officer/NCO must also be familiar with pre-deployment AT training requirements. Assignment as the AT Officer/NCO may be a collateral or additional duty for the individual appointed. The AT Officer/NCO duties include but are not limited to:

(7) Use UFC 4-010-10 DOD minimum anti-terrorism standoff distances for buildings, dated 31 July 2002, temporary structures, to determine if facilities either currently occupied or under consideration for occupancy by DOD personnel can adequately protect occupants against terrorist attack.

(8) AT/FP guidance must appear in all warning, planning, alert, deployment, and execute orders.

(9) All personnel must be proficient in individual chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive (CBRNE) defense survival skills as prescribed by service directives. Unit commanders will determine if personnel will deploy with their appropriate CBRNE protective equipment (MOPP gear), based upon the current threat situation.

h. Public Affairs (PA). See Basic plan and Annex F. PA guidance is active when conducted in coordination with (ICW) FEMA. Personnel involved in DSCA operations may actively engage the media to explain their role; however any comments regarding a specific disaster situation will be referred to Joint Information Center (JIC). DSCA operations PA guidance will be issued by USNORTHCOM PA.

4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex D

a. Administration

(1) Mission execution notification process is as follows:

(a) Upon receipt of an RFA or MA from civil authorities, USNORTHCOM will confirm JDOMS has received a copy. If the request is for a DCO/DCE or an installation to be used as a staging area AND the CJCS Severe Weather EXORD of 19 Aug

C-19-11

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2005 is still in effect, then USNORTHCOM has the authority to execute the mission after concurrence from the installation-owning service. Upon service concurrence or DCO notification, USNORTHCOM must submit a GENADMIN message to CJCS, followed by an email, and a follow-on phone call. Unclassified DDO emails are: j-3ddos@js.pentagon.mil and j-3addos@js.pentagon.mil. Classified DDO emails are: j-3ddo's@js.pentagon.smil.mil and j-3addo's@js.pentagon.smil.mil. DDO phone number: 703-695-0100, DSN: 225-0100. Include JDOMS in the email of the GENADMIN message.

(b) GENADMIN message will include:

1. Type of support requested (example: DCO, DCE, or installation).

2. Number, by type, of DOD assets to be provided or installation requirements needed.

3. Duration of support.

4. Confirmation of concurrence from Military Department(s).

5. Deployment location, by type, if applicable.

(2) Reports

(a) Supporting Commanders (RTF / JTF / TF Cdr's) will ensure that daily SITREP's are provided to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center upon start of operations through completion. Reports are due to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center by 0300Z daily. Reports are to be emailed to: nnc.cmdctrdir.omb@northcom.mil or nnc.cmdctrco.omb@northcom.mil, ATTN: NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center Deputy Director. Significant events and USNORTHCOM CCIR will be reported by telephone; DSN 692-2361, COMM (719) 554-2361, fax DSN 692-2367.

(b) Supporting Commanders will provide a daily personnel status report (PERSTAT) to USNORTHCOM J-1 utilizing the Joint Personnel Status Report (JPERSTAT) format. JPERSTAT reports will be submitted Not Later Than (NLT) 1200 hrs MST or 1800Z daily to nnc.cmdctrdir.omb@northcom.smil.mil or nnc.cmdctrco.omb@northcom.smil.mil, or call the day beeper at (719) 921-5431 or night beeper at (719) 921-5432.
(c) Communications status reporting. Commanders will report communications status IAW NORAD/USNORTHCOM J6 TCCC reporting requirements (message DTG 06106Z Mar 03) to the NORAD / USNORTHCOM TCCC via the e-mail address; Northcom.tccc@northcom.mil.mil. Commanders will include the communications status of deployed forces with their NETOPS status reports.

(d) Common Operational Picture (COP). Reporting instructions are identified in OPTASKCOP message DTG 272330Z Jan 03. USNORTHCOM COP classified e-mail address: nnc.cmdctrcopmanager.omb@northcom.mil.mil, unclassified email nnc.cmdctrcopmanager.omb@northcom.mil.mil, DSN 692-2363, COMM (719) 554-2363.

(3) Funding

(a) USNORTHCOM will not provide funding.

(b) Pre-disaster declaration support. The Economy Act is the funding authority for DOD support to another Federal department or agency in planning and preparing to conduct DSCA operations in advance of a Presidential Declaration of Emergency or Disaster. For all SecDef approved pre-incident DSCA rendered to another Federal department or agency under terms of the Economy Act, units will capture and report all costs to their Military Department comptroller and will record man-hours per grade per person expended in executing the DSCA operation, including pay and allowances (P&A).

(c) Post-disaster declaration DSCA operations are reimbursable IAW the Stafford Act. The Supported Combatant Commander, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will ensure DSCA operational support procedures and funding guidelines are adhered to. Units will capture and report incremental costs. If SecDef approves an RFA, it will be executed under a fund cite provided by the agency requesting DOD support.

(d) In all cases, the Supported Combatant Commander, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will ensure DSCA operational support procedures and funding guidelines are adhered to.

(e) Provide Primary Agency invoices from each DOD Service or Agency for goods and services using a Standard Form 1080.
(f) Reimbursable rates will be published for each Fiscal Year and provided by the USNORTHCOM J8 for the current year.

(g) Invoicing for earned reimbursements (performance of work or services, payments to contractors, or delivery from inventory) shall begin within 30 calendar days after the month in which performance occurred.

(h) Invoices shall identify the DOD point of contact (POC), the POC's commercial phone number, the DSCA operation incident name, incident number, incident date, and whether the invoice is a partial or final billing.

(i) Supporting documentation for reimbursement shall include a copy of all SecDef approved RFAs or MAs with the fund cite. Backup documentation will identify the DSCA operation incident name, incident number, incident date, and the costs incurred by each major item listed in the RFA or MA.

(j) USNORTHCOM N-NC J8 contact information is: USNORTHCOM J86, Programs and Resources Directorate, 250 Vandenberg St, Suite 1067, Peterson AFB CO 80914-3812. Fax is: (719) 556-0334.

(k) Services and agencies shall provide a copy of all SF 1080 invoices to USNORTHCOM J8.

b. Logistics

(1) Supply

(a) Forces will be self-sustaining to the maximum extent possible for 3 days of operations. Military forces should carry (as possible) additional rations, medical items, and water to allow emergency assistance when circumstances warrant.

(b) When designated, BSIs will coordinate logistics support for forces deployed in their area, to include forces from other services, for common items on a reimbursable basis. Re-supply support for service unique items is the responsibility of the parent service.

(2) Storage. Designated mobilization sites will provide secure and non-secure storage for relief items, FEMA approved equipment,
trailers and vehicles, as well as office space with basic communications for FEMA personnel.

(3) Transportation

(a) The use of Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is directed for all unit movements. JOPES processes and movement validations will be IAW the Joint Staff TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI), enclosure F of JOPES Vol III, and the NORAD/USNORTHCOM TPFDD instruction located on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM JOPES homepage at www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/j3/j35/jopes/. GCCS newsgroup “gccs.northcom.jopes.operations” on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM news servers www.news.gccs.northcom.smil.mil are used for all deployment planning and execution actions. For emergency validations during non-working hours, page the NORAD / USNORTHCOM duty validator at 1-888-284-0092 or e-mail 8882840092@myairmail.com.

(b) In-Transit Visibility (ITV). All requirements, including in-place assets (local to the area of operations), will be captured in JOPES and all movements will be captured in appropriate transportation-related automated data processing applications, i.e. Global Transportation Network (GTN), Scheduling and Movement (S&M) and the appropriate newsgroups, to ensure visibility in the AO. Commands without access to service ADP systems feeding GTN and S&M will report planned missions to their next higher headquarters for data entry. Shippers/units must Comply with the provisions of DOD Regulation 4500.9-R (Defense Transportation Regulation). The arrival and departure of unit personnel and equipment at all nodes from origin to destination will be visible in GTN and within 1 hour of the movement event.

(c) All DOD requirements for transporting hazardous goods are in effect.

(4) Health Service Support (HSS)

(a) Medical Treatment. First Responder and Forward Resuscitative Care health support to deploying military personnel will be organic or provided by civilian and/or governmental agencies supporting DSCA operations, ICW appropriate military medical authorities (service and unit-level). Medical evacuation is coordinated through the DCO and

C-19-15
Primary Agency. Hospitalization is coordinated by the surgeon in charge of DOD Forces, with the DCO, to a medical treatment facility, TRICARE network hospital, VA, or civilian hospital.

(b) The USNORTHCOM Joint Regional Medical Plans and Operations (JRMPO) will provide JRMPO support to the DCO as part of the DCE to include coordinating requests for DOD HSS resources ISO of the Primary Agency. JRMPO assets will provide advice and guidance concerning HHS capabilities appropriate for the stated mission; maintain interoperability with DOD, state, and Health and Human Services/ESF8 elements will provide SA and information updates through the DCO / DCE designated C2 structure to USNORTHCOM in general and specifically to the 24/7 Medical Operations Center (MOC) at 719-554-4980, when activated.

5. Command and Control

a. Command Relationships

(1) FEMA is the Federal Coordinating Agency (FCA).

(2) CDRUSNORTHCOM is the Supported Combatant Commander.

(3) CDRUSJFCOM and CDRUSTRANSCOM are Supporting Combatant Commanders.

(4) Military Departments and Defense Agencies are supporting organizations.

(5) Upon completion of support mission, as determined by the CDRUSNORTHCOM or SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM will relinquish OPCON of redeploying personnel and/or equipment on departure from the JOA. Subsequently, supporting combatant commanders, military departments, and/or defense agencies accept return of DOD personnel and/or equipment from CDRUSNORTHCOM.

b. Signal

(1) Send SATCOM requirements to USNORTHCOM J637 for validation and assignment. POC for SATCOM requests at USNORTHCOM is at DSN 692-8040, COMM (719) 554-8040. Unclassified E-mail address is nc.satcom.omb@northcom.mil or classified e-mail address is nc.satcom.omb@northcom.mil. **C-19-16**
(2) As soon as emergent frequency management issues and needs are identified, advise USNORTHCOM POC at DSN 692-4008, COMM (719) 554-4008. Classified email Ncj636.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified Ncj636.omb@northcom.mil.

(3) Common Operational Picture (COP). Operational authority will designate COP requirements and coordinate with USNORTHCOM COP Manager. Classified e-mail address: nnc.cmdctrcopmanager.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified email nnc.cmdctrcopmanager.omb@northcom.mil. DSN 692-2363, COMM (719) 554-2363.

(4) Video Teleconference (VTC) instructions. Secure VTCs are used, on call, to update CDRUSNORTHCOM. Participants are on an as needed basis. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center Chief, DSN 692-2361, COMM (719) 554-2361, will notify all personnel who need to participate. VTC technical support is provided by USNORTHCOM Command Presentations and N-NC J62, DSN 692-9990, COMM (719) 554-9990.

(5) Collaborative tool sets. USNORTHCOM POC for collaborative tools is at DSN 692-9078, COMM (719) 554-9078. Classified e-mail address Ncj.isg.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified e-mail address is Ncj.isg.omb@northcom.mil.

(6) USNORTHCOM portal information. The address for the classified USNORTHCOM portal is https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil. The address for the unclassified USNORTHCOM portal is https://www.noradnorthcom.mil.
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TAB A TO APPENDIX 19 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
MAJOR HURRICANE

References:

a. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act)


c. National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement, September 2005


f. Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum, 25 Jun 2004


1. Situation

   a. **Purpose.** This Tab provides USNORTHCOM guidance for the conduct of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations for major hurricanes, such as described in the National Planning Scenario (NPS) 10, Major Hurricane.

   b. **Background.** Every year portions of the USNORTHCOM AO are threatened by major hurricanes and their effects including thunderstorms, tornadoes, flash floods, river system floods, and coastal floods. Hurricanes are intense tropical weather systems consisting of dangerous winds and torrential rains. Hurricanes often spawn tornadoes and can produce a storm surge of ocean water that can be up to 24 feet at its peak and 50 to 100 miles wide. The most destructive companion of hurricanes is the storm surge. A typical hurricane is 400 miles in diameter and has an average forward speed of 15 mph in a range of 0 to 60 mph. The average lifespan of a hurricane is 9 days, within a range of less than 1 day to more than 12 days. The highest wind speeds occur 20
to 30 miles from the center. Hurricane force winds cover almost 100 miles, and gale force winds of 40 mph or more may cover 400 miles in diameter. A fully developed hurricane may tower 10 miles into the atmosphere. A hurricane is categorized by its sustained wind intensity on a Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale (see Table 1 below for details), which is used to estimate the potential for property damage and flooding. Major hurricanes are placed in Categories 3, 4, and 5 with sustained wind intensities between 111 mph to greater than 155 mph. The most dangerous potential storm would be a slow moving Category 5 hurricane, based on a vast volume of rainfall, making landfall in a highly populated area. Tropical cyclones in the Atlantic/Eastern Pacific Oceans are called hurricanes. In the Northwestern Pacific, they are called typhoons. Tropical cyclones form in seven regions around the world, two of which include the USNORTHCOM AOR. The Atlantic Basin (CONUS, U.S. Virgin Islands [USVI], and Puerto Rico [PR]) is depicted in Figure 19-1 in pale green. Atlantic Hurricane Season begins on June 1 and ends on November 30. On average, annual hurricane activity includes two major hurricanes. The Northeastern Pacific Basin (i.e., CA, AZ, and HI) is depicted in the Figure in pale yellow. Hurricane Season begins on May 15 and ends on November 30. On average, annual hurricane activity includes four major hurricanes. The effects of these major hurricane events can destroy lives, property and critically impact infrastructure. The Department of Defense (DOD) possesses unique assets and capabilities that may be used to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage. USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations when requested by civil authorities and approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Wind speed (mph)</th>
<th>Storm surge (ft)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>≥156</td>
<td>&gt;18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>131 - 155</td>
<td>13 - 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>111 - 130</td>
<td>9 - 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>96 - 110</td>
<td>6 - 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>74 - 95</td>
<td>4 - 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These surge values are for reference only. The actual storm surge experienced will depend on offshore bathymetry and onshore terrain and construction.

Table 19-1, Saffir-Simpson Scale
c. Friendly Forces.

(1) DHS/FEMA. DHS/FEMA is designated as the primary agency for preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and mitigating the effects of hurricanes and severe tropical storms. USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA for major hurricanes in accordance with the National Response Framework (NRF), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and DOD policy and guidance.

(2) The Department of State (DOS). Major hurricanes that occur on or near the border may result in cross-border response actions. DOS coordinates international offers of aid and support requests. USNORTHCOM conducts approved support to Canada in accordance with the CANUS Civil Assistance Plan (CAP).

(3) National Guard Bureau (NGB). The NGB plans and coordinates activities to facilitate mutual support among the various National Guard States and Territories, and to enhance National Guard Civil Support. The NGB assists USNORTHCOM by advising it on NG capabilities available and assets employed in the affected region. NGB is developing response plans to assist the NG to prepare, respond, recover, and mitigate damages from storms and hurricanes that exceed the capabilities of the affected state(s) and require external military support either through Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) or federal requests for assistance. The primary role of NGB during a major hurricane is to advise and assist senior DOD leadership, monitor
situational awareness, provide information to various DOD elements, senior leadership, and USNORTHCOM. NGB is also responsible for assisting in the sourcing and flow of forces, and coordination with Title 10 forces. Each state has a Joint Force Headquarters State (JFHQ-S) that serves as the C2 element for deployed NG forces responding to a major hurricane. NG forces in Title 32 or State Active Duty (SAD) status operate under the C2 of the Governor through the Adjutant General.

d. **Area of Operations (AO).** Several portions of the USNORTHCOM AOR including FEMA Regions I, II, III (including the National Capital Region), IV, VI, and IX are at risk of direct strikes from a major hurricane or typhoon. States that historically are prone to hurricane effects are Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas.

![Federal Regions](image)

**Figure 19-2. Federal Regions**

e. **Joint Operations Areas (JOAs).** USNORTHCOM will designate appropriate JOAs for air, land, and maritime operations for the execution of DSCA operations. Standing JOAs are established for the State of Alaska with Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-AK) and for the National Capital Region with Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR).
f. Critical Assumptions.

(1) There will be at least three days notice to execute emergency plans before a major hurricane makes landfall.

(2) Multiple states and territories will be affected simultaneously by one or more major hurricanes or typhoons.

(3) States will provide resources through EMACs and other existing agreements.

(4) The Regional Joint Field Office (JFO) will be fully operational within 72 hours after activation.

(5) The major hurricane will temporarily exceed local, State and Tribal civil authorities’ response capabilities and require Federal support in the following areas:

(a) Transportation. Damage to bridges and elevated roadways will close or restrict many major ground transportation arteries. Food, medicine, gasoline, and other necessities that depend upon ground transportation and other infrastructures are not readily available for the first 10 days following the disaster.

(b) Shelter. As a result of the storm surge, flooding, and wind destruction, some 100,000 disaster victims are not able to immediately return to permanent housing within the Major Metropolitan Area (MMA).

(c) Provision of food and water. Food and potable water are not readily available for the first 10 days following the disaster.

(d) Power generation. The MMA is completely without electric power for the first 10 days following the disaster.

(e) Medical evacuation and treatment. There are hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries. State and local capabilities for triaging and treating casualties in the disaster area are overwhelmed. Most primary medical treatment facilities are damaged or inoperable.

(f) Search and rescue. Most of the local fire, police, and other response personnel and officials are victims of the storm and unable to coordinate immediate response resources.
(g) Communications. Communications systems—including telephones, radios, and cellular systems—are only at 90% capacity in the first week following the storm.

(h) Temporary housing of special needs population, companion and service animals.

(i) Evacuation Support. This includes patient movement, transportation of persons with special needs, and mass evacuation of the general population.


3. Execution. The four primary objectives of DSCA operations for major hurricanes are to save lives, minimize suffering, protect property, and maintain the public confidence in the US Government and the DOD. CDRUSNORTHCOM will deploy forces within his authority to anticipate and establish a framework to provide timely support to the primary agency in support of the affected State(s).

   a. Commander's Intent. Anticipate and execute a timely and effective response in support of the primary agency during hurricane response operations. Provide appropriate DOD capabilities in a timely manner to assist civil authorities to provide necessary services and recover as quickly as possible.

      (1) Strategic Objectives

         [a] Anticipate USNORTHCOM requirements to respond to RFAs from the primary agency.

         [b] Achieve Unity of Effort with local/tribal, state (including National Guard), and other federal responders.

         [c] Collaborate with DOD, interagency, and intergovernmental partners.

         [d] Establish interoperable, flexible, and scalable C2 for deployed USNORTHCOM assets.

         [e] Coordinate closely with the primary agency to keep the American people informed.
b. **End State.** USNORTHCOM DSCA requirements are fulfilled, the command has transitioned response efforts to primary agencies, and the force is postured to anticipate and respond to future DSCA requirements.

c. **Concept of Operations.** USNORTHCOM provides DSCA response for a hurricane along seven logical lines of operation: Transportation, Incident Assessment & Awareness (IAA), Search and Rescue (SAR), Engineering Support, Medical Support, Communications Support, Security, and Support the Force. USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations for major hurricanes in six (6) phases: Shape, Anticipate, Respond, Operate, Stabilize, and Transition.

(1) **Phase 0, Shape.** The Shaping Phase is continuous. Actions include planning, interagency coordination, preparations, exercises, and maintaining situational awareness (SA) of events occurring in the AO. Phase 0 ends with the identification of a potential DSCA mission in support of a major hurricane or when directed by the President or SecDef.

(a) Situational awareness is provided to the CDRUSNORTHCOM by the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center (N2C2), the USNORTHCOM Situation Awareness Team (NSAT), USNORTHCOM Liaison Officers (LNOs) to other agencies and situation reports (SITREPs) provided by the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) teams and JTF Commander (when deployed).

(b) Regionally aligned DCO/DCE teams are an integral part of the USNORTHCOM DSCA operations for major hurricanes. They ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the DSCA operations by maintaining SA through developing and refining the following tasks:

1. Coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) for Regional Plans.

2. Coordinate with Joint Force Headquarters State (JFHQ-State) through the NGB for the non-Federalized National Guard (NG) capabilities and on-going response activities in the JOA.

3. Monitor non-Federalized NG operations executed under EMAC.

4. Conduct an assessment of DOD Installations within the region for use as a Base Support Installation (BSI).
5. Become Familiar with the DOD Installation's Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) / Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between the installation and the local communities within the region.

6. Review the local Disaster Response Plans for major population centers within the region.

7. Reviews Disaster Response Plans for Critical National Assets within the region.

8. Coordinate the training and integration for the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) assigned to each state and region into the DSCA operations for major hurricanes.

9. Maintain accountability and reporting responsibility for Title 10/DOD personnel deployed to the JOA through daily SITREP and JPERSTAT until a Task Force Commander is established.

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**DCO/E Regional Structure and Functions**

![Diagram of DCO/E Regional Structure and Functions]

Figure 19-3, DCO/DCE Regional Structure and Functions
(c) When an anticipated DSCA operation for a major hurricane is identified, Phase 0, Shaping situational awareness continues as a means to plan, prepare for, and identify other potential or follow-on incidents, but execution moves into Phase I, Anticipate the DSCA operation for a major hurricane.

Notional Operational Timeline – Notice Event

![Timeline Diagram]

**Phase III Operate**

Initial Response Forces Notified & Begin Deployment (EXORDs, PSMAAs, Immediate Response Forces, etc.)

- Place Forces on PFEO and/or Increase Response Posture Level
- Integrated BAR
- Initial Damage Assessment
- Evacuation
- Medical Augmentation
- Comm Support
- ALERT/TDO Addl Category I Efforts

Additional Forces (RFFs, etc.)

Figure 19-4, Anticipated Response Timeline

(2) **Phase I, Anticipate.** This phase begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission in response to a major hurricane or when directed by the President or SecDef. The key tasks during Phase I are Evacuation and Situational Awareness. Phase I ends with Tier 1 pre-identified response forces deployed.

(a) **Phase I actions include:**

1. Deployment of USNORTHCOM Situation Awareness Team (NSAT) to the incident site. See NCP 3-08, USNORTHCOM Situation Awareness Team (NSAT) Concept of Execution (CONEX).

2. Responsibilities of the DCO include:

   a. Validate requests from the FCO.
b. Establish the Defense Coordination Element (DCE).

c. Establish liaison among military, State, and other Federal Agencies for support.

d. Provide a liaison officer, as required, to each activated Emergency Support Function (ESF).

e. Coordinate with the FCO and other ESFs for defense support.

f. Coordinate with the FCO and other ESFs for support of defense support providers.

g. Work with the FCO and SCO to integrate the tasking of National Guard on SAD with active units to maximize responses while avoiding duplication of effort.

h. Confirm relief priorities established by the FCO and SCO for the disaster area.

i. Develop a priority of work for supporting units.

j. Maintain an audit trail of mission requests to ensure each tasking is supported by a valid request and/or mission assignment number. The audit trail should include estimated and actual costs of support for each mission.

k. DCG/DCE is responsible for accountability and reporting of Title 10/DOD personnel deployed to the JOA until a JTF is established.

3. Deployment of a DCO/DCE to FEMA Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC) or JFO when established. Coordinate specific requirements for evacuation:

a. Identify airports to be utilized for evacuation.

b. Define specific number/type of personnel to move from each airport.

c. Identify aircraft support capabilities at each airport.
d. Pre-coordinate aircraft marshalling, loading, ground handling and other support.

e. Coordinate ground transportation for passengers to the airports.

f. Establish procedures for orderly passenger flow.

g. Identify procedures to marshal passengers at the gate prior to aircraft arrival.

h. Pre-coordinate passenger processing/manifesting procedures.

i. Deconflict and synchronize requirements for general population, tourist and medical evacuation.

j. Establish and staff an Incident Command Post to manage flow in/out of multiple airports.

k. Identify shelter in place requirements at airports.

l. Coordinate passenger movement and final sheltering location at destination airports.

4. The BSI nomination process is led by the USNORTHCOM J4. Close coordination with the NSAT, DCOs and Service Components serves as the key to producing a detailed and deliberate nomination of viable installations that can serve as BSIs to DOD forces during a DSCA event. Ongoing installation missions and resource constraints are key factors in consideration of what installation will ultimately be selected.

5. Deployment of LNOs, EPLOs, and JRMPs.

6. Employment of C2 elements and assignment of JOA.

7. Deployment of Crisis Response Force Package Options (FPO), as appropriate, and as approved by SecDef (See Appendix 3 to Annex A, Force Package Options).

8. Repositioning of forces and supplies to avoid loss from the incident, or repositioning proximate to the incident site to speed response operations. (USNORTHCOM coordinates with owning services and with the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) Defense Distribution Center).
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9. Alert Stabilization and Recovery / Reconstitution Force
Package Option forces for deployment (request via Request for Forces
(RFF) to Joint Director for Military Support (JDOMS) for SecDef
approval).

10. Continued coordination with NG, other Federal
agencies, and State, local and Tribal governments to ensure unity of
effect. Provide a USNORTHCOM planning team to FEMA, who is
designated as the Coordinating Agency in the NRF for response and
recovery.

11. Commanders in the proximity of the event may provide
assistance under Immediate Response Authority to a request from an
apparently proper civil authority to save lives, prevent human suffering
and mitigate great property damage. All immediate response actions
must be reported as soon as possible (within hours) through the chain of
command to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and
concurrently to the N2C2.

12. Installation Commanders may provide support for major
hurricane events as planned and directed by DOD Instruction 2000.18,
Installation CBRNE Consequence Management (CM) response. This DOD
Instruction requires Installations to identify emergency response
personnel and assets that can provide support to the local community
during emergency circumstances. This response will be reported
through the appropriate chain of command to the NMCC and
concurrently to the N2C2 within hours of the support being provided.

13. Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) may be
provided by Air Force units under Air Force Regulation 64-1, and AFI 10-
802, Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST). Army units may
provide response as assets are available. MAST operations include
emergency medical evacuation and patient transport.

14. USNORTHCOM and U. S. Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM) coordinate on response capabilities for; Air Movements,
Military Sealift Command maritime transportation and logistics assets,
and for USTRANSCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center
(DDOC) support of USNORTHCOM including LNO, NDDOC
augmentation, DDOC-Forward, DIRMOBFOR Air and Surface, and JTF
Port Opening capabilities.

15. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and
Integration (JRSOI) locations are established (supporting forces deployed
to the AO or JOA (if established) and processing instructions are
provided in execution orders (EXORDs) / deployment orders (DEPORDs) to deploying units.

16. A damage assessment plan is developed and resources are requested to be placed on increased deployment readiness status via a Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO) or given an event occurrence as an execute trigger (e.g. 12 hours after hurricane land-fall).

17. Conduct response planning (Search and Rescue, etc.) and war-gaming.

18. Identify additional force capabilities for response and place on PTDO.

19. Identify materials and supplies (rations, medical items, tents, cots, etc.) for response and preposition if required or conduct coordination to obtain.

20. Conduct coordination with the Interagency and State (including NG forces), local and Tribal governments for a mutually supporting response.

[3] Phase II, Respond. Phase II begins with the deployment of initial response capabilities. Key tasks include Evacuation, Search and Rescue, Emergency Medical Response, and Initial Damage Assessment. Phase II ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the JOA.

(a) Phase II actions include:

1. Command and Control (C2), medical, transportation, communications, power generation, water purification, and supply units are rapidly established and operational. Life support services (water, food, medical care, shelter) are the mission focus. Supplies are procured using established DOD process through the DLA purchasing and contracting with available local venders.

2. Military forces provide public assurance of the national focus on response by being present in the stricken area.

3. Units and individuals reporting to the JOA process through JRSOI facilities.

4. Units responding under immediate response authority may be incorporated into the USNORTHCOM C2 structure for the DSCA operation via the JRSOI process.
(4) **Phase III, Operate.** Phase III begins when DSCA response operations commence in the JOA. Key tasks are Evacuation, Search and Rescue (SAR), Emergency Medical Response, and Initial Damage Assessment. Phase III ends when Title 10 forces begin to complete mission assignments and no further requests for DOD assistance are anticipated from civil authorities.

(a) Actions include:

1. Providing DSCA as requested by FEMA and approved by SecDef to execute Mission Assignments (MA).

2. Arranging for the procurement (through DLA and Defense Fuels) and distribution of supplies to support DOD forces.

3. DSCA operations may include, but are not limited to: SAR, emergency medical, patient transport, life support functions, supply distribution, recovery support operations, use of DOD facilities, mortuary affairs, safekeeping of utilities, emergency infrastructure repair, and debris clearance.


(5) **Phase IV, Stabilize.** Phase IV begins when military and civil authorities decide that DOD support will scale down. Phase IV ends when DOD support is no longer required by civil authorities and transition criteria are established.

(a) Actions include:

1. Scaling down operations, forces, C2, and logistics support.

2. Coordinating with the interagency.


4. Transition criteria are established.

(6) **Phase V, Transition.** Phase V begins with the redeployment of remaining DOD forces. Phase V, Transition ends when response forces have been relieved, redeployed and operational control (OPCON) is transferred to their respective commands.

(a) Phase V actions include: C-19-A-14
1. Transition of DSCA mission set to civil authorities.

2. USNORTHCOM relinquishes OPCON of forces as they depart the AO.

3. Forces redeploy and report closure at home station to USNORTHCOM.

4. Costs are reported.

5. Lessons learned are captured.

d. **Tasks.** Additional tasking will be provided in a mission specific USNORTHCOM EXORD for hurricane response operations.

(1) **N2C2.**

(a) Provide required COCOM-level command and control.

(b) Maintain the Common Operating Picture including tracking requests for assistance (RFAs) and MA's, T10/DOD forces moving in and out of the operation area, forces placed on PTDOS, and forces whose OPCON has been transferred to USNORTHCOM and its subordinates.

(c) Coordinate with NMCC to gain situational awareness of relevant Immediate Response and Mutual Aide Agreement activities in the operation area.

(d) Conduct other C2 and situational awareness activities IAW the USNORTHCOM Battle Staff Operating Procedures (BSOP) and as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM and USNORTHCOM/J3.

(2) **USNORTHCOM Future Operations Center (FOC).**

(a) Coordinate and publish EXORDS.

(b) Submit RFFs, PTDOS, DEPORDs, etc.

(c) Conduct short-term operational planning and other activities IAW the BSOP and as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM and USNORTHCOM/J3.

(3) **USNORTHCOM Future Plans Center (FPC).**
(a) Generate assessments and estimates with COAs analyzing potential branch plans and sequels and developing threats to support senior decision making for events and operations 96-hours or more in the future.

(b) Conduct operational planning and other activities IAW the BSOP and as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM and NORAD-USNORTHCOM/J5.

(4) USNORTHCOM Joint Support Group (JSG).
   (a) Recommend potential BSIs four days before storm landfall.
   (b) Determine BSIs two days prior to storm landfall.
   (c) Conduct support planning and other activities IAW the BSOP and as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM and NORAD-USNORTHCOM/J4.

(5) USNORTHCOM JIACG.
   (a) TBD by IC.

(6) Joint Intelligence Operations Center-North (JIOC-N).
   (a) Facilitate decision making and planning by supporting the FOC and FPC with required information on most dangerous scenarios and collateral threats.
   (b) Depict NAIIs graphically on an event template overlay.
   (c) (b) Conduct intelligence assessment and planning and other activities IAW the BSOP and as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM and NORAD-USNORTHCOM/J2.

(7) USNORTHCOM NG Office.
   (a) Provide planner/LNO to USNORTHCOM FOC and FPC to coordinate with counterparts at NGB.
   (b) Conduct liaison, assessment, and other activities IAW the BSOP and as directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM and NORAD-USNORTHCOM/NG.

(8) JTF-Hurricane. The JTF established for hurricane response operations (also generically referred to as JTF-DSCA in the basic plan)

C-19-A-16

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
can be expected to accomplish the following operational tasks during a major hurricane:

(a) OP 5.3 Prepare Plans and Orders during Phases 0-V.

(b) OP 5.7.4 Coordinate Plans with Non-DOD Organizations during Phases 0-V.

(c) OP 2.1 Direct Operational Intelligence Activities during Phases 0-V.

(d) OP 2.4.1.1 Identify Operational Issues and Threats during Phases 0-IV.

(e) OP 4.7.3 Provide Support to DOD and Other Government Agencies during Phases I-IV.

(f) OP 5.5.2 Develop Joint Force Liaison Structure during Phases I-II

(g) OP 5.8.1 Manage Media Relations in the Joint Operations Area during Phases I-IV.

(h) OP 5 Provide Operational Command and Control during Phases I-V.

(i) OP 5.5.5 Establish Command Transition Criteria and Procedures during Phases I-II.

(j) OP 1.1.3 Conduct Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) in the Joint Operations Area during Phases II-IV.

(k) OP 5.1.3 Determine Commander’s Critical Information Requirements during Phases 0-V.

(l) OP 5.1.7 Coordinate Combat Camera Activities during Phases II-IV.

(m) OP 4.8 Acquire, Manage and Distribute Funds during Phases 0-V.

(n) OP 6 Provide Operational Force Protection during Phases 0-V.

Coordinating Instructions. See Basic plan and Annex C
(1) USNORTHCOM's major hurricane Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) serve as triggers to initiate follow-on phases of this plan. These CCIRs keep the CDRUSNORTHCOM informed on the potential for, and current status of, DSCA operations for major hurricanes.

(a) Are there any potential tropical weather systems that may impact the United States?

(b) Has the President declared an Emergency or Major Disaster?

(c) Are there indications of a predicted or imminent emergency, disaster, or incident that has the potential to overwhelm civil authorities and impact DOD?

(d) Are there any impending threats to the Defense Industrial Base or DOD critical infrastructure?

(e) Are there any impending threats to transportation infrastructure (Road, Rail, Air, Maritime) due to major hurricanes?

(f) Have civil authorities issued guidance/warning to public?

(g) Has a Governor requested Federal assistance?

(h) Has a Request for Assistance (RFA) been submitted?

(i) Has a Request for Federal agency to agency assistance been submitted?

(j) Is there any negative reporting in media of the government response or actions?

(2) The annual Atlantic Hurricane Season is from 1 June to 30 November. The Northeastern Pacific Basin season is 15 May through 30 November.

(3) Support period is not to exceed 60 days without review.

(4) DSCA operations for major hurricanes are provided on a reimbursable basis IAW applicable laws and regulations for the type of incident.
(5) Service Administrative Control (ADCON) will be exercised through service components of supporting commands.

f. Force Protection (FP). See Basic plan and Annex C, Appendix 15. Specific guidance will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD for major hurricanes.

g. Public Affairs (PA). See Basic plan and Annex F. PA guidance is active when conducted in coordination with (ICW) FEMA. Personnel involved in DSCA operations may actively engage the media to explain their role; however any comments regarding a specific disaster situation will be referred to Joint Information Center (JIC). DSCA operations PA guidance will be issued by USNORTHCOM PA.

4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex D

a. Administration

(1) Mission execution notification process is as follows:

(a) Upon receipt of an RFA or MA from federal civil authorities, USNORTHCOM will confirm JDOMS has received a copy. Upon service concurrence or DCO notification, USNORTHCOM must submit a GENADMIN message to CJCS, followed by an email, and a follow-on phone call. Unclassified DDO emails are: j-3ddos@js.pentagon.mil and j-3ddos@js.pentagon.mil Classified DDO emails are: j-3ddo's@js.pentagon.smil.mil and j-3addo's@js.pentagon.smil.mil. DDO phone number: 703-695-0100, DSN: 225-0100. Include JDOMS in the email of the GENADMIN message.

(b) GENADMIN message will include:

1. Type of support requested (example: DCO, DCE, or installation).

2. Number, by type, of DOD assets to be provided or installation requirements needed.

3. Duration of support.

4. Confirmation of concurrence from Military Department(s).

5. Deployment location, by type, if applicable.

(2) Reports

C-19-A-19

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
(a) Supporting Commanders (RTF / JTF / TF Cdr's) will ensure that daily SITREPs are provided to the N2C2 upon start of operations through completion. Reports are due to the N2C2 by 0300Z daily. Reports are to be emailed to: Nc.joc.chief.omb@northcom.mil, ATTN: NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center Chief. Significant events and USNORTHCOM CCIR will be reported by telephone; DSN 692-2361, COMM (719) 554-2361, fax DSN 692-2367 (UNCLASSIFIED)/692-2368 (CLASSIFIED).

(b) Supporting Commanders will provide a daily personnel status report (PERSTAT) to USNORTHCOM J-1 utilizing the Joint Personnel Status Report (JPERSTAT) format. JPERSTAT reports will be submitted Not Later Than (NLT) 1200 hrs MST or 1800Z daily to nc.cog.j1.omb@northcom.smil.mil or call the day beeper at (719) 921-5431 or night beeper at (719) 921-5432.

(c) Communications status reporting is identified in Annex K.

(d) Common Operational Picture (COP). Reporting instructions are identified in Annex K.

(3) Funding

(a) USNORTHCOM will not provide funding.

(b) Pre-disaster declaration support. The Economy Act is the funding authority for DOD support to another Federal department or agency in planning and preparing to conduct DSCA operations in advance of a Presidential Declaration of Emergency or Disaster. For all SecDef approved pre-incident DSCA rendered to another Federal department or agency under terms of the Economy Act, units will capture and report all costs to their Military Department comptroller and will record man-hours per grade per person expended in executing the DSCA operation, including pay and allowances (P&A).

(c) Post-disaster declaration DSCA operations are reimbursable IAW the Stafford Act. The Supported Combatant Commander, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will ensure DSCA operational support procedures and funding guidelines are adhered to. Units will capture and report incremental costs. If SecDef approves an RFA, it will be executed under a fund cite provided by the agency requesting DOD support.

(d) In all cases, the Supported Combatant Commander, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will ensure DSCA operational support procedures and funding guidelines are adhered to.
(e) Provide primary agency invoices from each DOD Service or Agency for goods and services using a Standard Form 1080.

(f) Invoicing for earned reimbursements (performance of work or services, payments to contractors, or delivery from inventory) shall begin within 30 calendar days after the month in which performance occurred.

(g) Invoices shall identify the DOD point of contact (POC), the POC's commercial phone number, the DSCA operation incident name, incident number, incident date, and whether the invoice is a partial or final billing.

(h) Supporting documentation for reimbursement shall include a copy of all SecDef approved RFAs or MAs with the fund cite. Backup documentation will identify the DSCA operation incident name, incident number, incident date, and the costs incurred by each major item listed in the RFA or MA.

(i) USNORTHCOM N-NC J8 contact information is:
USNORTHCOM J83, Programs and Resources Directorate, 250 Vandenberg St, Suite 1067, Peterson AFB CO 80914-3812. Fax is: (719) 556-0334.

(j) Services and agencies shall provide a copy of all SF 1080 invoices to USNORTHCOM J8.

b. Logistics

(1) Supply

(a) Forces deploying for DSCA deploy with five days of supply of Class I and Class III(B) depending on the method of deployment. Deploy with other mission essential supplies as directed.

(b) When designated, BSIs will coordinate with the JTF for logistics support for forces deployed in their area, to include forces from other services, for common items on a reimbursable basis. Resupply support for service unique items is the responsibility of the parent service.

(2) Storage. Designated mobilization sites will provide secure and non-secure storage for relief items, FEMA approved equipment, trailers and vehicles, as well as office space with basic communications for FEMA personnel.
(3) Transportation

(a) The use of Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is directed for all unit movements. JOPES processes and movement validations will be IAW the Joint Staff TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI), enclosure F of JOPES Vol. III, and the NORAD/USNORTHCOM TPFDD instruction located on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM JOPES homepage at www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/j3/j35/jopes/. GCCS newsgroup "gccs.northcom.jopes.operations" on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM news servers www.news.gccs.northcom.smil.mil are used for all deployment planning and execution actions. For emergency validations during non-working hours, page the NORAD / USNORTHCOM duty validator at 1-888-284-0092 or e-mail 8882840092@myairmail.com.

(b) In-Transit Visibility (ITV). All requirements, including in-place assets (local to the area of operations), will be captured in JOPES and all movements will be captured in appropriate transportation-related automated data processing applications, i.e. Global Transportation Network (GTN), Scheduling and Movement (S&M) and the appropriate newsgroups, to ensure visibility in the AO. Commands without access to service ADP systems feeding GTN and S&M will report planned missions to their next higher headquarters for data entry. Shippers/units must Comply with the provisions of DOD Regulation 4500.9-R (Defense Transportation Regulation). The arrival and departure of unit personnel and equipment at all nodes from origin to destination will be visible in GTN and within 1 hour of the movement event.

(c) All DOD requirements for transporting hazardous goods are in effect.

(4) Health Service Support (HSS)

(a) Medical Treatment. First Responder and Forward Resuscitative Care health support to deploying military personnel will be organic or provided by civilian and/or governmental agencies supporting DSCA operations, ICW military medical authorities (service and unit-level). Medical evacuation is coordinated through the DCO and primary agency. Hospitalization is coordinated by the surgeon in charge of DOD Forces, with the DCO, to a medical treatment facility, TRICARE network hospital, VA, or civilian hospital.

(b) The USNORTHCOM Joint Regional Medical Plans and Operations (JRMPO) will provide JRMPO support to the DCO as part of the DCE to include coordinating requests for DOD HSS resources ISO of

C-19-A-22
the primary agency. JRMP0 assets will provide advice and guidance concerning HHS capabilities appropriate for the stated mission; maintain interoperability with DOD, state, and Health and Human Services/ESF8 elements will provide SA and information updates through the DCO / DCE designated C2 structure to USNORTHCOM in general and specifically to the 24/7 Medical Operations Center (MOC) at 719-554-4980, when activated.

5. **Command and Control**

   a. **Command Relationships**

   (1) DHS/FEMA is designated as the primary agency for preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and mitigating the effects of hurricanes and severe tropical storms. FEMA will remain the coordinating authority for all federal interagency partners in support of hurricane response operations.

   (2) CDRUSNORTHCOM is the Supported Combatant Commander.

   (3) CDRUSJFCOM, CDRUSTRANSCOM, USPACOM, and USSOCOM are Supporting Combatant Commanders.

   (4) Military Departments and Defense Agencies are supporting organizations.

   (5) Upon completion of support mission, as determined by the CDRUSNORTHCOM or SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM will relinquish OPCON of redeploying personnel and/or equipment on departure from the JOA. Subsequently, supporting combatant commanders, military departments, and/or defense agencies accept return of DOD personnel and/or equipment from CDRUSNORTHCOM.

   b. **Signal** See Annex K.

Exhibits:

1 - Decision Support Templating for Major Hurricanes
2 - CCIR, Decision Points, and Key Actions by Phase
EXHIBIT 1 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 19 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
ANTICIPATED FORCE REQUIREMENTS BY PHASE

1. **Purpose.** This Tab provides a general overview for anticipated force requirements by phase for major mission areas likely to be undertaken during a major hurricane. The data is not linked to a specific geographic area, but highlights capabilities likely to be required and potentially furnished by the National Guard of the states and/or Title 10 military forces. This information should aid in the efficient application of military resources in the response to a major hurricane.

## Integrated Search and Rescue (SAR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Anticipate</th>
<th>Additional Identified requirements per EMAC &amp; Interstate Compacts</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ-State JTF-State C2 -NG installations (State Wide)</td>
<td>Engineer (Horizontal) -Aviation Units (Fixed and Rotary) -Aviation RECON (RAID) -CERFP -NG Response Force (BN) -Civil Engineer Units -Aviation Rescue Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCOD/DCE &amp; Augmentation -JTF HQ/C2 -DOD installations (FOS/ABSI) -NSAT</td>
<td>Rotary Wing Support (Heavy x 4 helos) -Rotary Wing Support (Medium x 8 helos) -Comms Supt - C4 Planning Teams -Comms Supt - LNO Comms Package -Comms Supt - Small C2 Internet Protocol Page -Fixed-wing Search N/C w/ Imagery capability -Up to 4 planners to provide SME -JTF - Port Opening -1 x Catastrophic Initial Entry Force (BCT) -1 x Rotary Wing Aviation BN (Medium) -1 x Theater Aviation Brigade HQ Element -1 x Amphibious Ready Group -1 x Air Ground Coordination Cell</td>
<td>CBIRF (high angle rescue) -Engineer Company (Bldg Collapse USR) -All Terrain Vehicles -Joint Personal Recovery Center (JPRC) -Augmentation for Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC)</td>
<td>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</td>
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# Wide Area Damage Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JFHQ-State JTF-State C2</th>
<th>Civil Engineer Units</th>
<th>Additional identified requirements per EMAC &amp; Interstate Compacts</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NG Installations (State Wide)</td>
<td>Aviation Airlift (Fixed Wing and Rotary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCO/DCE &amp; Augmentation</td>
<td>Communications Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF HQ/C2</td>
<td>Civil Engineering Flight</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD Installations (FOSABS)</td>
<td>NSAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Rotary Wing Support (Heavy x 4 helos)
- Rotary Wing Support (Medium x 8 helos)
- Fixed-wing Search AC w/ Imagery capability
- AA downlink/uplink capability
- 1 x Commercial Imagery Space Supt team
- 2 x Comm Supt Teams for FOB
- 10 x Comm Fly Away Teams
- 2 x Airborne C2 AIC
- 4 x Packages for Global ISR Response Force (U-2, Global Hawk, etc.)
- 1 x Air-Ground Coordination Cell
- 1 x Theater Aviation Brigade HQ Element

Green = State NG Red = EMAC/Interstate Compact NG Purple = DSCA EXORD Blue = RFFs from PSMAs, etc.

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C-19-A-1-2

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## Evacuation Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Anticipate</th>
<th>Additional identified requirements per EMAC &amp; Interstate Compacts</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
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<td></td>
<td>- JFHQ-State/JTF C2</td>
<td>- Aviation (Fixed Wing and Rotary)</td>
<td>- Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</td>
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<td>- Aero Medical Evacuation</td>
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<td>- Aerial Ports SQDN</td>
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<td>- DOD/DoDCE &amp; Augmentation</td>
<td>- Rotary Wing Support (Heavy x 4 helos)</td>
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<td>- Rotary Wing Support (Medium x 8 helos)</td>
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<td>- Patient Movement Capability w/ enabling assets</td>
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<td>- DOD NIMS bed reporting to TRANSCOM</td>
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<td>- 1 x Catastrophic Initial Entry Force (BCT)</td>
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<td>- 1 x Rotary Wing Aviation BN (Medium)</td>
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<td>- 1 x Movement Control Team</td>
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<td>- 1 x Area Support Medical Company</td>
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<td>- 1 x Theater Aviation Brigade HQ Element</td>
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<td>- Aeromedical Evacuation</td>
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Green = State NG  Red = EMAC/Interstate Compact NG  Purple = DSCA EXORD  Blue = RFFs fm PSMAs, etc.
# Communications Interoperability

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>JFHQ-State/TF C2</th>
<th>Commo Flights, ANG</th>
<th>Civil Support Teams (CST)</th>
<th>Additional Identified requirements per EMAC &amp; Interstate Compacts</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
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<td>Signal Units</td>
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<td>DCO/DCE &amp; Augmentation</td>
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<td>JTF Headquarter/Command &amp; Control (C2)</td>
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<td>DOD Installations (FOSA/BBS)</td>
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<td>Comms Supt - C4 Planning Teams</td>
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<td>2 x Comms Supt Teams for FOBs</td>
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<td>10 x Comms Fly Away Teams</td>
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<td>Comms Supt - LNO Comms Package</td>
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<td>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</td>
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Green = State NG, Red = EMAC/Interstate Compact NG, Purple = DSCA EXORD, Blue = RFFs from PSMAs, etc.
# Medical Augmentation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1 Anticipate</th>
<th>JFHQ-State/ JTF C2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Rescue SQDN. ANG</td>
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<td>CEFRP</td>
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<td>Medical Battalions Companies and Groups</td>
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<td>ASMC (Medical)</td>
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<td>Additional identified requirements per EMAC &amp; Interstate Compacts</td>
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<td>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</td>
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<th>JFCOD C/O Augmentation</th>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
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<td>Headquarters/Command &amp; Control (C2)</td>
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<td>DOD Installations (FOSA/BLSI)</td>
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<td>Expeditionary Medical Support</td>
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<td>1 x Catastrophic Initial Entry Force (BCT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Amphibious Ready Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Med Logistics Smart Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Med Logistics Company to include Early Entry Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Preventive Med Det</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Area Support Med Company</td>
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| Med Det Combat Stress |
| Med Det Veterinary Services |
| Combat Support Hospital |
| Air Transportable Hospital |
| USNS Hospital Ship (MERCY/COMFORT) |
| PSMA 16, Temporary Medical Facilities |

Green = State NG  Red = EMAC/Interstate Compact NG  Purple = DSCA EXORD  Blue = RFFs from PSMA, etc.

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# Engineering & Logistics Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Additional Identified Requirements per EMAC &amp; Interstate Compacts</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
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<tr>
<td>JFHQ-State/JTF C2</td>
<td>NG Response Forces, Combat Arms Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>NG Response Forces</td>
<td>Combat Arms Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCO/DCE &amp; Augmentation</td>
<td>1 x BCT or RCT, 1 x ARG, 2 x Engineer Construction Battalion, 1 x Movement Control Team, 1 x Medium/Light Trans. Co., 1 x Army Field Supt Brigade, 2 x Engineer Div. Units</td>
<td>Additional Identified assets via RFF through Joint Staff</td>
<td>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Headquarters/Command &amp; Control (C2)</td>
<td>DOD Installations (FOSA/BSS)</td>
<td>Identified requirements per PSMA's</td>
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Green = State NG Red = EMAC/Interstate Compact NG Purple = DSCA EXORD Blue = RFFs fm PSMA's, etc.
EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 19 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
CCIR, DECISION POINTS, AND KEY ACTIONS BY PHASE

1. (U) Purpose. This enclosure provides a baseline to facilitate the development of decision support tools during crisis action planning and execution for hurricane response.

2. (U) Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) are a key information management tool for the commander and help the commander assess potential threats, the operational environment, friendly capabilities, and identify decision points (DP) throughout the conduct of operations. CCIR consist of priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and friendly forces information requirements (FFIR).

3. (U) CCIR, DPs, and timing of decisions are templated by phase as follows:

   a. (U) Phase 0: Steady State CCIR from the Theater Campaign Plan (CCIR # 5) triggers the decision to execute CONPLAN 3501 for a DSCA response.

   b. (U) Phase I: Anticipate.

| CCIR 1.1: Has [named storm] attained hurricane status and will it make CONUS landfall? (PIR) | 1.1.1. What is the 5-day forecast modeling for track and strength (likely and worst case)?
| - Issue CDR Assessment (OPREP-3PCA) to Chairman | 1.1.2. When and where is the forecast land fall?
| - Issue Warning Order to subordinates and components | 1.1.3. What are the vulnerabilities in the affected area based on current local, state, and FEMA assessments?
| DP Timing: NLT 0 – 5 days | 1.1.4. What is the forecasted area affected by tropical storm strength winds?
| | 1.1.5. What is the forecasted cumulative rain fall and impact based on precipitation already accumulated?
| | 1.1.6. What DOD forces and bases may be impacted by the storm?
| | 1.1.6. Are DCO/DCEs notified? |
| (note D = landfall of hurricane force winds) | 1.1.7. What level of response and specific actions are planned by FEMA? |
| 1.1.8. What DOD and non-DOD critical infrastructure in the affected area? | |
| **CCIR 1.2: Are additional DOD (T10) forces required to satisfy mission assignments? (FFIR)** | 1.2.1. Does the standing DSCA EXORD or current PTDO provide sufficient capacity to support anticipated DOD T-10 missions? |
| **Submit RFF for additional forces** | 1.2.1.1. Are there potential DOD T-10 support requirements? |
| **Issue PTDO for initial forces potentially required** | 1.2.1.1.1. General population evacuation? |
| **Recommend potential Base Support Installation (BSI)** | 1.2.1.1.2. Special needs evacuation? |
| **Deploy the NSAT** | 1.2.1.2. Are there potential DOD T-10 Incident Assessment & Awareness requirements? |
| **Pursue Canadian support under the Combined Assistance Plan (CAP) if required** | 1.2.1.2.1. Hazard surveillance and monitoring? |
| **DP Timing: D ~ 5 through D ~ 3** | 1.2.1.2.2. Support to Search and Rescue (SAR)? |
| | 1.2.1.2.3. Common operational picture? |
| | 1.2.1.3. Are there potential DOD T-10 Search & Rescue support requirements? |
| | 1.2.1.4. Are there potential DOD T-10 Engineering support requirements? |
| | 1.2.1.4.1. Route clearance? |
| | 1.2.1.4.2. Support to SAR? |
| | 1.2.1.4.3. Bridging? |
| | 1.2.1.4.4. Air or sea port opening? |
| | 1.2.1.4.5. Emergency Infrastructure repair? |
| | 1.2.1.5. Are there potential DOD T-10 Medical support requirements? |
| | 1.2.1.6. Are there potential DOD T-10 Communications support requirements? |
| 1.2.1.7. Are there potential DOD T-10 Security support requirements | |
| Critical infrastructure? | |
| Civil law and order? | |
| 1.2.1.8. What is the BSI requirement to support potential operations? | |
| 1.2.2. Do MA's previously issued for concurrent operations potentially affect force availability for anticipated follow on MA's? | |
c. (U) **Phase II: Respond** (note Phase I CCIR remain in effect).

| CCIR 2.1: What is the estimated or actual extent of the area impacted by the affects of the hurricane (PIR)? | 2.1.1. Has the President declared an Emergency or Major Disaster?  
2.1.2. Has a Governor requested Federal assistance?  
2.1.3. Have civil authorities issued hurricane guidance/warning or evacuation orders to the public?  
2.1.4. What is the estimated area affected by hurricane force winds, storm surge, and secondary flooding (pre-landfall)?  
2.1.5. What is the actual area affected by hurricane force winds, storm surge, and secondary flooding (post-landfall)? |
| --- | --- |
| ★ Designate BSI  
★ Establish the DSCA response Joint Operations Area (JOA)  
★ Issue DEPORD or EXORD to establish C2 nodes. |  |
| DP Timing: D - 3 through D + 1 |  |
| CCIR 2.2: Are DOD (T10) forces required to satisfy mission assignments (FFIR)? | 2.2.1. What RFAs been submitted for DOD support?  
2.2.2. What MAs have been tasked to USNORTHCOM?  
2.2.3. What DOD assets are engaged in Emergency Response activities? |
| ★ Request OPCON of PTDO forces  
★ Request OPCON of forces required for DSCA beyond emergency response criteria  
★ RFF additional forces as required |  |
| DP Timing: D - 4 through D + 5 |  |
| CCIR 2.3: Have NORTHCOM response enablers established an operational presence within the JOA? (FFIR)? | 2.3.1. Is/are the DCO/DCE and/or JTF with communications systems in place?  
2.3.2. What is the status of BSI and APOD/SPODs and are they still suitable to support DOD operations?  
2.3.3. Are JRSOI enablers in place?  
2.3.4. What is the status of Base Support Installation (BSI), |
| ★ Commence support to MAs |  |
d. (U) **Phase III: Operate** (note Phase I and II CCIR remain in effect).

| CCIR 3.1: Are additional DOD (T10) forces required to satisfy mission assignments (FFIR)? | 3.1.1. Is there sufficient capacity to support current assigned missions?  
3.1.2. Major concentrations of displaced civilians or casualties requiring evacuation or immediate relief within the JOA?  
3.1.3. Critical civil systems incapacitated by storm?  
3.1.4. Are the states or other Federal Agencies able to satisfy immediate needs of displaced population? |
| --- | --- |
| * Issue DEPORD/EXORD to support MAs  
* Issue PYDO for subsequent forces potentially required | 3.2.1. When will the onset of tropical force winds or other weather close APCD operations?  
3.2.2. When will the onset of adverse weather preclude low or medium altitude IAA operations?  
3.2.3. When will the onset of adverse weather preclude airborne SAR operations? |
| CCIR 3.2: When will the weather preclude air operations in the JOA? (PIR) | 3.3.1. Reports of lawlessness or criminal activity interfering in the employment of military assets  
3.3.2. Reports of civil disturbance targeting government responders or relief assets?  
3.3.3. Reports of potential fire hazards?  
3.3.4. Reports of potential electrical hazards? |
| * Delay or suspend selected operations or conduct alternate operations  
* Resume selected operations |  
<p>| DP Timing: D - 3 through D + 1 |<br />
| CCIR 3.3: What is the threat environment for DOD operations? (PIR) |<br />
| * Provide situational awareness to higher |<br />
| DP Timing: D - 2 through D + 1 |<br />
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<th>Action</th>
<th>Questions</th>
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| ★   | Elevate AT/FP postures | 3.3.5. Reports of potential flash flood hazards?  
3.3.6. Assessment of long term health threats to DOD forces? |
| ★   | Implement precautions to mitigate health risks |  |
| DP Timing: D – 3 through MC |  |
| ★   | CCIR 3.4: Has there been an accident or incident involving the loss of life, limb or eyesight of T10, National Guard T32/SAG, or civilian support personnel or equipment or capability (FFIR)? | 3.4.1. Was there any loss of life?  
3.4.2. Who was involved? Were any civilians involved?  
3.4.3. What caused the incident or accident?  
3.4.4. When did the incident or accident occur?  
3.4.5. Where did the incident or accident occur?  
3.4.6. How did the incident or accident occur?  
3.4.7. How are forces responding?  
3.4.8. What assistance is required, if any from USNORTHCOM?  
3.4.9. Is the media involved?  
3.4.10. Is an investigation underway, if not, when will it begin? |
| ★   | Complete notification procedures |  |
| ★   | Initiate investigation of the incident or accident |  |
| DP Timing: D – 3 through MC |  |
| ★   | CCIR 3.5: Has there been an incident or are there emerging issues that may result in negative media coverage for DOD or National Guard Forces? (FFIR) | 3.5.1. Is the emerging or reported coverage accurate?  
3.5.2. Does the report involve DOD or National Guard forces?  
3.5.3. Is the report critical of USNORTHCOM?  
3.5.4. What issues were addressed by the report?  
3.5.5. What impact does the report have on current or planned USNORTHCOM operations? |
| ★   | Determine if Strategic Communication efforts and associated themes need to be amended |  |
| ★   | Re-direct or refine Strategic Communication effort, as appropriate |  |
| ★   | Address response team processes or actions as required |  |
| DP Timing: D – 3 through MC |  |
**Phase IV: Stabilize** (note Phase II and III CCIR remain in effect).

| CCIR 4.1: Have USNORTHCOM operations met the criteria to initiate transition? | 4.1.1. Do deployed forces possess excess capacity to accomplish currently assigned operations?  
4.1.2. Are there any additional anticipated MAs for deployed capabilities?  
4.1.3. Are there limitations or negative aspects to maintaining the deployed or PTDO capabilities?  
4.1.4. Do we anticipate any near term need for these forces, either deployed or at home station?  

| ★ Begin phased redeployment of forces |  
| DP Timing: D + 1 through MC |

**Phase V: Transition** (note Phase III and IV CCIR remain in effect).

| CCIR 5.1: Has the Commander's End state been achieved? | 5.1.1. Have deployed forces accomplished all assigned operations?  
5.1.2. Are civil authorities (federal, state, local, tribal) able to provide essential services without DOD assistance?  

| ★ Terminate the DSCA operation |  
| DP Timing: D + 1 through MC |
HEADQUARTERS, US NORTHERN COMMAND  
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016  
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270  
24 April 2008

APPENDIX 20 TO ANNEX C, USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501  
WILDLAND FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS

References:  
a. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memo, 25 Mar 03  
b. Army Wildland Fire Policy Memorandum, 04 Sep 02  
c. MOU between DOD, USDA and DOI, 25 Apr 75, and MOU  
   between DOA/ and the Boise Interagency Fire Center, 8 Aug  
   90  
d. Air Force Instruction 11-2C-130, Vol 3 Chapter 26, 01  
   Apr 00  
e. National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) 2005 Fire Season  
   Outlook, 26 Jan 05  
f. NIFC Military Use Handbook, May 02  
g. Air Force Instruction 31-101, 1 Mar 03  
h. Financial Management Regulation (FMR), 7000.14-R,  
   Volume 11a, September 1997 (with changes through May  
   2001)  
i. Financial Management Regulation (FMR), 7000.14-R,  
   Volume 11b, December 1994 (with changes through October  
   2002)  
k. Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum, 25 Jun 04 (U)  
l. National Interagency Mobilization Guide, Mar 04

1. **Situation.**

   a. This Appendix provides USNORTHCOM Guidance for the conduct  
      of support for Wildland Firefighting.

   b. Background. DOD historically responds to requests to provide  
      emergency assistance to federal agencies for forest or grassland fires  
      that are beyond the capabilities of available local, state, and federal  
      resources. This support comes in the form of personnel, equipment,  
      supplies, and fire protection services. The hazards and priorities that  
      trigger a request include:

      (1) The potential to destroy or harm human life.

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(2) Potential to destroy communities, community infrastructure, historically significant cultural resources, commercial businesses, principal residences and/or outbuildings.

(3) The potential to adversely impact cultural and natural resource

c. Interagency Partners.

(1) The National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), a component of the US Department of Agriculture, US Forest Service (USDA/FS), is located in Boise, Idaho. NIFC is designated in the National Response Framework (NRF) as the Primary Agency for coordinating Federal resources for Wildland Firefighting (WFF) operations in the Continental United States (CONUS). The NRF designates USDA/FS as the coordinating agency for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #4, Firefighting. The Department of Commerce, DOD, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are supporting agencies for ESF #4.

(2) The National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) is located within NIFC and functions as the operations center for WFF operations. In situations where WFF requirements exceed the capabilities of local and State resources, the affected local agency may request support from NIFC through the respective Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) (See Figure 20 - C - 1). When WFF requirements exceed available GACC provided Federal assistance, NIFC will task NICC to request assistance from DOD.

(3) The Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (DOI/BLM), is the NRF designated Primary Agency for coordinating federal resources for WFF operations in Alaska.

d. WFF Area of Operations (AO). The USNORTHCOM AO for conducting WFF DSCA missions (in support of NIFC) includes the CONUS, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. NIFC divides this AO into 10 geographic areas as the following figure indicates;
e. Immediate Response. DODD 3025 dd outlines Immediate Response Authority. In response to requests for assistance, commanders are authorized to provide support to civil authorities for WFF in the immediate vicinity of their respective installations to: save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage, under imminently serious conditions. Unit commanders performing Immediate Response will inform the National Military Command Center (NMCC) as outlined in paragraph 5.j.(1) of this appendix.

f. WFF Planning considerations include:

(1) The annual fire season is expected to occur from 1 May to 31 Oct.

(2) NIFC will provide most of the logistics for forces conducting WFF operations in accordance with reference k.
(3) The National Guard within the affected state is not normally federalized for WFF ground crew duty.

(4) Eight (8) Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems (MAFFS) equipped C-130 aircraft, associated support personnel, and equipment are available for employment for the entire season.

(5) USDA/FS (DOI/BLM for operations in the Alaska) will perform airspace management functions.

(6) NIFC Preparedness Levels range from 1 to 5, with 1 being the lowest.

(a) Preparedness Level I: No large fire activity nationally. Most Geographic Areas have low to moderate fire danger. (Little or no commitment of National Resources)

(b) Preparedness Level II: One Geographic Area experiencing high fire danger. Numerous Class A, B, and C fires are occurring and a potential exists for escapes to larger (project) fires. Minimal mobilization of resources from other Geographic Areas is occurring. The potential exists for mobilizing additional resources from other Geographic Areas.

(c) Preparedness Level III: Two or more Geographic Areas are experiencing incidents requiring a major commitment of National Resources. High number of fires becoming Class D and larger, Additional resources are being ordered and mobilized, Type I teams are committed in two or more areas, or 300 crews are committed nationally.

(d) Preparedness Level IV: Two or more Geographic Areas experiencing incidents requiring Type I teams. Competition exists for resources between Geographic Areas. 450 crews or nine Type I teams committed nationally.

(e) Preparedness Level V: Several Geographic Areas are experiencing major incidents which have the potential to exhaust all Agency Fire Resources. 625 crews committed nationally.

2. Mission. When directed, Commander USNORTHCOM conducts Wildland Firefighting operations within the 48 contiguous States, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in support of the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC).
3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. USNORTHCOM conducts WFF operations in support of NIFC in six phases.

(1) Phase 0. Phase 0 is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. The Shaping Phase sets the conditions for the successful execution of the DOD response for wildland fire fighting. USNORTHCOM will maintain situational awareness through interagency coordination and monitoring the current wildland fire situation. During this phase training for MAFFS crews is conducted and coordination for installations to be used as mobilization bases or MAFFS operating bases is made. Coordination is conducted with NIFC for the pre-positioning of MAFFS assets and slurry/flame retardant. The Army Service Component will identify potential military fire fighting battalion (MFB) level units for possible employment. On or about 1 May of each year, JDOMS will issue a WFF EXORD. This EXORD will specify SecDef approved assets for WFF. CDRUSNORTHCOM will have authority to deploy and redeploy Title 10 MAFF assets based on NIFC requests. The following Wildland Fire Fighting situational CCIRs keep the CDRUSNORTHCOM informed on the potential for WFF missions:

(a) WFF CCIR 1. Have large wildland fires been reported in the DCSA OA?

(b) Has NIFC increased its preparedness level to Level III or higher?

(c) Has the President declared a national emergency as a result of wildland fires?

(d) Are there impending threats to the Defense Industrial Base or DOD critical infrastructure to include communications and communications nodes as a result of wildland fires?

(e) Are there impending threats to transportation infrastructure (Road, Rail, Air) as a result of wildland fires?

(f) Has NIFC submitted a request for DOD assistance for wildland fire fighting?
(2) Phase I. Phase I begins with the identification of a potential Wildland Firefighting mission, or when directed by SecDef. Actions during this phase include, but are not limited to: pre-positioning of MAFFS assets, identification of a JPACC for control of air operations, deployment of a DCO/DCE when requested by NIFC, designation of DOD installations for use as mobilization or MAFFS operating bases, identifying, training and equipping military firefighting battalions (MFB) (Note: MFB training requires 7 days). During the Staging Phase, coordination with NIFC continues.

(3) Phase II. Phase II begins with the main response force deployment. During this phase, command and control assets and response forces deploy to the effected areas and prepare to conduct WFF operations. USNORTHCOM assumes OPCON of forces as they arrive in the affected area. Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) are established and Liaison officers are employed. The following chart outlines the Force Packages that may be requested by NIFC in support of WFF.

### WFF Force Package Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground Forces</th>
<th>Air Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• BN receives WFF warning order.</td>
<td>• 145th AW KCANG, 146th AW CAANG, 153rd AW WYANG, and the 302nd AW AFRCs prepare for annual NIFC training, crew and airframe certification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NIFC assembles training cadre. (D+1)</td>
<td>• Units deploy to Boise for 5-7 day MAFFS training/certification. Joint training with USGA/FAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• BN prepares classrooms and equipment for training with NIFC.</td>
<td>• Certified units return to home station. Crews certified as “Low Level Air Drop Crews.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NIFC trainers deploy to BN installation, conduct training, and issue Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). (D+3)</td>
<td>• Units receive WFF WARNORD/EXORD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• BN marries up with NIFC trainers, receives specialized WFF training and PPE.</td>
<td>• Selected MAFFS are deployed to WFF locations. (D+1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NIFC transports designated BN to WFF site = RBOL (D+5)</td>
<td>• Units arrive and set up WFF MAFFS operations. (D+1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• BN arrives at NIFC base camp and sets up WFF operations.</td>
<td>• Units start flying MAFFS support missions. (D+2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NIFC conducts on-site hands-on training. (D+6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• BN deploys to actual fire fighting location. (D+7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 20 - C - 2, Ground and Air Force Packages Employment
(4) Phase III. Phase III begins when WFF response operations commence in support of NIFC. Supporting units (MAFFS or Ground Unit) report status to USNORTHCOM and maintain a common operational picture of current and future operations. Report the status of missions, personnel and equipment status and costs associated with operations. Begin transition planning.

(5) Phase IV. Stabilization begins as fires are contained and military support can be pulled off the fire line. No further requests for DOD assistance are anticipated and transition criteria are established.

(6) Phase V. Transition Transition will be conducted incrementally as NIFC can assume operational control for any continued wildland fire fighting operations. Units are redeployed back to home stations and parent organization assumes OPCON as soon as units depart the AO. Situational awareness and a common operational picture are maintained throughout the transition phase. All units capture lessons learned and submit cost expenditures for reimbursement.

c. **Tasks.** Per Basic Plan and Annex C. Specific tasking will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD upon CONPLAN execution.

d. **Coordinating Instructions.** Per Base Plan and Annex C.

(1) The Fire Season is from 1 May to 31 Oct annually.

(2) When military fire crews are requested, NIFC personnel will travel to the unit's installation to conduct WFF training and issue Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (See Figure 20 – C – 2). NIFC will provide advisors to each military fire fighting crew. All units will be properly trained and equipped prior to WFF operations.

(3) Unit commanders will not conduct WFF duties without proper training, equipment, certification, and supervision unless responding to Wildland fires on installations or operating under immediate response authority.

(4) Support for WFF operations is executed on a reimbursable basis under the authorities and procedures of reference h.

(5) Service ADCON will be exercised through service components of supporting commands.
e. Force Protection (FP) (In addition to Basic Plan and Annex C)

(1) Each MAFFS Air Expeditionary Squadron Commander (AES/CC) is responsible for force protection of C-130 MAFFS units, aircraft, personnel, and equipment. Refer to AFI 31-101, Aircraft Personnel and Security, for specific guidance. The USDA/FS has traditionally provided aircraft security at MAFFS operating bases, consisting of a combination of security fencing, ramp lighting, controlled entry points, and armed security guards, both on call and on scene. Each aircraft commander, and ultimately the AES/CC, is responsible for ensuring all aircraft, personnel, and equipment are adequately protected against the local threat.

(2) The AES/CC should elevate concerns up the chain of command if problems cannot be resolved at the local level.

f. Public Affairs. (In addition to Basic Plan and Annex C)

(1) The Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD PA) policy guidance requires pursuing a proactive, vigorous public information program. USNORTHCOM PA, C-130 Airlift Wings and/or the MFB may provide Public Affairs support to WFF as requested. Any deployed PA officers will primarily serve as subject matter experts regarding military operations in a WFF situation.

(2) When a DCO deploys to NIFC, a PA officer may be alerted and on-standby to deploy to support the DCO and the NIFC PA office.

(3) When MAFFS aircraft deploy to a forward operating location, the respective unit may deploy and provide PA support.

(4) When an EXORD is issued for ground battalion type unit deployment, an RFF for PA support may be issued. If the battalion is split and assigned to multiple fires within a complex, the DCO/Joint Force Commander will determine the appropriate PA support as needed.

(5) NIFC Public Affairs POC is (208) 387-5437.

4. Admin and Logistics. (In addition to Basic Plan and Annex C)

a. Current NIFC Military Use Handbook and the Fifth US Army WFF Handbook are informational documents for planning and executing
logistics support for WFF operations. They can both be found at: https://www.noradnorthcom.mil/j4/j4p/.

b. NIFC Incident Command staff will provide a variety of materiel and life support requirements for WFF operations once forces arrive at an incident site or mobilization center. In compliance with mission analysis and coordination with the primary agency, forces will deploy with organic equipment required to accomplish the mission. Units are responsible for self-sustainment to and from the incident site.

c. WFF boots. Currently issued boots for all Services are not appropriate for use in WFF operations. NIFC retains and inventory of acceptable boots and will provide them to DOD forces, along with other PPE required to support WFF operations. Parent Service Components are responsible for providing NIFC with boot size requirements to ensure that necessary boots are made available for deploying forces.

d. Health Service Support (HSS). First Responder and Forward Resuscitative support to deploying military personnel will be organic or provided by civilian and/or governmental agencies supporting WFF operations, in coordination with appropriate military medical authorities (service and unit-level). Medical evacuation is coordinated through the DCO and NIFC. Hospitalization is coordinated by the surgeon in charge of forces, with NIFC and the DCO, to a medical treatment facility, TRICARE network hospital, the Veterans Administration (VA), or civilian hospital.

e. Funding. USNORTHCOM will not provide funding for WFF missions. All support to NIFC is performed under the Economy Act and subject to reimbursement pursuant to references h, n, and o. Upon USNORTHCOM tasking, services and or agencies will estimate costs of requested support and send to NIFC for approval with information copy to N-NC/J83. NIFC contact information is: NIFC, ATTN: Financial Manager, 3833 S. Development Ave, Boise ID, 83705-5354. Fax is: (208) 387-5398. N-NC/J83 contact information is: USNORTHCOM J86, Programs and Resources Directorate, 250 Vandenberg St, Suite B016, Peterson AFB CO 80914-3812. Fax is: (719) 556-0334. NIFC Financial Manager will prepare a USDA Form, AD-672, Reimbursement or Advance of funds agreement, for service or agency signature. Upon signature by both parties, NIFC will establish an obligation in the USDA/FS accounting system. The signed USDA Form AD-672 shall provide reimbursable budget authority for supporting units. Pursuant to Tab k of ref p, Military Personnel Costs will be reimbursed at the current FY rates.
specific to each service. (see 6
Civilian personnel costs will be reimbursed at the current rates
specified by the office of personnel management (see
http://www.opm.gov/oca/06tables/) and accelerated by the current
FY fringe benefit rate specific to each service pursuant to Tab d of ref p (see
services and agencies will price all other goods and services provided
to NIFC based on actual costs incurred or on service or agency-
accepted cost factors for estimating and billing. Use guidance in
addendums 1 and 2, as well as chapters 1 and 3, of references n and
0 to ensure all costs are captured and services and agencies shall bill
NIFC using Standard Form (SF) 1080 (see para 10(e) above for
address). Services and agencies shall provide a copy of all SF 1080
invoices to N-NC/J83 (see para 10(e) above for address).

5. Command and Signal.

a. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported combatant commander for
WFF operations within the CONUS, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the US
Virgin Islands. JDOMS will normally release the WFF EXORD on or
about 1 May of each year specifying SecDef approval for:

(1) Deployment of a DCO for WFF

(2) Deployment of MAFFS equipped C-130s and associated
support personnel and equipment

(3) Use of MAFFS operating bases listed in the current MAFFS
OPLAN

(4) Use of NWCG certified volunteer civilian fire fighters. When
NIFC requests any of these assets, CDRUSNORTHCOM may deploy
them without a JDOMS EXORD MOD. CDRUSNORTHCOM will
notify SecDef, through CJCS, of deployment, redeployment, and/or
movement of any WFF assets prior to execution. This notification
is done by the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center as
follows: NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center Director will
notify the NMCC via the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) with
a GENADMIN message, followed by an email, and a follow-on
phone call. DDO emails are: UnclassifiedJ-
3DDO'S@js.pentagon.mil and J3ADDO'S@js.pentagon.mil;
Classified

C-20-10

-UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO-
J-3DDO'S@js.pentagon.smil.mil and J-3DDO'S@js.pentagon.smil.mil. Phone number (703) 695-0100. Include JDMS in the email of the GENADMIN message: Unclassified email jdoms@js.pentagon.mil and Classified email jdoms@js.pentagon.smil.mil. GENADMIN Message will include:

(a) Type of support requested by NIFC (example: MAFFS, DCO, etc.)

(b) Number, by Type, of assets to be provided

(c) Duration of support

(d) Deployment location, by type, if applicable

(e) Procedures for confirmation of reimbursement

b. C-130 aircraft, personnel, and equipment. IAW the C2 construct for C-130 forces, USNORTHCOM will receive TACON of C-130 forces while USTRANSCOM / AMC / AFRC / ANG retain OPCON. CDRUSNORTHCOM will transfer TACON to the JFACC or the Joint Task Force commander as appropriate.

c. Send SATCOM requirements to N-NC/J637 for validation and assignment. POC for SATCOM requests at USNORTHCOM is at DSN 692-8040, COMM (719) 554-8040. Unclassified E-mail address is nc.satcom.omb@northcom.mil or classified e-mail address is nc.satcom.omb@northcom.smil.mil.

d. As soon as emergent frequency management issues and needs are identified, advise USNORTHCOM POC at DSN 692-4008, COMM (719) 554-4008. Classified email Nc.j636.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified Nc.j636.omb@northcom.mil.

e. Components will report communications status IAW N-NC/J6 message DTG 061806z MAR 03 (TCCC reporting requirements, found at https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/j6/j63/j633, reference documents) to the NORAD / USNORTHCOM TCCC via the e-mail address Northcom.tccc@northcom.smil.mil. Components will include communications status of deployed forces with their NETOPS status reports.

f. Common Operational Picture (COP). Operational authority will designate COP requirements and coordinate with USNORTHCOM COP Manager. Classified e-mail address:
nnc.cmdctrcopmanager.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified email
nnc.cmdctrcopmanager.omb@northcom.mil. DSN 692-2363, COMM
(719) 554-2363.

g. Video Teleconference (VTC) instructions. Secure VTCs are used,
on call, to update CDRUSNORTHCOM. Participants are on an as
needed basis. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center Chief,
DSN 692-2361, COMM (719) 554-2361, will notify all personnel who
need to participate. VTC technical support is provided by NC
Command Presentations and N-NC J62, DSN 692-9990, COMM (719)
554-9990.

h. Collaborative tool sets. USNORTHCOM POC for collaborative
tools is at DSN 692-9078, COMM (719) 554-9078. Classified e-mail
address Nc.isg.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified e-mail address
is Nc.isg.omb@northcom.mil.

i. USNORTHCOM portal information. The address for the classified
USNORTHCOM portal is https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil. The
address for the unclassified USNORTHCOM portal is
https://www.noradnorthcom.mil.

j. Reporting.

(1) DCO/JFACC/JFLCC/JTF CDR will submit a SITREP to
CDRUSNORTHCOM by 0300Z daily. Email reports to the
NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center Aerospace Watch
Officer at: nc.ioc.aerospace.omb@northcom.mil, DSN 692-1659,
COMM (719) 554-1659.

(2) Upon stand-up of C2 elements, contact N-NC/J1 for
personnel reporting formats. JPERSTAT reports will be submitted
NLT 1200 hrs MST or 1800Z daily to
nc.cog.j1.omb@northcom.smil.mil or call the day beeper at (719)
921-5431 or night beeper at (719) 921-5432.

k. After Action Reports (AAR). USNORTHCOM components
(DCO/JFACC/JFLCC/JTF CDR (When designated by
CDRUSNORTHCOM)) submit AAR comments to USNORTHCOM J33
(NC/J33) NLT 30 days after the end of the fire season (when DOD
support is provided). Use item, discussion, and recommendation
format for both sustain and improve comments.
1. NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center POCs are the Operations Chief, DSN 692-2361, COMM (719) 554-2361, and the Aerospace Watch Officer, DSN 692-1659, COMM (719) 554-1659.

m. NIFC POC may be reached at, (208) 387-5661.

n. NGB POC may be reached at, DSN 327-3515.

Tabs
A – Force Package Options For Wild Land Fire Fighting
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
HEADQUARTERS,
US NORTHERN COMMAND
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270
24 April 2008

TAB A TO APPENDIX 20 TO ANNEX C, USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
FORCE PACKAGE OPTIONS FOR WILDLAND FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS

1. Force Packages to support Wild Land Firefighting may include:

   a. Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and Defense Coordinating Element (DCE).

   b. Use of installations as mobilization centers or MAFFS operating bases.

   c. Transportation support.

   d. Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) equipped C-130 aircraft, support personnel and equipment.

   e. Military ground fire fighting crews (normally Battalion sized element plus command and control (C2)).

   f. Rotary wing aviation support to include MEDEVAC / Casualty Evacuation.

   g. Limited logistical and medical support.

   h. Engineering support.

   i. Airspace management.

   j. National Wildfire Coordination Group (NWCG) certified volunteer civilian fire fighters.

   k. Imagery products and reconnaissance.
b. Special Events (SE). The SecDHS prepares the annual prioritized list of SEs which is the result of a coordinated IA effort to develop and implement an all-inclusive, comprehensive methodology to identify, categorize, and coordinate federal support for SEs below the NSSE threshold occurring across the country. Events that make the list are based upon potential threat, vulnerability, and consequence that do not rise to the level of NSSEs, but are nevertheless significant and merit varying degrees of federal support. Similar to NSSEs, the Primary Agency/Agencies for the event submit a RFA to the OSD Executive Secretary for DOD support. The request is staffed by the JDOMS and is approved by the SecDef. Once approved, the JDOMS issues an EXORD to USNORTHCOM to accept forces OPCON/TACON, provide C2 of approved forces, and provide DSCA for the event. The events are categorized into five SEAR levels:

(1) SEAR Level 1. Level 1 events are events of significant national and/or international importance that may require extensive Federal interagency security and incident management preparedness. Pre-deployment of Federal assets, as well as consultation, technical advice and support to specific functional areas in which the state and local agencies may lack expertise or key resources, may be warranted. In order to ensure unified Federal support to the local authorities and appropriate national situational awareness, a Federal Coordinator (FC) will be designated, and an Integrated Federal Support Plan (IFSP) will be developed. SecDHS will appoint a Federal Coordinator and approve the development of an Integrated Federal Support Plan (IFSP) for these events. Examples of a SEAR Level 1 event are the Superbowl and the United Nations General Assembly.

(2) SEAR Level 2. Level 2 events are significant events with national and/or international importance that may required direct national-level Federal support and situational awareness. The magnitude and significance of these events calls for close coordination between Federal, state, and local authorities and may warrant limited pre-deployment of U.S. Government assets as well as consultation, technical advice and support to specific functional areas in which the state and local agencies may lack expertise or key resources may be warranted. In order to ensure unified Federal support to the local authorities and appropriate national situational awareness, an FC will be designated and an IFSP will be developed. Examples of a SEAR Level 2 event are the 2008 Papal Visit to the United States and the North American Leaders Summit.
(3) **SEAR Level 3.** Level 3 events are events of national and/or international importance that require only limited direct Federal support to augment local capabilities. Generally, state and local authorities adequately support the events; however, the significance of these events generally warrants national situational awareness and, depending upon the jurisdiction, may require limited direct support from specific Federal agencies. In order to ensure appropriate national situational awareness, an IFSP may be developed. Monitoring and federal coordination for support are accomplished through the National Operations Center (NOC) and the Special Events Working Group (SEWG). The Kentucky Derby and the 4th of July celebrations in Washington, D.C., Boston, New York, and Philadelphia are examples of a SEAR Level 3 event.

(4) **SEAR Level 4.** Level 4 events are events with limited national importance that are generally handled at the state and local level. Unusual circumstances may sometime necessitate the employment of specific Federal resources to address unique needs of a particular event. Existing Federal assistance programs are available to state and local jurisdictions hosting the event for training, exercise, and/or tailored program support. The Golden Globe Awards, Grammy Awards, and the Academy Awards are all examples of Level 4 events.

(5) **SEAR Level 5.** Level 5 events are events that may be nationally recognized but generally have only local or state importance. Federal departments and agencies will receive notice of these events for situational awareness purposes but, in most cases, minimal, if any, Federal assets or resources will be expended to assist with management of these events. Federal officials will not normally actively monitor or coordinate support for these events unless specifically requested.

2. **Mission.** When directed, Commander USNORTHCOM conducts Defense Support of Civil Authorities within the 48 contiguous States, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands for designated NSSEs and SEs by providing unity of DOD effort and command and control of DOD Forces.

3. **Execution**

   a. **Commander's Intent.** Provide C2 and unity of effort to contribute to a safe and secure environment for the event.

   b. **Method**
(1) Provide unity of DOD effort.

(2) Conduct proactive planning, coordination, and collaboration.

(3) Provide scalable C2 to handle additional missions.

(4) Effectively use exercises and rehearsals.

(5) Maximize situational awareness, accurate reporting, and timely intelligence dissemination.

(6) Provide assistance to lessen and mitigate the effects in the event of consequence management activities.

c. **End State.** Quality, pre-event, planning and coordination that results in timely and synchronized support and contributes to a safe event, with public confidence in DOD/USNORTHCOM maintained throughout the operation.

d. **Supported Primary Agencies.** USNORTHCOM conducts SecDef approved DSCA operations for NSSEs and SEs. Primary Agencies may include, but are not limited to the USSS, FBI, FEMA, Department of State (DOS), United States Capitol Police (USCP), and United States Park Police (USPP).

e. **Area of Operations (AO).** See Base Plan.

f. **Standing Joint Operations Areas (JOA).** JOAs are established for the State of Alaska with Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-AK) and for the District of Columbia with Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR) which covers a multi-jurisdictional area that encompasses two states, six counties, four cities, and the District of Columbia.

g. **Concept of Operations.** USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA in six (6) phases: Shape, Anticipate,Respond, Operate, Stabilize, and Transition.

(1) **Phase 0, Shape.** The Shaping Phase is continuous and inherent to daily USNORTHCOM operations. It involves planning, interagency coordination, preparations, exercises, and situational awareness of upcoming events occurring in the AO. NSSE and SEs are pre-identified and pre-designated events that allow for advanced preparation and planning. Phase I, Shaping continues...
as a means to plan, prepare for and identify other events, but execution moves to Phase II, Staging. Major actions include:

(a) Specific plans for recurring and predicted NSSE / SE are completed during the Shaping phase to facilitate successful execution.

(b) Trained and ready response capabilities are developed and maintained.

(c) Utilization of Information Operations (IO) tools and public affairs messages supporting the themes of military readiness.

(d) Coordinate with National Guard Bureau (NGB) and Joint Force Headquarters-State(s) (JFHQ-State(s)) to ensure DOD unity of effort.

(e) Coordination with the Inter-agency and inter-governmental community for a mutually supporting response.

(f) Commanders may elect to support recurring NSSEs and SE as Innovative Readiness Training as described in DOD Directive 1100.20. To avoid duplication and to ensure unity of effort, planned support should be coordinated with USNORTHCOM and identified in the planning process in either the Shaping or the Staging Phases. Innovative Readiness Training is not a DSCA mission, but its execution may have an impact. Units executing Innovative Readiness Training, as support to a DSCA incident and or NSSE event, remain under their organic C2. Innovative Readiness Training is not authorized for disaster response operations.

(g) Commanders may provide support to NSSE / SE operations in the form of Public Affairs (PA)/ Civil Military Affairs under DOD Directive 5410.18. To avoid duplication and to ensure unity of effort, planned support should be coordinated with USNORTHCOM and identified in the planning process. Civil Military Affairs support is not authorized for disaster response operations.

(h) USNORTHCOM identifies representatives to participate on USSS planning subcommittees.

(2) Phase I, Anticipate. This phase begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, or when directed by SecDef. NSSE
and SE have known event start dates, allowing for significant staging activities. These activities include detailed preparations to support the event as well as preparing response to an incident, act of terrorism or otherwise, during the event. The following are the major actions during this phase:

(a) Focus intelligence integration efforts within the limits of legal authority on identifying any threat to the event.

(b) Identify force capabilities for response and place on alert / increased Response Posture Level.

(c) Identify materials and supplies (rations, medical items, tents, cots, etc.) for response and preposition.

(d) Publish orders.

(e) Establish Common Operating Picture (COP) with all involved commands and agencies.

(f) Coordinate with the U.S. Coast Guard and the National Guard Bureau for unity of effort in support of (ISO) the operation.

(g) Deploy LNO and DCO / DCE as required.

(h) Identify mobilization sites and staging areas.

(i) Identify VIP transportation support requirements and jump to locations.

(3) Phase II, Respond. Phase II begins with the main supporting force deployment. Deployment of force capabilities for NSSE / SE DSCA operations may occur in 2 parts. Requested supporting force capabilities are deployed as approved for the event. Response force capabilities are placed on heightened alert status for potential response and deploy only if needed as a second force deployment. Deployment, ends when all required supporting forces have deployed to the AO / JOA. Deployment phase major actions are:

(a) Employment of C2 element and SecDef approved supporting forces at the event site.

(b) Planned DOD Force Flow completed. (Exceptions requested as necessary).
(4) Phase III, Operate. Phase III begins with the employment of force capabilities supporting the event. The phase ends with civil authorities prepared to assume normal operations. Major actions during Phase III include:

(a) The employment of appropriate C2 element and consequence management forces as approved by SecDef.

(b) Title 10 Forces provide DSCA as requested by civil authorities and approved by SecDef.

(c) DSCA operations during NSSE / SE may include but are not limited to EOD, EDD, communications support, rotary wing assets, security forces, and transportation assets.

(d) Response forces remain on heightened alert status for the duration of the event as necessary.

(5) Phase IV, Stabilize. Phase IV begins at the planned conclusion of the event or, if DSCA response operations were required, as the incident is stabilized and civil authorities are able to assume control with no degradation of operations.

(5) Phase V, Transition. Phase V begins with the redeployment of remaining DOD forces. This phase ends when response forces have been relieved, redeployed and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands.

h. Coordinating Instructions. See Basic plan and Annex C. Specific coordinating instructions for the NSSE or SE will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD.


(1) Unit commanders are responsible for FP and will not conduct DSCA operations without proper equipment and training.

(2) All deploying unit ground commanders will ensure that at least one (1)/Level II qualified anti-terrorism (AT) Officer/NCO deploys with the deploying element.

(3) All deploying personnel must be Level I AT trained and certified. The Unit Commander and AT Officer/NCO are
responsible for ensuring all deploying personnel are level I trained and certified.

(4) Supporting Commands and/or services ensure all forces deploying receive a threat briefing for the deployment area. Supporting Commands and/or services will ensure forces complete service component required pre-deployment training certified by a Level II AT Officer/NCO, to include anti-terrorism awareness training IAW their parent service. Mission Commanders will ensure deployed forces receive an appropriate level of terrorist awareness training upon arrival and, as required, throughout the length of deployment. Ensure FP measures include provisions for contractors that are involved in the operation.

(5) Consider deploying the AT Officer/NCO early in the deployment flow to execute AT/FP tasks that are requisite to the deployment, e.g., site survey or assessment and coordination of security requirements with the Primary Agency.

(6) Ensure the AT Officer/NCO is trained to employ methods to reduce risk or mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack. The AT Officer/NCO must also be familiar with pre-deployment AT training requirements. Assignment as the AT Officer/NCO may be a collateral or additional duty for the individual appointed. The AT Officer/NCO duties include but are not limited to use UFC 4-010-10 DOD minimum anti-terrorism standoff distances for buildings, dated 31 July 2002, temporary structures, to determine if facilities either currently occupied or under consideration for occupancy by DOD personnel can adequately protect occupants against terrorist attack.

(7) AT/FP guidance must appear in all warning, planning, alert, deployment, and execute orders.

(8) All personnel must be proficient in individual chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive (CBRNE) defense survival skills as prescribed by service directives. Unit commanders will determine if personnel will deploy with their appropriate CBRNE protective equipment (MOPP gear), based upon the current threat situation.

j. Public Affairs (PA). See base plan, Annex C, and Annex F. PA guidance is passive. Standing NSSE PA guidance is provided in Annex F. Queries regarding the event should be directed to the Primary Agency. Queries regarding general event security should be
directed to the Primary Agency/Event Joint Information Center (JIC), if established. Queries regarding the NG involvement should be referred to the NGB. Queries regarding the NORAD air defense role will be handled IAW Operation Noble Eagle guidance or referred to NORAD/PA. If queried, DOD personnel may discuss their specific support role and general unit capabilities, consistent with guidance provided from the Primary Agency in order to protect operational security. Units on standby will not discuss their specific alert status. The following statement may be used: "The Department of Defense provides defense support of civil authorities in response to a request for Federal assistance submitted by civil authorities that is subsequently approved by the Secretary of Defense. During the [event], Title 10 Forces will provide DSCA to Primary Agency/Agencies and remain under the C2 of CDRUSNORTHCOM to accomplish SecDef approved operations. If directed by the SecDef, USNORTHCOM is prepared to provide other approved DSCA to other civil agencies as required". Questions regarding the use of DOD resources in support of this event that cannot be answered using this guidance, should be referred to NORAD/PA or USNORTHCOM/PA. POC for PA planning at USNORTHCOM is at DSN 692-4652, COMM 719-554-4652. For PA operations and media contact DSN 692-9618, COMM 719-554-9618.

4. Administration and Logistics. See base plan, Annex C, Annex D, and Annex E. Specific guidance will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD for each event.

a. Administration

(1) DSCA operations will be IAW the USNORTHCOM EXORD.

(2) Reports

(a) Supporting Commanders (Joint Task Force Commander or Joint Mission Commander) will ensure that daily situation reports (SITREPs) are provided to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center upon start of operations through completion. Reports are due to USNORTHCOM by 0300Z daily. Reports are to be emailed to: Nc_joc.chief.omb@northcom.mil, ATTN: NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center Chief. Significant events and USNORTHCOM Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) will be reported telephonically; DSN 692-2361, Comm (719) 554-2361, fax DSN 692-2367 (unclass)/692-2368 (classified).
(b) Supporting Commanders will provide a daily personnel status report (PERSTAT) to USNORTHCOM J-1 utilizing the Joint Personnel Status Report (JPERSTAT) format. JPERSTAT reports will be submitted NLT 1200 hrs MST or 1800Z daily to nc.cog.j1.omb@northcom.smil.mil or call the day beeper at (719) 921-5431 or night beeper at (719) 921-5432.

(c) Communications status reporting. Commanders will report communications status IAW NORAD/USNORTHCOM J6 TCCC reporting requirements (message Date Time Group (DTG) 06106Z Mar 03) to the USNORTHCOM TCCC via the e-mail address; Northcom.tccc@northcom.smil.mil. Commanders will include the communications status of deployed forces with their NETOPS status reports.

(d) Common Operational Picture (COP). Reporting instructions are identified in OPTASKCOP message DTG 272330Z Jan 03. USNORTHCOM COP classified e-mail address: nnc.cmdtrcopmanager.omb@northcom.smil.mil; unclassified email nnc.cmdtrcopmanager.omb@northcom.mil, DSN 692-2360, COMM (719) 554-2363.

(e) After Action Reports (AAR). Provide After Action Reports (AAR) IAW CDRUSNORTHCOM direction for DSCA operations.

(3) Funding

(a) USNORTHCOM will not provide funding.

(b) DSCA to another federal department or agency is provided under the Economy Act. For DSCA operations under terms of the Economy Act, units will capture and report all costs to their Military Department comptroller.

(c) The Supported Combatant Commander, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will ensure DSCA operations procedures and funding guidelines are adhered to IAW appropriate funding guidance. Units will capture and report incremental costs IAW appropriate funding guidance.

(d) In all cases, the Supported Combatant Commander, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will ensure DSCA operations procedures and funding guidelines are adhered to IAW the Economy Act.

C-21-11
(c) Pursuant to published DOD reimbursable rates, military personnel costs will be reimbursed at the current fiscal year rates specific to each service. FY08 rates may be found at http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/rates/fy2008/20085k.pdf. Civilian personnel costs will be reimbursed at the current rates specified by the office of personnel management (see http://www.opm.gov/oca/08tables/) and accelerated by the current FY DOD fringe benefit rate specific to each service pursuant to Tab d of ref p (see http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/rates/fy2008/2008_d.pdf).

(f) Invoicing for earned reimbursements (performance of work or services, payments to contractors, or delivery from inventory) shall begin within 30 calendar days after the month in which performance occurred.

(g) Invoices shall identify the DOD point of contact (POC), the POC's commercial phone number, the disaster relief incident name, the incident number, the incident date, and whether the invoice is a partial or final billing.

(h) Supporting documentation for reimbursement shall include a copy of all requests for Federal assistance. Backup documentation will identify the disaster relief incident name, the incident number, and the costs incurred by each major item listed in the mission order.

(i) USNORTHCOM J8 contact information is: USNORTHCOM J8, Programs and Resources Directorate, 250 Vandenberg St, Suite 1067, Peterson AFB CO 80914-3812. Fax is: (719) 556-0334.

b. Logistics. See Annex D

(1) Supply

(a) Forces will be self-sustaining to the maximum extent possible for 3 days of DSCA operations. Military forces should carry (as possible) additional rations, water, and medical to allow emergency assistance when circumstances warrant.
(b) Designated BSI will coordinate logistics support for forces deployed in their area, to include forces from other services, for common items on a reimbursable basis. Re-supply support for service unique items is the responsibility of the parent service.

(2) Storage. Designated mobilization sites will provide secure and non-secure storage for FEMA approved equipment, trailers and vehicles, as well as office space with basic communications for FEMA personnel.

(3) Transportation

(a) The use of JOPES is directed for all unit movements. JOPES processes and movement validations will be IAW the Joint Staff TPFDD LOI, enclosure F of JOPES Vol III, and the NORAD/USNORTHCOM TPFDD instruction located on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM JOPES homepage at www.noradnortcom.smil.mil/i3/i35/jopes/. GCCS newsgroup "gccs.northcom.jopes.operations" on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM news servers www.news.gccs.northcom.smil.mil are used for all deployment planning and execution actions. For emergency validations during non-working hours, page the NORAD / USNORTHCOM duty validator at 1-888-284-0957 or e-mail 8882840957@myairmail.com.

(b) In-Transit Visibility (ITV). All requirements, including in-place assets (local to the area of operations), will be captured in JOPES and all movements will be captured in appropriate transportation-related automated data processing applications, i.e. Global Transportation Network (GTN), Scheduling and Movement (S&M) and the appropriate newsgroups, to ensure visibility in the AO. Commands without access to service ADP systems feeding GTN and S&M will report planned missions to their next higher headquarters for data entry. Shippers/units must Comply with the provisions of DOD Regulation 4500.9-R (Defense Transportation Regulation). The arrival and departure of unit personnel and equipment at all nodes from origin to destination will be visible in GTN and within 1 hour of the movement event.

(c) All DOD requirements for transporting hazardous goods are in effect.

(4) Health Service Support (HSS). See Annex Q
(a) Medical Treatment. First Responder and Forward Resuscitative support to deploying military personnel will be organic or provided by civilian and/or governmental agencies ICW appropriate military medical authorities (service and unit-level).

(b) The USNORTHCOM Joint Regional Medical Plans and Operations (JRMPO) may provide JRMPO support. JRMPO assets will provide advice and guidance concerning HHS capabilities appropriate for the stated mission; maintain interoperability with DOD, State, and Health and Human Services; and provide situation awareness and information updates through the established C2 structure to USNORTHCOM and the 24/7 Medical Operations Center (MOC) at 719-554-4980, when activated.

5. **Command and Control.** See Base Plan

   a. **Command Relationships.** See Annex J

   (1) Several agencies can be the Primary Agency for NSSEs and SES (e.g., U.S. Secret Service, FBI, FEMA, USPP, and USCP, NASA, U.S. Olympic Committee)

   (2) CDRUSNORTHCOM is the Supported Combatant Commander for DSCA operations within its designated DSCA AO.

   (3) CDRUSJFCOM and CDRUSTRANSCOM are Supporting Combatant Commanders.

   (4) Military Departments and Defense Agencies are supporting organizations.

   (5) Upon completion of DSCA operations, as determined by the CDRUSNORTHCOM or SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM will relinquish OPCON of redeploying personnel and/or equipment on departure from the affected area. Subsequently, supporting combatant commanders, military departments, and/or defense agencies accept return of DOD personnel and/or equipment from CDRUSNORTHCOM.

   (6) Consider implementing a dual status commander under 32 USC 315 or 32 USC 325.

C-21-14
b. **Signal.** See Annex K

(1) Send SATCOM requirements to USNORTHCOM J637 for validation and assignment. POC for SATCOM requests at USNORTHCOM is at DSN 692-8040, COMM (719) 554-8040. Unclassified E-mail address is nc.satcom.omb@northcom.mil or classified e-mail address is nc.satcom.omb@northcom.smil.mil.

(2) As soon as emergent frequency management issues and needs are identified, advise USNORTHCOM POC at DSN 692-4008, COMM (719) 554-4008. Classified email Nc.j636.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified Nc.j636.omb@northcom.mil.

(3) **Common Operational Picture (COP).** Operational authority will designate COP requirements and coordinate with USNORTHCOM COP Manager. Classified e-mail address: nnc.cmdctrncopmanager.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified email nnc.cmdctrncopmanager.omb@northcom.mil. DSN 692-2363, COMM (719) 554-2363.

(4) **Video Teleconference (VTC) instructions.** Secure VTCs are used, on call, to update CDRUSNORTHCOM. Participants are on an as needed basis. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center Chief, DSN 692-2361, COMM (719) 554-2361, will notify all personnel who need to participate. VTC technical support is provided by USNORTHCOM Command Presentations and N-NC J62, DSN 692-9990, COMM (719) 554-9990.

(5) **Collaborative tool sets.** USNORTHCOM POC for collaborative tools is at DSN 692-9078, COMM (719) 554-9078. Classified e-mail address Nc.isg.omb@northcom.smil.mil, unclassified e-mail address is Nc.isg.omb@northcom.mil.

(6) **USNORTHCOM portal information.** The address for the classified USNORTHCOM portal is https://www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil. The address for the unclassified USNORTHCOM portal is https://www.noradnorthcom.mil.
HEADQUARTERS,
US NORTHERN COMMAND
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270
24 April 2008

TAB A TO APPENDIX 21 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN
3501
LIST OF NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS

References:  a. See Additional References Base Plan.
             b. See Annex C.
             c. See Appendix 21 to Annex C.

1. Purpose. To identify events which have been designated as National Special Security Events (NSSE).

2. General

   a. 1999

      (1) 50th Anniversary of NATO Conference

      (2) World Trade Organization Conference (WTOC)

      (3) President's 1999 State of the Union Address to Congress

      (4) Pope John Paul II Visit to St Louis MO

   b. 2000

      (1) 55th United Nations General Assembly

      (2) Democratic National Convention, 14-17 Aug 05, Los Angeles CA

      (3) Republican National Convention, 31 Jul – 3 Aug 05, Philadelphia PA

      (4) OpSail 2000

      (5) President's 2000 State of the Union Address to Congress

   c. 2001

   C-21-A-1
   _UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO_
(1) 2001 Presidential Inaugural, 20 Jan 01, Wash DC
(2) 56th United Nations General Assembly Opening Session

d. 2002
(1) Super Bowl XXXVI
(2) 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics
(3) President’s 2002 State of the Union Address to Congress

e. 2004
(1) President’s 2004 State of the Union Address to Congress
(2) Operation Serenade, Former President Reagan State Funeral
(3) G-8 Economic Summit, Sea Island GA
(4) Democratic National Convention, Boston MA
(5) Republican National Convention, New York City NY

g. 2005
(1) 2005 Presidential Inaugural
(2) President’s 2005 State of the Union Address to Congress
h. 2006
(1) President’s 2006 State of the Union Address to Congress
(2) Former President Ford State Funeral
i. 2007
(1) President’s 2007 State of the Union Address to Congress
j. 2008
(1) President’s 2008 State of the Union Address to Congress
(2) Democratic National Convention, Denver CO
(3) Republican National Convention, Minneapolis-St Paul MN

k. 2009

(1) 2009 Presidential Inaugural
(2) President's 2009 State of the Union Address to Congress
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250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270
24 April 2008

APPENDIX 22 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

References:

a. 10 United States Code 372, 382, 2576, 2667
b. 18 United States Code 831
c. 18 United States Code, Section 1385, Posse Comitatus Act
d. 31 United States Code, Section 1535, Economy Act
f. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement (ROE)/
   Standing Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) 13 June 2005 (S)
g. DOD Directive 3025.dd, Defense Support of Civil Authorities
h. DOD Directive 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities
i. DOD Regulation 5240.1-R, DOD Intelligence Components
   that affect United States Persons
j. 10 United States Code 371-378
k. DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning
   persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the
   Department of Defense, 7 January 1980
l. DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law
   Enforcement Officials, 15 January 1986

1. Situation

a. State, local, tribal, private-sector, and specific Federal authorities
   have primary responsibility for public safety and security, and
   typically are the first line of response and support. Local jurisdictions
   have primary authority and responsibility for law enforcement
   activities. As local incidents or events escalate, additional resources
   will first be obtained through the activation of mutual aid agreements
   with neighboring localities and/or State authorities. In the context of
   State's resources, the National Guard (NG), while serving under state
   control for state purposes, is not considered to be part of the
   Department of Defense (DOD) and executes missions under the
   command and control (C2) of the Governor in accordance with (IAW)
   the State's constitution and statutes.
b. It is DOD policy to cooperate with civilian law enforcement officials to the maximum extent practicable. The implementation of DOD policy shall be consistent with the needs of national security and military preparedness, the historic tradition of limiting direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities, and the requirements of applicable law.

c. It is the intent of this appendix to provide an overview of defense support of law enforcement as it cannot cover all potential requests for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) that relate to civilian law enforcement. Defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies covers a broad spectrum of potential activities from very small support activities such as training civilian law enforcement, loaning a piece of equipment, or an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or dog team to large-scale incidents or events such as a riot. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) addresses civil disturbance operations as part of public safety. This appendix will not address civil disturbance operations. See USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3502, Civil Disturbance Operations, for more information.

d. State level emergency response operations for natural disasters have evolved concerning the use of the NG in a law enforcement role from state to state. Governor's use of their powers has set a precedence for the future. Governor's may, by use of their state powers and via a state to state memorandum of agreement, authorize the NG of one state to perform law enforcement and security duties within the another state.

e. In accordance with (IAW) reference g. which is still in DRAFT form, DSCA does not apply to the following programs that are related to support to law enforcement agencies:

(1) Sensitive support provided IAW DOD Directive (DODD) S-5210.36.

(2) Inspector General of the DOD, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, or the military criminal investigative organizations when they are conducting joint investigations with civilian law enforcement agencies of matters within their respective jurisdictions, using their own forces and equipment.

(3) The non-Federalized National Guard and their activities under the C2 of the Governor.
(4) Counternarcotic operations conducted under section 124, Title 10, U.S. Code.

(5) Defense Intelligence Components providing intelligence support IAW Executive Orders (EO) 12333 and 13356, the DODD on Intelligence activities (DODD 5240.1) and DODD Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Person (DODD 5240.1-R). Defense Intelligence Components are defined in DOD Directive 5240.1

f. **Enemy Forces.** See Base plan

g. **Friendly Forces.** See Base plan

h. **Assumptions**

   (1) DOD law enforcement and security missions/tasks will be in support of a Primary Agency under the NRF or a designated agency for other approved law enforcement activities.

   (2) The Posse Comitatus Act will not be modified.

   (3) DOD policy and guidance will not change after the formal release of references g. and i.

   (4) Civilian law enforcement agencies will continue to request training support for law enforcement activities, loan/lease of DOD equipment, support for National Special Security Events (NSSEs), and other law enforcement activities.

2. **Mission.** See Base plan

3. **Execution**

   a. **Concept of Operations**

      (1) Defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies in response to a natural or man-made disaster, emergency, incident, or event will be processed IAW reference i above and executed at the direction of the President or approval of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) IAW the Base plan.

      (2) Release of information to the public concerning law enforcement operations is the primary responsibility of the civilian agency that is performing the law enforcement function. When
defense support is provided under reference j above, assistance provided and information released by DOD PAO agencies to the public shall be approved by the Secretaries of the Military Departments or the Directors of the Defense Agencies and such assistance may be conditioned upon control by the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies before information is released to the public.

(3) Use of Information Collected During DSCA Operations. Military Departments and Defense Agencies are encouraged to provide to federal, state, or local civilian law enforcement officials any information collected during the normal course of DSCA operations that may be relevant to a violation of any federal or state law within the jurisdiction of such officials.

(4) USNORTHCOM will initiate coordination for defense support with the designated law enforcement agency upon SecDef approval of a RFA.

(5) Training Civilian Law Enforcement. Military Departments and Defense Agencies may provide training to federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officials. Such assistance may include training in the operations and maintenance of equipment made available under the military equipment loan/lease program. This does not permit large scale or elaborate training, and does not permit regular or direct involvement of military personnel in activities that are fundamentally civilian law enforcement operations, except as otherwise approved and authorized.

b. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Coordination regarding legality of support will be staffed through the chain of command and USNORTHCOM Judge Advocate (JA) to the SecDef.

(2) The SecDef is the approval authority for all RFAs made by law enforcement agencies. This includes:

(a) Requests for potentially lethal support (i.e., lethal to the public, a member of law enforcement, a military member or DOD employee).

(b) Loans of equipment, facilities, or personnel to law enforcement.
(c) Lethal support includes: loans of arms; combat and tactical vehicles, vessels or aircraft, or ammunition.

(d) All requests for support under 10 USC 382 and 18 USC 831; all support to counterterrorism operations; and all support to law enforcement when there is a potential for confrontation between law enforcement and specifically identified civilian individuals or groups.

(3) Immediate response authority. When requested, local military commanders and DOD officials may provide defense support to civil law enforcement agencies under this authority in order to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. This authority does not authorize DOD forces to perform law enforcement functions in support of civil law enforcement agencies unless consistent with an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC, Section 1385) and IAW the guidance provided in the Basic plan.

(4) Restrictions on direct assistance to civilian law enforcement. Except as otherwise provided, the prohibition on the use of military personnel "as a Posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws" prohibits the following forms of direct assistance:

(a) Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity.

(b) A search or seizure.

(c) An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity.

(d) Use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.

(5) The SecDef is the approval authority for all assistance with the potential for confrontation between DOD personnel and civilian individuals or groups.

(6) If a DOD Component has a question on the appropriateness or legality of providing requested support, such request shall be forwarded through the military chain of command to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD/ASA)).
4. Administration and Logistics. See Base plan

5. Command and Control. See Base plan
APPENDIX 25 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
DEFENSE COORDINATING OFFICER (DCO)

References:

a. Title 42, United States Code, Section 5121 et. seq.
   (Stafford Act, Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act)


c. DOD Instruction 3025.6, Defense Support of Civil Authorities

d. Additional references in Basic Plan

1. Situation

   a. DOD has appointed 10 Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) and assigned one to each FEMA region. If requested and approved, the DCO serves as DOD's single point of contact at the Joint Field Office (JFO) for requesting assistance from DOD. With few exceptions, requests for DSCA originating at the JFO are coordinated with and processed through the DCO. The DCO may have a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) consisting of a staff and military liaison officers to facilitate coordination and support to activated Emergency Support Functions (ESFs).

   b. Specific responsibilities of the DCO (subject to modification based on the situation) include processing requirements for military support, forwarding mission assignments to the appropriate military organizations through DOD-designated channels, and assigning military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated ESFs.

   c. Pre-disaster Activation. A DCO may be appointed prior to a disaster or emergency declaration if there is a reasonable expectation that future events may require defense support and CDRUSNORTHCOM receives approval. Such activations are related to incidents that are somewhat predictable in intensity and location such as hurricanes, floods, and wildfires.

   d. As DOD's single point of contact at the JFO, the DCO coordinates DSCA IAW the above references. With few exceptions, requests for DSCA originating at the JFO will be coordinated with and processed through the DCO.
e. **Enemy.** See Base plan

f. **Friendly.** See Base plan

g. **Assumptions.** See Base plan

2. **Mission.** When activated by the SecDef and under the direction of CDRUSNORTHCOM, DCOs are DOD’s single POC within the JFO for receiving, validating, and forwarding Requests for Assistance (RFAs) and Mission Assignments (MAs) for DSCA.

3. **Execution**

   a. **Concept of Operation**

   (1) **Initial Actions.** Upon activation, the DCO and DCE should normally collocate with the FCO in the JFO. Depending on the specific nature of the incident, a DCO may initially work from one location while his staff operates nearer the disaster location. As soon as possible, the DCO should co-locate with the FCO and place the DCE with the JFO. Split operations may be the result of State decision-makers operating initially from several sites.

   (2) **Assessment.** Joint preliminary assessments are conducted between state and FEMA officials immediately following a natural or man-made disaster or emergency to determine if a Presidential Declaration is warranted under the criteria of the Stafford Act.

   (3) **DCO Tasks**

   (a) Validate requests from the FCO.

   (b) Establish the DCE.

   (c) Establish liaison among military, State, and other Federal Agencies for support.

   (d) Coordinate with the FCO and other ESFs for support providers.

   (e) Coordinate with the FCO and other ESFs for support of defense support providers.

   (f) Confirm relief priorities established by the FCO and SCO for the disaster area.
(g) Develop a priority of work for supporting units.

(h) Maintain an audit trail of mission requests to ensure each task is supported by a valid request and/or mission assignment number. The audit trail should include estimated and actual costs of support for each mission.

b. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Pre-designated DCOs and personnel identified to be part of the DCE are required to be trained prior to employment. Training consists of, but is not limited to:

(a) National Response Framework (NRF).

(b) National Incident Management System (NIMS).

(c) National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS) (FOUO).

(d) USNORTHCOM DSCA Training Course to include USNORTHCOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and USNORTHCOM Publication 0-2, Civil Support (CS) Concept of Employment (CONEMP).

(e) DoD policies and guidance contained in DOD Directive, Instruction, and Manual 3025.dd series (draft).

(f) Procedures pertaining to DoD contained in the Stafford Act.

(g) Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), JFO Activation and Operations (FOUO).

(2) Relationship with the FCO. The DCO is the DoD on-scene representative for coordinating DSCA requirements with the FCO or his/her designated representative. The DCO is the primary DoD interface in support of the State and Federal disaster response effort at the JFO. As such, the DCO participates in the incident action planning process, a formal action planning cycle that serves to coordinate short and long-tem activities.

4. Administration and Logistics. See Base plan

5. Command and Control. See Base plan and Annex J

C-25-3

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
a. Command Relationships

(1) When activated, normally the DCO is OPCON to CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(2) When activated for complex disasters, the DCO may be OPCON to the JTF or Subordinate Commander as decided upon by CDRUSNORTHCOM. The DCO will operate where he can best facilitate the unity of effort between the JFO and Title 10 Forces.

(3) Many factors influence decisions about what may determine the appropriate command structure and arrangements, but typically decisions are made based upon the type of incident or event, the magnitude and severity of the incident, scope of DOD assistance, complexity of the support, specialized capabilities of forces, and even political or public perception influence. Plans for some DSCA incidents such as CBRNE, Radiological emergencies, established JTF's, and WFF have pre-determined C2 procedures and DCO relationships.

(4) Relationship to JTF Commander. The relationship is determined by CDRUSNORTHCOM based upon factors such as seniority, type of deployed force, duration of the response effort, and the JTF mission.

b. Signal. See Base Plan
APPENDIX 26 to ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 

SAFETY

References:  
a. DOD Instruction 6055.1, "DOD Safety and Occupational Health (SCH) Program", 19 August 1998  
b. DOD Instruction 6055.7, "Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping", 3 October 2000  

1. General.
   
a. Purpose. This appendix provides directions to help reduce potential injuries, losses in combat power and damage to government and/or private property as a result of mishaps during DSCA operations.

b. Concept of Operations. USNORTHCOM will conduct DSCA operations in a manner that does not expose DOD personnel or assets or the general public to unacceptable levels of risk. Commanders at all levels will take a personal interest in the safe conduct of all assigned missions. Effective risk management and disciplined adherence to established standards are essential to success.

   
a. Risk Management. Commanders will conduct or direct the completion of mission specific risk assessments during the Pre-Deployment Phase and will update them as the mission progresses. All leaders will ensure that risk decisions are made at appropriate levels. The Task Force Commander is the approving authority for all operations deemed to carry an extremely high risk, after controls are in place. Units will develop and implement controls to retain risks at an acceptable level.
b. **Safety Staffing.** Units will deploy with their assigned safety professionals and collateral duty safety officers and NCOs. Liaison officers from each participating service will provide the task force safety manager with a safety point of contact or contacts for their significant elements supporting the operation.

c. **Accident Reporting.** All units will report mishaps to their respective services in accordance with existing policies and regulations. Additionally, they will report all Class A through C accidents on unit SIGACTs reports and provide courtesy copies of the accident reports to the task force safety manager.

d. **Accident Investigation.** All accidents will be investigated for possible causes and lessons learned that could be used to prevent accidents of a similar nature. The depth of the investigation depends upon the classification of the accident. Accident investigations will be conducted and boards established in accordance with established regulations and policies.

e. **Standards and Discipline.** Adherence to established standards must not be suspended during DSCA operations. Failure to follow regulations, policies and procedures frequently results in tragic loss. All leaders are responsible for enforcing standards and discipline.
HEADQUARTERS,
US NORTHERN COMMAND
250 Vandenberg Street
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270
24 April 2008

TAB A TO APPENDIX 26 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM
CONPLAN 3501
SAMPLE DISASTER RELIEF RISK ASSESSMENT

SUBJECT: HURRICANE DISASTER RELIEF RISK ASSESSMENT

1. THIS FRAGO PROVIDES MAJOR CONCERNS FOR MANAGING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH ACCIDENTAL LOSSES OF MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH JTF PERSONNEL AND OPERATIONS.
   1.A. RISK ACCEPTANCE AUTHORITY. IN GENERAL, THE RISK ACCEPTANCE AUTHORITY IS THE COMMANDER WHO HAS THE ASSETS AND RESPONSIBILITY TO MITIGATE THE RISK TO AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL BASED UPON MISSION REQUIREMENTS. RISKS DETERMINED TO BE "EXTREMELY HIGH RISKS WILL ONLY BE APPROVED BY THE JTF COMMANDER AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE RISKS VERSUS BENEFITS.

2.A. MAJOR AREAS OF CONCERN/ AVIATION OPERATIONS, VEHICLE / CONVOY OPERATIONS, WEAPONS HANDLING, DROWNING HAZARDS, HEAT INJURIES, ELECTRICAL MISHAPS, FIRE HAZARDS, EQUIPMENT SAFETY, HURRICANE DEBRIS, LIGHTNING STRIKES, SANITATION AND HYGIENE, BIVOUAC SAFETY, CHEMICALS AND FUELS EXPOSURE

2.B. SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN RISKS, CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND CONTROLS.

3.A. AVIATION OPERATIONS
   POTENTIAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH AVIATION OPERATIONS INCLUDE; THE POTENTIAL FOR A CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENT, IMPACT ON MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT, LOSS OF HUMAN AND MATERIEL RESOURCES, POTENTIAL INJURIES TO CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

3.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH AVIATION OPERATIONS INCLUDE; HEAVILY SATURATED AIRSPACE, MIXED OPERATIONS OF MULTI BRANCH AIRCRAFT, HAZARDS TO FLIGHT (WIRES, ANTENNAS, ETC.), OVERWATER OPERATIONS, INADEQUATE CREW ENDURANCE, OPERATIONS INTO/OUT OF UNSURVEYED LZS/PZS, UNRULY/ANXIOUS CROWDS, COASTAL/SUMMER WEATHER
FACTORS, POSSIBLE CONTAMINATION OF FUEL SOURCES, INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE FACILITIES, UNIT/TASK ORGANIZATION CHANGES, HIGH OPTEMPO DUE TO ACTUAL/PERCEIVED URGENCY OF SITUATION.

3.C. CONTROLS THAT MAY MITIGATE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH AVIATION OPERATIONS INCLUDE; ESTABLISH A FLIGHT COORDINATION CENTER AND DESIGNATE TRAFFIC DECONFLICTING ROUTES, CONDUCT CONCISE AND DETAILED MISSION BRIEFINGS, APPLY PROPER RISK MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES AND ENSURE APPROVAL AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL, MAINTAIN POSITIVE FLIGHT FOLLOWING FOR EACH AIRCRAFT, USE THE CRAWL-WALK-RUN APPROACH FOR EACH TASK AND MISSION, ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A HAZARDS TO FLIGHT REPORTING SYSTEM, DESIGNATE PZS AND LZS AND RECORD INFORMATION ON EACH ONE (HAZARDS, LANDING AND TAKEOFF AXIS, ETC), DEVELOP AND FOLLOW A CREW ENDURANCE PROGRAM TAILORED TO THE MISSION, ENSURE PROPER ASE IN ON BOARD TO INCLUDE WATER SURVIVAL GEAR, LIMIT NIGHT FLIGHT OPERATIONS TO EMERGENCY ONLY, DEVELOP INADVERTENT INSTRUMENT METEOROLOGICAL RECOVERY PROCEDURES, ENSURE POL PERSONNEL FOLLOW ESTABLISHED FUEL TESTING AND AIRCRAFT REFUELING PROCEDURES

4. VEHICLE / CONVOY OPERATIONS

4.A. POTENTIAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH VEHICLE / CONVOY OPERATIONS INCLUDE; VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, ROLLOVERS/COLLISIONS/PERSONNEL, LOADING AND UNLOADING (FORKLIFTS), POL SPILLS, BACK STRAINS AND MUSCLE STRAINS, EMERGENCY REPAIR OPERATIONS, SNIPERS, VEHICLE / PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENTS

4.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH CONVOY OPERATIONS INCLUDE; HASTE, FATIGUE, LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH ROADWAYS, NOT USING PPE, OVER ESTIMATING CAPABILITIES, WEATHER, ROAD CONDITIONS/TRAFFIC/SIGNAGE

4.C. CONTROLS. PROPERLY TRAINED AND LICENSED DRIVERS, SPEED LIMIT CONTROL, MANDATORY ASSISTANT DRIVER, COORDINATE WITH STATE PATROL, LOAD PLANS, SAFETY BRIEFINGS, GROUND GUIDES, SPILL KITS, IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION TO COC, TRAINING AND PROPER LIFTING TECHNIQUES, EMERGENCY SIGNALING SYSTEMS, BLOCKING VEHICLE, FULL COMBAT GEAR AND KEVLAR (IN HIGH RISK AREAS), MAINTAIN TROOP INTEGRITY DURING MOVEMENT
5. WEAPONS HANDLING

5.A. POTENTIAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS HANDLING INCLUDE: NEGLIGENT DISCHARGES, LACK OF MUZZLE AWARENESS, INSUFFICIENT TRAINING, INEFFECTIVE SUPERVISION, NEGLIGENCE, INATTENTIVENESS, INDISCIPLINE

5.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: OPERATIONAL PACE, FREQUENT CHANGES IN WEAPONS CONTROL STATUS / OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, COMPLACENCY, INCREASED ACCESS TO WEAPONS & MUNITIONS, NON-STANDARD CONDITIONS, CONFLICTING PROCEDURES IN SOLDIERS MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS, TMS & CMS

5.C. CONTROLS: TRAIN TO ARMY STANDARDS FOR CLEARING WEAPONS, LEADER ENGAGEMENT & ENFORCEMENT OF CONTROLS, PRE-DEPLOYMENT REVIEW OF WEAPONS HANDLING & PROCEDURES, ESTABLISH & DISSEminate RULES OF ENGAGEMENT & WEAPONS STATUS LEVELS FOR MISSION PROFILES & TROOP LOCATIONS, TRAIN & CERTIFY AMMUNITION HANDLERS & SUPERVISORS, INSTALL CLEARING BARRELS WITH INSTRUCTIONS, THOROUGH REDEPLOYMENT SHIPMENT CHECKS, CONDUCT APPROPRIATE WEAPONS TRAINING

6. FIRE HAZARDS

6.A. POTENTIAL RISKS: RUPTURED GAS LINES, STRUCTURE FIRES, VEHICLE FIRES, CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING, EXPLOSIONS.

6.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: GAS LINES NOT VISIBLE, UTILITY COMPANIES OVERWHELMED, ARSON, USE OF FIELD EXPEDITED LIGHT AND HEAT SOURCES

6.C. CONTROLS: USE ONLY BATTERY POWERED FLASHLIGHTS OR AVAILABLE GENERATOR POWERED LIGHTS, SIGNAGE OF AREAS NOT CONSIDERED SAFE, TRAINING FROM UTILITY COMPANIES, LET SEARCH AND RESCUE DO THEIR JOB, ASSUME ALL RUPTURED GAS LINES ARE LETHAL, USE PROPER FIRE SUPPRESSION, STAY OUT FLOODED STRUCTURES.

7. DROWNING HAZARDS
7.A. POTENTIAL RISKS: LEVEES NOT STABILIZED, SINK HOLES IN ROADS, WATER DEEPER THAN APPEARS, WATER MAY HAVE AN
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

UNDERTOW, DOWNED POWER LINES IN WATER, FALLING FROM CRAFT, INJURY FROM BOAT PROPELLERS, BOAT SINKING.

7.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; WATER IS WEAKENING INFRASTRUCTURES, DEPTH OF WATER NOT CLEAR, HIDDEN HAZARDS NOT CLEARED, UNFAMILIARITY WITH AREA, UNFAMILIARITY WITH BOAT OPERATION, PROXIMITY TO MOVING BOATS BY PERSONNEL

7.C. CONTROLS; SOLDIERS USE FLOTATION DEVICES IN VEHICLES/WATER CRAFT AND WORKING NEAR WATER, IDENTIFY WEAK AND NON-SWIMMERS / DROWN PROOFING, BUDDY SYSTEM, TRAIN IN RESCUE TECHNIQUES, RADIO COMMUNICATIONS TO ENSURE ALL SOLDIERS ARE AWARE OF AREAS AFFECTED BY BROKEN LEVEES, WAIT FOR ENGINEERS TO DETERMINE IF ROAD OR BRIDGE IS SAFE, SOLDIERS LET SEARCH AND RESCUE DO THEIR MISSION AND AVOID ENTERING WATER, WORK WITH UTILITY COMPANIES BEFORE ENTERING AN AREA TO DETERMINE IF POWER LINES/GAS LINES ARE A RISK FACTOR.

8. HEAT INJURIES
8.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; POTENTIAL HIGH HEAT INDEX, PHYSICAL EXERTION, REPEAT EXPOSURE/POOR RECOVERY, REDUCED WATER SUPPLY, SUN EXPOSURE

8.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; FATIGUE: ACUTE AND CHRONIC, PREVIOUS HEAT INJURIES, PHYSICAL CONDITIONING, POOR LIVING CONDITIONS,

8.C. CONTROLS; INCREASED SUPERVISION, WATER STATIONS, TRANSPORTATION PLAN FOR MOST DISTANT EVACUATION CAMPS, HYDRATION ALL THE TIME, SUPPLEMENT TO MAINTAIN ELECTROLYTE BALANCE, ID, MONITOR & ASSIST HIGH RISK PERSONNEL, USE BUDDY SYSTEM, USE SUNSCREEN, WEAR APPROPRIATE CLOTHING, INCREASE TRAVEL TIME-LINE, SHADE SOLDIERS WHEN POSSIBLE, IF ONE TO TWO INDIVIDUALS SUFFER HEAT INJURY, STOP AND REASSESS, COOLING TENTS

9. ELECTRICAL MISHAPS
9.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; DOWNED POWER LINES DURING HURRICANE AND FUTURE STORMS, TENTS ERECTED UNDER POWER LINES; SAGGING OF LINES OVER EXISTING TENTS, OVERLOADING OF ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS IN THE LIVING AREAS WHICH POTENTIALLY COULD CAUSE A FIRE, POOR WIRING

C-26-A-4
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
9.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; LIMITED OPEN SPACE WITH NO POWER LINES, LACK OF AWARENESS, EVERYONE WILL WANT SOME CREATURE COMFORT, POOR CONTRACTORS/HASTE

9.C. CONTROLS; ASSUME THAT ALL DOWNED LINES ARE LETHAL, AVOID ERECTION OF TENTS OR OTHER STRUCTURES UNDER POWER LINES, DO NOT OVERLOAD CIRCUITS...STAY WITHIN AMP LIMITS, USE UL APPROVED APPLIANCES ONLY, AVOID CONTACT WITH WATER NEAR DOWNED POWER LINES, MAKE SURE ELECTRICITY IS OFF IN UNSTABLE BUILDINGS, ENSURE PROPER GROUNDING, TRAINING FROM TRAINED POWER CO PERSONNEL, CONDUCT DAILY INSPECTION OF LIVING QUARTERS.

10. EQUIPMENT SAFETY

10.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; CHAINSAW KICKBACKS, IMPROPER USE OF EQUIPMENT LEADING TO INJURY OR DEATH, LOSS OF HEARING/EYE INJURIES, FIRE FROM IMPROPER FUEL.

10.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; HASTE, LACK OF FAMILIARITY, NOT USING PPE, OVER ESTIMATING ABILITIES

10.C. CONTROLS; INSPECT FOR SERVICEABLE CONDITION AND WEAR PPE. TRAINING ON USE OF EQUIPMENT, REALISTIC TIMELINES FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT, PROPER FUEL AND FUEL CONTAINERS, PROPER EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE, USE TRAINED PROFESSIONALS TO OPERATE EQUIPMENT

11. HURRICANE DEBRIS

11.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; PUNCTURE WOUNDS, CUTS, TETANUS, BUILDINGS COLLAPSING ENTRAPPING SOLDIERS, MOLD - HEALTH REACTIONS, CONTRIBUTING FACTORS, EVERYWHERE THERE IS DEBRIS OF ALL TYPES OF SUBSTANCES, CONTAMINATION

11.B. CONTROLS; USE FLASHLIGHTS, WEAR PPE, BUDDY SYSTEM IN CASE A SOLDIER BECOMES TRAPPED, MONITOR FOR MOLD AND TREAT PERSONNEL APPROPRIATELY, PRACTICE GOOD HYGIENE, FIRST AID TRAINING, ENSURE SOLDIERS' IMMUNIZATIONS ARE CURRENT

12. LIGHTNING STRIKE
12.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; HIGH CHANCE OF THUNDERSTORMS, LOCATION OF SOLDIERS, TREES, STRUCTURES, AQUATIC
AREAS, INADEQUATE WARNING, FAILURE TO FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS / SUPERVISION, STRUCTURAL FIRES
12.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; DISPERSION OF SOLDIERS, SEPARATION OF SOLDIERS FROM LEADERS, LACK OF TRAINING / EXPERIENCE, CIVILIAN GROUNDING NOT AVAILABLE, INADEQUATE FIREFIGHTING AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
12.C. CONTROLS; INCREASED SUPERVISION, USE BUDDY SYSTEM, USE OF PORTABLE LIGHTNING DETECTORS, STAY OR GO INDOORS IF POSSIBLE, IF OUTDOORS, AVOID HIGHEST OBJECT OR HIGH GROUND, STAY IN VEHICLE IF TRAVELING, DISCONTINUE USE OF CELL PHONES, GET OUT OF THE WATER, DON'T USE METAL OBJECTS IF OUTDOORS, STAY CLEAR OF ALL WIRES, ANTENNAS OR OBJECTS CONNECTED TO WIRES, ENSURE THAT GENERATORS AND FUELING EQUIPMENT ARE PROPERLY GROUNDED, FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, CPR/FIRST AID TRAINING, MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIGHER

13. BIVOUAC SAFETY
13.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; TENT FIRES, ELECTRIC SHOCK / ELECTROCUTION, TRIP HAZARDS, PUNCTURE HAZARDS,
13.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; MISUSE OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, OVERLOADING CIRCUITS, HASTY CONSTRUCTION / SETUP, INATTENTION TO HIGH POWER LINES, LACK OF UNDERSTANDING, ELECTRICITY AND STANDING WATER.
13.C. CONTROLS; PROHIBIT COOKING IN TENTS NOT DESIGNATED AND CONFIGURED FOR COOKING, ENFORCE SAFE LIMITS ON POWER CIRCUIT USE, AVOID SETTING UP AROUND HIGH POWER LINES, INITIATE SITE SURVEY / DIG PERMIT PROCESS, AVOID OUTDOOR USE OF INDOOR POWER CORDS, AVOID USE OF OR PROTECT TEMPORARY ELECTRICAL LINES IN HIGH TRAFFIC AREAS, ENFORCE NO SMOKING POLICY IN OR NEXT TO TENTS – PROVIDE BUT CANS, CLEAR AREA AROUND TENTS OF FLAMMABLE & COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL, CAP TENT PEGS TO AVOID PUNCTURE, ENFORCE HOUSE KEEPING

14. CHEMICALS AND FUELS EXPOSURE
14.A. POTENTIAL RISKS; BURNS TO SKIN, MUSCLES, EYES, RESPIRATORY SYSTEM, SKIN RASHES, DIZZINESS, NAUSEA, EXCITABILITY, WEAKNESS/FATIGUE, STRUCTURE FIRES, VEHICLE FIRES, EXPLOSIONS
14.B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS; DESTROYED STORAGE AREAS AND FACILITIES, AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS, FUEL SPILLS FROM STORAGE TANKS ARE LIKELY
14.C. CONTROLS; USE ONLY BATTERY POWERED FLASHLIGHTS OR AVAILABLE GENERATOR POWERED LIGHTS, SIGNAGE OF AREAS NOT CONSIDERED SAFE, TRAINING FROM HAZMAT TEAMS, LET SEARCH AND RESCUE DO THEIR JOB, USE PROPER FIRE SUPPRESSION, IF WATER IS SUSPECTED OF BEING CONTAMINATED WITH HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS USE PROTECTIVE OUTER CLOTHING, GOGGLES, GLOVES AND BOOTS TO AVOID CONTACT WITH WATER., STAY OUT FLOODED STRUCTURES
APPENDIX 27 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
SEARCH AND RESCUE

References:
a. DOD Directive 3003.01, "DoD Support to Civil Search and Rescue," January 20, 2006
d. National Search and Rescue Plan, 1999, as amended
e. International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, January 1, 1999, as amended
g. 1958 Convention on the High Seas, article 12
h. Sections 1535 and 1536 of title 31, United States Code, "The Economy Act"
i. Section 5121 of title 42, United States Code, "The Stafford Act"

1. Purpose. CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for a multitude of domestic emergencies and other activities. In Disaster Response (DR) situations USNORTHCOM may be required, as directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), to provide Search and Rescue (SAR) support to civil authorities. Immediate Response Authority also applies to rescue situations providing that immediate response may be taken to assist civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions.
a. DOD Combatant Commanders, as appropriate, and within their capabilities and legal authority, will provide support to civil SAR operations within their respective geographic Area of Responsibility (AOR) (Ref c). USNORTHCOM is responsible for planning and executing personnel recovery operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

b. DOD provides SAR capabilities and assets supporting day-to-day civil SAR operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR. This support is promulgated by the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP). Further authority is directed by the National Response Framework (NRF). These authorities are implemented through the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR Manual) and the National Search and Rescue Supplement to the IAMSAR Manual. It has separate authorities, coordination, oversight, and command structures. This support can/will be involved in the initial SAR response to a catastrophic event prior to a federal declaration.

2. Situation. See base plan.

a. Enemy Forces. See base plan and intelligence annex.

b. Friendly Forces. See base plan and intelligence annex.

(1) DOD SAR Resources and Facilities. DOD resources and facilities include air, land, sea and command and control personnel, equipment, and facilities that may be available to provide support to civil authorities.

(a) US Air Force (USAF). USAF capabilities include air SAR, short and long range airlift, interception and escort of distressed aircraft, navigation and communications aids, locating landing or crash sites, aeromedical evacuation, reconnaissance, locating electromagnetic emitters, and general illumination to aid in SAR efforts. Many of these capabilities are performed by the Civil Air Patrol (CAP), a USAF auxiliary that flies the majority of US inland SAR missions. USAF resources include:

1. Civil Air Patrol (CAP) personnel, aircraft, and SAR equipment
2. Limited numbers of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft
3. Limited numbers of pararescue (PJ) Combat Rescue Officer (CRO) personnel
4. Radar sites either in conjunction with the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) or as stand-alone systems that can be utilized to locate missing aircraft.

5. Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) personnel and equipment

6. Air Operations Center (AOC) Command and Control capabilities

(b) **US Navy (USN).** USN capabilities include all-weather air, surface, subsurface, sheltered or semi-sheltered water SAR, radar, extensive communications, helicopter-refueling, salvage of non-Navy shipping, and advanced emergency medical care. USN resources include:

1. Extensive numbers and types of aircraft,
2. Surface and submarine vessels,
3. Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams,
4. Diving teams,
5. Salvage forces,
6. Radar nets,
7. Sound fixing and ranging nets,
8. Worldwide communications.

(c) **US Army (USA).** USA capabilities include air and ground SAR. USA is responsible for managing the Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) program (A USA and USAF program to assist in serious civilian medical emergencies by providing transportation). Army units may no longer provide response under Army Regulation (AR) 500-4 (rescinded), but may provide support under Immediate Response if assets are available. USA resources include:

1. Large number of helicopters
2. Light aircraft
3. Ground vehicles
4. Surface detection nets

(2) **Federal Government SAR Resources**

(a) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The FAA, in addition to other resources, maintains a nationwide communications net, coordinated with international aeronautical communications services for the control, coordination, and assistance of civil and military air traffic. Primary capabilities
that may be used for SAR are aircraft of various types equipped
with sophisticated sensors and area navigation equipment,
flight-following service for aircraft on flight plans under
instrument flight rules and visual flight rules and alert RCCs
when an aircraft is overdue, radar nets providing complete
coverage of the continental US, Alaska, Hawaii, Panama, and
Puerto Rico (can provide a missing aircraft's last known
position), VHF direction-finding nets, and approximately 27 Air
Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) for all areas where the
US provides ATC services.

(b) Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC
operates a High Frequency (HF) direction-finding net covering
the inland US and parts of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.
Their Communications and Crisis Management Center is staffed
24 hours a day and has the capability to provide the locations
of aircraft, ships or persons in distress. The FCC also operates
field offices with personnel who can locate Emergency Locator
Transmitter (ELT) and Emergency Position Indicating
Radiobeacon (EPIRB) using mobile and portable Direction
Finding (DF) equipment. FCC services should be used for
urgent SAR only and are generally not available to the public.

(c) Department of Homeland Security - US Coast Guard
(USCG). USCG capabilities include air, maritime, and land
SAR, and communications. The USCG maintains a wide variety
of resources, equipped, trained, and capable of conducting
maritime SAR throughout the US and its territories. USCG
resources include:

1. Large number of helicopters
2. Fixed-wing aircraft
3. Cutters
4. Boats
5. Stations
6. Automated Mutual-assistance Vessel Rescue System
(AMVER) - a computerized system for maintaining the
position of participating merchant vessels worldwide) capable
of being used to support civil SAR operations.
7. USCG operations are also supported by an extensive
communications network of coastal radio stations,
specialized landline circuits, and communications.

c. Definitions
(1) Civil Search and Rescue (civil SAR). Search operations, rescue operations, and associated civilian services provided to assist persons and property in potential or actual distress in a non-hostile environment.

(2) Search and Rescue Coordinator. A Federal person or agency with overall responsibility for establishing and providing civil SAR services for a Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs) for which the US has primary responsibility.

(3) Search and Rescue Region (SRR). An area of defined dimensions, recognized by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), or other cognizant international body, and associated with a rescue coordination center within which SAR services are provided.

(4) Search and Rescue Services. The performance of distress monitoring, communication, coordination and SAR functions, including provision of medical advice, initial medical assistance, or medical evacuation, through the use of public and private resources including cooperating aircraft, vessels and other craft and installations.

(5) Rescue Coordination Center (RCC). A unit, recognized by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO) or other cognizant international body, responsible for promoting efficient organization of civil SAR services and for coordinating the conduct of SAR operations within the SRR.

(6) Distress. A person, craft, or vehicle threatened by grave and imminent danger that requires immediate assistance.

(7) Rescue. An operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety.

(8) Search. An operation normally coordinated by a Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) or rescue sub-center, using available personnel and facilities to locate persons in distress.

d. Assumptions

(1) USNORTHCOM will comply with and support the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, National SAR Supplement to the IAMSAR Manual, National SAR Plan, Presidential Directives, and the Stafford Act while conducting civil SAR operations supporting disaster response.

(2) Title 10 SAR forces will be OPCON (or TACON) to USNORTHCOM and its established C2 element.
(3) Title 32 SAR forces will coordinate and liaise with the AFNORTH/1AF JPRC and AOC.

(4) Non-DOD SAR forces will coordinate and liaise with the AFNORTH/1AF JPRC and AOC.

(5) USNORTHCOM DSCA SAR operations other than that specified under existing agreements will cease when directed by the President or SecDef.

(6) The designated Primary Agency will establish a SAR element under its Operation Section within its Incident Command structure.

e. Legal Considerations. See Chapter 7, Legal Aspects of the US National Search and Rescue Supplement (Ref. 1).

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

(1) USNORTHCOM, when directed by the SecDef, shall plan and execute DSCA SAR operations in support of the designated Primary Agency. AFNORTH/1AF, the USNORTHCOM Air Force Component, is tasked to accomplish personnel recovery operations to include establishing a Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). The JPRC will support and establish liaison with the appropriate Primary Agency command element for SAR operations. In addition, the JPRC will establish liaison with the following organizations:

(a) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) – responsible for urban search and rescue.

(b) Department of the Interior – responsible for search and rescue in remote areas.

(c) Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) - the SAR Coordinator for the recognized U.S. aeronautical SRR corresponding to the continental US other than Alaska.

(d) Alaska Rescue Coordination Center - the SAR Coordinator for the recognized US aeronautical SRR corresponding to Alaska;

(e) US Coast Guard (USCG) - the SAR Coordinator for the recognized US aeronautical and maritime SRRs which coincide with the ocean environments including Hawaii.

(f) DSCA specific JTF headquarters and component RCCs.

(g) Affected State Emergency Operations Centers

(h) Affected State National Guard Operations Centers
(2) USNORTHCOM will execute DSCA SAR operations in six phases.

(a) **Phase I, Shape.** SecDef EXORD issued ordering CDRUSNORTHCOM to provide DOD SAR support.

1. During this phase, actions are undertaken to ensure maximum readiness for DSCA response execution.
2. CDRUSNORTHCOM prepares to execute SAR in support of civilian authorities SAR efforts.
3. USNORTHCOM conducts liaison/coordination with interagency partners involved in response operations to include Mission Assignment telephone conferences.
4. USNORTHCOM directs AFNORTH/1AF JFACC to be prepared to stand up a JPRC when directed.

(b) **Phase II, Anticipate.** Phase II operations include deployment of the 5-person AFRCC element to the AFNORTH/1AF Air Operation Center (AOC) to establish a JPRC, Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO), Defense Coordinating Elements (DCE), Emergency Planning Liaison Officers (EPL), and additional forces. The forces are optimally positioned to facilitate the DOD response.

(c) **Phase II, Respond.** CDRUSNORTHCOM activates and deploys command and control (C2) construct, establishes Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), and response forces move to the Area of Operations (AO). On arrival, deployed SAR forces contact the AFNORTH/1AF JPRC for specific air tasking order information, guidance, and special instructions.

(d) **Phase III, Operate.** USNORTHCOM SAR forces conduct missions, report Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), maintain common operational picture (COP), and begin transition planning through the AFNORTH/1AF JPRC. Mission Assignments are in completion process. Phase I ends when DOD civil SAR support is no longer required/desired by the Primary Agency. Deployed units will be released through appropriate DSCA JTF Commander and JFACC.

(e) **Phase IV, Stabilize.** Military and civil authorities decide SAR activities will scale down. Phase IV ends when DOD SAR support is not longer required by civil authorities and transition criteria are established.

(f) **Phase V, Transition.** DOD forces redeploy incrementally to home station, operational control is transferred back to home
unit, C2 stands down, situational awareness maintained, lessons learned captured, after-action reviews conducted, and expenditures reported.

b. Tasks

(1) USNORTHCOM J1 shall:
   (a) Source components for augments for the JPRC and Rescue Coordination Centers (RCC)s, as requested by AFNORTH/1AF and validated by NCJ3.

(2) USNORTHCOM J2 shall:
   (a) Provide JPRC with required support during a SAR event. Submit collection requirements and requests for information (RFIs) for SAR
   (b) Validate Geospatial Information and Services (GI&IS) requirements in support of SAR operations.
   (c) Submit validated intelligence support requirements to the appropriate intelligence organizations
   (d) Support SAR Intelligence requests from allied/coalition/other forces as directed by the President or SecDef.

(3) USNORTHCOM J3 shall:
   (a) Establish procedures for assessment and evaluation of SAR operations and exercises.
   (b) NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center – Provide additional assistance to the JPRC through the AOC as required (USNORTHCOM/J33)
   (c) As PR OPR, provide staff assistance, when required, and act as a conduit to the command for the JPRC, as necessary (USNORTHCOM J35).
   (d) Serve as the OPR for this document

(7) USNORTHCOM J6 shall:
   (a) Coordinate directly with the JPRC Director to develop and establish and maintain connectivity to support C4 planning, coordination, and execution of SAR operations.
   (b) Advise USNORTHCOM staff and JPRC, interagency, JTF, and components during CONPLAN, and contingency planning on C4 support to SAR matters.
   (c) Assist operational commanders charged with SAR responsibilities with frequency management and the
preparation, coordination, and submittal of satellite access requests.

(8) USNORTHCOM IC shall advise USNORTHCOM staff and coordinate interagency SAR matters

(9) USNORTHCOM SG shall provide assistance to the AFNORTH/1AF-JA and JPRC Director as directed.

(10) USNORTHCOM PA shall:

(a) Provide public affairs advise regarding release of SAR information to operations and planning staffs.

(b) When required, prepare media releases regarding SAR operations.

(c) Issue post-mission press guidance to recovery forces and staffs

(11) USNORTHCOM JA shall:

(a) Provide assistance to the JPRC through the AFNORTH/1AF-SG and component RCCs regarding rules of engagement, legal status as directed by the JPRC Director

(12) AFNORTH/1AF shall:

(a) Man, train, and equip a JPRC, capable of 24/7 operations during DSCA events when augmented.

(b) Ensure JPRC operations are fully integrated with DOD and non-DOD organizations.

(c) Be prepared to support SAR operations with available assets

(13) ARNORTH/JFLCC shall:

(a) Be prepared to stand up a component RCC when directed.

(b) Be prepared to support SAR operations with available assets

(14) JTF Commanders shall:

(a) Ensure coordination/communication between the JTF and AFNORTH/1AF AOC and JPRC.

(b) Be prepared to support SAR operations with available assets

(15) JFMCC shall:

(a) Be prepared to stand up a component RCC when directed.

(b) Be prepared to support SAR operations with available assets

(16) JFHQ-NCR, JTF-CS shall:

(a) Be prepared to support SAR operations with available assets
(b) Coordinate all SAR issues and operations through the AFNORTH/1AF AOC and JPRC.
(c) Be prepared exercise C2 over SAR assets as appropriate.

(17) AFNORTH/1AF AOC/JPRC shall:
(a) Train, equip, man and program to generate, modify, and perform SAR execution checklists.
(b) Serve as the focal point for all USNORTHCOM SAR planning and execution activities.
(c) Plan, develop, train and exercise C4I and standard operation procedures for SAR operations
(d) Publish and maintain a JPRC SIPRNet and NIPRNet website to post related information.
(e) Serve as the OPR for USNORTHCOM SAR execution checklists and supporting documents.

(18) SJFHQ-N shall facilitate coordination/communication between the JTF and JPRC.

C. General Guidance

(1) On order, direct coordination is authorized between DOD personnel and SAR Coordinators, JTF Staff, USNORTHCOM Staff, AFNORTH/1AF AOC staff and Primary Agency Staff.

(2) Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) will be followed in accordance with Reference q.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Logistics. See Base Plan.
b. Administration. See Base Plan.

5. Command and Control

a. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported commander. AFNORTH is the AFFOR, JPACC and the supported component commander for DSACA SAR. ARNORTH is the ARFOR, JFLCC and a supporting component commander. CDR, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) is the supporting naval service component commander. MARFORNORTH is a supporting service component commander.
APPENDIX 28 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08 CH 2
MAJOR EARTHQUAKE

References: a. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act)


c. National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement, September 2005


f. Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum, 25 Jun 2004


1. Situation

a. Purpose. This Appendix provides USNORTHCOM guidance for the conduct of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations for major earthquakes, such as described in the National Planning Scenario (NPS) 9, Major Earthquake. To emphasize efficient application of military resources, Tab A provides consideration of both state National Guard and Title 10 forces for the response.

b. Background. Historic U.S. earthquakes, including the 1811-12 New Madrid Earthquake (Mississippi Valley), the Great San Francisco Earthquake of 1906, and the Good Friday Earthquake of 1964 (Alaska), have wrought widespread devastation and human suffering. As Figures 1-1 and 1-2 illustrate, significant portions of the USNORTHCOM AOR are in seismic zones subject to major earthquakes and their effects which include damage or destruction of structures, landslides, fires, and
tsunamis. The earth's crust is divided into several major plates, some 50 miles thick, which move slowly and continuously over the earth's interior. Most earthquakes occur as the result of slowly accumulating pressure that causes the ground to slip abruptly along a geological fault plane on or near a plate boundary. The resulting waves of vibration within the earth create ground motion at the surface that vibrates in a very complex manner. The effects of a major seismic event can destroy lives and property and critically impact infrastructure. The Department of Defense (DOD) possesses unique assets and capabilities that may be used to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage. USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations when requested by civil authorities and approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). Since there will be no prior warning to its occurrence, a major earthquake poses a significant challenge to response operations.

Figure 1-1, Seismicity of the U.S. 1990-2000 [from USGS]

(1) Key Terms.

(a) Aftershock: An earthquake of similar or lesser intensity that follows the main earthquake.
(b) **Earthquake**: A sudden slipping or movement of a portion of the earth’s crust, accompanied and followed by a series of vibrations.

(c) **Epicenter**: The place on the earth’s surface directly above the point on the fault where the earthquake rupture began. Once fault slippage begins, it expands along the fault during the earthquake and can extend hundreds of miles before stopping.

![Seismicity of Alaska: 1990-2000](image)

Figure 1-2, Seismicity of Alaska 1990-2000 (from USGS)

(d) **Fault**: The fracture across which displacement has occurred during an earthquake. The slippage may range from less than an inch to more than 10 yards in a severe earthquake.

(e) **Magnitude**: The amount of energy released during an earthquake, which is computed from the amplitude of the seismic waves. A magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter Scale indicates an extremely strong earthquake.

(f) **Seismic Waves**: Vibrations that travel outward from the earthquake fault at speeds of several miles per second. Although fault slippage directly under a structure can cause considerable damage, the
vibrations of seismic waves cause most of the destruction during earthquakes.

(2) The Richter Scale. The magnitude of an earthquake is determined from the logarithm of the amplitude of waves recorded by seismographs. Adjustments are included for the variation in the distance between the various seismographs and the epicenter of the earthquakes. On the Richter Scale, magnitude is expressed in whole numbers and decimal fractions. For example, a magnitude 5.3 might be computed for a moderate earthquake, and a strong earthquake might be rated as magnitude 6.3. Because of the logarithmic basis of the scale, each whole number increase in magnitude represents a tenfold increase in measured amplitude; as an estimate of energy, each whole number step in the magnitude scale corresponds to the release of about 31 times more energy than the amount associated with the preceding whole number value. Earthquakes with magnitude of about 2.0 or less are usually called microearthquakes; they are not commonly felt by people and are generally recorded only on local seismographs. Events with magnitudes of about 4.5 or greater (of which there are several thousand such shocks annually) are strong enough to be recorded by sensitive seismographs worldwide. Great earthquakes, such as the 1964 Good Friday earthquake in Alaska, have magnitudes of 8.0 or higher. On average, one earthquake of such magnitude occurs somewhere in the world each year. The Richter Scale has no upper limit.

(3) The Modified Mercalli Scale. The intensity scale currently used in the United States is the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) Scale (see Figures 1-3 and 1-4). This scale, composed of 12 increasing levels of intensity that range from imperceptible shaking to catastrophic destruction, is designated by Roman numerals. It does not have a mathematical basis; instead it is an arbitrary ranking based on observed effects. The maximum observed intensity generally occurs near the epicenter. The lower numbers of the intensity scale generally deal with the manner in which the earthquake is felt by people. The higher numbers of the scale are based on observed structural damage. Structural engineers usually contribute information for assigning intensity values of VIII or above. Another measure of the relative strength of an earthquake is the size of the area over which the shaking is noticed. This measure has been particularly useful in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Modified Mercalli Scale Description of Earthquake Intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Felt only by a very few individuals under especially favorable conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Felt only by a few individuals at rest, especially on upper floors of buildings. Delicately suspended objects may swing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Felt quite noticeably by individuals indoors, especially on upper floors of buildings. Many people do not recognize it as an earthquake. Stationary automobiles may rock slightly. Vibration similar to the passing of a truck. Duration estimated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Felt indoors by many, outdoors by a few individuals during the day. At night, some individuals may be awakened. Dishes, windows, doors disturbed; walls make cracking sound. Sensation like heavy truck striking building. Stationary automobiles rocked noticeably.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes, windows broken. Unstable objects overturned. Pendulum clocks may stop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Felt by all. Some heavy furniture moved; a few instances of fallen plaster. Damage slight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; slight to moderate damage in well-built ordinary structures; considerable damage in poorly built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable damage in ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse. Damage great in poorly built structures. Fall of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy furniture overturned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed frame structures thrown out of plumb. Damage great in substantial buildings, with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame structures destroyed with foundations. Rail bent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>Few, if any (masonry) structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed. Rails bent greatly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Damage total. Lines of sight and level are distorted. Objects thrown into the air.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1-3, The Modified Mercalli Scale

estimating the relative severity of historic earthquakes that were not recorded by seismographs or did not occur in populated areas. For example, the three shocks in 1811 and 1812 near New Madrid, Missouri, were each felt over the entire eastern United States. The 1886 Charleston, S.C., earthquake was also felt over a region of about 2 million square miles, which includes most of the eastern United States.
c. Friendly Forces.

(1) Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA). DHS/FEMA is designated as the primary agency for responding to, recovering from, and mitigating the effects of earthquakes. USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA for major earthquakes in accordance with the National Response Framework (NRF), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and DOD policy and guidance.
(2) The Department of State (DOS). Major earthquakes that occur on or near the border may result in cross-border response actions. DOS will assist in coordinating international aid requests. USNORTHCOM conducts approved support to Canada IAW the CANUS Civil Assistance Plan (CAP).

(3) National Guard Bureau (NGB). The NGB plans and coordinates activities to facilitate mutual support among the various National Guard States and Territories, and to enhance National Guard Civil Support. The NGB assists USNORTHCOM by advising it on NG capabilities available and assets employed in the affected region. NGB is developing response plans to assist the NG to prepare, respond, recover, and mitigate damages from earthquakes that exceed the capabilities of the affected state(s) and require external military support either through Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) or federal requests for assistance. The primary role of NGB during a major earthquake is to advise and assist senior DOD leadership, monitor situational awareness, provide information to various DOD elements, senior leadership, and USNORTHCOM. NGB is also responsible for assisting in the sourcing and flow of forces, and coordination with Title 10 forces. Each state has a Joint Force Headquarters State (JFHQ-State) that serves as the C2 element for deployed NG forces responding to a major earthquake. NG forces in Title 32 or State Active Duty status operate under the C2 of the Governor through the Adjutant General.

Federal Regions

Figure 1-5. FEMA Federal Regions

d. **Area of Operations (AO).** The entire USNORTHCOM AOR and all FEMA Regions (see Figure 1-5) are potentially at risk from a major earthquake.
earthquake. Historically, the Pacific Coast, Alaska, Mountain West, and Mississippi Valley (centered around New Madrid, Missouri) are the regions most frequently impacted by earthquakes.

e. Joint Operations Areas (JOAs). USNORTHCOM will designate appropriate JOAs for air, land, and maritime operations for the execution of DSCA operations. Standing JOAs are established for the State of Alaska with Joint Task Force-Alaska (JTF-AK) and for the National Capital Region with Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR).

f. Critical Assumptions.

(1) Multiple states and territories will be simultaneously affected by a major earthquake.

(2) States will provide resources through EMACs and other existing agreements.

(3) The Regional Joint Field Office (JFO) will be fully operational within 72 hours after activation.

(4) The major earthquake will temporarily exceed local, state and tribal authorities' response capabilities and require Federal support in the following areas:

(a) Transportation. Damage to bridges and elevated roadways will close or restrict many major ground transportation arteries. Food, medicine, gasoline, and other necessities that depend upon ground transportation and other infrastructures are not readily available for the first 10 days following the disaster. Seaport facilities are closed for one month and major airports are closed for 10 days.

(b) Shelter. As result of building destruction and fire, some 100,000 disaster victims will seek shelter and will not able to immediately return to permanent housing within the Major Metropolitan Area (MMA).

(c) Provision of food and water. Food and potable water are not readily available for the first 10 days following the disaster.

(d) Power generation. The MMA is completely without electric power for the first 10 days following the disaster.
(e) Medical evacuation and treatment. There are 1,400 deaths and 18,000 hospitalizations. State and local capabilities for triaging and treating casualties in the disaster area are overwhelmed. Most primary medical treatment facilities are damaged or inoperable.

(f) Search and Rescue (SAR). Most of the local fire, police, and other response personnel and officials are victims of the earthquake and unable to coordinate immediate response resources.

(g) Communications. Communications systems—including telephones, radios, and cellular systems—gradually recover to 90% capacity in the first week following the earthquake.

(h) Temporary housing of special needs population, companion and service animals.


3. Execution. The four primary objectives of DSCA operations for major earthquakes are to save lives, minimize suffering, protect property, and maintain public confidence in the US Government and the DOD. After receipt, validation, and approval of a primary agency Request for Assistance (RFA), CDRUSNORTHCOM may deploy forces to anticipate and establish a framework to provide timely support to the primary agency in support of the affected State.

   a. Concept of Operations. USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations for major earthquakes in six (6) phases: Shape, Anticipate, Respond, Operate, Stabilize, and Transition. Due to the no notice nature of an earthquake, however, Phases I and II are combined.

      (1) Phase 0, Shape. The Shaping Phase is continuous. Actions include planning, interagency coordination, planning, identification of gaps, exercises, maintaining Situational Awareness (SA), and public affairs. Phase 0 ends with the identification of a potential DSCA mission in support of a major earthquake response operation or when directed by the President or SecDef.

      (a) Situational awareness is provided to the CDRUSNORTHCOM by the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center (N2C2), the USNORTHCOM Situation Awareness Team (NSAT), USNORTHCOM Liaison Officers (LNOs) to other agencies and Situation Reports (SITREPs) provided by the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) teams and the JTF Commander (when deployed).
(b) Regionally aligned DCO/DCE teams (see Figure 3-1) are an integral part of USNORTHCOM DSCA operations for major earthquakes. They assist in providing an effective and coordinated DOD response by maintaining SA through developing and refining the following tasks:

1. Coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and FEMA’s Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) for Regional Plans.

2. Conduct an assessment of DOD Installations within the region for use as a Base Support Installation (BSI).

3. Become Familiar with the DOD Installation MOAs/MOUUs with communities in the region.

4. Review the local Disaster Response Plans for major population centers within the region.

5. Review Disaster Response Plans for Critical National Assets within the region.

6. Coordinate the training and integration of the Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (REPLOs) and the State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (SEPLOs) into the DSCA operations for major earthquakes.
(c) When a DSCA operation for a major earthquake is executed, Phase 0, Shaping situational awareness continues as a means to plan, prepare for, and identify other potential or follow-on incidents, but execution moves into Phase I/Phase II, Anticipate/Respond for the DSCA operation for the major earthquake.
(2) **Phase I/II, Anticipate/Respond.** This phase begins with the identification of a DSCA mission in response to a major earthquake or when directed by the President or SecDef. The key tasks during Phase I/II are Evacuation, SAR, Emergency Medical Response, and Initial Damage Assessment. Phase I/II ends with response forces deployed and ready to conduct operations in the JOA.

(a) **During Phase I, Anticipate, actions include:**

1. Deployment of USNORTHCOM Situation Awareness Team (NSAT) to the incident site.

2. Coordinate with activated Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) in the JPO.

3. Coordinate with Joint Force Headquarters State (JFHQ-State) through the NGB for the non-Federalized NG capabilities and ongoing response activities in the JOA.
4. Monitor non-Federalized NG operations executed under the EMAC.

5. Deployment of a DCO/DCE to FEMA Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), RRCC or JFO when established. Coordinate specific requirements for evacuation:
   a. Identify airports and/or airfields to be utilized for evacuation.
   b. Define specific number/type of personnel to move from each airport.
   c. Identify aircraft support capabilities at each airport.
   d. Pre-coordinate aircraft marshalling, loading, ground handling and other support.
   e. Coordinate ground transportation for passengers to the airports.
   f. Establish procedures for orderly passenger flow.
   g. Identify procedures to marshal passengers at the gate prior to aircraft arrival.
   h. Pre-coordinate passenger processing/manifesting procedures.
   i. Deconflict and synchronize requirements for general population, tourist and medical evacuation.
   j. Establish and staff an Incident Command Post to manage flow in/out of multiple airports.
   k. Identify shelter in place requirements at airports.
   l. Coordinate passenger movement and final sheltering location at destination airports.

6. The BSI nomination process is led by the USNORTHCOM J4. Close coordination with the NSAT, DCOs and Service Components serves as the key to producing a detailed and deliberate nomination of viable installations that can serve as BSIs to DOD forces during a DSCA event. Ongoing installation missions and resource constraints are key factors in consideration of what installation will ultimately be selected.
7. Deployment of LNOs, EPLOs, and Joint Regional Medical Planning Officers (JRMPOs).

8. Employment of C2 elements and assignment of JOA.

9. Deployment of Crisis Response Force Package Options (FPO), as appropriate, and as approved by SecDef (See Appendix 3 to Annex A, Force Package Options).

10. Repositioning of forces and supplies to avoid loss from the incident, or repositioning proximate to the incident site to speed response operations. (USNORTHCOM coordinates with owning services and with the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) Defense Distribution Center).

11. Alert Stabilization and Recovery / Reconstitution Force Package Option forces for deployment (request via Request for Forces (RFF) to Joint Director for Military Support (JDOMS) for SecDef approval).

12. Continued coordination with NG, federal agencies and State, local and Tribal governments to ensure unity of effort. Provide a USNORTHCOM planning team to FEMA, who is designated as the Coordinating Agency in the NRF for response and recovery.

13. Commanders in the proximity of the event may provide assistance under Immediate Response Authority to a request from an apparently proper civil authority to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate great property damage. All immediate response actions must be reported as soon as possible (within hours) through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and concurrently to the N2C2.

14. Installation Commanders may provide support for major seismic events as planned and directed by DOD Instruction 2000.18, Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management (CM) response. This DOD Instruction requires installations to identify emergency response personnel and assets that can provide support to the local community during emergency circumstances. This response will be reported through the appropriate chain of command to the NMCC. The N2C2 will request notification of such action from the NMCC.

15. Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) may be provided by Air Force units under Air Force Regulation 64-1, and API 10-802, Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST). Army units may
provide response as assets are available. MAST operations include emergency medical evacuation and patient transport.

16. USNORTHCOM and USTRANSCOM coordinate on response capabilities for; Air Movements, Military Sealift Command maritime transportation and logistics assets, and for USTRANSCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC) support of USNORTHCOM including LNO, NDDOC augmentation, DDOC-Forward, DIRMOBFOR Air and Surface, and JTF Port Opening capabilities.

17. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) locations are established for forces flowing into the AO or JOA (if established) and processing instructions are provided in EXORDS / DEPORDs to deploying units.

18. A damage assessment plan is developed and resources are requested to be placed on increased deployment readiness status (Prepare to Deploy Orders (PTDO)) or given an event occurrence as an execute trigger.

19. Conduct response planning (SAR, etc.).

20. Identify additional force capabilities for response and place on PTDO.

21. Identify materials and supplies (rations, medical items, tents, cots, etc.) for response and preposition if required or conduct coordination to obtain.

22. Conduct coordination with federal agencies and State (including NG forces), local and Tribal governments for a mutually supporting response.

23. Command and Control (C2), medical, transportation, communications, power generation, water purification, and supply units are rapidly established and operational. Life support services (water, food, medical care, shelter) are the mission focus. Supplies are procured using established DOD process through the DLA purchasing and contracting with available local vendors.

24. Military forces provide public assurance of the national focus on response by being present in the stricken area.

25. Units and individuals reporting to the JOA process through JRSOI facilities.
26. Units responding under immediate response authority may be incorporated into the USNORTHCOM C2 structure for the DSCA operation via the JRSOI process.

(b) Phase I/II Responsibilities of the DCO include:

1. Validate requests from the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO).

2. Establish the DCE.

3. Establish liaison among military, State, and other Federal Agencies for support.

4. Provide a liaison officer, as required, to each activated ESF.

5. Coordinate with the FCO and other ESFs for defense support.

6. Coordinate with the FCO and other ESFs for support of defense support providers.

7. Work with the FCO and State Coordinating Officer (SCO) to integrate the missions of National Guard on State Active Duty (SAD) with active units to maximize responses while avoiding duplication of effort.

8. Confirm relief priorities established by the FCO and SCO for the disaster area.

9. Develop a priority of work for supporting units.

10. Maintain an audit trail of mission requests to ensure each tasking is supported by a valid request and/or mission assignment number. The audit trail should include estimated and actual costs of support for each mission.

11. DCO/DCE is responsible for accountability and reporting of Title 10/DOD personnel deployed to the JOA until a JTF is established.

(4) Phase III. Operate. Phase III begins when DSCA response operations commence in the JOA. Key tasks are Evacuation, SAR, Emergency Medical Response, and Initial Damage Assessment. Phase III ends when Title 10 forces begin to complete mission assignments and no
further requests for DOD assistance are anticipated from civil authorities.

(a) Actions include:

1. Providing DSCA as requested by FEMA and approved by SecDef to execute Mission Assignments (MA). DSCA operations may include, but are not limited to:
   a. SAR
   b. Emergency medical response/care
   c. Patient transport/evacuation
   d. Life support functions
   e. Supply distribution
   f. Recovery support
   g. DOD facility support
   h. Mortuary Affairs
   i. Safeing of utilities
   j. Infrastructure repair
   k. Debris clearance
   l. Environmental clean-up

2. Distribution of supplies (through DLA and Defense Fuels) and distribution of supplies (rations, water, canvas, tents, cots, sandbags, bulk fuel, etc.) if requested by MA.


4. Capturing and reporting of costs.

(5) **Phase IV, Stabilize.** Phase IV begins when military and civil authorities decide that DOD support will scale down. Phase IV ends when DOD support is no longer required by civil authorities and transition criteria are established.

(a) Actions include:

1. Scaling down operations, forces, C2, and logistics support.

2. Coordinating with federal agencies.


4. Establishing transition criteria.
(6) **Phase V, Transition.** Phase V begins with the redeployment of remaining DOD forces. Phase V, Transition ends when response forces have been relieved, redeployed and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands.

(a) Phase V, Transition actions include:

1. Transition of DSCA mission set to civil authorities.

2. USNORTHCOM relinquishes OPCON of forces as they depart the AO.

3. Forces redeploy and report closure at home station to USNORTHCOM.

4. Costs are reported.

5. Lessons learned are captured.

e. **Tasks.** Specific tasking will be provided in Reference (h). JTF-DSCA can be expected to accomplish the following operational tasks during a major earthquake:

   (1) OP 5.3 Prepare Plans and Orders during Phases 0-V.

   (2) OP 5.7.4 Coordinate Plans with Non-DOD Organizations during Phases 0-V.

   (3) OP 2.1 Direct Operational Intelligence Activities during Phases 0-V.

   (4) OP 2.4.1.1 Identify Operational Issues and Threats during Phases 0-IV.

   (5) OP 4.7.3 Provide Support to DOD and Other Government Agencies during Phases I-IV.

   (6) OP 5.5.2 Develop Joint Force Liaison Structure during Phases I-II

   (7) OP 5.8.1 Manage Media Relations in the Joint Operations Area during Phases I-IV.

   (8) OP 5 Provide Operational Command and Control during Phases I-V.
(9) OP 5.5.5 Establish Command Transition Criteria and Procedures during Phases I-II.

(10) OP 1.1.3 Conduct JRSOI in JOA during Phases II-IV.

(11) OP 5.1.3 Determine Commander's Critical Information Requirements during Phases 0-V.

(12) OP 5.1.7 Coordinate Combat Camera Activities during Phases II-IV.

(13) OP 4.8 Acquire, Manage and Distribute Funds during Phases 0-V.

(14) OP 6 Provide Operational Force Protection during Phases 0-V.

f. Coordinating Instructions. See Basic plan and Annex C

(1) USNORTHCOM's major earthquake Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) serve as triggers to initiate follow-on phases of this plan. These CCIRs keep CDRUSNORTHCOM informed of the occurrence of a major seismic event and on the current status of DSCA operations for major earthquakes.

(a) Has a major earthquake occurred in the United States?

(b) Has the President declared an Emergency or Major Disaster?

(c) Has the incident overwhelmed civil authorities or impacted DOD?

(d) Has Defense Industrial Base or DOD critical infrastructure in the region been impacted? How?

(e) Has transportation infrastructure (Road, Rail, Air, Maritime) in the region been impacted? How?

(f) Has a Governor requested Federal assistance?

(g) Has an RFA been submitted?

(h) Has a Request for Federal agency to agency assistance been submitted?
(i) Is there any negative reporting in media of the government response or actions?

(2) Support period is not to exceed 60 days without review.

(3) DSCA operations for major earthquakes are provided on a reimbursable basis IAW applicable laws and regulations for the type of incident.

(4) Service Administrative Control (ADCON) will be exercised through service components of supporting commands.

g. Force Protection (FP). See Basic plan and Annex C, Appendix 15. Specific guidance will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD for major earthquakes.

h. Public Affairs (PA). See Basic plan and Annex F. PA guidance is active when conducted in coordination with (ICW) FEMA. Personnel involved in DSCA operations may actively engage the media to explain their role; however any comments regarding a specific disaster situation will be referred to Joint Information Center (JIC). DSCA operations PA guidance will be issued by USNORTHCOM PAO.

4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex D

a. Administration

(1) Mission execution notification process is as follows:

(a) Upon receipt of an RFA or MA from civil authorities, USNORTHCOM will confirm JDOMS has received a copy.

(b) GENADMIN message will include:

1. Type of support requested (example: DCO, DCE, or installation).

2. Number, by type, of DOD assets to be provided or installation requirements needed.

3. Duration of support.

4. Confirmation of concurrence from Military Department(s).

5. Deployment location, by type, if applicable.
(2) Reports

(a) Supporting Commanders (RTF / JTF / TF Cdr’s) will ensure that daily SITREPs are provided to the N2C2 upon start of operations through completion. Reports are due to the N2C2 by 0300Z daily. Reports are to be emailed to: Nc.joc.chief.omb@northcom.mil, ATTN: NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center Chief. Significant events and USNORTHCOM CCIR will be reported by telephone; DSN 692-2361, COMM (719) 554-2361, fax DSN 692-2367 (UNCLASSIFIED)/692-2368 (CLASSIFIED).

(b) Supporting Commanders will provide a daily personnel status report (PERSTAT) to USNORTHCOM J-1 utilizing the Joint Personnel Status Report (JPERSTAT) format. JPERSTAT reports will be submitted Not Later Than (NLT) 1200 hrs MST or 1800Z daily to nc.cog.j1.omb@northcom.mil or call the day beeper at (719) 921-5431 or night beeper at (719) 921-5432.

(c) Communications status reporting is identified in Annex K.

(d) Common Operational Picture (COP). Reporting instructions are identified in Annex K.

(3) Funding

(a) USNORTHCOM will not provide funding.

(b) Post-disaster declaration DSCA operations are reimbursable IAW the Stafford Act. The Supported Combatant Commander, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will ensure DSCA operational support procedures and funding guidelines are adhered to. Units will capture and report incremental costs. If SecDef approves an RFA, it will be executed under a fund cite provided by the agency requesting DOD support.

(c) In all cases, the Supported Combatant Commander, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will ensure DSCA operational support procedures and funding guidelines are adhered to.

(d) Provide primary agency invoices from each DOD Service or Agency for goods and services using a Standard Form 1080.

(e) Invoicing for earned reimbursements (performance of work or services, payments to contractors, or delivery from inventory) shall begin within 30 calendar days after the month in which performance occurred.
(f) Invoices shall identify the DOD point of contact (POC), the POC's commercial phone number, the DSCA operation incident name, incident number, incident date, and whether the invoice is a partial or final billing.

(g) Supporting documentation for reimbursement shall include a copy of all SecDef approved RFAs or MAs with the fund cite. Backup documentation will identify the DSCA operation incident name, incident number, incident date, and the costs incurred by each major item listed in the RFA or MA.

(h) USNORTHCOM N-NC J8 contact information is:
USNORTHCOM J83, Programs and Resources Directorate, 250 Vandenberg St, Suite 1067, Peterson AFB CO 80914-3812. Fax is: (719) 556-0334.

(i) Services and agencies shall provide a copy of all SF 1080 invoices to USNORTHCOM J8.

b. Logistics

(1) Supply

(a) Forces deploying for DSCA deploy with five days of supply of Class I and Class III(B) depending on the method of deployment. Deploy with other mission essential supplies as directed.

(b) When designated, BSIs will coordinate logistics support for forces deployed in their area, to include forces from other services, for common items on a reimbursable basis. Resupply support for service unique items is the responsibility of the parent service.

(2) Storage. Designated mobilization sites will provide secure and non-secure storage for relief items, FEMA approved equipment, trailers and vehicles, as well as office space with basic communications for FEMA personnel.

(3) Transportation

(a) The use of Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is directed for all unit movements. JOPES processes and movement validations will be IAW the Joint Staff TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI), enclosure F of JOPES Vol. III, and the NORAD/USNORTHCOM TPFDD instruction located on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM JOPES homepage at C-28-22
www.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/j3/j35/jopes/. GCCS newsgroup “gcss.northcom.jopes.operations” on the NORAD/USNORTHCOM news servers www.news.gcss.northcom.smil.mil are used for all deployment planning and execution actions. For emergency validations during non-working hours, page the NORAD / USNORTHCOM duty validator at 1-888-284-0092 or e-mail 8882840092@myairmail.com.

(b) In-Transit Visibility (ITV). All requirements, including in-place assets (local to the area of operations), will be captured in JOPES and all movements will be captured in appropriate transportation-related automated data processing applications, i.e. Global Transportation Network (GTN), Scheduling and Movement (S&M) and the appropriate newsgroups, to ensure visibility in the AO. Commands without access to service ADP systems feeding GTN and S&M will report planned missions to their next higher headquarters for data entry. Shippers/units must Comply with the provisions of DOD Regulation 4500.9-R (Defense Transportation Regulation). The arrival and departure of unit personnel and equipment at all nodes from origin to destination will be visible in GTN and within 1 hour of the movement event.

(c) All DOD requirements for transporting hazardous goods are in effect.

(4) Health Service Support (HSS)

(a) Medical Treatment. First Responder and Forward Resuscitative Care health support to deploying military personnel will be organic or provided by civilian and/or governmental agencies supporting DSCA operations, ICW appropriate military medical authorities (service and unit-level). Medical evacuation is coordinated through the DCO and the primary agency. Hospitalization is coordinated by the surgeon in charge of DOD Forces, with the DCO, to a medical treatment facility, TRICARE network hospital, Veteran’s Affairs hospital, or civilian hospital.

(b) The USNORTHCOM Joint Regional Medical Plans and Operations (JMPO) will provide JMPO support to the DCO as part of the DCE to include coordinating requests for DOD HSS resources ISO of the primary agency. JMPO assets will provide advice and guidance concerning HHS capabilities appropriate for the stated mission; maintain interoperability with DOD, state, and Health and Human Services/ESF8 elements will provide SA and information updates through the DCO / DCE designated C2 structure to USNORTHCOM in general and specifically to the 24/7 Medical Operations Center (MOC) at 719-554-4980, when activated.

S. Command and Control
a. **Command Relationships**

   (1) DHS/FEMA is designated as the primary agency for responding to, recovering from, and mitigating the effects of earthquakes. FEMA will remain the coordinating authority for all federal interagency partners in support of earthquake response operations.

   (2) CDRUSNORTHCOM is the Supported Combatant Commander.

   (3) CDRUSJFCOM, CDRUSTRANSCOM, USPACOM, and USSOCOM are Supporting Combatant Commanders.

   (4) Military Departments and Defense Agencies are supporting organizations.

   (5) Upon completion of support mission, as determined by the CDRUSNORTHCOM or SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM will relinquish OPCON of redeploying personnel and/or equipment on departure from the JOA. Subsequently, supporting combatant commanders, military departments, and/or defense agencies accept return of DOD personnel and/or equipment from CDRUSNORTHCOM.

b. **Signal.** See Annex K.
HEADQUARTERS, US NORTHERN COMMAND  
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016  
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270  
18 November 2008

TAB A TO APPENDIX 28 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 
ANTICIPATED FORCE REQUIREMENTS BY PHASE

1. **Purpose.** This Tab provides a general overview for anticipated force requirements by phase for major mission areas likely to be undertaken during a major earthquake. The data is not linked to a specific geographic area, but highlights capabilities likely to be required and potentially furnished by the National Guard of the states and/or Title 10 military forces. This information should aid in the efficient application of military resources in the response to a major earthquake.

### Integrated Search and Rescue (SAR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JFHQ-State/JTF-State C2</th>
<th>NG Installations (State Wide)</th>
<th>Engineer (Horizontal)</th>
<th>Aviation Units (Fixed and Rotary)</th>
<th>Aviation RECON (RAID)</th>
<th>CERF P</th>
<th>NG Response Force (BN)</th>
<th>Civil Engineer Units</th>
<th>Aviation Rescue Wing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additional identified requirements per EMAC &amp; Interstate Compacts</td>
<td>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</td>
<td>CBIRF (High angle rescue)</td>
<td>Engineer Company (Bldg Collapse USR)</td>
<td>All Terrain Vehicles</td>
<td>Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC)</td>
<td>Augmentation for Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- CBID (Catastrophic Initial Entry Force)  
- Rotary Wing (Medium)  
- Amphibious Ready Group  
- Air Ground Coordination Cell

Green = State NG  Red = EMAC/Interstate Compact NG  Purple = DSCA EXORD  Blue = RFFFs from PSMAs, etc.

C-28-A-1  
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
# Wide Area Damage Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JFHQ-State JTF-State C2</th>
<th>Additional Identified requirements per EMAC &amp; Interstate Compacts</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NG Installations (State Wide)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Engineer Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aviation Airlift (Fixed Wing and Rotary)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Engineering Flight</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOD/OCE &amp; Augmentation</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JTF HQ/C2</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD Installations (FOSABBS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSAT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing Support (Heavy x 4 helos)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing Support (Medium x 9 helos)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fixed-wing Search A/C w/Imagery capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAA downlink/uplink capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Commercial Imagery Space Supt team</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 x Comms Supt Teams for FOB</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 x Comms Fly Away Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 x Airborne C2 AIC</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAA Packages from Global ISR Response Force (U-2, Global Hawk, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Air-Ground Coordination Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Theater Aviation Brigade HQ Element</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Green = State NG  Red = EMAC/Interstate Compact NG  Purple = DSCA EXORD  Blue = RFFs from PSMA, etc.
# Evacuation Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JFHQ-State/JTF C2</th>
<th>Additional Identified Requirements per EMAC &amp; Interstate Compacts</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avitation (Fixed Wing and Rotary)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aero Medical Evacuation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground Transportation Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aviation Rescue Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aero Medical Evacuation SQDN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground Ambulance Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aerial Port SQDN</td>
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<tr>
<th>DCOC/CE &amp; Augmentation</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JTF Headquarters/Command &amp; Control (C2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD Installations (FOS/SS) &amp; APOEs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing Support (Heavy x 4 helos)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing Support (Medium x 8 helos)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patient Movement Capability w/ enabling assets</td>
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<td>DOD NDMS bed reporting to TRANSCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Catastrophic Initial Entry Force (BCT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Rotary Wing Aviation BN (Medium)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Movement Control Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Vehicle Maintenance Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 x Medium Transportation Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Area Support Medical Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Theater Aviation Brigade HQ Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aeromedical Evacuation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Green = State NG  Red = EMAC/Interstate Compact NG  Purple = DSCA EXORD  Blue = RFFs fm PSMA's, etc.
# Communications Interoperability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Identifying Requirements per EMAC &amp; Interstate Compacts</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ-StateUFT C2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Signal Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commo Flights, ANG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Support Teams (CST)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCO/DCE &amp; Augmentation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF Headquarters/Command &amp; Control (C2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD Installations (FOSA/BIS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comma Supt - C4 Planning Teams</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Comma Supt - LNO Comms Package</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comma Supt - Small C2 Internet Protocol Pkge</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 x Comma Supt Teams for FOBs</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 x Comma Fly Away Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 x Comma Supt - C4 Planning Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 x Comma Supt - LNO Comms Package</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10 x Comma Supt - Small C2 Internet Protocol Pkge</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 x Comma Supt Teams for FOBs</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 x Comma Fly Away Teams</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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# Medical Augmentation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional Identified Requirements per EMAC &amp; Interstate Compacts</th>
<th>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ State/JTF C2</td>
<td>Med Det Combat Stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescue SQDN, ANG</td>
<td>Med Det Veterinary Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEFR P</td>
<td>Combat Support Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Battalions Companies and Groups</td>
<td>Air Transportable Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASMC (Medical)</td>
<td>USNS Hospital Ship (MERCY/COMFORT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCO/IDCE &amp; Augmentation</td>
<td>PSMA 16, Temporary Medical Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Headquarters/Command &amp; Control (C2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD Installations (FOSA/BS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expeditionary Medical Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x Catastrophic Initial Entry Force (BCT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Amphibious Ready Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Med Logistics Smart Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Med Logistics Company to include Early Entry Team</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 x Preventative Med Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x Area Support Med Company</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Green = State NG, Red = EMAC/Interstate Compact NG, Purple = DSAC EXORD, Blue = RFFs fm PSMA, etc.

C-28-A-5

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UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
# Engineering & Logistics Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JFHQ-StateJTF C2</th>
<th>NG Response Forces</th>
<th>Combat Arms Units</th>
<th>NG Response Forces</th>
<th>Combat Arms Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Additional identified requirements per EMAC &amp; Interstate Compacts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCO/DCE &amp; Augmentation</td>
<td>JTF Headquarters/Command&amp;Control (C2)</td>
<td>DOD Installations (FOSABS)</td>
<td>1 x BCT or RCT</td>
<td>1 x ARG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 x Engineer Construction Battalion</td>
<td>1 x Movement Control Team</td>
<td>1 x Medium/Light Trans. Co.</td>
<td>1 x Army Field Supt Brigade</td>
<td>2 x Engineer Diving Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified requirements per PSMA</td>
<td>Additional identified assets via RFF through Joint Staff</td>
<td>Additional Resources driven by specific scenario requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Green = State NG  Red = EMAC/Interstate Compact NG  Purple = DSCA EXORD  Blue = RFFs from PSMA, etc.
APPENDIX 29 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08 CH 3  
CARIBBEAN MASS MIGRATION (CMM) SUPPORT

References:  

   b. Executive Order 13276 – Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning Undocumented Aliens Interdicted or Intercepted in the Caribbean Region, 19 Nov 2002

   c. USNORTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan, 1 Oct 2008

   d. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) OPLAN OPERATION VIGILANT SENTRY (OVS), (1 Aug 2007)


   f. USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM Memorandum of Agreement, Annex B, 24 NOV 2008

1. Situation

   a. Purpose. This Appendix provides USNORTHCOM guidance for the support of Caribbean Mass Migration (CMM) operations within the auspices of the NRF and conducted per Department of Homeland Security (DHS) OPLAN VIGILANT SENTRY (OVS).

   b. Background. CMM is a long standing issue that results from the economic instability and/or political conditions extant in several Caribbean nations. Past instances of CMM most frequently involved Cuban and Haitian migration events with landings in South Florida. Under DHS OVS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for establishing Collection and Relocation Points (CRP) to process apprehended migrants who reach U.S. soil. Current DHS mass migration plans for the southeast region are based on a worst case scenario of 55,000 migrants being processed in the contiguous United States (CONUS). This number is derived from an anticipated total migrant collection of 100,000, with 45,000 migrants intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) being housed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and
the remaining 55,000 migrants processed within CONUS and then given a "notice to appear," according to current U.S. policy. Current DHS resources in CONUS are not sufficient to provide the required capability to process the anticipated 55,000 migrants. It is anticipated that DOD assistance will be required when, based on DHS intelligence, arrival migrant rates are projected to exceed DHS resource capabilities. Current DHS policy is to request DOD support for CRPs. In accordance with OVS, DHS will establish temporary detention centers where migrants will be transported from CRPs. The two types of mass migration are cooperative and non-cooperative.

(1) Under a cooperative mass migration, the U.S. government encourages U.S. citizens to assist migrants with entering the United States. An example of this type was the 1980 Mariel Boat Lift where nearly 125,000 migrants entered the U.S. over a six month period.

(2) Under a non-cooperative mass migration, the U.S. government discourages the migrants by a combination of tactics to include interdiction at sea and repatriation. An example of this type was the 1994 USCG Operation Able Vigil where over 30,000 migrants were interdicted at sea over a three month period.

c. Friendly Forces.


(2) Homeland Security Task Force Southeast (HSTF-SE) is the organizational framework established by DHS to integrate the capabilities of assigned and supporting Federal agencies, State and local governments and the non-governmental and private sectors while garnering and maintaining the support of the American public in the event of a Caribbean mass migration.

(3) Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP is responsible for land-based migrant interdiction. Migrants are turned over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) following processing at the CRPs.

(4) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE is responsible for transportation and final disposition of intercepted migrants.

(5) U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). USCG is responsible for sea-based migrant interdiction. The USCG will exercise the USCG-USN MOA for transfer of forces to obtain required support via USSOUTHCOM.

C-29-2
(6) USSOUTHCOM, CDRUSSOUTHCOM is the DOD supported commander providing support to Homeland Security Task Force Southeast (HSTF-SE) for maritime interdiction of illegal migrants and migrant operations at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay.

d. **Area of Operations (AO)**. The AO for CMM within the USNORTHCOM AOR includes the State of Florida and its inland waters.

**Figure 1-1, Caribbean Mass Migration Potential CRP sites**

e. **Joint Operations Areas (JOAs)**. USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and HSTF-SE will designate appropriate JOAs for air, land, and maritime operations for the execution of CMM related operations.

1. (FOUO) The USNORTHCOM Defense Support of Civil Authority (DSCA) JOA provides “Feet Dry” DSCA in the State of Florida, shoreward of the US baseline. The DSCA JOA may expand or contract depending on the level of support required by HSTF-SE.

2. (FOUO) Based upon current agreements, the following JOA is established to delineate areas of USSOUTHCOM support to DHS in
Figure 1-2. The USSOUTHCOM JOA boundary starts along the east coast of Florida at 27-30N and proceeds east to 064-21W, south to 17-05N, west to 086-22W, north to 27-30N and east to the west coast of Florida, south along the coast of Florida and along the Florida Keys until terminating at the origin on the east coast at 27-30N. The JOA encompasses the entire maritime domain from the US baseline and encompassed by the waypoints.

Figure 1-2, USSOUTHCOM Maritime Interdiction JOA

(3) (FOUO) Encompassing these measures to deconflict GCC operations is the HSTF-SE JOA, which combines the two and extends the maritime area of intended operations into the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic Ocean. The HSTF-SE JOA covers the States of Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands; the inland waters and territorial seas of the United States in their vicinity territorial waters of other Nations; international waters in the Gulf of Mexico, Straits of Florida, Caribbean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean.
f. Assumptions.

(1) The CMM will be a non-cooperative event similar to Operation Able Vigil in 1994.

(2) DHS will be able to process 540 migrants per day per CRP.

(3) DHS will be able to transport 540 migrants per day and within 48 hours of arrival at the CRP.

(4) Migration levels will not exceed 1,620 per day.

(5) DHS's contractor will be able to provide all the food, water, shelter, and medical care required by all migrants brought onto DOD bases.

(6) DHS will be able to provide all required internal security of CRPs on DOD bases.

3. **Execution.** OVS will be executed through HSTF-SE. HSTF-SE Director (Commander, Coast Guard District Seven, Miami, FL) reports to SecDHS through the DHS Senior Oversight Group. HSTF-SE directs all DHS operations during a mass migration event. OVS calls for three CRPs at DOD bases. DHS has a service contract to provide services and logistics at the CRPs. DHS requires that designated bases have 45,000 sq. ft. of hangarspace with drainage and existing infrastructure (power, light, HVAC, water, and sewage), available T1 data lines, a fully operational 6,500 ft. runway, access control, restricted airspace, and 24-hour base operations. Further definition of the three CRP locations is located in TAB A (NAS Key West), TAB B (Homestead ARB), and TAB C (Avon Park AFR).

   a. **Concept of Operations.** USNORTHCOM conducts CS operations for major CMM in six (6) phases: Shape, Anticipate, Respond, Operate, Stabilize, and Transition. These are mapped to OVS phases. Potential branches and sequels will be discussed in TAB D.

   (1) **Phase 0, Shape (OVS "Normal Operations").** The Shaping Phase is continuous. Actions include planning, interagency coordination, identification of gaps, exercises, maintaining Situational Awareness (SA), and public affairs. Phase 0 ends with the identification of a potential CMM support mission in support of DHS OVS or when directed by the President or SecDef.

   (a) **Situational awareness is provided to the CDRUSNORTHCOM by the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center (N2C2), USNORTHCOM Liaison Officers (LNOs) to other agencies and Situation Reports (SITREPs) provided by the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) teams and the JTF Commander (when deployed).**

   (b) **The Region IV DCO/DCE team is an integral part of USNORTHCOM CMM operations. They assist in providing an effective and coordinated DOD response by maintaining SA through developing and refining the following tasks:**

      1. Coordinate with regional DHS, CBP, and HSTF-SE officials.

      2. Become Familiar with the DOD Installations in the AO in order to best prepare for and anticipate additional CRP base requirements or the need to shift from designated CRP bases to alternate sites.
(2) Phase I, Anticipate OVS "Alert and Readiness," "Activating OVS," and "Deterrence". This phase begins with the identification of a potential CS mission in response to CMM or when directed by the President or SecDef. The key tasks during Phase I are placement of required forces on Prepare to Deploy (PTDO) status and Situational Awareness. Phase I ends with Tier 1 pre-identified CRP bases activated and CRP base augmentation forces deployed.

(a) During Phase I, Anticipate, actions include:

1. Deployment of USNORTHCOM Situational Awareness Team (NSAT) to the incident site as required.

2. Deployment of Region IV DCO/DCE to the HSTP-SE Integrated Command Center.

3. Select and place a backup DCO/DCE on PTDO to FEMA Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC), Initial Operating Center (IOC) or Joint Field Office (JFO) if established.

4. Place forces identified in TABs A (NAS Key West), B (Homestead ARB), and C (Avon Park AFR) on PTDO.

5. Employment of C2 elements and assignment of JOA as appropriate. See Tab D.

6. Identify additional force capabilities for potential response and place on PTDO. See Tab D.

7. Identify materials and supplies (rations, medical items, tents, cots, etc.) for response and prepositioning if required or conduct coordination to obtain. See Tab D.

(3) Phase II, Respond OVS "Land Level I". Phase II begins with the deployment of support capabilities. Key tasks include establishment of support activities and security at CRPs. Phase II ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the JOA.

(a) Phase II, Respond, actions may include:

1. Deploy Command and Control (C2), Force Protection Support, Airfield Support, communications, and supply forces to the designated bases. Be prepared to conduct medical care, transportation of migrants and/or supplies, power generation, and life support services (water, food, and shelter). Supplies are procured using established DOD C-29-7
process through the DLA purchasing and contracting with available local vendors.

2. Units and individuals reporting to the JOA process through JRSOI facilities.

3. For additional potential phase II actions, see Tab D.

(4) Phase III. Operate (OVS "Land Level I," "Land Level II," "Land Level III"). Phase III begins when CMM support operations commence in the JOA. Key tasks are facilitating the use of DOD infrastructure for DSCA. Phase III ends when additional DOD assistance is no longer anticipated or required by DHS.

(a) Phase III. Operate. Actions include:

1. Providing DSCA as requested by DHS and approved by SecDef to execute Requests for Assistance (RFAs). DSCA operations may include, but are not limited to:
   a. Support of counter migrant operations.
   b. Emergency medical response/care
   c. Patient transport/evacuation
   d. Life support functions
   e. Supply distribution
   f. DOD facility support
   g. Mortuary Affairs

2. Arranging for the procurement (through DLA and Defense Fuels) and distribution of supplies (rations, water, canvas, tents, cots, sandbags, bulk fuel, etc.) if requested by MA.


4. Capturing and reporting costs.

(5) Phase IV. Stabilize (OVS "Demobilization Phase"). Phase IV begins when DHS and DOD decide that DOD support will scale down. Phase IV ends when DOD support is no longer required by DHS and transition criteria are established.

(a) Phase IV. Stabilize. Actions include:

1. Establishing transition criteria.

2. Coordinating with federal agencies.

4. Scaling down operations, forces, C2, and logistics support.

(6) Phase V, Transition (OVS “Demobilization Phase”). Phase V begins with the redeployment of remaining DOD forces and the transition of designated CRP bases back to normal operations. Phase V, Transition ends when response forces and CRP bases have been relieved, redeployed and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands.

(a) Phase V, Transition, actions include:

1. Transition of CMM support mission set to DHS.

2. USNORTHCOM relinquishes OPCON of forces as they depart the AO.

3. Forces redeploy and report closure at home station to USNORTHCOM.

4. Costs are reported.

5. Lessons learned are captured.

b. Tasks. Specific taskings will be provided via EXORD or FRAGO to the current USNORTHCOM OPORD in effect. JTF-CMM HQ can be expected to accomplish the following operational tasks during a CMM support operations:

(1) OP 5.3 Prepare Plans and Orders during Phases 0-V.

(2) OP 5.7.4 Coordinate Plans with Non-DOD Organizations during Phases 0-V.

(3) OP 2.1 Direct Operational Intelligence Activities during Phases 0-V.

(4) OP 2.4.1.1 Identify Operational Issues and Threats during Phases 0-IV.

(5) OP 4.7.3 Provide Support to DOD and Other Government Agencies during Phases I-IV.

(6) OP 5.5.2 Develop Joint Force Liaison Structure during Phases I-II
(7) OP 5.8.1 Manage Media Relations in the Joint Operations Area during Phases I-IV.

(8) OP 5 Provide Operational Command and Control during Phases I-V.

(9) OP 5.5.5 Establish Command Transition Criteria and Procedures during Phases I-II.

(10) OP 1.1.3 Conduct JRSOI in JOA during Phases II-IV.

(11) OP 5.1.3 Determine Commander's Critical Information Requirements during Phases 0-V.

(12) OP 5.1.7 Coordinate Combat Camera Activities during Phases II-IV.

(13) OP 4.8 Acquire, Manage and Distribute Funds during Phases 0-V.

(14) OP 6 Provide Operational Force Protection during Phases 0-V.

c. Additional Planning Requirements. In the event DHS submits an RFA for additional support, those requests should be handled per the Basic plan and appropriate annex(es) and by requesting capabilities through the Standing DSCA EXORD. Additional RFAs are anticipated in the following areas:

(1) DOD support for medical care, water, food, and shelter of migrants. See Annexes D and Q.

(2) DOD support for transportation of migrants. See Annex D.

(3) AT/FP and airfield augmentation of CRP host bases. See Annex C, Appendix 15 and Annex D.

d. Coordinating Instructions. See Basic plan and Annex C

(1) USNORTHCOM's CMM Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) serve as triggers to initiate follow-on phases of this plan. These CCIRs keep CDRUSNORTHCOM informed of the occurrence of a CMM event and on the current status of DSCA for CMM.

(a) Are there indications and warning of an impending CMM event?
(b) Has the President declared an Emergency?

(c) Has SecDHS requested DOD assistance?

(d) Is the CMM incident threatening to overwhelm DHS and other civil authorities or impact DOD installations?

(e) Is there any negative reporting in media of the government response or actions?

(2) Support period is not to exceed 60 days without review.

(3) DSCA for CMM is provided on a reimbursable basis IAW applicable laws and regulations for the type of incident until a Presidential declaration that the event constitutes a threat to national security. After the declaration, DSCA occurs on a non-reimbursable basis per EO 13276.

(4) Service Administrative Control (ADCON) will be exercised through service components of supporting commands.

(5) Performing Emergency Support Function #5, Emergency Management, begins with deployment of the Region IV DCO/DCE to the HSTP-SE ICC in Phase I. Deployment and incorporation of Headquarters, Joint Task Force – Caribbean Mass Migration (JTF-CMM HQ) into the operation, will constitute an expansion of this ESF in the event USNORTHCOM executes one of the branches described in Tab D.

e. Force Protection (FP). See Basic plan and Annex C, Appendix 15. Specific guidance will be provided in USNORTHCOM EXORD for CMM.

f. Public Affairs (PA). See Basic plan and Annex F. PA guidance is active when conducted in coordination with (ICW) DHS. Any inquiries regarding a specific CMM situation will be referred to the Joint Information Center (JIC). CMM operations PA guidance will be issued by USNORTHCOM PAO.


5. Command and Control

   a. Command Relationships
(1) DHS is designated as the Primary Agency for responding to CMM. HSTF-SE will remain the coordinating authority for all federal interagency partners in support of CMM response operations.

(2) CDRUSNORTHCOM is the Supported Combatant Commander in the designated USNORTHCOM JOA.

(3) CDRUSARNORTH, in the USNORTHCOM JFLCC role, is the Supported Component Commander in the designated USNORTHCOM JOA.

(4) CDRUSSOUTHCOM is the Supported Combatant Commander in the designated USSOUTHCOM JOA.

(5) CDRUSJFCOM and CDRUSTRANSCOM are Supporting Combatant Commanders.

(6) Military Departments and Defense Agencies are supporting organizations.

(7) Services retain command authority over the bases providing CRPs.

(8) Upon completion of support mission, as determined by the CDRUSNORTHCOM or SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM will relinquish OPCON of redeploying personnel and/or equipment on departure from the JOA. Subsequently, supporting combatant commanders, military departments, and/or defense agencies accept return of DOD personnel and/or equipment from CDRUSNORTHCOM.

b. Signal. See Annex K and USNORTHCOM OPORD in effect.

(1) Common Operational Picture (COP). HSTF-SE will designate COP requirements and coordinate with USNORTHCOM COP Manager. USCG District 7 Command Center will coordinate with HSTF-SE for the interagency COP picture. USCG District 7 Command Center contact e-mail address D07-smb-cmdcenter@uscg.mil, sdo.hscenter@dhs.gov, and hscenter@dhscenter@dhs.gov and phone number (305) 415-6920 or (305) 415-6800. USNORTHCOM classified e-mail address: Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.smil.mil, uncategorized email Nc.joc.copmanager.omb@northcom.mil. DSN 692-2363, COMM (719) 554-2363.

(2) Video Teleconference (VTC) instructions. DHS will normally conduct VTCs at 0900 and 1800 Eastern Time daily during a CMM event.
HEADQUARTERS, US NORTHERN COMMAND
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270
24 August 2009

TAB A TO APPENDIX 29 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08 CH 3
NAVAL AIR STATION (NAS) KEY WEST DESCRIPTION AND REQUIREMENTS

References: See Basic Plan and Appendix 29 to Annex C, Caribbean Mass Migration

1. Situation.
   a. Enemy. See Basic Plan and Annex B. Intelligence.
   b. Friendly. See Basic Plan and Appendix 29 to Annex C, Task Organization.
   c. Assumptions. A political, economic, or natural disaster initiates a mass migration to South Florida, activating Department of Homeland Security (DHS) OPLAN VIGILANT SENTRY (OVS). When the onshore arrival rate exceeds DHS internal capability to support OVS capacity (over 200 migrants on average), full Collection and Relocation Point (CRP) operations will be established to support DHS processing, holding and staging functions for onward movement.

   (1) DOD resources will be made available upon request from DHS to DOD.

   (2) Between June and November, hurricane evacuation is a higher probability. CRP activation shall not take place during a hurricane evacuation or hurricane sheltering event for NAS Key West. If Commanding Officer NAS Key West changes condition of readiness (COR) condition below COR V, CRP operations should cease due to increased potential for base evacuation.

   (3) NAS Key West will have at least 72 hours from initial notification until CRP activation in order to shift primary mission and vacate facilities in order to support DHS personnel.

   (4) Funding shall be made available to support the immediate procurement of materials needed by NAS Key West to conduct CRP activation and operations.

   (5) Sustained CRP operations are anticipated to exceed six months.

   (6) Homeland Security Task Force – Southeast (HSTF-SE) will conduct necessary coordination with non-DOD agencies.

   (7) DOS sponsored Office of Cuban Broadcasting (OCB) will continue to operate at NAS Key West throughout CRP activation. OCB operates two Gulfstream G-1 aircraft with operations conducted from building A-129 on Boca Chica field.

C-29-A-1
The following HSTF-SE finance and administration personnel will be deployed to NAS Key West to support CRP operation: Logistics manager; Administrative manager (with purchase card); Electronic technician and Computer/ADP specialist.

Security force augmentation will be requested by CDR USNORTHCOM via the Request for Forces (RFF) process to support CRP operations. Security forces will deploy with and secure any required ammunition.

Liaison Officers (LNOs) from participating agencies shall be identified prior to CRP activation.


3. Execution.
   a. Concept of Operations.

Upon notification, NAS Key West will immediately begin coordination for departure of training detachments and transient personnel/aircraft. DHS will establish the CRP in and around hangar A-981 once vacated.

Migrants will arrive via US 1 at the commercial gate located approximately a half-mile East of Boca Chica main gate. All vehicles will be inspected prior to clearance on station. Vehicles will be escorted by DHS from the commercial gate west down Midway Avenue to the CRP location (A-981). Transport vehicles will enter the ramp on the east side and depart the ramp on the west side in most direct route to Midway Avenue for an escorted easterly route back to the commercial gate to depart the installation.

The following figure is an overhead view of NAS Key West, Boca Chica airfield, depicting the entrance and exit route taken by DHS migrant transient vehicles to the CRP.
(4) NAS Key West will provide aircraft fueling (JP-5) and transient services for aircraft in support of the CRP. NAS Key West has limited ramp space. 24/7 operations will be capable of providing up to 250,000 gallons per day. No hot-refueling is available and services are limited by refuel truck inventory (six refueling trucks maximum) and bulk storage of 900,000 gallons. Each refueling truck contains a maximum of 7,500 gallons. Fueling requirements in excess of the above capabilities will require Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System (TAFDS) or other augmentation. Any service provided to non-DOD units shall have funding line prepared in advance of services being rendered.

(5) Arriving aircraft shall ensure sufficient number of qualified load masters and crewmen are available to unload aircraft. NAS Key West transient line is not adequately staffed to handle multiple large aircraft and is limited by one K-loader for use. DHS will provide transportation from flight line to DHS designated storage area. Refer to DOD Flight Information Publication, IFR Supplement, for airfield configuration, aircraft limitations and available services. Required services not described shall be DHS outsourced.

(6) NAS Key West will continue to provide radar/approach services 0700-2200 local and shift to 24/7 tower operations in support of OVS. Range control services (W-465 and W-174) will not be available.
(7) DHS contractors will provide all internal security services for the CRP. Additionally, DHS must provide entrance gate checkpoint teams with vehicle inspection capability 24/7 during the duration of CRP operations.

(8) DHS contractors will provide all internal security, food, water, shelter, waste management, and medical care required to support the CRP.

(a) NAS Key West has no government messing available or means to provide mass food preparation services. Additionally, NAS Key West has no brig facility.

(b) Boca Chica airfield/annex does not have an on-site medical or morgue facility. Navy Branch Health Medical Clinic is a limited facility located approximately five miles from Boca Chica airfield.

(9) NAS Key West can provide lodging facilities for a maximum of 800 personnel. (Boca Chica airfield 230, Truman Annex 300, and Trumbo Point Annex 270). Truman and Trumbo Point Annex’s are located approximately 7 miles from CRP location. Any additional lodging and transportation requirements must be outsourced.

(10) All construction and location of temporary facilities in support of the CRP shall be coordinated with and approved by Naval Facilities Engineering Command Southeast (NAVFAC SE) and Public Works Department (PWD) Key West. NAVFAC SE HQ shall provide an augmentation team with engineers from all core engineering disciplines to provide expanded technical assistance.

(11) DHS contractors, materials, and equipment are required for the construction of any structure required for the stand-up of the CRP, to include fences, temporary buildings and shelters. All utility connection requirements in support of the CRP shall be coordinated and approved by NAVFAC SE and PWD Key West. DHS contractor shall provide materials and labor required to complete utility connections and install meters at utility connection points.

(12) NAS Key West has minimal motor pool assets and mass transit capability is limited to two 48 passenger buses. Civilian rental car services (one located at Boca Chica air terminal) are available for use and should be coordinated by DHS. Limited parking is available at or near the CRP; shuttle services should be considered.

(13) All vehicle drivers requiring flight line access shall complete airfield vehicle operator indoctrination course (AVOIC). Coordination with the Airfield Manager shall be conducted for the three hour course. Vehicles will require two-way radio communications and rotating beacons if departing the ramp and driving on or across any runway and/or taxiway.

(14) All two-way radio communication devices will be approved by Ground Electronics frequency manager, phone (305) 293-2271. NAS Key West will not have radios or beacons to issue. All external antenna requirements shall be approved by Ground Electronics Division.
(15) NAS Key West Public Affairs department is not staffed to manage a prolonged major public news event. Public affairs augmentation from DHS, DOD, and DON will be required to manage and disseminate information to the general public and the media. NAS Key West Public Affairs effort will be turned over to DHS as soon as feasible and NAS Key West Public Affairs will be in a support role.

(16) Refueling of vehicles onboard NAS Key West, Boca Chica Field is limited by a three unleaded gasoline and two diesel pump fueling station, with 16,000 gallons unleaded and 6,000 gallons of diesel storage capacity.

(17) Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) will be generated for the airspace around NAS Key West to aide in the control of media and general aviation aircraft. NAS Key West tower will retain positive control of its Class Delta airspace.

(18) All assigned DOD forces involved in CRP operations shall comply at a minimum with CJCSI 3121.01 (series) concerning Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF). (Ref of base plan). Additional measures supplementing SRUF may be authorized and implemented by higher authority.

(19) DHS shall ensure all Boca Chica airfield, facilities, and equipment are restored to original or improved condition at completion of the CRP requirement. DHS shall ensure the removal and disposal of all associated debris.

(20) Hazardous material (HAZMAT) receiving, storage and management shall be coordinated through Consolidated Hazardous Reutilization Inventory Management Program (CHRIMP). CHRIMP is located in building A-931 adjacent to CRP A-981, phone (305) 293-2358.

(21) Hazardous waste disposal will be coordinated with Key West PWD and Florida Department of Environmental Protection.

(22) Advanced notice and specific hosting requirements for any unit supporting OVS (Commando Solo, etc) require prior coordination with NAS Key West in order to support non-organic mission requirements.

(23) The following impacts will occur on base operations:

(a) All USPP Fleet Training Continuum Operations will be suspended for the duration of CRP operations and the subsequent airfield/facility recovery operation.

(b) VFC-111 and VFA-106 will be unable to perform missions on NAS Key West. Squadrons must relocate to perform missions.

(c) Unable to support Fleet/Joint/Coalition training (SFARP, FRS, CNATRA) at Boca Chica Field.
(d) Boca Chica Field mission focus will shift from tactical jet training to OVS mission and logistic support hub.

(e) CRP utility (sewer, water, electricity...) requirements will exceed base current configuration/capacity/capability.

(f) Degraded airfield support for 39 tenant commands. All JIATF-S visitors (CAPSTONE, Ambassadors, etc...) arriving through air terminal may encounter delays or require cancellation of flight/field services.

(g) NAS Key West Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) plan may require modification during the CRP operation.

4. Administration and Logistics.

   a. Administration. The JFLCC will request all Title 10 DOD assets required to support NAS Key West be placed on P/IDO or deployed as described in Appendix 29 and this TAB.

      (1) NAS Key West is located within the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary. Per the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), federal agencies are supposed to consider the environmental impacts of their proposed actions. DHS shall ensure the NEPA process is completed prior to CRP activation to ensure any impacts to the environment are mitigated. This process must be accomplished in advance of CRP activation requirements.

   b. Logistics. The JFLCC will support all logistics requirements for movements of required Title 10 DOD assets to and from NAS Key West. DHS will be responsible for all logistics requirements for movement of contracted personnel, services, equipment and supplies to NAS Key West.

      (1) DHS contractor shall bring a manned-portable armory. NAS Key West is not authorized to store contractor arms/ammo.

      (2) NAS Key West cannot provide secure/covered storage. DHS will need to provide secured/covered storage to support CRP operations.

5. Command and Control.

   a. Command. See Basic Plan and Appendix 29 Annex C.
HEADQUARTERS, US NORTHERN COMMAND
230 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270
24 August 2009

TAB B TO APPENDIX 29 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08
CH 3
HOMESTEAD AIR RESERVE BASE (ARB) DESCRIPTION AND REQUIREMENTS

References: See Basic Plan and Appendix 29 to Annex C, Caribbean Mass Migration

1. Situation

a. Enemy. See Basic Plan and Annex B, Intelligence.

b. Friendly. See Basic Plan and Appendix 29 to Annex C, Task Organization.

c. Assumptions. See Basic Plan and Appendix 29 to Annex C, Task Organization.

(1) DOD resources will be made available upon request from DHS to DOD.

(2) Between June and November hurricane evacuation is a likely probability. CRP activation will not take place during a hurricane evacuation or hurricane sheltering event for Homestead ARB. 482nd FW Commander's actions are detailed in 482 FW CEMP 10-2.

(3) Upon mobilization, execution, and activation of necessary personnel by appropriate authority, a minimum of 72 hours is required to vacate facilities to allow for CRP establishment. Without mobilization of required personnel, the minimum time required to shift missions and vacate facilities will be 144 hours or more.

(4) Funding shall be made available to support the immediate procurement of materials needed by Homestead ARB to conduct CRP activation and operations.

(5) Sustained CRP operations are anticipated to exceed six months.

(6) Homeland Security Task Force – Southeast (HSTF-SE) will conduct necessary coordination with non-DOD agencies.

(7) The following HSTF-SE finance and administration personnel will deploy to Homestead ARB to support CRP operation: Logistics manager; Administrative manager (with purchase card); Electronic technician and Computer/ADP specialist.

3. **Execution**

   a. **Concept of Operations.**

      (1) Upon notification, Homestead ARB will immediately begin coordination with DHS to establish the CRP in and around building 920.

      (2) DHS migrant transit vehicles will proceed east from Highway 821 (FL Turnpike) for 1.3 miles. Turn left on Coral Sea Boulevard and immediately turn right into the parking lot. Exit by the reverse route. See Figure 1.

      (3) Figure 1 (below) is an overhead view of Homestead ARB showing the route that will be taken by the DHS migrant transit vehicles and the location of the Collection and Relocation Point (CRP).

      ![Figure 1. Route to Building 920 (CRP)](image)

      (4) Transit services are limited to aircraft parking and refueling. JP8 fuel is available via assigned refueling trucks. MOG = 2 C-130 aircraft. Parking is available for 21 C-130 aircraft. Current fuel capacity is limited to 689,000 gallons, and all fuel supply must be delivered by truck. Fueling requirements in excess of the above capabilities will require Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System (TAFDS) or other augmentation. Any service provided to non-DOD units shall have funding line prepared in advance of services being rendered.
(5) Arriving aircraft shall ensure sufficient number of qualified load masters and crewmen are available to unload aircraft. Homestead ARB transient line is not adequately staffed to handle multiple large aircraft and is limited by 1 Halverson 25 K-loader for use. DHS will provide transportation from flight line to DHS designated storage area. Refer to DOD Flight Information Publication, IFR Supplement, for airfield configuration, aircraft limitations and available services. Required services not described shall be DHS outsourced.

(6) Homestead ARB Tower provides radar/approach service from 1200Z – 0400Z (0700 – 2300 EST) daily, Sunday - Saturday. Radar is turned back to Miami Approach/Miami Tower between 2300 EST – 0700 EST. Additional personnel will be required for 24/7 operations to augment the Airfield Management (AMOPS) and ATC. One additional AMOPS and 2 additional ATC personnel will be required.

(7) DHS contractors will provide all internal security services for the CRP. Additionally, DHS must provide entrance gate checkpoint teams with vehicle inspection capability 24/7 during the duration of CRP operations.

(8) DHS contractors will provide all internal security, food, water, shelter, waste management, and medical care required to support the CRP.

(a) The on base dining facility is capable of supporting 1,000 meals per day with current staffing. An additional 250 meals can be supported with additional personnel augmenting the dining facility staff. Homestead ARB does not have a brig.

(b) There are no military medical/morgue facilities at Homestead ARB. Homestead ARB does have medical manpower resources that could provide limited primary care if activated. Only regional capability would be in civilian sector; there are no existing MOA/U’s to support any mass contingency response other than what would be available under the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). Questions should be directed to Ms. Gisger, 478-327-1890. AFRC CAT SG Rep.

(9) Homestead ARB can provide lodging facilities for a maximum of 250 personnel, double occupancy. Additional billeting can be established in the base gym utilizing cots.

(10) All construction and location of temporary facilities in support of the CRP shall be coordinated with and approved by 482nd Mission Support Group Commander and Base Civil Engineering

(11) DHS contractors, materials, and equipment are required for the construction of any structure required for the stand-up of the CRP, to include fences, temporary buildings and shelters. All utility connection requirements in support of the CRP shall be coordinated and approved by Base Civil Engineering. DHS contractor shall provide materials and labor required to complete utility connections and install meters at utility connection points.
(12) Base Transportation has two 25 passenger buses and one 40 passenger bus available. The nearest rental car agency is Enterprise Car Rental, located on US 1. Rental car services should be coordinated by DHS.

(13) Driving to Bldg 920 can be accomplished without flight line access. All vehicle drivers requiring flight line access shall complete the airfield vehicle operator indoctrination course (AVOIC). Coordination with the Airfield Manager shall be conducted for the three-hour course. Vehicles will require two-way radio communications and rotating beacons if departing the ramp and driving on or across any runway and/or taxiway.

(14) All two-way radio communication devices (radios, antenna’s and frequency’s) will be approved by the Ground Electronics frequency manager the, phone (305)224-7075. Homestead ARB will not have radios or beacons to issue.

(15) Homestead ARB Public Affairs department is not staffed to manage a prolonged major public news event. Public affairs augmentation from DHS or DOD will be required to manage and disseminate information to the general public and the media.

(16) Government vehicle refueling is available on Homestead ARB. One refueling station with unleaded and diesel fuel is available. Storage capacity is 15,000 gallons each for unleaded gasoline and diesel fuel.

(17) Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) will be generated for the airspace around Homestead ARB to aide in the control of media and general aviation aircraft. Homestead tower will retain positive control of its Class Delta airspace.

(18) All assigned DOD forces involved in CRP operations shall comply at a minimum with CJCSI 3121.01 (series) concerning Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF). (Ref F of Basic Plan). Additional measures supplementing SRUF may be authorized and implemented by higher authority.

(19) DHS shall ensure all Homestead ARB airfield, facilities, and equipment are restored to original or improved condition at completion of the CRP requirement. DHS shall ensure the removal and disposal of all associated debris.

(20) Hazardous material (HAZMAT) receiving, storage and management shall be coordinated through 482 nd MSG/BCF Environmental Flight, Bldg 232, extension 7163.

(21) Hazardous waste disposal will be coordinated with 482 nd MSG/ BCE Environmental Flight and Florida Department of Environmental Protection.

(22) Advanced notice and specific hosting requirements for any unit supporting OVS (Commando Solo, etc) require prior coordination with Homestead ARB in order to
support non-organic mission requirements.

(23) The following impacts will occur on base operations:

(a) Homestead ARB is a Reserve Air Force installation, not an active duty installation, and by design has less capacity.

(b) Coordination is required between DHS and local law enforcement due to increased traffic on US HWY 1 & 95.

(24) Due to the increased base population and the 24x7 use of the airfield, additional assets are detailed in 482 FW CEMP 10-2.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Administration. The JFLCC will request all Title 10 DOD assets required to support Homestead ARB be placed on PTDO or deployed as described in Appendix 29 and this TAB.

b. Logistics. The JFLCC will support all logistics requirements for movement of required Title 10 DOD assets to and from Homestead ARB. DHS has responsibility for all aspects of CRP operations to include CRP support, security, medical and staffing. Also, DHS's contractor will provide all the food, water, shelter, and medical care required by all migrants brought onto DOD bases.

5. Command and Control

a. Command. See Basic Plan and Appendix 29 Annex C.
AVON PARK AIR FORCE RANGE (AFR) DESCRIPTION AND REQUIREMENTS

References: See base plan and Appendix 29 to Annex C, Caribbean Mass Migration

1. Situation
   a. Enemy. See Basic Plan and Annex B, Intelligence.
   b. Friendly. See Basic Plan and Appendix 29 to Annex C, Task Organization.
   c. Assumptions. See Basic Plan and Appendix 29 to Annex C, Task Organization.

   (1) Between June and November hurricane evacuation is a likely possibility. Collection and Relocation Point (CRP) activation will not take place at Avon Park AFR during hurricane evacuation or hurricane sheltering event.

   (2) Approximately 72 hrs prior to the anticipated arrival of a tropical storm/hurricane, the Commander, Avon Park AFR will convene the Disaster Control Group (DCG). If evacuation is required, the range will be closed, deployed units will be instructed to return to their home station, and range personnel will return to their residences to follow local community hurricane evacuation procedures. The Commander will typically relocate to MacDill AFB to monitor the storm through the MacDill Crisis Action Team. A small contingent of Avon Park AFR Fire Rescue personnel will “ride out” the storm at the installation fire station. Additionally, Avon Park AFR is a possible evacuation location for Homestead ARB, Patrick AFB, and MacDill AFB. If the predicted path of the hurricane threatens those locations but not Avon Park AFR, the Commander will initiate preparations to receive evacuating aircraft and personnel.

   (3) If Avon Park AFR is activated as a CRP, the worst case scenario would be an initial notification that occurs during one of the large force exercises held at Avon Park AFR in which deployed units will require 48 hours to pack equipment and redeploy personnel.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Figure 1 is an overhead view of Avon Park AFR showing the route that will be taken by the DHS migrant transit vehicles and the location of the CRP. DHS migrant transit vehicles will enter and exit at the Front Gate (same route to and from the CRP).

(2) The following impacts will occur on the base and may require further coordination with the USAF to resolve:

(a) Impact on Avon Park’s operations will depend on the number of personnel coming onto station. Avon Park AFR performs many classified training missions, including Special Operations training, at all hours of the day which would be impacted by folks from off Range. They also train units extensively in Special Ops, etc. A large influx of refugees will halt training at the largest training range east of the Mississippi River and the primary range for fighters and Combat Search and Rescue on the east coast. 25th Wing Commander and Air Combat Command A3A are aware of these possible restrictions.

(b) Avon Park has no assigned security forces. Units deploying to Avon Park must provide their own security.

(c) Coordination will be required between DHS and local law enforcement due to US HWY 27/98 and 64 limitations.
3. The Avon Park AFR airfield is currently certified only as a Landing Zone (LZ). Airfield certification from Air Combat Command is expected spring 2010. Avon Park Executive Airport is the closest airport that can handle large airplanes. There are no in-house transient aircraft services or personnel. Personnel to conduct 24/7 flight-line ops and aircraft service support would all have to be augmented and would depend on the number and type of arriving aircraft. Emergency response will be provided by the Fire Department.

4. Avon Park AFR is not capable of providing force protection adequate to secure base facilities due to the increased base population and the 24x7 use of the airfield.

5. Limited aircraft servicing equipment includes 1 x GPU-60 power cart, 1 x air compressor, 3 x light-alls, 1 x universal tow bar, and 1 x aircraft tug with 15K lbs drawbar pull. Deployed units must provide their own aircraft servicing personnel and any additional equipment. Avg Fuel 100LL and JetA fuel is available through contract with the Sebring Airport. Fuel is delivered by 5,000 gallon truck requiring 1-hr notification. Total fuel storage and delivery capacity can be obtained by contacting the Sebring Airport Authority:

Mr. Mike Willingham
128 Authority Lane
Sebring, Florida 33870
(863) 655-6444 · FAX (863) 655-6447
Website – http://www.sebring-airport.com/
E-Mail – Mike@sebring-Airport.com

6. Avon Park AFR specifications are as follows:
Ramp Space: Apron B - 600 ft (width)
400 ft (length)
240,000 sq ft or 26,666 sq yds

Taxiway dimensions: Taxiway A and C - 2900 ft (length)
60 ft (width)
174,000 sq ft or 45,833 sq yds

Inactive runway is suitable for rotary wing parking/operations:
5000 x 150' = 750000 sq ft or 87,792 sq yds

7. Avon Park AFR has neither K-loaders nor personnel qualified to operate.

8. Avon Park AFR does not have radar/approach service. Landing Zone (airfield) is VFR only. Nearest military airfield with instrument approach capability is Patrick AFB (ILS, LOC/DME, VOR/DME, TACAN), nearest civilian airfield with instrument approach capability is Avon Park Executive Airport (GPS). Control tower is typically open Mon-Fri, 12 hrs per day. Estimate a minimum of 4 additional tower controllers required to operate 24/7.
(9) Avon Park AFR has one dining facility with a 60 person seating capacity. It has a full serving line with grill. The kitchen area has commercial grill, steam kettle, 2 small ranges (non-commercial), walk in freezer, walk-in cooler, and 2 ice machines. Food service is provided by local contractors – no in-house personnel. Avon Park AFR does have a brig although it does not have security forces. The brig has a standing room capacity of approximately 20 people.

(10) Avon Park AFR has no medical or morgue facilities. Fire Dept personnel are EMT qualified. The closest military facilities are at MacDill AFB and Patrick AFB. The nearest civilian hospital is the Highlands Regional Medical Center approximately 12 miles away in Sebring, FL. Avon Park AFR has an MOA with Highlands Regional for “life-flight” services.

(11) Avon Park AFR has a field condition dormitory capable of housing 70 personnel. An additional 100 person capacity is available (warehouse style) in Bldg 77. Capacity is based on non-contingency occupancy safety. There is room for additional personnel if safety regulations are waived. The dormitory is approximately 3 miles away.

(12) Avon Park AFR does not have motor pool assets available for use by deployed units nor does it have mass transit capability. Local rental car companies are as follows:

   - Enterprise, Avon Park (863) 452-5483
   - Hertz, Sebring (863) 385-1192
   - Budget, Sebring (863) 382-2326

(13) Parking is available adjacent to Bldg 77. Shuttle service may be needed to/from the dormitory.

(14) Avon Park AFR has one unleaded and one diesel refueling pump, with a storage capacity of 5,000 gallons each.

(15) Flight-line driving is not required to reach the CRP however transportation to/from arriving aircraft may require flight-line access depending on aircraft parking location. Local airfield driving instruction will be provided by Mr. Dick Cutshall, Avon Park AFR Director of Operations.

(16) Frequency and external antenna requirements are approved through Mr. Ron Riedel, Avon Park AFR Range Support Manager (863) 452-4110 in coordination with the MacDill AFB and Moody AFB Frequency Managers.

(17) Avon Park AFR does not have a Public Affairs (PA) dept. Mr. Dick Cutshall, Avon Park Director of Operations serves as the installation’s PA officer. PA support will be required in the event of CRP activation.

(18) HAZMAT will be coordinated through Mr. Paul Ebersbach, Chief, Environmental Flight, Avon Park AFR (863) 452-4119 ext 301.
(19) Depending on population size the following additional assets will be required:

- Sanitation trailers/port-a-johns
- Toiletry
- Shower trailers
- Mess personnel/facilities
- Security personnel/facilities
- Medical personnel/facilities
- Furnishings (cotts, tables, chairs, etc)
- Linens/towels
- Transportation
- Signage/barriers
- Administrative space/offices
- Storage space
- Refuse services

4. Administration and Logistics

   a. Administration. The JFLCC will request all Title 10 DOD assets required to support Avon Park AFR be placed on FTD or deployed as described in Appendix 29 and this TAB.

   b. Logistics. The JFLCC will support all logistics requirements for movement of required Title 10 DOD assets to and from Avon Park AFR. DHS has responsibility for all aspects of CRP operations to include CRP support, security, medical and staffing. Also, DHS's contractor will provide all the food, water, shelter, and medical care required by all migrants brought onto DOD bases.

5. Command and Control

   a. Command. See Basic Plan and Appendix 29 Annex C.
HEADQUARTERS, US NORTHERN COMMAND
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270
24 August 2009

TAB D TO APPENDIX 29 TO ANNEX C TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08
CH 3
EXPECTED BRANCHES AND SEQUELS TO CMM SUPPORT

References: See Basic Plan and Appendix 29 to Annex C, Caribbean Mass Migration

1. Situation


   b. Friendly. See Basic Plan and Appendix 29 to Annex C, Task Organization.

   c. Assumptions. The following conditions depict a deterioration of the situation
      sufficient to overmatch DHS internal capabilities. One or a combination of these
      conditions drive an expansion of DOD support beyond provision of three installations
      serving as venues for Collection and Relocation Points (CRP).

      (1) A major hurricane renders one CRP unavailable.

      (2) A major hurricane partially commits Florida law enforcement and National
      Guard resources to hurricane response.

      (3) Operation Vigilant Sentry Land Level III is in effect, but migrant land
      apprehensions exceed 1,620 migrants per day.

      (4) Non-domestic Migrant Processing Centers are at capacity, so HSTF-SE has
      directed intentional landing of migrants ashore in CONUS.

      (5) LEDETs are not able to detect all migrants reaching shore as well as
      apprehend and transfer a satisfactory percentage of them to CRPs.

      (6) DHS is not able to process 540 migrants per day per CRP.

      (7) The three planned CRPs are not sufficient.

      (8) DHS contractors require support to provide internal security of
      CRPs on DOD bases.

      (9) DHS contractors are not able to provide all the food, water, shelter, and
      medical care required by migrants brought onto DOD bases.
(10) DHS is not able to transport 540 migrants per day or within 48 hours of arrival at CRPs.

(11) Assessment and selection criteria for additional CRPs will be the same as in JS PLANORD (171552Z Mar 08).

2. **Mission**. See base plan and Appendix 29 to Annex C, Task Organization.

3. **Execution**

   a. **Concept of Operations**. For any DOD support beyond that arranged in the basic Appendix 29 and Tabs A, B, and C, T10 Forces will be generated from an approved Primary Agency Request For Assistance (RFA), sourced from the DSCA EXORD or RFF, and employed under the OPCON of the JFLCC for integration into CMM response efforts. The DCO/E serving as liaison to HSTF-SE will be the direct interface between the lead federal agency and DOD. A tailored joint task force, JTF-CMM, will serve as the JFLCC’s main effort receiving forces comprising required capabilities to support HSTF-SE. Imbedded HSTF-SE elements will provide any required expert guidance or serve as official USG, state, or local representatives to satisfy legal considerations. Continuous assessment will allow scaling the level of DOD support back as soon as possible.

   Combined with an active public affairs effort, this should result in an end state with HSTF-SE supported, DOD forces available for other missions, orderly migrant processing, and favorable public opinion.

   b. **Branch and Sequel Overview**. Three branches from the basic plan may involve DOD forces. Exhibits 1 through 3 describe the conditions triggering infusion of DOD support in the event that: one or more CRPs need augmentation; HSTF-SE requires another CRP; and/or, the Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET) need support. Action along any of these lines will result in three possible sequels. Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 describe: transition back to the DHS concept of normal operations; the potential requirement to sustain DOD support over time by rotating deployed T10 forces; and the response to a community health, mass casualty, weather, or security incident in the context of migrant collection and relocation. See Exhibits 1 through 6 for details.

   c. **Coordinating Instructions**.

      (1) The HSTF-SE AOR includes Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and Alabama. Depending on the scale and scope of CMM operations, DOD facilities nation-wide, particularly those within the HSTF-SE AOR, may be incorporated into the effort. Service components should identify installations with features matching those listed in paragraph 3 of Appendix 29 and be prepared to have them serve as CRPs.

      (2) Given the political sensitivity of these potential operations, all forces engaged must understand the RUF, intelligence collection limitations, and public affairs impacts of any DOD activity. This is imperative to positively influencing strategic communications.
(3) T10 task forces are tailored to fill specific requirements, so size and composition may vary. The type of units selected for employment in the branches represents capabilities potentially in need of support. Security forces can be sourced from any suitable organization, with varying degrees of internment and resettlement training, or other training required, depending on the unit, e.g., Military Police Internee and Refugee Company versus Field Artillery battery in a non-standard mission.

4. **Administration and Logistics**

   a. **Administration.** See CONPLAN 3501-08, Annex E (Personnel).

   b. **Logistics.** See CONPLAN 3501-08, Annex D (Logistics), Q (Health Services), and W (Contingency Contractors and Contracting)

5. **Command and Control**

   a. **Command Relationships.** JFLCC commands the Operational Command Post comprising the core of the JTF-CMM HQ and the DCO/DCE serving as liaison to HSTF-SE. See JFLCC OPORD 01-08. Units and individuals comprising JTF-CMM are OPCON through USNORTHCOM and JFLCC to the JTF-CMM HQ. The DCO/DCE coordinates with the JTF-CMM HQ. JTF-CMM HQ conducts command and staff coordination with HSTF-SE and involved DOD installations. Figure 1 is a depiction of these relationships. The base plan is in execution, with the DCO/E positioned with HSTF-SE. The diagram shows JTF-CMM and any T10 forces not yet deployed. Similar diagrams for each of the branches will depict only the JFLCC, HSTF-SE, and the relevant subordinate units/activities associated with that branch.
b. **Control.**

(1) **Liaison Elements.** DCO/DCE Region IV serves as Joint LNO from JFLCC to HSTF-SE. The DCO represents CG JFLCC. The element assists in requirements development, articulation, and transmission. It advises Dir HSTF-SE on DOD capabilities and status. It facilitates shared situational awareness between JFLCC and HSTF-SE. The team includes SMEs/planners for Army/Navy/Marines/Air Force. JFLCC will backfill DCO/DCE Region IV in anticipation that other DSCA requirements emerge.

(2) **Reporting.** JTF-CMM will pass reporting requirements for units OPCON to the JTF when those units make initial contact during the reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) process. JTF-CMM will consolidate JFLCC, USNORTHCOM, and HSTF-SE reporting requirements from the annexes of USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08, USARNORTH CONPLAN 3501, and DHS OPLAN OVS. JTF-CMM will reconcile and deconflict reporting requirements and comply with validated reporting requirements.

(3) **C4 Systems.** See Annex K, CONPLAN 3501-08.

   (a) As an exception to the theater level requirements called for in Annex K, JTF-CMM will configure its COP track inputs to feed only HSTF-SE in order to prevent duplication and inaccurate track reporting.

   (b) JFLCC will use the DOD DSCA Automated Support System (DDASS) to document and track RFAs and MAs.
EXHIBIT 1 TO TAB D TO APPENDIX 29 TO ANNEX C TO CONPLAN 3501-08
BRANCH 1 – CRP AUGMENTATION

1. Situation. One or more of the following applicable assumptions have become valid.
HSTF-SE requests augmentation of their capability to support one or more of the CRPs:

   a. Operation Vigilant Sentry Land Level III is in effect, but migrant land
   apprehensions exceed 1,620 per day.

   b. Non-domestic Migrant Processing Centers are at capacity, so HSTF-SE has
   directed intentional landing of migrants ashore in CONUS.

   c. DHS is not able to process 540 migrants per day per CRP.

   d. DHS contractors are not able to provide all required internal security of
   CRPs on DOD bases.

   e. DHS contractors are not able to provide all the food, water, shelter, and
   medical care required by migrants brought onto DOD bases.

   f. DHS is not able to transport 540 migrants per day or within 48 hours of
   arrival at CRPs.

   g. A Temporary Restraining Order prevents relocation of migrants out of Florida.

2. Mission. JTF-CMM supports CRP operations with security, medical care, food, water,
and shelter for migrants in existing CRPs/TDCs and stands prepared to transport migrants
from CRPs to country of origin or assimilation destinations within CONUS.

3. Execution. Based on coordination between HSTF-SE and JFLCC, HQ JTF-CMM will
form, deploy, receive appropriate forces OPCON into the HSTF-SE AOR, and coordinate
their movement, link-up, and integration into ongoing CRP operations.

   a. JTF-CMM units will perform the functions associated with the following pre-
   scripted mission assignments (PSMA) as well as any other tasks identified during RFF
   development such as security and field services.

   ESF #1 Transportation
      3c. Tactical Transportation Support
      3d. Strategic Transportation Support
      3e. Air Component Coordination Element
      3g. Airspace Control (Ground)

   ESF #2 Communications
      3b. 25 User Communications Package

   ESF #8 Public Health and Medical Service

C-29-D-5

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3a. Rotary Wing Medical Patient Evacuation
3b. Deployable DOD Temporary Medical Treatment
3c. Strategic Patient Movement and Airlift (NDMS Activation)
3d. Mortuary Affairs Assistance

ESF #15 External Affairs
3. DOD Public Affairs Broadcast Transmission Support to Joint Information Control.

b. Type units appropriate for inclusion in the JTF are:
Security
Military Police
CAISE
Public Affairs
Transportation
APOD/APOE Operations
Fixed Wing Aviation C2
Mortuary Affairs
Signal
Medical
Supply
Engineer

4. Administration and Logistics. JTF-CMM will utilize the designated BSI for logistics to support JTF-CMM, JTF-CMM OPCON units, and DHS required support.

a. Common user logistical items such as food, water, and fuel will be ordered through the BSI Support Activity utilizing that installation’s DOD Activity Address Code (DODAAC) and document numbers.

b. Use of temporary facilities on the BSI will be coordinated by the JTF-CMM J4 with the installation commander. The base gym or other facility that can be secured and has transportation access should be considered. The facility must have latrines, showers, and space for cots and administrative activity so that migrants can be processed. Construction on the installation will not take place, but the temporary erection of tents/temporary shelters in an enclosed (fenced in) area is a possibility and must be given the same considerations as described above. See CONPLAN 3501-08, Annex W (Contingency Contractors and Contracting) for guidance on contract support.

c. JTF-CMM will coordinate buses for migrant transportation through the BSI and local Installation Transportation Office (ITO). If buses are not available at the BSI the Contracting Officer will contract commercial buses for the migrant transportation.

d. Air transportation requirements for migrants will be sent to the JTF-CMM J4. The JTF-CMM J4 will coordinate movement with USNORTHCOM and USTRANSCOM.
5. Command and Signal. The diagram below depicts the C2 Relationship for this branch.
EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB D TO APPENDIX 29 TO ANNEX C TO CONPLAN 3501-08
BRANCH 2 – DOD PROVIDES A FOURTH CRP

1. Situation. One or more of the following applicable assumptions have become valid. HSTF-SE requests DOD to provide and support another CRP:

   a. A major hurricane renders one CRP unavailable.

   b. A major hurricane partially commits Florida law enforcement and National Guard resources to hurricane response.

   c. Operation Vigilant Sentry Land Level III is in effect, but migrant land apprehensions exceed 1,620 per day.

   d. Non-domestic Migrant Processing Centers are at capacity, so HSTF-SE has directed intentional landing of migrants ashore in CONUS.

   e. DHS is not able to process 540 migrants per day per CRP.

   f. DHS is not able to transport 540 migrants per day or within 48 hours of arrival at CRPs.

   g. Assessment and selection criteria for additional CRPs and TDCs will be the same as in JS PLANORD 17155Z MAR 08.

2. Mission. JTF-CMM provides and supports a fourth CRP in accordance with the base plan. Additional support required for a fourth CRP will be per Exhibit 1.

3. Execution. Based on coordination between HSTF-SE and JFLCC, HQ JTF-CMM will support HSTF-SE in the establishment of a fourth CRP.

   a. JTF-CMM units will perform the functions associated with the following prescribed mission assignments (MA), as well as any other tasks identified during RFF development such as security, engineering, and field services.

   ESF #1 Transportation
     3c. Tactical Transportation Support
     3d. Strategic Transportation Support
     3e. Air Component Coordination Element
     3g. Airspace Control (Ground)

   ESF #2 Communications
     3b. 25 User Communications Package

   ESF #6 Mass Care
     3. Prepare Temporary Housing Sites

   ESF #7 Resource Support
     3a. Mobilization Center
ESF #8 Public Health and Medical Service
   3a. Rotary Wing Medical Patient Evacuation
   3b. Deployable DOD Temporary Medical Treatment
   3c. Strategic Patient Movement and Airlift (NDMS Activation)
   3d. Mortuary Affairs Assistance
ESF #15 External Affairs
   3. DOD Public Affairs Broadcast Transmission Support to Joint Info Ctr

b. Type units appropriate for inclusion in the JTF are:
   Security
   Military Police
   CAISE
   Public Affairs
   Transportation
   APOD/APOE Operations
   Fixed Wing Aviation C2
   Mortuary Affairs
   Signal
   Medical
   Supply
   Engineer

4. Administration and Logistics. JTF-CMM will utilize the designated BSI for logistics to
   support JTF-CMM, JTF-CMM OPCON units, and DHS required support.

   a. Common user logistical items such as food, water, and fuel will be ordered through
      the BSI Support Activity utilizing that installation’s DODAAC and document numbers.

   b. Use of temporary facilities on the BSI will be coordinated by the JTF-CMM J4
      with the installation commander. The base gym or other facility that can be secured and
      has transportation access should be considered. The facility must have latrines, showers,
      and space for cots and administrative activity such that migrants can be processed.
      Construction on the installation will not take place, but the temporary erection of
      tents/temporary shelters in an enclosed (fenced in) area is a possibility and must be given
      the same considerations as described above. See CONPLAN 3501-08, Annex W
      (Contingency Contractors and Contracting) for guidance on contract support.

   c. JTF-CMM will coordinate buses for migrant transportation through the BSI and
      local Installation Transportation Office (ITO). If buses are not available at the BSI the
      Contracting Officer will contract commercial buses for the migrant transportation.

   d. Air transportation requirements for migrants will be sent to the JTF-CMM J4.
      The JTF-CMM J4 will coordinate movement with NORTHCOM and TRANSCOM.

5. Command and Signal. Figure 1 depicts the C2 relationships for this branch.

C-29-D-9
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EXHIBIT 3 TO TAB D TO APPENDIX 29 TO ANNEX C TO CONPLAN 3501-08
BRANCH 3 – LEDET SUPPORT

1. Situation. One or more of the following applicable assumptions have become valid. HSTF-SE requests DOD to support its deployed LEDETs:

   a. A major hurricane partially commits Florida law enforcement and National Guard resources to hurricane response.

   b. Operation Vigilant Sentry Land Level III is in effect, but migrant land apprehensions exceed 1,620 per day.

   c. Non-domestic Migrant Processing Centers are at capacity, so HSTF-SE has directed intentional landing of migrants ashore in CONUS.

   d. LEDETs are not able to detect all migrants reaching shore or apprehend and transport a satisfactory percentage of them to CRPs.

2. Mission. JTF-CMM augments LEDET capacity to detect and monitor the movements of migrants. After apprehension of migrants by LEDET controlled elements, JTF-CMM supports LEDETs in transporting the migrants to CRPs.

3. Execution. Based on coordination between HSTF-SE and JFLCC, HQ JTF-CMM will form, deploy, receive appropriate forces OPCON into the HSTF-SE AOR, coordinate their movement to suitable locations, and employ them to support ongoing LEDET operations.

   a. JTF-CMM units will perform the functions associated with the following prescribed mission assignments (MA). The model of JTF-N military support to civilian law enforcement agencies is relevant in the context of this branch.

ESF #1 Transportation
   3a. Rotary Wing Lift (Medium)
   3b. Rotary Wing Lift (Heavy)
   3c. Tactical Transportation Support (must include inshore patrol craft)
   3e. Air Component Coordination Element
   3g. Airspace Control (Ground)

ESF #2 Communications
   3a. Communications Support to First Responders

ESF #7 Resource Support
   3c. Ground Vehicle Fuel Distribution Points
   3d. Military Rotary Wing Aircraft Retail Fuel Point

ESF #8 Public Health and Medical Service
   3a. Rotary Wing Medical Patient Evacuation

ESF #15 External Affairs
   3. DOD Public Affairs Broadcast Transmission Support to Joint Info Ctr
b. Requirements for assistance in detection and monitoring of migrants as they approach the shore and land will adjust the scope and scale of support characterized by these pre-scripted MAs.

c. Type units appropriate for inclusion in the JTF are:
   Military Police
   CAISE
   Public Affairs
   Transportation
   Rotary Wing Aviation C2
   Rotary Wing Aviation
   Riverine Internal Security
   Signal
   Medical
   Supply
   Class III
   Class III Aviation
   Engineer

4. Administration and Logistics. JTF-CMM will utilize the designated BSI for logistics to support JTF-CMM, JTF-CMM OPCON units, and DHS required support.

   a. JTF-CMM J4 will utilize forward operating bases as designated for supply distribution in coordination with HSTF-SE elements as the situation warrants.

   b. Common user logistical items such as food, water, and fuel will be ordered through the BSI Support Activity utilizing that installation’s DODAAC and document numbers.

   c. JTF-CMM will coordinate buses for Migrant transportation through the BSI and local Installation Transportation Office (ITO). If buses are not available at the BSI the Contracting Officer will contract commercial buses for the Migrant transportation.

   d. Air transportation requirements for Migrants will be sent to the JTF-CMM J4. The JTF-CMM J4 will coordinate movement with NORTHCOM and TRANSCOM.

5. Command and Signal. The diagram below depicts the C2 Relationship for this branch.
EXHIBIT 4 TO TABLE D TO APPENDIX 29 TO ANNEX C TO CONPLAN 3501-08
SEQUEL 1 – STABILIZATION AND TRANSITION

1. Situation. Base plan with zero, one, or several branches is in execution. Level of activity drops off to within DHS maximum capabilities (Land Level III).

2. Mission. On order, DOD elements supporting OVS coordinate hand over of missions to elements of DHS, redeploy, and revert to CMM Phase 0 level of activity.

3. Execution. Tasks to end execution of the base plan are outlined in the basic Appendix 29 and are common to all DSCA operations. For disengagement, JTF-CMM and HSTF-SE will develop the criteria associated with DOD mission termination. Once actions associated with mission transition are complete, the units will conduct their usual redeployment activities and coordination. JTF-CMM will serve as the redeployment coordinator with external agencies, track the force as it returns to home station, and receive closure reports.

   a. Branch 1, CRP Augmentation, and Branch 3, LEDET Support, will see DOD elements interspersed among DHS elements dealing with a dwindling population of migrants to detect, monitor, process, hold, and transport. Once HSTF-SE assesses that the transition criteria are met and notifies its subordinates and JTF-CMM, DOD elements at the CRPs and LEDETs will conduct a relief in place with existing or incoming DHS elements. They will then move to a redeployment assembly area or the BS1, and redeploy.

   b. Branch 2 may result in large, temporary tenant activities on DOD installations.

   The anticipated sequence of activity will be:

   (1) Receive notification to transition.

   (2) Support transport of remaining migrants to another CRP.

   (3) Dismantle and clean site. Return contracted or hand-receipted portable equipment such as latrines, lighting systems, generators, and shelters.

   (4) Conduct joint inspection of site with installation staff. Perform any mitigation required or coordinate leaving semi-permanent works such as concrete pads, drainage structures, and fencing as they are.

   (5) Redeploy.

4. Administration and Logistics. See CONPLAN 3501-08. JTF-CMM will coordinate with contracted services and OPCON units to dismantle/clear site, and turn-in leased/contracted items.

5. Command and Signal. No change to arrangements already depicted.
1. Situation. Base plan with zero, one, or several branches is in execution. Level of activity remains above DHS maximum capabilities (Land Level III).

2. Mission. On order, DOD elements supporting OVS conduct relief in place with other T10 forces.

3. Execution. In the event that DHS requires a sustained level of DOD support JTF-CMM will coordinate generation of an RFF on the 45th day after deployment of the first Title 10 unit to replace committed units. The goal will be to have no single T10 unit, other than the JTF-CMM and higher echelon HQs, committed longer than 60 days, including time in PTDQ status, in transit, and in post-deployment recovery. This will limit the impact of CMM support on the overall force generation process allowing committed units to continue preparing for future deployments.

   a. Requirement validation, staffing, sourcing, and execution of the deployment of relief forces will be per base plan.

   b. The existing BSI/APOD structure that supported in the initial deployment of T10 forces will remain in place.

   c. Elements constituting the communications zone portion of the DOD effort, such as JRSOI teams, may have to remain engaged beyond sixty days.

4. Administration and Logistics. See CONPLAN 3501-08.

   a. JTF-CMM will utilize the BSI to temporarily house the incoming unit. After the outgoing unit re-deploys, JTF-CMM will coordinate the movement of the incoming unit to the unit’s designated billeting location. If the BSI does not have the capacity to house the incoming unit, JTF-CMM will coordinate billeting with alternate BSIs, area hotels, or base camp.

   b. Supply support is the same for the incoming unit as it is for the outgoing unit. Common user logistical items such as food, water, and fuel will be ordered through the BSI Support Activity utilizing that installation’s DODAAC and document numbers.

   c. Incoming unit will submit its LOGSTAT to JTF-CMM on a daily basis.

5. Command and Signal. No change to arrangements already depicted.
EXHIBIT 6 TO TAB D TO APPENDIX 29 TO ANNEX C TO CONPLAN 3501-08
SEQUEL 3 – RESPOND TO COMMUNITY HEALTH, MASS CASUALTY,
WEATHER, OR SECURITY INCIDENT

1. Situation. Base plan with zero, one, or several branches is in execution. A breakdown in the execution of CMM operations occurs. This breakdown exceeds the capability of on site personnel and equipment to mitigate or resolve. The variety, scope, and scale of potential incidents are unlimited. Listed below are vignettes that encompass the more likely eventualities.

   a. The migrant population of one of the CRPs becomes infected with a disease.

   b. A CRP conveyance crashes on or at a supporting installation or a structure collapse occurs resulting in a migrant mass casualty situation.

   c. Severe weather degrades the capability of a CRP to house, sustain, or secure its migrant population.

   d. Disruptive elements within the migrant population take action, such as assault or rioting, either at a CRP escape or generate a negative media event regarding their treatment.

2. Mission. On order, DOD elements supporting OVS support civil authorities in responding to an incident threatening the perceived success of the operation.

3. Execution. Awareness, time, and situational dominance are the key factors associated with responding to these or other incidents. The capability of DOD forces to assist DHS will vary depending on the degree of support already in place per the base plan or one or more of the branches. All scenarios will involve deployment of some type of reserve capability, with local response forces first, then a widening of scope and scale until the activity returns to within the parameters of the plan. Integrated planning with the HSTF-SE will result in DOD T10 support being the last engaged. Outlined below are planning considerations associated with tiered DOD responses linked to degrees of support.

   a. Base plan in effect. The DCO/E is operating from the HSTF-SE ICC. One or more of the designated DOD installations are hosting a CRP. Standard routes between LEDETs and CRPs are in use. The following actions constitute T10 support.

      (1) The affected installation commanders are in contact with the CRPs they host per OVS.

      (2) The affected installation has a contingency incident response plan. This plan includes incorporation of local community emergency responders, local Reserve Component units, and local healthcare institutions. The installation staff reviews CONPLAN 3501-08 Immediate Response Authority and requisite reporting requirements.

   b. One or more of Branches 1 through 3 are in effect. The ICC, DCO, installations, and NORTHCOM coordinate as outlined above. A T10 JTF is implementing DOD
support. The JTF will take the following actions to provide incident response T10 support:

1. Give task force elements the mission to be prepared to respond to incidents in addition to their ongoing support activities.
2. Create a reserve force from additional forces provided via the RFF process. This force should be capable of movement to an incident site, contacting and integrating with on-scene responders, taking immediate action to mitigate the situation, and calling for reinforcing capabilities as deemed necessary.
3. Establish and maintain a current Common Operational Picture, communications, and logistical readiness.

4. Administration and Logistics. See CONPLAN 3501-08.

5. Command and Signal. No change to arrangements already depicted.
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND  
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016  
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3270  
24 April 2008

ANNEX D TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501  
LOGISTICS

References:  
b. CJCSI 4120.02, Assignment of Movement Priority, 15 April 2005  
c. Joint Pub 4.0, Doctrine for Logistic Support to Joint Operations, 06 April 2000  
d. Joint Pub 4.01, Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, 19 March 2003  
e. Deputy SecDef Memorandum, Policy on Contaminated Human Remains, 28 March 2003

1. Situation.
   
a. Enemy  See Base plan.
   
b. Friendly  See Base plan.

(1) U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides deployment and redeployment common-user air, land, and sea transportation for forces engaged in civil support operations; and provides aero medical evacuation and air refueling support as required. Additionally, USTRANSCOM is designated as Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Distribution Process Owner, charged to integrate strategic and theater Joint Operations Area (JOA) distribution. When requested by a federal agency and approved by SecDef, USTRANSCOM may provide transportation support to non-DOD organizations, such as movement of critical capabilities or commodities, or evacuation of personnel.

(2) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides logistics support for the missions of the military departments and the unified combatant commands engaged in civil support operations. It also provides logistics support to other DOD components and certain federal agencies, foreign governments, international organizations, and others as authorized. DLA provides worldwide reuse, recycling, and disposal solutions, to include hazardous, non-radioactive material disposal through its defense reutilization and marketing services.

(3) Defense Contract Management Agency provides contract administrative service support and assists USNORTHCOM in developing contingency contracting packages as required.

D-1
c. Assumptions. See Base plan.

(1) Commercial businesses, hotels, restaurants, and retail stores outside of the impacted area will be available for DOD support.

(2) Commercial transportation, air, maritime (ports and inland waterways), rail, and ground will continue to operate outside the impacted area. DOD will operate and reopen transportation hubs, as approved for a requesting agency, or if required for DOD operations.

(3) DOD primary logistics focus is in support of deploying DOD forces, not to supporting civilian populations.

(4) DOD forces will deploy for thirty (30) days or more for defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations.

d. Resource Availability.

(1) Employed forces depart home station with their requisite days of supply predicated on anticipated mission requirements and availability of commercial resources.

(2) Limited airlift is available to support continued operations.

e. Planning Factors.

(1) Supply levels of consumption for DOD forces are based on service approved planning factors.

(2) Planning factors for support must consider available commercial resources as well as DOD sources.

(3) Units self-deploy whenever possible, as long as specified deployment timelines are met. Generally, units will self-deploy if the origin is within 400 miles of the destination. USJFCOM utilizes "regional sourcing" whenever possible to minimize airlift requirements.

(4) The supported Joint Task Force (JTF) will provide the designated Base Support Installation (BSI) with a commodity forecast at time of execution. The primary BSI will requisition commodities using budget authority from USNORTHCOM, to meet forecasted requirements.

3. Execution.

   a. **Concept of Logistics Support.** The concept for DSCA Logistics support is to utilize the designated BSI (or multiple installations) as the logistics hub, supporting the JTF. The JTF is responsible for planning all aspects of the logistics concept of support for DOD forces responding for DSCA.

   (1) The BSI provides the majority of common user logistics items. This support (e.g. water, fuel, food, and general supplies) is provided through either DOD or commercially contracted resources.

   (2) Each service remains responsible for providing service-unique logistics support (e.g. uniforms, special equipment maintenance support, and service-specific items) to their forces deployed for DSCA operations, using established ordering procedures.

   (3) The JTF is responsible for integrating logistics support provided from service channels and commercial sources.

   (4) In all cases, delivery of DLA-provided items will be pushed as far down the supply chain as feasible to the nearest retail distribution point, typically located on the designated BSI.

   (5) Contracting is the primary means to increase capability at the BSI and within the JOA. The JTF may either modify existing BSI service contracts or leverage local or regional contract capability to meet logistics support requirements. In cases where the BSI has minimal capability and/or contracting support in a timely or effective manner is not feasible, the JTF will request additional DOD logistics assets to meet requirements by sending a Request for Forces (RFF) message to USNORTHCOM. See Annex W for more information on Contingency Contracting.

   (6) When a BSI is designated in the vicinity of an incident, that installation is responsible for common-user support to all responding DSCA forces. This mission takes priority over all other routine peacetime operations at the installation. The installation staff will utilize available personnel, facilities and equipment resources in executing missions for providing life support services and retail distribution of logistics requirements to the DOD response force. The following guidelines apply:

   (a) Logistics support includes lodging, food service support, general supplies (e.g. fuel, water, food, general supplies, common repair parts), common-item maintenance (e.g. wheeled vehicles and generators), retail fuel distribution, receipt store and issue of supplies, local transportation support,
life support (utilities, laundry and bath, waste removal), resource management, and contracting support.

(b) The JTF is responsible for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) operations once DOD response forces arrive within the JOA. The BSI will support the JTF in all aspects of reception, staging and onward movement of the DOD response force. When deploying to a BSI with limited capability, the JTF will ensure that adequate DOD forces are available, including a JROSI Support Team, if required, to execute efficient and effective JRSOI operations. Additional information on JRSOI can be found in Annex C, paragraph 3.a.(3).

(7) If a BSI is designated in a location which is geographically separated from the incident response site or the BSI has very limited capabilities and resources, the JTF will request logistics capabilities to provide support according to the following guidelines:

(a) Request logistics forces of sufficient size and capacity to support the DOD response force and assigned missions.

(b) The JTF must coordinate with the BSI staff to determine the logistics distribution plan for DOD units operating away from the BSI. The JTF will determine the most appropriate distribution means to support the mission.

(c) In coordination with either the BSI contracting team or a deployed contracting team, the JTF will provide housing, feeding, and general troop care for DSCA forces conducting operations some distance away from the BSI.

(8) If no DOD installation is available to serve as the BSI in the vicinity of the incident, DOD logistics forces will be the primary agent for providing supply and service support for all DOD response for all forces in the area until such time that local, regional or national service contracts can be leveraged to support the force.

(a) The JTF must request adequate logistics support forces and equipment to ensure mission success.

(b) The JTF develops the plan to ensure continuous troop sustainment for the duration of the mission.

(9) The BSI nomination process is lead by the N-NC/J4. Close coordination with Command Assessment Elements (CAEs), DCOs, and Service Components serves as the key to producing a detailed and deliberate
nomination of viable installations that can serve as BSIs to DOD forces during a DSCA event. Ongoing installation missions and resource constraints are key factors in considering what installation will ultimately be selected.

(a) The nomination process timeline is based upon DOD force deployment timelines, but typically will be accomplished within six (6) to eighteen (18) hours of a no-notice catastrophic event, or within 24-72 hours of pre-notification of a possible event that may require a DOD response.

(b) Based upon previously collected BSI pre-assessment data, the N-NC/J4 distributes a list of potentially suitable installations in close proximity to the potential JOA to all Service Component representatives and CAEs. Service Components and CAEs will then conduct deliberate analysis of all potential BSI locations and will be prepared to provide a collective recommendation during a scheduled N-NC/J4 BSI Teleconference. The BSI nomination(s) will be reviewed and approved by the N-NC/J4 then forwarded to the N-NC/J3 and N-NC Commander for approval and final designation after gaining concurrence from the owning military service.

b. Logistics and Engineering Support by Phase.

(1) Phase 0, Shape. Service components and subordinate commands participate in planning efforts, training exercises, and coordinate with interagency and defense agency staffs to prepare for rapid DSCA response. This phase is comprised of actions required to gain and maintain situational awareness and to prepare for deployment. This phase includes the development of timely and accurate assessments of the situation, as well as developing and maintaining a positive situational awareness. USNORTHCOM Service component commands are actively engaged in pre-assessments of DOD installations as potential BSIs. Phase 0 is continuous as the command maintains situational awareness for additional DSCA events in the AOR. When an event occurs, the command begins Phase I, Anticipate.

(2) Phase I, Anticipate. Phase I begins when an event occurs or is anticipated and after the SecDef authorizes DOD force deployment per a Request for Assistance (RFA). The USNORTHCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Cell (NDDOC) will be stood up during this phase, if required. After an execute order (EXORD) is issued, designated DOD forces will begin deployment into the JOA. Commander Assessment Elements (CAE) deploy and provide initial assessments to both the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Commander and JTF Commander. Potential DOD installations are assessed and a BSI(s) is designated to support DOD response forces. See paragraph 3.a.(9) for more detail on the BSI selection process. As the designated JTF develops situational awareness and federal support requirements are further defined, response force requirements are identified and preparations for
deployment are initiated. BSI JRSTO and logistics sustainment capabilities are
evaluated. A JRSTO Support Element may deploy to augment the BSI staff.
Planning continues in order to refine DOD logistics force requirements and
additional Logistics forces are requested as determined by the JTF. All
deploying units complete level 4 time-phased force flow data (TPFFD) inputs
into JOPES. Phase I ends with the JTF and BSI prepared to JRSTO the DSCA
forces.

(3) Phase II, Respond. Phase II begins when response forces begin
moving, logistics support forces deploy (if required) into the JOA, and JTF
JRSTO operations commence. Preparations for execution of logistics
sustainment operations and logistics wholesale distribution operations begin
during this phase. The BSI tailors installation assets to support JRSTO and
follow on logistics sustainment operations for the DSCA force. DLA serves as
the primary resource for common user logistics requirements. Phase II ends
when reception and staging requirements are complete for the initial JTF
response force, the JTF is ready to conduct operations in the JOA, and the BSI
and designated DOD logistics forces are postured to sustain the force.

(4) Phases III & IV, Operate & Stabilize. Phase III begins with
coordinated and deliberate sustainment operations to the response force. Re-
supply operations for common user logistics are executed utilizing the Defense
Logistics Agency wholesale distribution and prime vendor systems.
Contracting of life support requirements is leveraged utilizing the civilian
industrial base as required. Tactical logistics and retail distribution in support
of DOD forces is accomplished by the BSI and DOD logistics forces. NORAD-
USNORTHCOM and JTF logistics elements anticipate future requirements and
refine capability as required via increased DOD or contracting capability as
required. Phase IV ends with a mature logistics sustainment operation in
place, Civil Authorities preparing to assume responsibility for operations, and
DOD logistics assets posturing for redeployment operations. The end state or
definition of success for this phase is the successful accomplishment of all
SecDef approved requests for DSCA, or the successful delegation of remaining
requests for defense support to other federal agencies for accomplishment.

(5) Phase V, Transition. Civil Authorities resume control and the need for
DOD support reduces and concludes. Logistics priorities shift to JTF
redeployment operations. DOD forces ensure cost accounting and property
accountability is complete and accurate. The JTF is responsible for
redeployment tasks and the BSI supports redeployment of the JTF. The JTF
ensures all costs associated with support of DSCA are recorded for future
reimbursement. DOD response forces redeploy to home station and
reconstitute. Phase V ends when sustainment and redeployment operations are
curtailed, financial reconciliation is complete, and all elements of the DSCA
force redeploy to home station.
c. Tasks.

(1) NORAD-USNORTHCOM Directorate of Logistics and Engineering
    [N-NC/J4]

    (a) Provide the overall concepts, policies, and guidance for logistics
        and engineering support of DOD forces involved in the DSCA operation.

    (b) Maintain situational awareness of logistics support for deployed
        forces via the JTF or the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO).

    (c) Monitor the logistics and engineering capability of tasked units
        and deploying forces to support each phase of DSCA operations.

    (d) Determine the requirement to activate the USNORTHCOM
        Deployment and Distribution Operations Cell (NDDOC) to synchronize
        movement of assets into and out of the JOA.

    (e) In coordination with USTRANSCOM J3, determine the
        requirement for and location(s) of JTF Port Opening capability.

(2) USNORTHCOM Subordinate / Supporting Commands.

    (a) Maintain accurate cost records and capture all incremental costs
        for reimbursement purposes.

    (b) Coordinate BSI, POD, and POE support requirements with
        designated installations.

    (c) Comply with policies and guidance for logistics and engineering
        support of DSCA forces published by NORAD-USNORTHCOM.

(3) Services.

    (a) Maintain accurate cost records and capture all incremental costs
        for reimbursement purposes.

    (b) Provide supportability assessment of BSI nominations and provide
        BSI support, as directed.

    (c) Provide reception and staging support as required for all DOD
        forces at designated BSIs, PODs, and POEs.
(d) Comply with policies and guidance for logistics and engineering support of DSCA forces published by NORAD-USNORTHCOM.

(e) Provide service-unique logistics requirements to joint response forces deployed in support of DSCA operations, as required.

(4) **Commander, USTRANSCOM.**

(a) Provide ground, sealift, and airlift support assets to transport DOD and other agency personnel, teams, and equipment as directed by SecDef.

(b) When requested by USNORTHCOM, provide augmentation to the NDDOC, establish JTF Port Opening capabilities and deploy Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) capabilities.

(c) Gain and maintain situational awareness of the transportation infrastructure throughout operations, and provide a common operating picture of the status of the infrastructure to USNORTHCOM, supporting commands, services, and agencies.

(d) Provide lift for other federal agencies as directed by SecDef.

(5) **Joint Task Force (if established).**

(a) Develop a Concept of Logistics Support, outlining the specific organization of logistics tasks for supporting DSCA operations inside the JOA, and submit to N-NC/J4 for review and approval.

(b) Prepare the Logistics paragraph for the JTF-CC situation report, outlining logistics issues, shortfalls, and accomplishments.

(c) Assume responsibility for JRDSO in coordination with the BSI and deployed JRDSO enhancers.

(d) On order, coordinate and execute redeployment of all DOD elements to home station.

4. **Administration and Logistics.**

   a. **Logistics.**

   (1) **Supply and Distribution.** The support concept is built around forces deploying with a mission tailored initial level of supply and leveraging resident capabilities at the designated BSI.
(a) **Distribution and Allocation.** Common-user supplies are provided in accordance with paragraph 3.a. above. Services are responsible for service-unique logistical support of forces OPCON to the joint force commander.

(b) **Level of Supply.** Forces deploying for DSCA deploy with five days of supply of Class I and Class III(B) depending on the method of deployment. Deploy with other mission essential supplies as directed.

(c) **Salvage.** Civil Authorities retain responsibility to plan and execute salvage operations in the affected area. DOD only provides support as requested by the primary agency and approved by the SecDef or the President.

(d) **Captured Enemy Materiel.** Not used.

(e) **Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services.** Acquisition procedures are IAW established Federal and DOD regulations through the supporting BSI.

(f) **Petroleum, Oils, and Lubrication (POL).** DOD response forces will deploy with 5 days of supply. The supporting BSI, if capable, is responsible for retail fuel distribution and packaged POL products for DOD response forces operating within the JOA. Services retain responsibility for service-unique POL support to their deployed DSCA forces.

(g) **Inter-Service Logistic Support.** Inter-Service Support Agreements remain in effect.

(h) **Mortuary Affairs.** Service members that die while under OPCON of USNORTHCOM are handled in accordance with service and subordinate command procedures. In general, civilian medical examiners or coroners maintain jurisdiction over both military and civilian fatalities. In certain circumstances, such as a mass fatality involving predominately military personnel, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) will likely have jurisdiction over remains and will coordinate and determine final disposition of remains. Additionally, military mortuary affairs units can be deployed in order to search, recover, transport, and temporarily store remains in the event of a mass fatality incident. The capacity for this support is limited within DOD and should be considered only as a last resort. The transportation of contaminated human remains will be IAW DepSecDef Memo, Policy on Contaminated Human Remains, 28 March 2003 (reference f). See Appendix 3, (Mortuary Affairs).

(2) **Maintenance and Modification.** Services are responsible to perform maintenance, equipment evacuation, and modification per their service and
component procedures and doctrine. Common-user maintenance and modification requirements are handled IAW paragraph 3.a., above.

(3) Medical Services. See Annex Q

(4) Mobility and Transportation.

(a) General.

1. Supporting and subordinate commands use the Joint Operations and Planning Execution System (JOPES) for movement of all forces.

2. Force deployment and redeployment is time-phased per validated priorities in JOPES. CDRUSNORTHCOM, as the supported Combatant Commander, validates movement requirements via time-phased force and deployment data and Special Assignment Airlift Missions.

3. CDRUSTRANSCOM provides required lift IAW CJCSI 4120.02, Assignment of Movement Priority.

(b) Mobility Support Force and Movement Feasibility Assessment.

1. In conjunction with the DCO, and if feasible, deployed JTF and USTRANSCOM, USNORTHCOM determine movement priorities and designate POEs and PODs.

2. Seaport and aerial port terminals are assessed with regard to throughput capabilities.

(c) Intra-Theater Lift. Damage to commercial airfields may prevent commercial aircraft from flying into the JOA and roadways may be impassable. Under these circumstances USTRANSCOM, in coordination with USNORTHCOM, may be requested to provide intratheater lift to move forces and sustainment resources into the JOA by setting up channel and or shuttle service, IAW JP 4.0, Doctrine for Logistics.

(d) Intransit Visibility (ITV). USNORTHCOM Service Components will use established DOD systems and procedures for providing movement data and monitoring the movement of all forces and equipment. As a minimum, the ITV will include departure from point-of-origin and arrival at final destination. When utilizing a time-phased deployment data (TPFDD), USNORTHCOM Service Components will enter appropriate arrival and departure data in the TPFDD as directed by the USNORTHCOM TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI). Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) will be used to the fullest extent possible. Units deploying via land will request Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite
tracking or the use of Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS) qualified carriers be employed.

(5) Civil Engineering Support Plan. See Appendix 6, Annex D.

(6) Sustainability Assessment. USNORTHCOM develops a sustainability assessment to ensure DOD’s ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the affected area for the duration of the operation. Logistic momentum is maintained to ensure that resources arrive where and when they are needed. In addition, waste of supplies and services must be minimized to prevent a shortage, which may jeopardize continued operations.

b. Administration. Reporting requirements are tailored to the situation and vary depending on both the nature and scope of the DOD response.

5. Command and Control. See Base plan and Annex J.

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Appendixes:
1--Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply – Not Used
2--Joint Substance, Food Service Support & Water Management – Not Used
3--Mortuary Affairs
4--Sustainability Analysis – Not Used
5--Mobility and Transportation – Not Used
6--Engineering Support Plan
7--Non-nuclear Ammunition – Not Used
8--Logistics Automation – Not Used

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501  
MORTUARY AFFAIRS

References:  
a. Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support in Joint Operations, 6 April 2000  
b. Joint Publication 4-6, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations, 5 June 2006  
d. Department of the Army Pamphlet 638-2, Procedure for the Care and Disposition of Remains and Personal Effects, 22 December 2000  
e. DOD Directive 1300.22, Mortuary Affairs Policy, 3 February 2000  
f. DOD Directive 5154.24, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, 03 October 2001  
g. DOD Instruction 1300.18, Military Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures, 18 December 2000

1. General. Each of the military services is responsible for the care of remains of deceased members. However, during Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations, the legal jurisdiction over deceased personnel will rest with an appropriate local authority, normally a medical examiner or coroner. The Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) may have jurisdiction for a particular area or event if significant military personnel are affected by a catastrophic incident. Additionally, installation commanders and their parent service will follow the appropriate service procedures for the handling of remains and casualty assistance.

2. Purpose, Scope, and Limitations. Depending on the severity, an incident requiring federal assistance, and potentially DOD support, is likely to generate a variety of mortuary affairs requirements. These requirements include, but are not limited to: coordination with the local medical examiner for mission requirement; protective measures for mortuary affairs personnel;
coordination with explosive ordnance disposal personnel and structural engineering personnel for access to or through the site; coordination with the medical examiner and investigative authorities in regards to preserving evidence on the remains and personnel effects; liaison with public affairs personnel for interface with the press; and coordination with logistics representatives for refrigeration, transportation, and contracting of remains. The underlying principle is that the local medical examiner and primary or coordinating agency will determine the extent and type of support.

3. Mortuary Affairs Intelligence. The condition of remains can best be assessed by the initial responders and the local medical examiner. Other subject matter experts such as the Center for Disease Control, and Federal Emergency Management Agency can provide intelligence. See Annex B for applicable geospatial intelligence such as climatologic, terrain, hydrographic, and natural and industrial resources in the operational area.

4. Concept of Mortuary Affairs Support to Civil Authorities.

(a) The scope of mortuary affairs support will focus on integrating into the existing local, state, and federal mortuary affairs plans by providing search and recovery, tentative identification, and local transport of remains to designated locations for disposition. The Primary or Coordinating Agency will have the assistance of Disaster Mortuary Response Teams (DMORT). DMORT has the ability to scale their response for the size of the incident and has considerable capability to store, identify, conduct forensic investigation, and prepare a large number of remains for burial.

(b) Trained mortuary affairs personnel can handle civilian remains, but must first obtain the permission of the local authority responsible for those remains.

(c) The JTF may establish a Mortuary Affairs Response Task Force (RTF) in order to focus and consolidate MA operations. The exact composition of this team will depend on the mission, equipment available, troops available, time and terrain (METT-T). This RTF may include Military Mortuary Affairs Specialists, non-MA military personnel, local law enforcement, civilian expertise (such as EOD, dive teams, or dog teams) in order to facilitate an effective MA response. The JTF Mortuary Affairs Officer must ensure the RTF conducts operations by direction of a local authority and complies with all local applicable laws and regulations.

5. Concept of Mortuary Affairs for Military Forces. The DOD current death and concurrent return program will remain in effect as long as local conditions allow. Forces under operational control (OPCON) of USNORTHCOM will have to coordinate with local authorities for release of
military remains in civilian jurisdiction to the AFME or to the person authorized to direct disposition. An interment program is only implemented at the direction of CDRUSNORTHCOM (see also para 7a below).

6. Tasks.

   Joint Mortuary Affairs Officer (JMAO). Response Task Force OPCON to USNORTHCOM will appoint a JMAO to coordinate DSCA and military mortuary affairs support.

7. Coordinating Instructions.

   a. Temporary Interment. The authority to temporarily inter remains resides with the appropriate civilian authority at the incident site. The authority to temporarily inter military personnel resides with CDRUSNORTHCOM, in coordination with the local authorities or the secretary of the service responsible for the military installation.

   b. Reporting. Report casualties of forces OPCON to USNORTHCOM in accordance with N-NC/J1 procedures.

   c. Casualty Assistance. Casualty notification and family assistance is the responsibility of the appropriate service and installation commander.

   d. Mortuary Affairs Standards. The military mortuary affairs missions will be conducted with civilian guidance and monitored by civilian authority or law enforcement in charge. General procedures set forth in Joint Publication 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations should be followed and modified to comply with the civilian plan.
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX D TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
ENGINEERING SUPPORT PLAN

References:

a. Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support, 14 Sep 2007
b. Joint Publication 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, 12 Feb 2007
f. Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01 DoD Minimum Anti Terrorism Standards for Buildings, 8 Oct 2003
g. Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-02 DoD Minimum Standoff Distances for Buildings, 8 Oct 2003
h. See references in base plan and Annex D.

1. Situation

a. Purpose, Scope, and Limitations. To provide guidance for Department of Defense (DOD) engineering support for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations in the USNORTHCOM Joint Operational Area (JOA). The primary focus of the DOD engineering effort is to sustain and assist DOD forces employed, force bed-down work, emergency stabilization/repair of damaged critical infrastructure, opening lines of communication (roads/debris clearing) and rendering assistance to the designated Base Support Installations (BSIs). In general, DOD Engineer forces will be called upon when local, state, tribal, federal, and contract resources are fully engaged, exhausted, or timely action is necessary to save lives and prevent further human suffering and loss of property.

b. Intelligence Support. See Annex B of this plan.

2. Mission. See the base plan summary.

3. Execution
a. Concept of Civil Engineer Support. DOD Engineer forces may be tasked with short notice to assist civil authorities as a result of a natural or manmade disaster. DOD Engineer forces may be engaged in DSCA operations by the local commander under immediate response authority or in support of a Primary Agency through the National Response Framework (NRF).

(1) Engineers will anticipate, analyze and posture for potential DSCA missions. Maximum consideration will be given to the use of locally available contract services, facilities, and support structures, followed by state, tribal, and federal resources before DOD engineers are engaged. The federal response will be conducted by a Primary Agency. The NRF and National Incident Management System (NIMS) will be used.

(2) A total force perspective for achieving engineering objectives is necessary. Engineer support may be garnered from local, state and federal resources via a multitude of avenues or agreements. Non-Federalized National Guard engineer forces may be actively conducting operations within the JOA at the same time Title 10 Active Duty engineer forces are conducting similar operations in the vicinity.

(3) The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the Primary and Coordinating Agency for Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works and Engineering, directly assisting the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). USACE coordinates and organizes the capabilities and resources of the Federal Government to facilitate the delivery of services, technical assistance, engineering expertise, and construction management to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents.

(a) Submitting an Action Request Form (ARF) to the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) is the procedure for any agency to request FEMA assistance. If FEMA requires DOD capability (except USACE) to accomplish the request, the ARF is validated by the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and routed to the Joint Staff through USNORTHCOM. If approved, the ARF becomes a Mission Assignment (MA) and Title 10 forces are placed OPCON to USNORTHCOM for Command and Control. The requesting agency coordinates MA completion with USNORTHCOM.
(b) USACE uses the same ARF procedure to request unique DOD engineer capability and/or to request DOD assistance to complete an existing MA.

b. **Responsibilities for Civil Engineering Support Planning**

1. **Primary Responsibility.** USNORTHCOM retains primary responsibility for the civil engineering support concept and analysis, and military engineer resource allocation within the USNORTHCOM JOA.

2. **Supporting Responsibility.** Engineer forces provided by supporting commands will follow all engineering and environmental policy, directives and planning guidance provided by USNORTHCOM, the established Joint Task Force (JTF), and the Primary Agency supported in the DSCA operation.

b. **Definitions.** See Joint Publication 1-02.

c. **International Agreements and Political Factors.** See the base plan.

d. **Construction Policy.** New construction effort to support DSCA operations in accordance with this plan is not envisioned. When construction is authorized, all local, state and federal codes and standards should be adhered to. Use of service construction standards, planning factors, development priorities, and cost estimates is encouraged. Reference b. provides construction standards, and provides guidance for bed-down of DOD forces.

e. **Construction Standards.** Expedient construction includes several types of rapid construction techniques such as pre-fabricated buildings, inflatable buildings, clamshell structures, etc. These construction techniques can be selectively employed with minimum time, cost, and risk and provide deployed forces another source of temporary facilities. Temporary facilities may be required or requested in certain cases during the initial phase of operations or in support of the Primary Agency.

f. **Planning Factors**

1. **Operations.** On-going military operations and homeland defense requirements have priority over DSCA operations unless otherwise directed.
(2) **Scope.** The DSCA mission will likely be the result of a major or catastrophic incident. The large possibility of locations, varying types of incident, and near limitless scope of requirements hinders the identification of specific capabilities and any resulting shortfalls. Typical actions are outlined in section g. General Priority of Engineer Actions.

(3) **Duration.** The duration and scope of DOD involvement is directly related to the severity and magnitude of the event, and requirements for DOD DSCA operations. For planning purposes, operations will conclude within 30 to 45 days.

(4) **Deployable assets.** Consider use of DOD military services' deployable assets as described in JP 3-34. Deployable assets for force bed down are primarily in the Army Force Provider, Navy Advanced Base Functional Components (ABFC), and Air Force Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources (BEAR) equipment sets.

(5) **Class IV.** Where supplies are limited or significant competing demand is anticipated, it is crucial that engineers estimate their requirements and initiate requests prior to or as early as possible during DSCA operations.

(6) **Facilities.** Facility requirements will first be met through existing local facilities, preferably government owned, organic portable or re-locatable substitute facilities, or field construction.

(7) **DOD Engineers.** DOD Engineers should utilize DOD Engineer and construction agencies such as USACE, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA), and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) for technical and specialized engineer support.

(8) **Real Property.** DOD forces will rely on DOD facilities for real estate needs to the maximum extent possible. Short-term leasing may be a necessary option depending on location and duration. No occupation of private land or facilities is authorized without specific legal authority. Real Property support may be obtained from the General Services Administration (GSA), USACE, NAVFAC, or other government agencies.

(9) **Financial Planning.** See paragraph 4.f. of the base plan.

g. **General Priority of Engineer Actions.** Engineer units will be requested to provide support to other federal agencies in accordance
with the NRF through the executing JTF. Based on the type of mission, the tasks may differ, but the general priority is as follows:

(1) Force bed-down with anti-terrorism force protection considerations.

(2) Emergency stabilization and expedient repair of damaged infrastructure. Rendering safe critical public utilities, services, and facilities that will help restore the ability of the local authority to manage its own recovery efforts.

(3) Emergency clearing of debris from streets, roads, bridges, airfields, ports, and waterways.

(4) Immediate humanitarian needs of the dislocated populace, such as the construction of temporary shelters and support facilities.

(5) Demolition of hazardous damaged structures and facilities.

h. Contractors. Contracts will be the primary methodology used to accomplish engineer/construction requirements in civil emergencies. Ample contractor support in heavy equipment and materials should be available in the JOA. DOD Engineer capabilities coupled with the commercial sector/contract capabilities provide virtually unlimited engineering depth and breadth. Coordination with USACE and other potential construction contracting agencies at local, state and federal levels must be conducted to ensure efficient resource utilization and economies of scale.

i. Allied and Coalition Forces. The availability and possible use of allied and coalition civil engineering forces should not be considered during mission planning. Requests for and offers of international assistance will be handled IAW the International Assistance System.

j. Other Government Agencies. Aside from the primary Federal agencies involved in the National Response Framework (NRF) during a DSCA event, there is the high potential for DOD interface with other government agencies at the Federal, State and local level. These government agencies may include, but are not limited to:

- US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- State EPA offices
- State Departments of Natural Resources
- Federal, state and local Departments of Transportation
- National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
State and local law enforcement
US Department of Agriculture (USDA)
US Forest Service
State forest services
National Parks Service
State and local parks services
US Public Health Service
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
State and local utility providers

4. **Time-Phased Requirements.** DOD engineer forces will be deployed via the Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) to provide the appropriate level of support. Engineer requirements will be sourced based on the force availability, geographic location and anticipated size, scope, area and duration of the DSCA operation.

5. **Summary of Critical Factors Affecting Civil Engineering Support Planning.** DSCA operations conducted in the USNORTHCOM JOA are affected by numerous local, state and federal laws and regulations. Most of the laws, regulations, etc. are those that civil engineers deal with on a daily bases. In most instances the request for federal assistance will be submitted through the DCO from the Primary Agency and will be funded via the Primary Agency. See Appendix 4 to Annex E of this plan. The proper flow and authorization of the MA must be accomplished. This will avoid difficult issues such as environmental impacts, funding sources, scope and authorities of work, etc. Close coordination with the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), and the USNORTHCOM staff will help ensure many problematic issues are avoided or quickly overcome.

6. **Command Relationships.** The operational command and control (C2) structure is described in the Annex J. In most cases engineer forces OPCON to USNORTHCOM will work through a JTF (to the J-3, J-4, or to a staff engineer) command structure. As noted above, the local commander may direct his engineer units under immediate response authority and will maintain C2 authority over the engineer forces. Each DSCA operation will be unique and may require adjustments to the C2 structure of engineer forces. Further elaboration of C2 will be provided in the DSCA EXORD prior to and during the execution.
ANNEX E TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
PERSONNEL

c. DODI 1327.6 Leave and Liberty Program
d. Joint Pub 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 May 2007
e. CJCSM 3150.13, Joint Reporting Structure- Personnel Manual
f. DOD Financial Management Regulation (DODFMR)
g. DOD 1348.33-M, Manual of Military Decorations and Awards, 12 September 1996
h. DOD Directive 1404.10, Emergency Essential (E-E) DOD Citizen Civilian Employees, 10 April 1992
i. CJCSI 1301.01C, Individual Augmentation Procedures, 1 January 2004
j. CJCSM 3122.01 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Vol. 1 Policies and Procedures.
k. JP 1-0, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations, 18 November 1998
l. Title 10, Armed Forces, United States Code

1. General

   a. **Purpose.** This concept of personnel support establishes the administrative and personnel responsibilities, policies and planning guidance necessary to support the basic order.

   b. **Concept of Personnel Support.**

      (1) The USNORTHCOM J-1 will manage, synchronize and optimize personnel support to the joint force; formulate personnel policies; accomplish manpower management; establish personnel accountability standards and procedures; coordinate morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs within the Joint operating area; and manage casualty reporting for the joint force.

      (2) Personnel Service Support (PSS) as used herein includes personnel services, postal support, chaplain support, finance and disbursing services, and legal services support. Providing PSS is a component responsibility.
(3) A component “reachback” concept for PSS will be formulated prior to commencing joint operations.

(4) PSS will be provided at both the home station and forward operating location.

(5) In progress reviews, with the JTF J-1, will be conducted on a regular basis throughout the planning and operational phases as determined by the USNORTHCOM J-1.

c. Planning Factors

(1) Manning & Augmentation. Manning and augmentation of individual units is a Service responsibility. Augmentation to any potential JTF Headquarters will be in accordance with IAW current policies and will follow current procedures outlined in CJCSI 1301.01C and JP 1-0.

(2) Replacement and Rotation Requirements. Replacement and rotation operations are the responsibility of the affected Service. Planning factors for computing personnel attrition will be developed per existing Service procedures. Component Personnel Officers will coordinate replacement and rotation through USNORTHCOM J1. In addition, the Component J1 representative will record TEMPO days, as required, IAW the National Defense Authorization Act FY-01 and Service instructions.

(3) Reserve Forces. See paragraph 2.b (20) of this plan.

(4) Joint Reception Center (JRC). Under current operations, Components/JTFs are responsible for reception, accountability, processing and training of military, DOD civilian and contractor employees, and individual augmentees. If the scope of operations changes to necessitate a JRC, JP 1-0 specifies establishment and additional guidance concerning the concept, function, responsibilities and mission of the JRC.

(5) Equip, Train, Prepare. Prior to deployment, the Component/JTF employing military and/or civilian personnel will ensure the member is equipped, trained and prepared to deploy.

2. Personnel Policies and Procedures

a. General Guidance. Individual Service military and civilian personnel policies and procedures will apply unless otherwise directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM.

b. Specific Guidance
1) Reporting Requirements

(a) Joint Personnel Status Report (JPERSTAT). When directed, Component Personnel Officers will submit JPERSTAT to NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center per CJCSM 3150.13. Reports are due by 1900Z with a cut off as of 1700Z. NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center will compile the report by 2100Z and forward to Joint Staff J-1/PRD each day.

(b) Accountability. Due to the sensitivity of a large DOD personnel presence concentrated within the U.S. and the danger of contamination/infection at deployment sites, the Component/JTF must maintain accountability for all assigned/attached/OPCON Title 10 Armed Forces and DOD civilian and contractor personnel. To document any potential or actual exposure to a hazard, a comprehensive list of all personnel must be maintained for historical accounting in the event long-term medical consequences result from exposure to such a hazard.

(c) Performance Evaluations. Officer, enlisted and civilian evaluation reports will be IAW applicable Service directives.

2) Replacement Policies. Requests for replacement of Service personnel will be submitted per existing Service directives and procedures.

3) Replacement Personnel. Replacement personnel will be provided by the Component through parent Service channels.

4) Personnel Service Support Center. Component/JTF Commanders will establish personnel service support centers, as required, to effectively account for and in/out-process of forces. Component/JTF Personnel Officers are responsible for establishing a JRC as required. The parent Service will account for TAD/TDY/TCS personnel.

5) Rotation Policies. Rotation policy will be established by USNORTHCOM or JCS. Unless otherwise directed, 30 day rotations will be assumed for DSCA operations.

6) Critical Skills/Specialists/Key Positions. The Services are responsible for ensuring the selective assignment of specialists under conditions of mobilization. Upon execution of this plan, Component/JTF Commanders will ensure the proper assignment
and utilization of personnel (e.g., linguists, chaplains, intelligence analysts, civil affairs, psychological operations teams). Civilian employees with critical skills and occupying key positions must continue to perform those functions during a crisis or national emergency.

(7) Military Law, Discipline, and Order:

(a) JP 1 outlines the policies and responsibilities for establishment of Joint military police and disciplinary measures necessary to support major military operations.

(b) USNORTHCOM J1 will act through Component Commanders, where practical, to coordinate discipline of assigned forces. Each Component Commander will ensure that uniform procedures are developed for police functions within his command in order to carry out the specific responsibilities.

(8) Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting will be IAW applicable Service directives and will be reported via JPERSTAT when applicable. Parallel reporting is anticipated.

(9) Decorations and Awards.

(a) Only those personnel assigned to or attached to a joint staff or a joint activity, as defined by DOD 1348.33-M are eligible for joint awards (Defense decorations and unit awards). Personnel officially assigned in a temporary additional duty/temporary duty joint capacity are also eligible for joint awards. Personnel who are assigned to units that are attached to a joint activity (as a unit) are not eligible for joint awards.

(b) The Components/JTF will execute all joint awards via existing directives and policies.

(10) Hostile Fire Pay/Imminent Danger Pay. Depending on the nature of the operation, JP 1-0, Appendix J will apply for military members.

(11) Family Separation Allowance (FSA). Members may be eligible for FSA per DOD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 7A, Chapter 27.

(12) Travel Procedures. Travel procedures will be IAW Joint Federal Travel Regulation Volume 1 (military members) and Volume 2 (DOD Civilian Personnel).
(13) **Medical.** See Annex Q.

(14) **Spot and Field Promotions.** Will adhere to procedures outlined in Joint Pub 1-0 and IAW service requirements.

(15) **Special Leave Accrual.** Accrual will be IAW applicable Service directives. Normally, only leave of an emergency nature should be granted. Commanders can allow leave to those in a "use or lose" status, if possible. If not possible, applicable Service directives apply to lost leave recoupment. Requests for exception should be forwarded through command channels. The Component/JTF will establish policy on passes.

(16) **Combat Zone Benefits.** For the purpose of tax exclusion, combat zones must be designated by the Executive Order of the President.

(17) **Pay and Allowances.**

(a) Various entitlements have been established to compensate military members for the rigors and sacrifices caused by different types of military operations. In recent years, joint force commanders and their staffs have become more involved in making entitlement determinations and ensuring equity among participants in joint operations. Thorough consideration of pay and entitlements issues in the early stages of joint operation planning ensures a level of consistency throughout the operation.

(b) The USNORTHCOM J-1, in coordination with the USNORTHCOM Comptroller will make a recommendation to CDRUSNORTHCOM pertaining to service member entitlements, including the authorization of a TDY allowance. Critical among these is the need to determine the TDY status for the initial deployment as either: per diem, field duty or essential mess. The intent is to avoid situations where various service members serving side-by-side under similar circumstances earn different due solely to differing determinations made by subordinate service component commanders.

(c) Decisions made regarding pay and allowances for service members apply equally to all components serving under similar circumstances. The USNORTHCOM J-1 will announce the conditions of the operations affecting entitlements as soon as possible to ensure that deploying service members are financially prepared. This information is particularly important as it must appear, in many cases, on deployment orders. Actions to request entitlements should be initiated so they are in place when the joint operation begins.
(d) Entitlement policy is a CDRUSNORTHCOM responsibility and will be accomplished by the USNORTHCOM J-1, in accordance with the applicable DODFMR, Joint Federal Travel Regulations (JFTR) and the entitlement matrix provided in JP 1-06, appendix J “Joint Operations Entitlements and Pay Matrix”.

(e) The joint task force comptroller will coordinate the JTF entitlement policy (pay and allowances) through the JTF manpower and personnel directorate (J-1) with the USNORTHCOM J-1. This includes the CDRUSNORTHCOM determination of the appropriate temporary duty (TDY) option for JTF personnel.

(18) **Uniform Policy.** The host Commander will determine the appropriate duty uniform for military and civilian members. If BDUs are essential for DSCA operations, a civilian employee’s parent Service organization is responsible for issuance or authorization to purchase.

(19) **Civilian Personnel**

(a) **DOD Civilian Work Force.** Employees of the DOD civilian work force will be considered as an available resource when creating and sustaining personnel requirements for deployment. While deployed, civilian employees will be under the direct command and control (C2) of the on-site supervisory chain, which will provide normal supervisory functions such as assignment of work, establishment of work schedules, performance evaluation and initiating and effecting disciplinary actions. The Component/JTF deploying the civilian employee will retain administrative responsibility for all personnel management responsibilities, including time and attendance reporting.

(b) **Earning Limitations.** Biweekly Earning Limitation, Annual Limitation on Premium Pay for Emergency Work, and Annual Aggregate Limitation will be executed IAW 5 USC 5546.

(20) **Use of Reserve Forces**

Presidential Reserve Call-up Authority. Provision of a public law (title 10, US Code, section 12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (of whom not more than 30,000 may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve), for not more than 365 days to meet the requirements of any operational mission. Members called under this provision may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection. This authority has particular utility when used in circumstances in which the escalatory
national or international signals of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization.

(21) Morale, Welfare and Recreation [MWR].
   (a). CDR USNORTHCOM will plan for the logistic means required to establish and maintain morale, welfare and recreational activities for assigned forces.
   (b). CDR USNORTHCOM will affect necessary liaison with the Commander, Army and Air Force Exchange Service to assure complete utilization of services provided by AFEES.
   (c). CDR USNORTHCOM will affect necessary liaison with Director, American Red Cross (ARC) to assure complete and proper utilization of the services provided by the ARC.
   (d). CDR USNORTHCOM will affect policies regarding gifts, donations and commercial sponsorship services (i.e. telephone service).

(22) Determination of the Appropriate Temporary Duty (TDY) Option.
The supported CCDR’s J-1, in coordination with the joint force comptroller, will make a recommendation to the CCDR pertaining to Service member entitlements, including the authorization of a TDY allowance. Critical among these is the need to determine the TDY status for the initial deployment; as either per diem, field duty, or essential mess. The intent is to avoid situations where various Service members, serving side-by-side under similar circumstances, earn different entitlements due solely to differing determinations made by subordinate Service component commanders.

(23) Records.
Official records created as a result of a joint task force operations will be maintained as prescribed in CJCS Manual 5760.01, Volume I, Joint Staff and Combatant Command Records Management Manual.
   (a). The standards outlined in CJCSM 5760.01, Volume II, Joint Staff and Combatant Command Records Management Manual constitutes the authority for retention, transfer, retirement, and destruction of records accumulated during the life of a joint task force.
   (b). The value of records is determined by their use as administrative tools, as legal or other official evidence, and as material for historical or other research. Only a portion of the total volume of records accumulated by a joint task force is of sufficient
value to justify its preservation as part of the permanent archives of the United States.

(c). In general, the records that are most authoritative, informative, and valuable in conducting office operations are also the most important for historical or other research purposes will be identified as Temporary Records.

(d). Upon completion of the joint task force operation, all Temporary Records will be identified, consolidated, boxed and shipped to the HQ USNORTHCOM Records Manager for disposition.

(25). Joint Lessons Learned Program.

(a). The JTF J-1 will identify issues (which are defined as observed, analyzed, interpreted and evaluated shortcoming, deficiency or problem identified during the joint activity that precludes training or operation to joint mission-essential tasks standards and required focused problem solving.

(b). Identifying issues and documenting them regularly and frequently during the course of the operation is by far the most comprehensive method and this process begins in the planning phase of the operation and continues until the JTF is disestablished.

3. Finance and Disbursing

a. All SecDef approved DSCA operations are reimbursable unless reimbursement is waived by the SecDef or the President. IAW the provisions set forth in DOD Financial Management Regulation (FMR), Volume, 12, Chapter 23, directed contingency operations must be accomplished within the Command's or the DOD Component's available funding. A contingency operations cost report will be completed and forwarded through Service channels as indicated in Appendix 1 to the DOD FMR Volume 12, Chapter 23. DOD costs incurred in support of (ISO) a Primary Agency will be captured separately from cost incurred to support DOD efforts. The Primary Agency will issue a control number with all mission assignments. The Primary Agency control number must be used to qualify for possible reimbursement.

b. Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require immediate response. These instances will be handled IAW DOD Directive 3025.dd, DSCA (draft).

c. USNORTHCOM will issue more specific financial management guidance with execution of DSCA operations.
4. **Legal.** See Appendix 4

5. **Military Postal Services.** See Appendix 5

6. **Chaplain Activities.** See Appendix 6

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VICTOR E. RENUART, JR.
General, USAF
Commander

Appendixes
1. --- Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons - Not Used.
2. --- Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained US Personnel - Not Used
3. --- Finance and Disbursing - Not Used
4. --- Legal
5. --- Military Post Offices
6. --- Chaplain Activities
9. --- EFAC CONOP

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MIRIAM G. MICHAEL
Colonel, USAF
Director of Manpower and Personnel

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX E TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 350.1
LEGAL

References: See references in the Base Plan and Annex B, as applicable.

1. Mission. USNORTHCOM Judge Advocate (JA) Office and subordinate JA’s shall provide the fullest possible range of legal services to units and personnel in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) as far forward as circumstances permit. Specifically, subordinate command JA’s shall:

   a. Provide legal advice to the Commander and staff, and units providing mission support.

   b. Serve as the single point of contact for all legal issues for their respective commands.

   c. Monitor all mission-related legal activities within the JOA for their respective commands.

2. Specific Legal Issues

   a. Claims. Subordinate commanders shall ensure that all claims are promptly reported and thoroughly investigated in accordance with IAW applicable law and policy. Normally, claims will be handled IAW applicable Service regulations.

   b. Legal Assistance. Subordinate commanders shall arrange legal assistance for personnel assigned or attached to their respective forces.

   c. Military Justice. Service component commanders shall administer military justice within Service component channels in accordance with Service directives. Other subordinate commanders shall administer military justice in accordance with convening authority delegation memorandums, as applicable, and service directives.

   d. Items of Immediate Interest.
(1) USNORTHCOM and subordinate command personnel shall immediately report all acts of violence, to include homicides, assaults, rapes, robberies, abductions, and instances of mayhem or mass disorder, to their commander. Commanders shall ensure proper civil authorities are notified, as required.

(2) Subordinate commanders shall immediately pass reports up the chain of command to Commander, USNORTHCOM and the USNORTHCOM JA Office.

(3) Subordinate commanders shall report though the chain of command all issues that could garner media attention that involve DOD elements.

e. **Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF).**

(1) Reference – See Appendix 6 to Annex C. All personnel shall comply with the SRUF.

(2) All mission-specific RUF shall be processed through command operational channels and coordinated with the supporting command JA and the USNORTHCOM JA Office.

(3) Subordinate commanders who receive information concerning a possible violation of the SRUF/SROE shall:

   (a) Immediately report suspected violations in accordance with OPREP-3 procedures.

   (b) Immediately report suspected violations to the USNORTHCOM JA Office and the supporting command JA on the ground.

   (c) Conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether violations were committed by or against USNORTHCOM or subordinate command personnel.

   (d) When USNORTHCOM or subordinate command personnel are involved as either victims or perpetrators of a crime, or when directed by USNORTHCOM, conduct a complete investigation, preserve all evidence of the suspected violation, and take appropriate corrective and/or disciplinary action. A decision not to investigate or to discontinue an investigation will be made only after coordination with the servicing SJA.

   (e) Provide copies of all OPREPs, initial reports, and reports of investigation to the servicing SJA and the USNORTHCOM JA Office.
f. **Legal compliance.** Subordinate commanders shall:

(1) Ensure all plans, orders, target lists, policies, and procedures comply with applicable law and policy, including the law of war and the SRUF.

(2) Immediately report legal issues that affect operations to the USNORTHCOM J A Office.

(3) Provide a weekly status of general legal operations to CDR, USNORTHCOM, ATTN: SJA. This report will include, at a minimum, the following information:

   (a) Domestic law. Report through proper channels incidents involving USNORTHCOM and/or subordinate command personnel and local civil authorities, and suspected violations of the SRUF.

   (b) Military Justice. Report through proper channels incidents that may result in disciplinary action under the UCMJ, as well as the final disposition of such actions, including any USNORTHCOM or subordinate command personnel in pretrial confinement. Immediately report serious incidents.

   (c) Claims. Any incidents that may give rise to claims for or against the U.S. government.

  g. **Memorandums of Understanding/Agreement & Interagency Agreements.** For issues involving USNORTHCOM, prior to being signed, proposed memoranda of understanding/agreement and interagency agreements shall be forwarded to USNORTHCOM J A Office for review and approval.

h. **Intelligence oversight.** Intelligence oversight rules apply. See reference (g) Annex B.

i. **Acquisitions.**

(1) Goods and services to satisfy U.S. specific requirements shall be obtained in accordance with applicable U.S. laws, treaties, international agreements, directives, and regulations. Subordinate commanders do not have the authority to waive any of the statutory or regulatory requirements contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).
(2) Only contracting officers may enter into and sign contracts on behalf of the U.S. Government. Only those persons who possess valid contracting warrants may act as contracting officers and then only to the extent authorized. Only those persons who have been appointed as ordering officers by competent authority may make obligations pursuant to contracts.

(3) Avoid unauthorized commitments. Although an unauthorized commitment is not binding on the U.S. Government, in appropriate cases it may be ratified by an authorized person in accordance with the FAR. Unratified unauthorized commitments are the responsibility of the person who made the commitment. In appropriate cases, such persons also may be subject to disciplinary action.

j. Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA). Subordinate command JA's shall ensure relevant references (in Base Plan) are followed when providing support to civilian law enforcement agencies, including:

(1) Provide legal guidance to the unit commander and supporting personnel.

(2) Verify proposed missions are legally permissible, and approved and executed in accordance with applicable references and restrictions.

(3) Ensure subordinate command personnel involved in MSCLEA comply with the guidance and limitations found in the Posse Comitatus Act, SRUF, and Intelligence Oversight rules and restrictions.

(4) Ensure missions are conducted in accordance with other legal requirements in this document.

k. Immediate Response. Subordinate command JA's shall clarify Immediate Response authorities and requirements, concerning USNORTHCOM AOR.
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX E TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
MILITARY POST OFFICES

References: 
   a. DOD 4525.6-M, DOD Postal Manual, 15 August 2002
   b. DODD 5101.11, DOD Executive Agent for the Military Postal Service, 31 January 2005
   c. DODI 4525.8, DOD Official Mail Management, 26 December 2001
   d. DOD 4525.8-M, DOD Official Mail Manual, 26 December 2001
   e. AR 600-8-3, Unit Postal Operations, 28 December 1989

1. General Guidance

   a. Purpose. To establish policy and provide guidance for the planning and execution of postal operations support.

   b. Concept of Postal Operations. Postal requirements will be based on the minimum support necessary to provide personal and official mail services to all units and personnel. Each Service is responsible for providing or arranging for postal support for its own forces.

   c. Assumptions. Postal support will be required as long as forces are deployed in the area.
      
      (1) United States Postal Service (USPS) will continue to distribute to local Post Offices.

      (2) There are no initial restrictions on inbound mail. As the operation matures and the number of forces committed grows, restrictions may be applied.

   d. Planning Factors. Not applicable.

   e. Responsibilities

      (1) Military Postal Service Agency will provide technical guidance.
(2) USNORTHCOM will provide overall guidance to supporting commanders.

(3) USNORTHCOM will task a component to be in general and direct support for postal operations.

(4) Each Component/Joint Task Force (JTF), in accordance with (IAW) Service instructions, will develop and implement procedures to screen, identify, and handle suspected contaminated mail.

(5) Each Component/JTF IAW Service instructions, will develop and publish emergency actions procedures in the event a package is suspected of being contaminated.

HEADQUARTERS, US NORTHERN COMMAND
250 Vandenberg Street
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24 April 2008

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX E TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES

References:

a. See references (a) through (y) of base plan


c. Joint Pub 3-33, 16 February 2007, Joint Task Force Headquarters


g. DODD 1300.17, 3 February 1988, "Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military Services", with Change 1, 17 October 1988

h. DODD 1304.19, 11 June 2004, "Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Departments."


l. Air Force Instruction 52-101, 10 May 2005, "Planning and Organizing."

E-6-1
m. OPNAVINST 1730.1D, 6 May 2003, “Religious Ministries in the Navy.”

n. NWP 1.05, August 2003, “Religious Ministry in the U.S. Navy.”


p. MCWP 6-12, 12 Dec 2001, “Religious Ministry Support in the USMC.”


1. Situation

a. Purpose. This appendix is the USNORTHCOM Religious Support Plan (RSP) for planning and execution of CONPLAN 3501-07, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations. This appendix applies to all DOD forces and installations OPCON to USNORTHCOM for DSCA operations.

b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B.

c. Friendly Forces. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO), Faith-Based Organizations (FBO) and Community-Based Organizations (CBO) active in disasters which provide both disaster relief and religious support (RS) to victims, families and first responders.

d. Assumptions

(1) DSCA operations may develop rapidly and will create extraordinary stress on the force, requiring chaplain involvement during all phases of the operation, to include extensive follow up.

(2) There may be mass fatality events requiring spiritual and psychological intervention and extraordinary levels of religious support to the force.
(3) National Guard (NG) Religious Support Teams (RSTs), under supervision of commanders and coordination by the Joint Force Headquarters State (JFHQ-State) Command Chaplain, will normally be the first military chaplains on the scene during a catastrophic incident.

e. Limitations

(1) RST availability may be affected by competing operational commitments. Service augmentation or mobilization may be required.

(2) The presence of some contaminants in possible scenarios may require that affected areas and populations be quarantined. Quarantines will precipitate intense stress for affected civilians, their families outside the restricted zone, the enforcers of the quarantine, and those working with the quarantined.

(3) Communication between organizations and agencies may be severely impeded due to circumstances.

(4) In some possible scenarios, RSTs may themselves become physical, psychological and emotional casualties, and may require “care to the caregiver”, extensive professional follow-up, and short-notice reinforcement or replacement by follow-on RSTs.

2. Mission. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Chaplain (N-NC/HC) provides and coordinates religious support to the Command and authorized DOD personnel, in order to insure the free exercise of religion for forces in the AOR conducting DSCA operations.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Considerations common to all phases.

(a) N-NC/HC establishes theater religious support (RS) policy, provides RS to the Command, and coordinates RS activities of subordinate commands and JTFs for all phases of DSCA operations.

(b) RSTs provide RS to authorized DOD personnel during all phases of DSCA operations.
(c) CDRUSNORTHCOM will employ Strategic Communication and Public Information plans in coordination with civil authorities in order to mitigate fear and miscommunication. Chaplains have a role in advising the command on the impact of religion during DSCA operations. Chaplains may also assist in public information efforts as good will ambassadors and perceived trusted agents in order to mitigate fear and miscommunication.

(2) Support Planning

(a) Religious Support to DOD Forces. General planning considerations for ministry to DOD forces will be in accordance with Joint Pub 1-05, Joint Pub 3-28 and Joint Pub 3-33.

(b) Medical Services. Identify coordination and planning requirements for chaplain activities in support of Annex Q.

(c) Mortuary Affairs. At the national level, DHHS has responsibility to coordinate civilian fatality management with local, state and tribal authorities. RSTs will provide religious support to military units in handling of remains as needed IAW JP 4-06. DOD Mortuary Affairs personnel may be also tasked to assist other government agencies. During such operations, chaplains are present to provide pastoral care to DOD personnel. In addition, RSTs may assist in assessing and mitigating stress as part of a multidisciplinary stress management process (CISM or an equivalent method). Chaplains may render “honors” with respect to the remains of deceased individuals under the guidance provided by the Command Chaplain or as appropriate for uniformed/DOD personnel.

(d) Joint Emergency Family Assistance Center (JEFAC). JEFAC implementation will be IAW the JEFAC CONOPS (Annex E Appendix 9). Chaplain support will be provided to the JEFAC as required.

(3) Employment common to all phases

(a) Joint area religious support as defined in JP 3-28 and the USNORTHCOM CS CONEMP will be employed when necessary. The Joint Staff Standing DSCA EXORD contains military units that do not contain attached religious support capability (See Annex A Task Organization). NC/HC and the designated JTF RST shall coordinate joint area religious support for all DOD personnel with consideration given to faith group balance.
(b) In compliance with DOD policy, chaplains are noncombatants, and will not carry or use weapons under any circumstances. Chaplain Assistants and Religious Program Specialists are classified as combatants and therefore are authorized to carry and use weapons consistent with the defined Rules for the Use of Force.

(4) **Phase 0 (Shape).** RSTs provide RS to authorized DOD personnel and their families, plan for operations, and secure deployment liturgical supplies. RTF/JTF Chaplains coordinate with the N-NC/HC and subordinate chaplains to plan and prepare for the possibility of providing RS during DSCA operations. All RSTs in units designated for DSCA operations require appropriate DSCA familiarization training. Supervisory chaplains insure all RS personnel are qualified for worldwide deployment standards IAW established procedures and policies, and possess the required level of DSCA training, certification and equipment.

(5) **Phase 1 (Anticipate).** RSTs provide RS to authorized DOD personnel and conduct mission analysis. RSTs anticipate religious support needs, prepare religious support plans and develop standing requests for RS augmentation as appropriate. RSTs gain awareness of the presence of National Guard, USCG, NGOs, FBOs and CBOs in the JOA and prepare to conduct liaison as directed.

(6) **Phase II (Respond).** USNORTHCOM Service Component, RTF and JTF RSTs provide RS to authorized personnel. When RTFs/JTFs deploy Command Assessment Elements (CAE) to the disaster area, an RST may be included to assess the situation, the religious support needs of the affected population and provide situational awareness to the N-NC/HC. An RST may accompany the DCO if requested. Before and after forward movement, RSTs contact supervisory chaplains to coordinate religious support. RSTs continue to assess the situation, anticipate RS needs and immediately initiate reporting procedures. RSTs continue to monitor the presence of National Guard, USCG, NGOs, FBOs and CBOs in the JOA and conduct liaison as directed. Following certain mass fatality events, RSTs may be needed to provide religious support during medical triage, decontamination and palliative care to expectant casualties. When assigned RSTs are not available because of competing global requirements, Service Components shall cross-level to meet religious support requirements, or request that N-NC/HC submit a Request for Forces (RFF) for validated shortfalls.
(7) Phase III [Operate]. RSTs provide RS to authorized DOD personnel, coordinate religious support with supervisory chaplains, provide joint area religious support as coordinated by the designated JTF RST. The RST monitors stress levels of assigned personnel, first responders and affected civilians, takes actions to provide care and mitigate stress, and provides situational awareness reports to the commander. RSTs advise the command on indicators documenting civilian community capabilities to resume normal functioning without military support. RSTs conduct coordination and liaison with NG RSTs and other clergy or spiritual and faith based care personnel present. Local, state, tribal and federal fire and police agencies will have a large presence with chaplain support at DSCA incidents. RSTs focus on counseling, information gathering and facilitation with other NGOs, FBOs and CBOs as well as worship opportunities, memorial services and trauma event or stress management. RSTs may be present to prioritize RS to victims and provide requested emergency ministrations to evacuated victims. Critical Incident Stress debriefings should be considered in the JOA, not only for first responders but for RST personnel as well. Care for the caregiver is part of the overall pastoral care response.

Chaplain activities may differ based upon DSCA locations. RSTs should be present at the following key locations during a DSCA incident.

(a) Joint Field Office (JFO). The command chaplain or a senior RS representative locates at the JFO to serve as on-scene director of religious support in order to advise the DCO command element on religious support requirements and to coordinate religious support operations.

(b) Casualty Collection Points (CCP). RSTs are located at the CCP in order to provide RS to medical staff and victims during triage and staging and evacuation to hospitals or Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs).

(c) Expectant areas designated by medical personnel. RSTs should be located in the area designated for “expectant victims” in order to provide emergency ministrations.

(d) Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF). High volume of victims at MTFs would mandate assigning additional RS to the organic RSTs of the MTF.

(e) Mortuary Affairs Collection Points (MACP). Mass casualty events may result in exceedingly high demands for chaplains to support mortuary personnel and show “honor and respect” to the dead.
When directed, DOD chaplains may support such efforts along with civilian disaster clergy and spiritual and faith based care providers.

(8) **Phase IV (Stabilize).** RSTs advise the command on indicators documenting civilian community capabilities to return to normal functioning without military support. RSTs provide RS to authorized DOD personnel, continue to monitor stress levels and mitigate the impact of traumatic events, and provide situational awareness to commanders. RSTs coordinate scale down activities with the National Guard and civilian organizations and other agencies operating in the area.

(9) **Phase V (Transition).** RSTs conduct redeployment religious support to assigned personnel and their families, focusing on reunion and reintegration issues. RSTs complete RS missions, redeploy as directed, and provide reports and lessons learned as directed.

b. **Tasks**

(1) **USNORTHCOM Chaplain**

(a) Advise CDRUSNORTHCOM on issues pertaining to the free exercise of religion and the impact of religion on military operations.

(b) Coordinate religious support activities for Title 10 forces in the USNORTHCOM AOR to include unit and area religious support.

(c) Identify Unit Type Code (UTC)/Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) requirements to meet mission objectives, and coordinate with RTF/JTF Command Chaplains, Service Components, and the Joint Staff (JS) Chaplain.

(d) Establish reporting formats and suspense dates.

(e) Establish Chaplain policy and procedures for donated goods received from faith groups, charities, or individuals in conjunction with legal counsel and command policy.

(f) Establish method and means of communication.

(2) **ARNORTH, AFNORTH, MARFORNORTH, USFFC Command Chaplains**
(a) Coordinate RST UTC/TPFDD requirements with service component crisis action team planning and response groups, JTF and USNORTHCOM Chaplain.

(b) Be prepared to validate TPFDD modifications and/or RFFs for RST personnel.

(c) Ensure that authorized RST positions are filled in order to provide religious support to service personnel.

(d) AFNORTH shall ensure that deploying USAF EMEDs contain attached religious support capability of the appropriate UTCs in order to provide RS to EMEDS personnel and expected patient load.

(e) Be prepared to submit RFFs for additional RST personnel to provide RS during mortuary affairs operations.

(f) Plan for reconstitution of forces following cessation of operations.

(g) Train and equip RSTs for DSCA operations consistent with the directives of this appendix.

(3) Other supporting commands’ staff Chaplains Supporting commands’ staff chaplains include but are not limited to Active and Reserve Service Components, Air and Army NG, and the Coast Guard. N-NC/HC coordinates OPLAN guidance and execution with all appropriate departments for deployment and sustainment of forces.

(4) JTF-CS Chaplain

(a) Advise the USNORTHCOM Chaplain on distinctive component organizational and operational procedures and policies.

(b) Certify appropriate levels of training for RSTs. This should be based on the service component requirements for deployment of the RSTs.

(c) Coordinate joint area religious support for units employed in the DSCA JOA.

(d) Advise USNORTHCOM Chaplain in coordination with, Civil Affairs (CA), Legal and Public Affairs (PA) on the religious implications of operations in the JOA.
(e) Prepare to receive a chaplain from the National Guard Bureau Office of the Chaplain (NGB-OC) in order to facilitate coordination between the JTF Command Chaplain, NGB-OC, and NG RSTs in the JOA. The JTF chaplain will use the NGB LNO to maintain situational awareness of ongoing operations and religious support requirements.

(f) Plan for required RS augmentation to the JTF HQs to insure 24/7 capability for the JTF RST.

(g) Assume C2 for RSTs in the JOA.

(5) Chaplain Service Personnel

(a) Provide direct and indirect religious support for joint component military personnel, families, and authorized civilian DOD personnel.

(b) Acquire additional training for DSCA operations to enable chaplains to know how to respond and their limits in this environment. This training should include National Response Framework (NRF), National Incident Management System (NIMS) National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Disaster Mortuary Affairs Team (DMORT) training, Critical Incident Stress Debriefing and Management CISM/CISM, Post-Traumatic Stress, Applied Suicide Intervention Skill Training (ASIST), Joint Forces Chaplaincy Theater Training, public affairs/mass media and Mass Casualty (MASCAL).

(c) Personnel will meet service component standards for worldwide deployment, including receipt of appropriate immunizations.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Commanders will ensure that appropriate religious support is provided for their personnel IAW JP 1-05 and JP 3-28. The primary role of the RST is to provide religious support to authorized DOD personnel and their families.

(2) RSTs will follow command direction, joint doctrine, supervisory chaplain guidance and legal counsel when providing religious support during DSCA operations. RSTs will not normally provide religious support to persons unaffiliated with the Armed Forces. However, during rare and emergency conditions, and when directed or
upon individual and personal request during DSCA operations, RSTs may provide such support under the following conditions:

(a) Authorized Support: Generally, no such support could be authorized. However, in extraordinary circumstance, when a government-imposed burden interferes with free expression, an RST could conceivably be tasked, through normal channels, to temporarily provide religious support to non-DOD affiliated personnel, until unaffiliated clergy could be arranged. Such tasking must be explicit and unambiguous. Due to Constitutional concerns, such a mission would only be considered where the needs stemming from such government imposed burden are acute, and unaffiliated clergy are wholly unavailable.

(b) Incidental Support: Support provided ad-hoc, unplanned and upon individual and personal request, during the execution of an authorized mission. Such support incurs no incremental monetary cost and does not significantly detract from the primary role of the RST. Such incidental support must simultaneously meet the following conditions.

i. The support must be requested in an emergency situation, whereby the need is immediate, unusual and unplanned;

ii. The need must be acute. Acute needs are those which are of short duration, prone to rapid deterioration, and in need of immediate and urgent care. The provision of last rights is the clearest, but not the only, example of such needs; and

iii. The requested support must be incapable of being reasonably rendered by members of the clergy unaffiliated with the Armed Forces. Time, distance, and the state of communications may require such a determination to be made on the spot, by the Chaplain, based on the information available at the time.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Chaplain logistics, resupply, and material management are a service component responsibility.

b. Service components will ensure chaplain supplies and material are available to support rapid deployment and subsequent sustainment until routine resupply can be accomplished. Deploying personnel will have sufficient equipment and ecclesiastical supplies to sustain effective religious support for an initial period of thirty days.
c. Personnel. Reserve component/NG augmentation and mobilization are essential to mission accomplishment. Such procedures should be refined for expedient activation of Reserve/NG personnel.

d. Ground transportation will be the responsibility of deploying units. Deploying units need to provide dedicated ground transportation assets to the RSTs for use in their work.

5. Chaplain Communication

a. Coordinate security requirements for communication with appropriate authorities.

b. Routine communication among USNORTHCOM, service components, Sub-unified Commands, NGB-OC, and the RTF/JTF Command Chaplain directorates will be by telephone when possible. Routine communication in the JOA may be accomplished by battery operated hand held radios.

c. Official plans, orders, reports and request will be passed by NIPRNET, SIPRNET, STU phones, teleconference and/or AHMS messaging.

d. Reports

(1) Reports will be submitted as directed.

(2) RTF/JTF Command Chaplain will submit reports to the RTF/JTF Commander and to the USNORTHCOM Chaplain as required in the USNORTHCOM Battle Staff Operating Procedures.

(3) RSTs will prepare after action reports for submission to the RTF/JTF Command Chaplain and Service Component supervisors NLT thirty days after completion of deployments.

TAB A: Inter-Service Chaplain Support – Not Used
TAB B: Host-Nation religious support – Not Used
APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX E TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
EFAC CONOPS FOR DSCA

References: a. DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005
b. USNORTHCOM Strategic Action Plan, 16 December 2003
c. USNORTHCOM FY05 JMETL, ST 4.2; 8.4.5; 8.5; and 9.5
d. Memorandum from the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to NORAD-USNORTHCOM Commander, 17 August 2005
e. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Pentagon Family Assistance Center (PFAC) After Action Report, March 2003
f. DODD 1342.17, Family Policy and 1342.22, Family Centers
g. DODI 1300.18, “Military Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies and Procedures,” December 18, 2000

1. Situation

a. Purpose. This tab is the USNORTHCOM Emergency Family Assistance Center (EFAC) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) during Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

b. Conditions for Implementation. As directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM for situational awareness or in direct support of DSCA operations, USNORTHCOM will implement the EFAC CONOPS to assess the need for support to DOD personnel and their families and/or local, state and federal Family Assistance Centers (FACs) with a focus on DOD populations.

(1) A Command Assessment Element (CAE) may be deployed at the direction of the CRDUSNORTHCOM for situational awareness.

(2) USNORTHCOM will facilitate a graduated response to validated requests for EFAC support consistent with the Commander’s intent.
(3) EFAC manning will be sourced from the Services at large to augment Service specific FACs and/or support local, tribal, state and federal FACs. Under catastrophic conditions, a fully staffed EFAC may be sourced as a stand-alone capability to support DOD personnel and their families and to lessen the burden on local, state and tribal agencies.

c. **Scope.** This plan applies to any natural or manmade disaster requiring an EFAC response within the DSCA OA.

d. **Assumptions**

(1) Natural and manmade disasters are capable of overwhelming local, tribal, state, federal and DOD installation resources, including Service specific reach-back capabilities.

(2) DOD personnel and their families could be involved in a catastrophic event in significant numbers and represent a burden to civil authorities.

(3) EFAC staff requirements will be based upon the essential capabilities needed to accomplish mission objectives.

(4) EFAC manning is multidisciplinary and includes, but is not limited to, personnel from family support, public affairs, force protection, mental health, chaplains, casualty assistance, mortuary affairs, communications, and judge advocates.

2. **Mission.** USNORTHCOM will implement the EFAC CONOPS during DSCA operations to provide planning assistance and/or support the needs of DOD personnel and their families when a catastrophic event overwhelms available resources.

3. **Execution**

a. **Concept of Operations**

(1) **Commander's Intent.** If an overwhelming catastrophic event occurs impacting local, tribal, state and federal resources, USNORTHCOM will facilitate deployment of a tiered complement of EFAC capabilities or a stand-alone EFAC to mitigate the effects of the incident and initiate a return to normalcy.

(2) **Employment.** Operational control (OPCON) of EFAC staff members may be delegated to the on-scene Installation
Commander or the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander or retained by the CDRUSNORTHCOM, who will coordinate efforts with other agencies as appropriate.

(3) Deployment. EFAC capabilities may be deployed as elements, modules, cells or as a full complement of required services. An EFAC capability will be deployed when the Commander deems it necessary to provide DSCA to local, state or federal agencies, or to combine Service resources and/or when the incident impacts multiple Services.

(a) Religious Support Assessment Element (RSAE). The RSAE consists of one to four USNORTHCOM personnel to assess EFAC requirements, provide situational awareness to the Commander and advisory assistance to local, tribal, state, or federal agencies.

(b) EFAC Advance Coordinating Element (ACE). An ACE is a multi-disciplined, rapid response capability deployed forward to provide command and control (C-2) for EFAC operations. An ACE will consist of a cadre numbering five to fifteen personnel.

(c) EFAC Module. A module is a specialized skill set identified within an EFAC, such as communications, chaplains, mental health counselors, security forces, etc., which can be deployed to supplement an existing FAC.

(d) EFAC Cell. An EFAC Cell may be deployed to serve DOD personnel and their families as part of a local, state, or federal FAC. The EFAC Cell will provide a scaled range of EFAC services for military families contingent upon the needs of the affected DOD population. Services may include grief counseling, legal assistance, mortuary and casualty assistance, briefings on recovery ops, etc.

(e) Stand-Alone EFAC. A stand-alone EFAC consists of a full complement of services such as counseling, data collection, legal assistance, communications, public affairs, interagency support, and fatality management, including DNA collection and casualty assistance. A complete EFAC organization will consist of command, support and action centers. The minimum recommended grade for the EFAC Director is Colonel/CAPTAIN (O-6) and may require higher grades depending on the scale of the incident.
(f) CONOPs (figure 1).

DoD Centric Concept of Operations for EFAC

DoD Event:

- Catastrophic Event
  - Service Response
    - NORTHCOM CAE/ACE
      - NORTHCOM Module
        - NORTHCOM Cell
          - NORTHCOM EFAC

Civil Event Affecting DoD Families:

- Catastrophic Event
  - State Response
    - Local/State/Federal EFAC
      - NC Module
        - NC Cell
          - NC EFAC
            - NC Planners

Figure 1

(g) Resourcing. EFACs can require extensive resources and must be sourced under careful guidelines.

1. Requests for Assistance (RFAs) from local, state or federal FACs will be submitted through a Primary Agency IAW the National Response Framework (NRF). RFAs will then be validated according to DOD procedures.

2. On behalf of affected DOD personnel and their families, requests for EFAC capabilities will be coordinated through the Installation Commander to the appropriate Service, or JTF Commander or USNORTHCOM as events dictate. The Services will forward requests to USNORTHCOM which in turn will process a Request for Forces (RFF) through the
Joint Staff and the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as appropriate. The Services will then provide augmentation to resource the EFAC as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

4. **Selected Tasks**. Ensure 24/7 immediate and sustained crisis intervention by providing a central point of contact for sustained support and services to grieving DOD family members in the midst of DSCA operations and/or planning assistance for civil authorities as requested.

   a. CAE will provide an assessment to CDRUSNORTHCOM and the JTF Commander of situational needs and coordinate initial support to civil authorities.

   b. Provide psychological, spiritual and survivor benefit counseling to stabilize family distress, grief and shock.

   c. Establish a data collection center including a center.

   d. Arrange child-care services for families seeking EFAC services.

   e. Monitor the status of DSCA operations and update families on unfolding events through daily briefings.

   f. Schedule site visits, if appropriate, when conditions are safe.

   g. Facilitate reunification between families and victim’s remains.

   h. Honor fatalities by coordinating a memorial service(s) for families.

   i. Facilitate contact with families to foster assist their return to a functional lifestyle.

   j. Perform additional tasks as required including planning assistance to local, state and federal agencies if requested and feasible.

   k. A full complement of tactics, techniques and procedures will provide further guidance.
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24 April 2008

ANNEX F TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

References:
   a. Joint Publication 3-61, Public Affairs, 9 May 2005
   c. National Incident Management System (NIMS), March 2004

1. Situation

   a. General. This annex assigns responsibilities and provides guidance for
      military Public Affairs (PA) actions for Defense Support of Civil Authorities
      (DSCA). (See Annex C for operational details)

   b. Enemy. See basic plan

   c. Friendly. See basic plan

      (1) The DOD PA posture for DSCA is active when done in coordination
      with (ICW) the Primary Agency. Units supporting DSCA operations may
      discuss their specific mission assignments following receipt of
      deployment orders. Units should refrain from discussing the overall
      operation and refer queries to the Primary Agency or Department of
      Homeland Security (DHS), as appropriate. USNORTHCOM will issue PA
      guidance.

      (2) Prior to the issuance of USNORTHCOM guidance, questions
      regarding DSCA will be referred to the NORAD/USNORTHCOM (N/NC)
      PA or the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD)/PA.

   d. Assumptions. See basic plan

      (1) DOD will be in support of (ISO) a Primary Agency during DSCA
      operations. The Primary Agency will be responsible for leading public
      communications and must be prepared to direct operations in multiple
      Joint Areas of Operation.
(2) IAW the NRF, ESF15 will be activated placing DHS in charge of all public communication. SJFHQ-N will provide PA when directed by N/NC PA. SJFHQ-N will provide PA when directed by N/NC PA.

(3) A Federal Interagency Joint Information Center (JIC) will be established in the vicinity of the incident. DOD will provide representatives to that JIC.

(4) Combat Camera resources (as deployed by N-NC/J-39, see Appendix 9 to Annex C) will be available to document the DOD response (i.e., arrival of first troops, employment of DOD, significant operations, etc.) and provide a product in a timely manner to PA for review and release to the media.

2. **Mission.** PA personnel provide a free-flow of information to the public while at the same time protecting the inadvertent release of classified information.

3. **Execution**
   
a. **Concept of Operations**

   (1) A Public Affairs Officer (PAO) will deploy with the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) for major events or those that are expected to have significant public interest. Normally, the PAO will come from the Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). When the DCE does not have an assigned PA and ARNORTH PA cannot support, N-NC/PA may ask SJFHQ-N to deploy a PAO.

   (2) When deemed appropriate by the senior Public Affairs (PA) official with OPCON of all DOD PA personnel, additional PAOs will be deployed from the component command providing primary support to the event to staff the JIC. The Primary Agency may submit mission assignment to request DOD PA support in the JIC.

   (3) Units deploying for DSCA operations will deploy with PA personnel as part of their overhead staff. Deploying PA personnel will maintain regular contact with the DCO's PAO.

   (4) If the scope of a disaster, emergency, incident, or event requires the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF), the JTF PAO and N/NC PA will require augmentation. The Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) will deploy personnel, as required, to augment both staffs. Additional PA resources will be provided by the services as tasked by USJFCOM.

b. **Tasks**
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ANNEX J TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08  
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

c. National Incident Management System (NIMS), 1 March 2004  
d. Canada-US Civil Assistance Plan (CAP), 14 February 2008  
(FOUO)  
e. Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans, CJCSI 3141.01D, 24 April 2008 (U)  
f. USNORTHCOM OPORD 01-08, Realignment of USNORTHCOM and Operations within the USNORTHCOM AOR, 25 February 2008 (S/NF)  
g. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 May 2007 (U)  
h. The National Guard Bureau, DODD 5105.77, 21 May 2008  
i. NORAD-USNORTHCOM and NGB Memorandum of Agreement, 9 June 2005  
j. DSCA Responsibility for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, SecDef memo of 7 August 2007.

1. General  

a. Operational Areas.  

(1) AOR: Reference (a) defines the USNORTHCOM AOR as  
"USNORTHCOM's general geographic AOR for the conduct of normal operations includes North America, the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, the Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic Ocean from 169° W, east to 045° W, south to 270 30'N, west to 079° 15W, south to 26° 15'N, east to 078° 45W, south to 22° 45'N, west
along the northern Cuban territorial waters to 23°N/084°W, southwest to the Yucatan peninsula at 21°N/086°45W, south from Mexico at 092° W to 08° N, west to 112° W, northwest to 50° N/ 142° W, west to 170°E, north to 53°N, northeast to 65°307N/ 160W, and north to 90°N.

(2) USNORTHCOM’s AO for DSCA is the 48 contiguous states, the District of Columbia, and the state of Alaska.

(3) The State of Alaska is a standing JOA for JTF-AK.

(4) The National Capital Region (NCR) is a standing JOA for JFHQ-NCR. The NCR is defined by the National Capital Planning Act (Title 40, USC, Section 71(b)) as the District of Columbia, Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties of Maryland, Arlington, Fairfax, Loudon, and Prince William Counties of Virginia, and all cities now or hereafter existing in Maryland or Virginia within the geographic area bounded by the outer boundaries of the jurisdictions in the State of Maryland and the Commonwealth of Virginia. (See Figure J-1)

(5) CDRUSNORTHCOM is the approval authority for the establishment/modification of JOAs.

Figure J-1, JFHQ-NCR JOA

b. Scope
(1) Annex J establishes and describes the C2 relationships between CDRUSNORTHCOM and the following entities for DSCA operations:

(a) Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the Office of the SecDef (OSD)

(b) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff (JS)

(c) U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)

(d) U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

(e) USNORTHCOM Subordinate and Component Commands

(f) Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

(g) State response forces under the C2 of the governor, specifically National Guard forces operating under Title 32 or State Active Duty (SAD).

(2) The relationships established in this annex apply to all DOD personnel deployed to a DSCA operation under CDRUSNORTHCOM’s C2 (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, ADCON, supporting).

(3) Upon SecDef-approval, forces/capabilities will be provided to CDRUSNORTHCOM at the direction of the SecDef via Commander, Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) and/or other force provider(s) including, but not limited to, the Services, CSAs, USTRANSCOM, and supporting CCDRs.

2. Mission. See Basic Plan

3. Execution. The execution of DSCA operations is accomplished using a functional component command structure. The C2 structure upon execution (post-event/incident) is scaled and adapted to the C2 guidance described in the National Response Framework (NRF), specifically, the Joint Field Office (JFO).

a. Phase 0 (Shape). Phase 0 activities (pre-event/incident) are conducted under a command structure as depicted in figure J-2.
b. Phase I-V Command and Control. CDRUSNORTHCOM will, upon receiving OPCON of response forces, transfer OPCON of these forces to a designated functional component commander or JTF. The figures in this annex depict relationships between USNORTHCOM, its subordinates, and primary mission partners. Consequently, not all departments or agencies are listed, nor are all relationships shown in every figure. A coordinating or C2 relationship can exist without explicit illustration in this annex. In addition, CDRUSNORTHCOM may direct SJFHQ-N to augment a component commander’s staff to provide functional expertise from other service components.
(1) Per Reference (f), CDRUSARNORTH is USNORTHCOM’s standing Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC).

(2) Per Reference (f), CDRUSAFNORTH is USNORTHCOM’s standing Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC).

(3) Per Reference (f), CDRUSFF is USNORTHCOM’s standing Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC).

c. Other C2 Structures.

(1) DSCA Operations in a Standing JOA. JTF-AK and JTF-NCR will operate independent of a USNORTHCOM functional component commander. They will establish C2 within their JOAs per figure J-4.
(2) **Dual Status Commander.**

(a) **Title 32 Officer.** A NG officer ordered to Title 10 active duty may C2 Title 32, SAD, and Title 10 forces. A simplified example of this C2 structure is illustrated in figure J-5.

(b) **Title 10 Officer.** A Title 10 officer who accepts a NG state commission may C2 Title 32, SAD, and Title 10 forces.

(c) **Coordination.** Ideally, the recommendation to appoint a dual status commander will originate as a consensus between the state (governor and TAG) and USNORTHCOM with input from NGB and the Joint Staff.

(d) **Advantages.** Dual status commands are advantageous in that a single commander is enabled to make decisions (based on a more complete situational awareness) on issues that frequently affect the planning/operations of both forces under his command.

(e) **Limitations.** When a dual status commander is appointed, the commander receives orders/guidance from both the State and Federal chains of command. It is important to note that though the commander is dual status,
the forces under his/her command are not. Therefore, the commander directs non-federalized NG forces to perform state missions for the Governor through The Adjutant General (TAG). Likewise, the commander directs Title 10 forces perform DSCA missions for the President through CDRUSNORTHCOM. Additionally, the framework in which Title 10 forces perform missions in the JOA is subject to the same limitations/processes/procedures (funding, MA/RFF, etc) as a Title 10 only commander. Additionally, reference (i) prohibits the commander from placing Title 10 forces under the C2 of Title 32 only commanders. (Cannot place at Title 10 medical company OPCON/TACON to a Title 32 medical battalion)

![Dual Status Commander Diagram]

Figure J-5, Dual Status Commander

(3) **DCO as Joint Force Commander.** During the initial stages of a contingency or in a small scale DSCA operation, the DCO may be designated the Joint Force Commander. A key consideration in this arrangement is span of control as the DCO/DCE has limited C2 capacity.

d. **Specialized Assignments.** None
4. Support and Coordination Relationships

a. Supporting Military Forces. When directed by the SecDef, the following U.S. commands provide support to CDRUSNORTHCOM in the event of a DSCA incident. Additional requirements may be identified during crisis action planning as a result of a particular event/incident.

(1) Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM). When directed by SecDef, CDRUSJFCOM provides support by serving as the primary joint force provider for DSCA response forces. CDRUSJFCOM exercises COCOM authority over USFF, USNORTHCOM's naval component.

(2) Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM). When directed by SecDef, CDRUSTRANSCOM provides strategic movement of forces in support of CDRUSNORTHCOM, and serves as the mobility force provider. With the exception of MAFSS capable C-130 aircraft, CDRUSTRANSCOM retains OPCON of all USTRANSCOM mobility forces.

(3) Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM). When directed by SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM provides support by serving as a force provider.

(4) Military Services. When approved by the SecDef, the military services provide forces, facilities, and other resources to CDRUSNORTHCOM in support of DSCA operations.

(5) Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB). NGB is USNORTHCOM's official channel to the states, including state National Guard elements, for planning. The NGB and USNORTHCOM also share information throughout all phases of DSCA operations, see Reference (h).

b. Coordinating Authorities. Specific requirements will be identified during crisis action planning.

c. Coordination with the state National Guard (NG) forces. National Guard forces in a non-federalized status operate under state control. During execution of DSCA operations, coordination will occur as necessary between Title 10 DSCA response forces and state's forces (including National Guard forces).

5. Relationships with Multinational and Foreign Commands and Organizations. USNORTHCOM will coordinate with DOS as required for incidents that have a potential impact on foreign mission partner countries. In the case of Canada, the Canada-US Civil Assistance Plan (CANUS CAP)
establishes a process whereby military forces can be leveraged between the US and Canada for mutual support, see Reference (d).

6. Planning Relationships. The JSCP directs coordinating planning efforts with USPACOM, USTRANSCOM, and USOUTHCOM. Furthermore, standing CJCS instructions direct a JPEC review during periodic plan revision, see reference (e). Additionally, USNORTHCOM coordinates with the NGB and interagency partners (via the Interagency Coordination Directorate) for DSCA planning.

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ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U)
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER (C4) SYSTEMS (U)

(U) References:

a. (U) Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 13 Feb 06
b. (U) Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air
   Operations, 5 Jun 03 (U)
c. (U) Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land
   Operations, 23 Mar 04 (U)
d. (U) Joint Publication 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime
   Operations, 8 Aug 06 (U)
e. (U) Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communications System, 20 Mar 06
f. (U) CJCSI 3110.10D, Command, Control, Communications and Computer
   (C4) Systems Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 02, 31
   Aug 07 (U)
g. (U) CJCSM 3115.01A, Joint Data Networking Operations, 1 Sep 04 (U)
h. (U) USNORTHCOM Communications Extension Standards Guidance and
   Telecommunications Rules of Engagement, 27 Jul 06 (U)

1. (U) Situation.

   a. (U) Enemy. See Base Plan. The potential exists for the enemy to cause
      disruptions or outages of the Global Information Grid (GIG) and the Defense
      Information Systems Network (DISN), to include but not limited to commercial
      Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), cellular telephone systems, radio
      networks, Internet Protocol (IP) router networks (SIPRNET, NIPRNET),
      commercial internet, and commercial long-haul telecommunications network.

   b. (U) Friendly. DOD resources must be capable of establishing voice and
      data communications directly through their chain of command with
      USNORTHCOM, the Principal Federal Agencies, other Supporting Agencies,
      civil authorities, and other supporting forces to effectively manage the
      situation. As the supported commander for Defense Support of Civil Authorities
      (DSCA), CDRUSNORTHCOM will have operational lead for NetOps which is
      executed through a designated Service lead and supported by USSTRATCOM.
      Mission partners include agencies and organizations within and beyond DOD.

      (1) (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Approves
      requirements for and identifies sources of tactical and gateway
      communications-electronics assets requested by USNORTHCOM.
(2) [U] Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (CDSUSSTRATCOM). Provides SATCOM and NetOps support within the AOR.

(3) [U] Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CDRNORAD). Provides access to the NORAD COP and input to the USNORTHCOM COP.

(4) [U] Supporting Combatant Commands/Military Services/Agencies. Support CDRNORTHCOM when directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

(5) [U] The National Communications System (NCS).

(a) [U] The mission of the NCS is to assist the President, the National Security Council (NSC), the Homeland Security Council (HSC), the Director, Office of Science Technology and Policy (OSTP), and the Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in:

1. [U] Exercise of telecommunications functions and responsibilities assigned by the President to organizations of the Executive Office of the President.

2. [U] Coordination of the planning for and provision of NS/EP communications for the Federal Government under all circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attach, recovery, and reconstitution.

b. [U] The mission of the National Coordination Center (NCC) is to assist in the initiation, coordination, and restoration, and reconstitution of NS/EP telecommunications services or facilities. The NCC will perform or contribute to the performance of the telecommunications functions assigned to the NCC. The NCC is the NCS' 24-hour operations center. The NCC monitors the status of the nation’s telecommunications resources, gathers and maintains information regarding these assets, and prepares to respond to NS/EP telecommunications service requirements. During times of emergency or major disaster, the NCC provides information to the Manager, NCS in support of ESF#2 requirements. If an incident occurs, the NCC has the most current status of the commercial telecommunications infrastructure and capabilities in the incident area. It has access to Local Exchange Carrier and Local Access Transport Area boundaries and other proprietary information. The USNORTHCOM NCS liaison can be contacted at (719) 244-8822 or (719) 556-2134.

(6) [U] Defense Information System Agency (DISA). DISA is a combat support agency responsible for planning, engineering, acquiring, fielding, and supporting global net-centric solutions to serve the needs of the President, Vice President, the SecDef, and other DoD Components, in peace and war.
(a) (U) Provides use of existing GIG and DISN assets to meet operational requirements of USNORTHCOM.

(b) (U) Provides primary and alternate routing of DISN services for command and control (C2) elements supporting USNORTHCOM. This includes use of alternate entry stations to restore connectivity in the event of failures.

(c) (U) Provides provisioning and restoral coordination for DISA leased commercial communications service.

(7) (U) **U.S. Coast Guard.** Provides communications support as directed.

(8) (U) **National Guard Bureau (NGB).** Provides C4 support as directed.

(9) (U) **Canada Command.** Liaison for coordinating C4 support.

c. (U) **Assumptions**

(1) (U) Funds will be available for extending communications services.

(2) (U) Sufficient Satellite Communications (SATCOM) resources and assets will be made available.

(3) (U) Required communications facilities and circuits will be available.

(4) (U) Intra-theater transportation support for deploying highest priority communications resources will be available and limited.

(5) (U) A large percentage of the JOA infrastructure could be destroyed or degraded, to include commercial power grids. A robust tactical C4 architecture may be required due to disruptions in the communications infrastructure.

(6) (U) NS/EP may be invoked for the AOR.

(7) DOD systems and networks must have the ability to react to a catastrophic event, and provide critical voice and data capabilities to support operations of essential civil authorities.

2. (U) **Mission.** Plan, install, operate, and maintain C4 systems in support of the CONPLAN missions.

3. (U) **Execution**

   a. (U) **Concept of Operations**
(1) (U) Support for the baseline C4 systems and other communications capabilities requires planning for connectivity to DISN services to provide secure and non-secure voice, data, e-mail, file transfer, and VTC services.

(2) (U) Communications with intergovernmental partners will continue to evolve as mission requirements are defined and as the situation dictates. The C2 HQ will ensure coordination with intergovernmental participants for implementation of critical links supporting communications and information.

(3) (U) The Information Synchronization Group (ISG) synchronizes the mission and function of the cyberspace domain and provides decision makers and mission partners with relevant, accurate, and timely information in order to achieve decisive levels of shared and accessible knowledge.

(4) (U) The N-NC/J6 also serves as the ISG Director and provides overall leadership and direction for Information Synchronization functions. The ISG consists of the Director, the Joint Information Synchronization Cell (JISC) Chief (N-NC/J63), the C4 Planners Cell, NORAD C4 Planners, Joint Communications Support Center (JSCS), TNCC, and Knowledge Management Cell (KMC). The KMC also includes the Information Exchange Brokers (IEBs), who are assigned to support other battle staff cells. USNORTHCOM has tactical control (TACON) of the DISA Theater NetOps Center-North (TNC-N).

(5) (U) The JISC is the primary node responsible for overseeing and directing the operational processes of the ISG. The JISC accomplishes Information Synchronization and Knowledge Management activities. Elements subordinate to the JISC include the CPC, TNCC, TNC-N, JSCS, and the KMC.

b. (U) Tasks.

(1) (U) N-NC/J6

(a) (U) Oversee and monitor networks in support of USNORTHCOM. Set policies and provide guidance to ensure C4 equipment interoperability, compatibility and integration between USNORTHCOM, Services, components, and other supporting commands and agencies.

(b) (U) Establish a TNCC to oversee and monitor JTF Joint Network Control Centers (JNCC).

(c) (U) Establish, a Joint Frequency Management Office North (JFMO NORTH) with the overall responsibility for spectrum management for joint operations within the JOA/AOR

(d) (U) Coordinate use of joint keying materials.
(e) (U) Release a COMSEC Call Out message to supporting units.

(f) (U) Request, coordinate, and validate the interfaces (protocols, standards, etc.) between commercial and fixed communications systems.

(g) (U) Develop, promulgate, and update the JCEOI.

(h) (U) Identify, review, validate, assess and obtain SATCOM services.

(i) (U) Develop and validate C4 CIP issues within the JOA.

(j) (U) Identify, validate, and prioritize Standard Tactical Entry Point (STEP) support for USNORTHCOM.

(k) (U) Coordinate with USJFCOM for C4 support to supporting units.

(l) (U) Coordinate with NCS to provide National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) requested by CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(m) (U) Manage the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) supporting the USNORTHCOM Common Operational Picture (COP).

(2) (U) USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office (DISA-North)

(a) (U) Provide a liaison to the HQ USNORTHCOM Adaptive Organizations, JTFs and USNORTHCOM Battle Staff Cells when mutually coordinated or agreed upon.

(b) (U) Provide interface with HQ DISA to leverage DISA support.

(c) (U) In conjunction with NCS, coordinate NSEP actions.

(d) (U) Assist USNORTHCOM planners in identifying DISA provided communications capabilities during course of action (COA) development.

(3) (U) National Security Agency (NSA)

(a) (U) Provides COMSEC materials system (CMS) support as required.

(b) (U) Provides cryptographic support as required.

(4) (U) Army North [ARNORTH]; Air Force North [AFNORTH]; Marine Corps Forces North [MARFORNORTH]; U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF); Joint Task Force -Civil Support [JTF-CS]; JTF-North [JTF-N]; Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region [JFHQ-NCR]; JTF-Alaska [JTF-AK].
(a) (U) Provide C4 personnel and equipment support for JTF HQ.

(b) (U) When designated, nominate and provide a JTF/J6.

(c) (U) Be prepared to establish JTF C4 nodes.

(d) (U) Be prepared to establish a JNCC in support of this plan. JNCC will be responsible for overall network management of the deployed C4 systems for the JTF and its subordinates. JNCC will also be responsible to provide a "Help Desk as the single POC for all network, computer, and phone problems.

(e) (U) Provide a C4 planning team for deployed JTF JNCC.

(f) (U) Identify to USNORTHCOM J6 C4 requirements, to include JCSE or SATCOM access support. Include C4I locations within the JOA that should be assessed for additional CIP support or protection.

(g) (U) Plan communications interoperability procedures for operations with USNORTHCOM Service Components, support elements, and civil agencies.

(h) (U) Be prepared to provide C4 support for follow-on units.

(i) (U) Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM TNCC who will in turn forward the request through the USNORTHCOM DISA Field Office.

(j) (U) Be prepared to assist with maintenance and support of C4 equipment supporting DCO, DCE, QRF, and RRF missions as outlined.

(k) (U) Submit reports IAW Tab F to Appendix 6.

(l) (U) Provide unit and track data to the USNORTHCOM COP.

(m) (U) AFNORTH will facilitate the implementation of the Full Motion Video (FMV) to assist in critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.

5 (U) Commander, USJFCOM; Commander, Joint Communications Support Element (CDR/JCSE)

(a) (U) Upon CJCS approval, provide C4 planning teams, expertise, personnel and equipment, as available.

(b) (U) Plan and coordinate spectrum management requirements for joint operations through JFMO NORTH.
(c) (U) Provide a frequency manager and basic frequency management training for the JTF Joint Spectrum Management Element as required.

c. (U) Special Measures

(1) (U) Any Commander imposing MINIMIZE within the USNORTHCOM AOR will coordinate with N-NC/J6.

(2) (U) Requests for deployed routing indicators and plain language addressees or Defense Messaging System (DMS) support will be forwarded via chain of command, to N-NC/J6 in accordance with Service directives.

(3) (U) IA and Information Systems Security for a specific contingency management operation will be addressed by N-NC/J6 or the JTF Information Manager (IM), in the appropriate orders (EXORD, DEPORD, etc.).

(4) (U) Information Conditions (INFOCON) within the USNORTHCOM AOR will be declared by CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(5) (U) Commanders of supporting forces will identify personnel and equipment shortfalls limiting support of this plan to N-NC/J6 via SITREP.

(6) (U) Forward requests for commercial C4 restoral or provisioning in the incident area via the USNORTHCOM TNCC.

(7) (U) Service and country TEMPEST standards will be followed.

(8) (U) Existing communications infrastructure will be used to the maximum extent possible.

(9) (U) JFMO NORTH coordinates approval of military radio frequencies and those required for interoperability with civil authorities.

(10) (U) Coalition Communications links should be used in accordance with Host Nation agreements.

(11) (U) Joint communications procedures will be employed unless otherwise directed. Joint procedures will supercede individual Service doctrine.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics.

a. (U) Logistics. Refer to Annex D.

(1) (U) USNORTHCOM components and agencies will fund their costs incurred as a result of this operation to include all pre-deployment costs and
ongoing costs of transportation support to and from the USNORTHCOM JOA. Component commands will track costs and report costs to their comptrollers.

(2) (U) Maintenance and logistics support of communications resources tasked to support joint requirements will be the responsibility of supporting Services unless other arrangements are made through prior coordination.

b. (U) Administration


(2) (U) Reporting requirements will be directed by EXORD or DEPORD.

5. (U) Command and Control


b. C4 Systems. Refer to the appendices for C4 requirements.

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Appendices

1 -- (U) Information Assurance
2 -- (U) Satellite Communications Planning
3 -- (U) Defense Courier Service
4 -- (U) Foreign Data Exchange
5 -- (U) Frequency Spectrum Planning
6 -- (U) C4 Planning

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APPENDIX J TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U) INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) (U)

(U) References:

a. (U) DOD Instruction O-8530.2, Support to Computer Network Defense, 9 Mar 01 (U)

b. (U) DOD Directive 8500.01E, Information Assurance, 24 Oct 02 (U)

c. (U) DOD Instruction 8500.02, Information Assurance Implementation, 6 Feb 03 (U)

d. (U) DOD Directive O-8530.1, Computer Network Defense, 8 Jan 01 (U)

e. (U) DOD Instruction O-8530.2, Support to Computer Network Defense, 9 Mar 01 (U)

f. (U) Interim DOD Certification and Accreditation Process Guidance, 6 Jul 06 (U)

g. (U) NSA Information Assurance Technical Framework Forum, Information Assurance Technical Framework (IATF), Release 3.1, Sep 06 (U)

h. (U) NSTISSI No. 4013, National Information Assurance Training Standard for System Administrators (SA), Mar 04 (U)

i. (U) CJCSI 3210.01B, Information Operations Policy, 5 Jan 07 (S)

j. (U) CJCSI 6510.01E, Defense in Depth: Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense, 15 Aug 07 (U)

k. (U) CJCSM 6510.01, Defense-in-Depth: Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense, 25 Mar 03; Change 1, 10 Aug 04; Change 2, 26 Jan 06; Change 3, 8 Mar 06 (U)

l. (U) Joint Pub 3-13, Information Operations, 13 Feb 06 (U)

m. (U) Deputy SecDef Memorandum, DOD Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA), 30 Dec 99 (U)
n. (U) Strategic Command Directive, SD 527-1, Department of Defense (DOD) Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) Systems Procedures, 27 Jan 07 (U)

1. (U) Situation.

a. (U) General. Advanced information systems technology today represents the cutting edge in many of our weapons, sensors, and C4 systems. This advanced technology is also a threat to military systems due to the availability of inexpensive attack alternatives to our adversaries. Adversaries have an array of attack options available including Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) and other Offensive Information Operations (OIO) options. For these reasons, a coordinated and structured strategy must be employed to defend against adversarial attacks on DOD computers and computer networks of the Global Information Grid (GIG).

b. (U) Enemy. We can expect the enemy to possess or acquire the capability to launch CNA against USNORTHCOM networks from almost anywhere in the world. These attacks may be conducted over a variety of transmission mechanisms disguised as harmless traffic but are intended to disrupt, delay or prevent information exchange and disrupt military operations. Attacks on DOD computer networks may be launched in a variety of ways. Examples include:

   (1) (U) Passive Attack. Includes traffic analysis, monitoring of unprotected communications, decrypting traffic and capturing user names and passwords.

   (2) (U) Active Attack. Includes social engineering, denial of service attacks, attempts to circumvent or break security features, introduce malicious code, steal or modify information. Active attacks may also include the malicious modification of hardware or software at the factory, or modification or substitution of computer code during distribution.

   (3) (U) Insider Attack. Insider attacks are those performed by individuals who have authorized access to the network. Insider attacks may be either active or passive and intentional or unintentional. All insider attacks on the information or information system may have security consequences and disrupt network services.

c. (U) Friendly. All organizations are involved in protecting communications networks. USSTRATCOM via Joint Task Force-Global Net Ops (JTF-GNO) is responsible for processing and disseminating IA Vulnerability Alerts (IAVAs)/IA Vulnerability Bulletins (IAVBs) which include implementing instructions.

2. (U) Mission. Protect information by ensuring systems availability, integrity and confidentiality, and detecting, reporting, and recovering from incidents.

3. (U) Execution. USNORTHCOM shall incorporate both technical and non-technical means to employ multiple protections within information systems and their supporting networks to establish and maintain a strong IA posture.
a. (U) **Concept of Operations.** The USNORTHCOM Computer Network Defense (CND) strategy employs people, technology and operations to provide a defense-in-depth of DOD networks.

(i) (U) USNORTHCOM networks must be protected against unauthorized access and denial of service attacks to the maximum extent possible.

(2) (U) DOD systems and networks must have the ability to react to a catastrophic event and restore critical capabilities to support operations.

b. (U) **Tasks.** All USNORTHCOM functional components and assigned forces will develop and implement a CND program. USNORTHCOM subordinate elements and staff must accomplish the tasks listed below.

(1) (U) Ensure all computer networks are reinforced with access control and strong identification and authentication measures within the system or network management components.

(2) (U) Enforce the need-to-know principle for access to computer networks and specific types of information (e.g., intelligence, proprietary).

(3) (U) Ensure network enclaves are protected by intrusion detection systems and firewalls.

(4) (U) Ensure networks are protected by DOD licensed anti-virus software.

(5) (U) Ensure that classified or sensitive information transmitted between networks over a non-secure medium is encrypted or travels through an approved, protected distribution system.

(6) (U) Provide for an IA monitoring and analysis capability that includes review of audit, firewall and intrusion detection logs.

(7) (U) Ensure that Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP) are developed and tested for all mission critical and support systems.

(8) (U) Ensure electronic transaction data integrity and authentication are enhanced using appropriate combinations of digital signature, keyed hash and encryption mechanisms, whenever possible.

(9) (U) Ensure systems are deployed and implemented as outlined in the accreditation package approved by the Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA).

(10) (U) Ensure all personnel who use, operate, administer, or maintain DOD computers and computer networks receive IA awareness training. Ensure all system administrators are certified in accordance with DOD skill qualifications and training level requirements.

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**UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO**
(11) (U) Ensure all systems comply with DOD, USNORTHCOM, and service COMSEC instructions and regulations.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics.
   a. (U) Units tasked to provide COMSEC service will support requests from operational elements for keying material required to support operations.
   b. (U) Acquire security related COTS products (anti-virus software, enterprise security management software, etc.) required to protect USNORTHCOM information systems, including those used to protect "sensitive" information.
   c. (U) Operational units will identify their COMSEC requirements early to the base or facility COMSEC service to ensure the key material is on hand.

5. (U) Command and Control. Report all possible compromises of COMSEC keys to the unit COMSEC Custodian.

Tabs
- (U) Information Security (INFOSEC)
- (U) Theater COMSEC Management
- (U) Cryptographic Instructions
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TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501(U)
INFORMATION SECURITY (INFOSEC) (U)

(U) References:

a. (U) DOD Directive 8570.01, Information Assurance Training, Certification
   And Workforce Management, 15 Aug 04 (U)

b. (U) CJCSI 3210.01B, Information Operations Policy, 5 Jan 07 (S)

c. (U) Interim DOD Certification and Accreditation Process Guidance, 6 Jul
   06 (U)

1. (U) Purpose. This tab establishes USNORTHCOM’s Information Security
   procedures to ensure the defense of DOD information and information systems
   that Combatant Commanders, Services, and agencies rely on to conduct
   operations. It includes processes and procedures necessary to achieve a
   secure information environment in which unauthorized elements are denied
   access. It includes the responsibilities, concepts and procedures of Information
   Security (INFOSEC), including COMSEC and Computer Security (COMPUSEC).

2. (U) General. INFOSEC is critical to the successful execution of US military
   operations. The provisions of this tab apply to all USNORTHCOM computers
   and networks. The objective of this tab is to provide for transmission security,
   cryptographic security, and the physical security necessary to support
   INFOSEC and ultimately CND.

   a. (U) Training.

      (1) (U) The Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA), Information
           Assurance Manager (IAM), Information Assurance Officer (IAO), System
           Administrators, Information Assurance Professionals, JTF-C2 Protect Officer
           and others assigned Automated Information system (AIS) and computer
           network security responsibilities must be properly trained in security principles
           and techniques per reference c to ensure the program is properly administered.

      (2) (U) Personnel with access to USNORTHCOM computer networks will
           be familiar with the USNORTHCOM Information Assurance Awareness
           Program.

   d. (U) Certification & Accreditation.
(1) (U) Information and processes must be protected to ensure a level of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability exist and ensure NORAD-USNORTHCOM operations are not disrupted.

(2) (U) All information systems to include stand-alone personal computers, connected systems, and networks must be accredited IAW the DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Program (DIACAP).

3. (U) Execution.
   
   a. (U) Concept of COMSEC Support. Detailed in Tab B of this Appendix.

   b. (U) Concept of COMPUSEC. Fundamental COMPUSEC safeguards shall be enforced to limit access to authorized persons, assure data integrity and provide for continuity of operations.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics. Units are required to protect their information and information systems IAW written policy and procedures.

5. (U) Physical Security. Units are required to protect their information and information systems IAW written policy and procedures commensurate to high classification of information processed.
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TAB B TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K SUPPORTING USNORTHCORE CONPLAN 3501 (U)
THEATER COMSEC MANAGEMENT (U)

(U) References:

a. (U) DOD Directive 8523, Communications Security (COMSEC), Draft (C)

b. (U) NTISSD 600, Communication Security Monitoring, 10 Apr 90

c. (U) CNSSI 7000, TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities, May 04 (C)

d. (U) CJCSI 6510.06, Communications Security Releases to Foreign Nations, 18 Dec 06


1. (U) **Purpose.** Establishes the INFOSEC/COMSEC procedures to attain a secure communications-electronics (C-E) environment where hostile elements are denied interception, intrusion, extraction, imitative deception, and analysis of essential of friendly information (EEFI). Additional procedures will be cleared through the N-NC/J6 COMSEC office prior to implementation.

2. (U) **General.** These provisions apply to all who use secure USNORTHCOM C4 systems in the performance of their duties.

3. (U) **Execution.**

a. (U) **Concept of COMSEC Support Operations.** Achieve maximum protection against hostile interception and analysis of communications by:

   (1) (U) Minimum use of non-secure systems.

   (2) (U) Complying with established red and black installation standards.
(3) (U) Separation of classified from unclassified processors to minimize acoustical and electromagnetic coupling possibly resulting in inadvertent transmission of classified information beyond physical control zones.

(4) (U) Bulk encrypting transmissions reducing interception vulnerability.

(5) (U) Establishing procedures to reduce electro-magnetic emissions (reduce transmitter power, use directional antennas, eliminate unnecessary transmissions).

(6) (U) Training and practicing sound electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM).

(7) (U) Establishing a Joint Theater COMSEC Management Office with a primary mission to provide centralized control of the distribution of COMSEC key materials in the AOR supporting NORAD-USNORTHCOM operations.

(8) (U) Securing links to coalition elements using U.S.-based COMSEC. Releasing COMSEC to a coalition partner requires prior NSA approval and use of special-purpose cryptographic devices. Until release approval is received or where no releasable U.S. COMSEC devices are available, U.S. TSEC-nomenclature COMSEC may be used at a coalition location if it remains under continuous, positive control of U.S. personnel. Foreign nationals cannot view COMSEC rekeying activities. During periods of non-U.S. presence, the U.S. COMSEC equipment will be zeroized, removed, and securely stored in locations under U.S. control.

(9) (U) USNORTHCOM COMSEC Management Office is the DOD POC for COMSEC management in USNORTHCOM and provides overall policy guidance.

b. (U) Tasks.

(1) (U) Commanders will ensure appropriate joint, Service component, and unit-unique cryptographic codes and authenticators are issued from unit accounts to support operations.

(2) (U) Responsible personnel will account for and provide physical security of all classified communications equipment, materials, and directives.

(3) (U) Responsible personnel will maintain continuous accountability of all COMSEC material according to prescribed service directives.

(4) (U) Commanders ensure custodians are trained on the Electronic Key Management System (EKMS) which is the primary means for distributing keying materials in the AOR.
(5) (U) Only approved storage facilities will be used for COMSEC material.

(6) (U) COMSEC materials will be destroyed IAW Service procedures.

(7) (U) Commanders will ensure personnel are briefed on the following:

(a) (U) Proper COMSEC procedures.

(b) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

(c) (U) Proper use of call signs, crypto codes, and authentication systems.

(d) (U) Techniques and countermeasures to use when confronted with communications deception and jamming.

(8) (U) The Joint COMSEC Management Office Intertheater COMSEC Package (ICP) will be used to support joint secure communications connectivity, other specific circuits and interoperability. USNORTHCOM will issue COCOM level COMSEC Call Out messages providing additional specific guidance as needed in coordination with supported and supporting Combatant Commanders. USNORTHCOM AOR-specific COMSEC will be distributed in-theater from the JTCMO to the units, when directed.

(9) (U) Component headquarters (HQ) will ensure units requisition listed materials, based on required connectivity, from Service cryptologic depots in advance of deployment. Deploying units will take all assigned/on-hand joint, Service, and unit-unique material. The basic deployment load for ICP and non-ICP material is current one (1) month plus three (3) reserve editions/months. Refer problems encountered in obtaining keying material for joint requirements to N-NC/J6 for resolution.

(10) (U) To order required cryptographic material, one-time holders of ICP material will submit requests, through Service channels, to the Joint COMSEC Management Office (JCMO) ICP manager, and info N-NC/J6.

(11) (U) Requests for cryptographic period freezes or extensions associated with AOR contingency operations will be considered on a case-by-case basis for nets secured by ICP or USNORTHCOM short titles prescribed for joint and/or combined interoperability. Requested or proposed freeze of ICP will be IAW applicable JCMO ICP Policy, while freeze of USNORTHCOM controlled short titles will be at the direction of the N-NC/J6.
(12) (U) COMSEC incidents (cryptographic losses, violations, physical, personnel insecurities, etc.), to include those concerning ICP material, will be reported by immediate message to USNORTHCOM/J635/J635/COMSEC (CA 680500) and the controlling authority of the keymat involved (for ICP material: JCMO MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL) with info copies to Service authorities and Service cryptologic agencies, for evaluation and resolution.

(13) (U) Publish a USNORTHCOM AOR COMSEC Call Out message and post it to the USNORTHCOM COMSEC Account internal web portal.

(14) (U) USNORTHCOM makes decisions for emergency supercession of USNORTHCOM controlled keying material.

c. (U) Training. All organizations are required to have trained COMSEC personnel IAW written policy and procedures.

d. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Holders of COMSEC material will follow service directives to maintain continuous accountability.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics. Administer COMSEC programs IAW written policy and procedures.

a. (U) Cryptographic Security. Only those codes, ciphers, or authentication systems provided by approved production agencies will be used for USNORTHCOM operations.

b. (U) COMSEC Assistance to Foreign Governments and Military Organizations.

(1) (U) Foreign COMSEC release is governed by references e and f.

(2) (U/FOUO) Providing COMSEC assistance and information relating to cryptographic materials to foreign states is extremely sensitive, must be based on a U.S. interoperability requirement, and will be authorized on a case by case basis by USNORTHCOM. Information concerning specific releases to specific states is classified SECRET until approved. Once approved, this information is releasable to the state concerned. The fact that a foreign state requires or desires U.S. COMSEC is not a basis for a release approval.

(3) (U) Requests for COMSEC release should be forwarded, with supporting justification and all information required by reference g, to N-NC/J6.

(4) (U) Requests for keying material for foreign forces will be initiated by the supported U.S. Command.

K-1-B-4

---UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO---
c. (U) Physical Security. Units are required to administer their COMSEC programs IAW written policy and procedures.

   (1) (U) Operators must have a clearance at least as high as the level of traffic being passed. Formal cryptographic access will be granted based upon national and Service regulations or instructions.

   (2) (U) Personnel assigned to guard vehicles, ships, or aircraft which contain cryptographic equipment or who operate equipment and do not have access to keying material do not require formal cryptographic access, but must be responsible and trustworthy U.S. military or U.S. government employees.

   (3) (U) COMSEC equipment may be used in the immediate presence of non-U.S. personnel. Non-U.S. personnel should not be allowed to examine keying material, support documents, or the equipment interior. Non-U.S. personnel will not be used as couriers for keying material.

   (4) (U) Over-the-Air Transmission/Over-the-Air Re-keying will be accomplished only in emergency situations and every precaution must be taken to eliminate the chances of proliferation of keying materials.

   (5) (U) Follow TEMPEST guidelines as outlined in ref d.

5. (U) Command and Control.

   a. (U) Positive Actions.

      (1) (U) When using non-secured telephone or radio communications:

          (a) (U) Maintain strict communications discipline.

          (b) (U) Restrict number and length of telephone call or radio transmissions.

          (c) (U) Maximize use of approved operations codes and authentication systems. Called station makes the initial challenge when authentication is mandatory.

          (d) (U) Using available automanual systems, encode or encrypt all sensitive or classified information for transmission.

          (e) (U) Review cryptographic operating instructions of automanual cipher systems.

K-1-B-5

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(f) (U) Advise personnel of open circuit or uncradled phones to prevent acoustical coupling of background conversations over non-secure paths.

(2) (U) When to use secured communications links:
    (a) (U) To pass EEFIs and sensitive or classified information.
    (b) (U) To pass actual or suspected COMSEC violations.
    (c) (U) To provide the required physical and personnel security for cryptographic equipment and materials.

(3) (U) Transmission of sensitive but unclassified information will be encoded or encrypted when it:
    (a) (U) Reveals tactical training or the readiness or efficiency of units.
    (b) (U) Contains information regarding identity, location, movement, or changes in strength of units.
    (c) (U) Reveals changes in unit organization or mission.
    (d) (U) Reveals the introduction of new equipment which changes capabilities.
    (e) (U) Discloses shortages or deficiencies which impair the efficiency or readiness of a unit.
    (f) (U) Reveals actions which indicate operational intent or activity.
    (g) (U) Reveals the classification of an operation, program, or project.

b. (U) Prohibited Actions.

(1) (U) Do not discuss classified information or EEFI over nonsecured communications means or attempt to "talk around the subject."

(2) (U) Do not use "homemade" call signs, code, cipher, or authentication systems or make modifications to approved cryptographic systems.
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24 April 2008

TAB C OF APPENDIX I TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U)
CRYPTOGRAPHIC INSTRUCTIONS (U)

(U) Reference:

a. (U) NSTISSI-4003, Reporting and Evaluating COMSEC Incidents, Current
Edition, 2 Dec 91 (FOUO)

1. (U) Purpose. To prescribe COMSEC software, authentication systems and
tables, and operation codes for use in interfacing HQ USNORTHCOM with
higher HQ, component and supporting HQ, and allied or host-nation forces as
required.

2. (U) General.

a. (U) ICP will be used to secure links between CFC and component HQ
during deployment/employment phase, or until directed to transition to
USNORTHCOM-controlled, AOR-specific COMSEC material by the N-NC/J6.

b. (U) Components will use the ICP, until otherwise directed by N-NC/J6, to
secure lateral connectivity with other components or for cross-attachment of
forces from other Services.

c. (U) Components will provide for intra-Service or component-downward
COMSEC netting requirements to ensure availability of sufficient secure
interconnectivity.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Component HQs will ensure units requisition only required listed joint
materials from service cryptologic depots before deployment IAW JCMO ICP
validation procedures. Basic deployment load is current month plus three
months editions reserve. Material will accompany deploying units. Follow-on
resupply is the responsibility of components.

b. (U) CFC will promulgate RADAY keying material change (HJ) times and effective edition
status for operational use of CFC-managed networks.
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U)
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING (U)

(U) References:

a. (U) CJCSI 6250.01C (draft), Satellite Communications, 30 Apr 07 (U)

b. (U) Strategic Command Instruction (SCI) 714-4, 15 Oct 07 and SCI 714 Series (U)

c. (U) National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, 25 Aug 06 (S)

d. (U) CJCSI 3320.02A, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution Program (JSIR), 20 Jan 06 (U)

e. (U) US Joint Forces Command, Global Broadcast Service Information Guide (U), 28 Feb 03

f. (U) DISA CIRCULAR 800-A110-1 Apr 95 (S),

g. (U) CJCSI 6251.01, Ultrahigh Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communications Demand Assigned Multiple Access Requirements, 16 Nov 06 (S),

h. (U) USNORTHCOM Communications extension, Standards Guidance and Telecommunications Rules of Engagement (FOUO), Section 6.1.6, 27 Jul 06 (U)

1. (U) Situation.

a. (U) General. Satellite requirements identified during the planning processes must be prioritized according to mission criticality in consideration of on-going assigned and operational missions using narrowband, wideband, protected, Government-augmented, and commercial resources in support of NORAD-USNORTHCOM.

b. (U) Threat. Units deploying in the NORAD-USNORTHCOM AOR must recognize that C4 systems are vulnerable to frequency interference, deception, or possible physical and virtual attack.

2. (U) Satellite Resources.
a. MILSATCOM and Commercial SATCOM resources are managed differently within the various spectrums (UHF, SHF, EHF, government augmented, and commercial). Satellite resources are subject to change based on real-world events. Current operational situations may require immediate reassignment of SATCOM resources as priorities dictate.

b. N-NC/J6 manages the UHF/SHF/EHF satellite resources apportioned by the Chairman, Joint Cheifs of Staff (CJCS/J6Z) to NORAD-USNORTHCOM. Users acquire a Satellite Database (SDB) number or an SDB waiver from the Joint Staff J6. UHF service requests are prioritized based upon the SDB and actual mission. A Satellite Access Request (SAR) and or a Gateway Access Request (GAR) is prepared and forwarded to N-NC/J635 for assessment and validation. The J635 validates and forwards the request to the Global SATCOM Support Center (GSSC). The GSSC assigns satellite resources for mission execution and issues a Satellite Access Authorization (SAA). Users forward After Action Reports (AARs) to the N-NC/J635 and the GSSC. Joint Staff approved SAR/GAR/GMRS templates are posted on the GSSC home page.

3. (U) Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Resources. Voice and Data Nets.

   a. (U) Homeland Defense Net (HD Net). Used to maintain positive control of forces being deployed to secure critical infrastructure identified by Commander, USNORTHCOM. JFLCC is the Net Control and can delegate net control to a subordinate. QRFs and RRFs are the expected users of this net as directed by JFLCC. Units deploying for this mission will resource their own UHF TACSAT radio equipment capable of using a 5KHz-dedicated channel.

   b. (U) Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Net. Used to maintain positive control of forces being employed to assist civil authorities in consequence management as directed by Commander, USNORTHCOM. The JTF HQ is Net Control. Along with the JTF, any DCOs supporting the operation will use this net to coordinate relief efforts and resources. Units deploying to this mission will resource their own UHF TACSAT radio equipment capable of using a 5KHz-dedicated channel.


   a. (U) SHF HD wideband SATCOM capabilities. Support HD and DSCA by providing commercial Internet, NIPRNET, SIPRNET, Defense Switched Network (DSN), Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), VTC, and JWICS service to deployed forces. Deployed JTFs and DCOs use this link to coordinate relief efforts and resources. Units will resource their own SHF terminal equipment.

5. (U) Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Satellite Resources. Guidance for EHF Protected SATCOM use during USNORTHCOM exercises and operations.
a. (U) Low Data Rate Capabilities. The purpose of these protected SATCOM capabilities is to establish voice and/or data communications for the HD Net. The HD Net maintains positive control of the deployed forces' secure and critical communications infrastructure. The JFLCC will be the Network Controller for this net.

b. (U) Medium Data Rate Capabilities. These resources provide protected communications for HD and DSCA. Protected SATCOM provides connectivity to the Internet, DSN, commercial telephone service, and high-speed data capabilities from deployed forces to component and command HQs. JTF-CM and DCOs use this link to coordinate relief efforts and resources. Units will resource their own EHF terminal equipment.


a. (U) U.S. forces can access DISN services through use of deployable COMMSAT terminals, typically operating in the C-, Ka-, or Ku-bands. COMMSAT services can be obtained through DISA's COMMSAT Team (CST) Office. Users can lease access to a COMMSAT transponder and use a commercial ground entry point (teleport) to a DISN point of presence (POP).

b. (U) Authorization for frequencies to be used on COMMSAT platforms must be obtained through the JPMO-North.

   a. (U) Provides a high throughput satellite broadcast capability for transmitting video and data products to fixed, in-transit, and forward deployed forces. It provides the capability to distribute large files of information to deployed user platforms.

   b. (U) Information managers at the JTF and Component levels develop information product lists that support their missions using a “Smart Push/Users Pull” philosophy to avert saturating deployed forces with information.

   c. (U) Components, Subordinate Commands and JTPs will coordinate Government augmented GBS support through the NORAD and USNORTHCOM SATCOM Organizational Mailbox (OMB) at nc.satcom.omb@northcom.mil. GBS Mission Requests (GMRs) should only be submitted through the SIPRNET OMB as they are classified CONFIDENTIAL when information is filed in. Telephonic support will be provided at DSN 8334-8035 or Commercial (719) 556-8035. Lead time for GBS requests is a minimum of 14 days, unless otherwise coordinated with the GBS Theater Information Manager (TIM).
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24 April 2008

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO NC CONPLAN 3501-07 (U)
DEFENSE COURIER (U)

(U) References:

a. (U) DODI 5200.33, Defense Courier Operations, May 07 (U)

b. (U) http://dcd.transcom.mil/ (U)

c. (U) USTCI 10-22, Defense Courier Operations, Nov 07 (U)

d. (U) DOD 4500.9r, Defense Transportation Regulation, Part V, Sep 07 (U)

1. (U) Purpose. Provides information about Defense Courier support.

2. (U) General.

   a. (U) USTRANSCOM TCJ3-C, Defense Courier Division operates a network
      of service stations to provide secure, timely, and efficient end-to-end global
      distribution of classified and sensitive material for the United States and its
      allies. Per ref a., courier support during contingencies or hostilities shall be
      provided in accordance with the requirements of the Chairman of the Joint
      Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands.

   b. (U) In accordance with Ref a., NORTHCOM and its assigned/attached
      forces requiring courier service shall:

      (1) (U) Coordinate courier requirements and priorities with
          USTRANSCOM, including the requirements of their contractors and foreign
          military sales as appropriate.

      (2) (U) Reimburse USTRANSCOM for defense courier services provided or
          arranged on their behalf, including special delivery services.

      (3) (U) In emergency situations, provide USTRANSCOM defense couriers
          all necessary support required to safeguard material in accordance with DOD
          5200.33R (Reference c.). Specific areas of support include; Temporary secure
          storage for material and/or required guards, billeting and messing,
          transportation support, and access to secure communications.

K-3-1

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(4) (U) Assess the responsiveness of the defense courier network to their operational needs and advise the CDRUSTRANSCOM, of any problem areas.

(5) (U) Coordinate with host-nation officials to develop and implement procedures for the protection of defense courier-escorted material from search and seizure by customs or other agency officials in accordance with Ref a. and Ref d.

(6) (U) During wartime or contingency situations, identify priorities for material destined to the Combatant Command based on mission and operational requirements and assign airlift priority to courier movement to meet those requirements.

c. (U) Activities requesting courier service must ensure that only qualified material is tendered for movement by defense courier. Ref a. contains a listing of qualified/unqualified material. Of specific note, Defense Couriers are specifically prohibited from transporting etiologic material or controlled substances and all classes of hazardous materials. Contact TCJ3-C or the servicing courier station for questions about qualified material.

d. (U) When courier customer requirements cannot be met through regularly scheduled delivery routes or timelines, customers may request special movement through their servicing courier station or by contacting TCJ3-C operations staff, DSN 779-2338, utscj3-c@ustranscom.mil. The requesting customer will be responsible for funding the operational costs associated with special movements.

e. (U) Mobile or afloat units with a current Defense Courier account may obtain courier service from any DCS station, worldwide.

f. (U) Units or individuals requiring courier support should contact the nearest defense courier station or USTCJ3-C to request service.

g. (U) Contact information for the Courier Station servicing Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Idaho, and Washington State:

Defense Courier Station Colorado Springs
5769 Wallace Street, Building 1045
Fort Carson, CO 80913-4113
DSN 691-1835, COMM (719) 526-1835

h. (U) Contact information for all other Defense Courier stations can be found at the Courier Division website (ref b).
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24 April 2008

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 [U]
FOREIGN DATA EXCHANGES (U)

(U) References:

a. (U) DOD Directive 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information
to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, 16 Jun 92 (U)

b. (U) NDP-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified
Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations,
2 Oct 00 (U)

c. (U) DOD Directive C-5230.23, Intelligence Disclosure Policy,
18 Nov 83 [U]

d. (U) CJCSI 5221.01B, Delegation of Authority to Commanders of
Combatant Commands to Disclose Classified Military Information to Foreign
Governments and International Organizations, 1 Dec 03 (U)

e. (U) CJCSI 5714.01, Policy for the Release of Joint Information, 28 Aug 06
(U)

1. (U) **Purpose.** Provide guidance for disclosure of classified military
information to foreign governments and international organizations.

2. (U) **General.** It is U.S. national and DOD policy under ref b. that classified military
information is a national security asset that shall be protected and shall be shared with
foreign governments only when there is a clearly defined benefit to the United States.
Disclosures of such information shall be made only when authorized by officials
designated under ref a., and then only when all requirements of the directive are met.
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX K SUPPORTING USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 [U] ELECTROMAGNETIC (EM) SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT (U)

(U) References:

a. (U) USMCEB PUB 7, Version 7, Standard Frequency Action Format (SFAP), 30 Jun 05 (U)

b. (U) ACP-190B, Guide to Spectrum Management in Military Operations, May 03 (U)

c. (U) CJCSM 3320.01B, Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace, 25 Mar 06 (U)

d. (U) CJCSM 3320.02A, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR), 20 Jan 06 (U)

e. (U) CJCSI 3320.02C, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR), 27 Jan 06 (U)

f. (U) CJCSI 3320.03A, Joint Communications Electronics Operations Instructions, 29 Jun 06 (U)

g. (U) CJCSI 3220.01B, Electromagnetic Spectrum Use in Joint Military Operations, 15 May 06 (U)

h. (U) CJCSI 3320.03A, Joint Communications Electronics Operations Instructions, 29 Jun 06 (U)

1. (U) Purpose. Provides frequency management, JCEOI development, and electromagnetic interference (EMI) guidance upon implementation of the plan.

2. (U) Concept.

   a. (U) Pre-deployment. This period is dynamic and characterized by an uncertainty about exact positioning of equipment or which equipment will be deployed. Using units, based on identified requirements, must request frequency support. These requirements must be determined early enough to allow for established lead-time as specified by the lead agency or supported Combatant Commander. Nominally, a minimum of 90 days notice is required for frequency coordination between agencies.
b. (U) **Deployment.** This period involves actions taken while forces are enroute to the AOR. It is critical for commanders to have frequencies free of interference during this phase.

c. (U) **Employment.** This period involves actions taken while forces are installing equipment and initializing circuits. The assigned frequency manager must be totally involved in this process to assure electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) of deployed frequency-dependent equipment. If components are assigned excess frequencies, they should turn back unused frequency assets to the JTF frequency manager so other units can utilize those frequencies. Likewise, if additional frequencies are required to support the required event or campaign, the deployed JTF frequency manager should be notified of the unplanned requirement in order to begin coordination with higher levels.

d. (U) **Redeployment.** This period involves actions, which are taken after the mission is completed and forces are departing the AOR. During this phase the deployed frequency manager should be advised as systems are deactivated or released, especially satellite systems, so those frequency resources can be re-assigned to support other organizations.

3. (U) **Spectrum Management.**

   a. (U) **General.** JFMO NORTH is responsible for frequency management and coordination of the military electromagnetic systems dedicated to inter-governmental civil frequency support and HD support in the USNORTHCOM JOA. JFMO NORTH will coordinate with Federal and State agencies including the NGB, Service Frequency Management Offices (FMOS) and local civil authorities to ensure comprehensive C4 requirements are satisfied.

   b. (U) **Concept of Support.** Frequency managers assigned to all components operating in support of all NORAD-USNORTHCOM missions will consolidate their frequency requests and submit them in Standard Frequency Action Format (SFAF) per ref a. and forward all frequency requests to JFMO NORTH. A Joint Frequency Management Element (JSME) will be deployed to the JTF HQ staffed IAW the C2 structured identified in the EXORD and ref e.

4. (U) **JCEOI Concept.** The JCEOI is a single, comprehensive document developed by the N-NC/J6 and coordinated through NC/J3.

   a. (U) The JCEOI will be developed using Joint Automated CEOI System (JACS) and will be distributed electronically. Paper copies will be distributed as required by exception.
b. (U) Subordinate and Component commands are responsible for establishing standards and procedures for planning, generating, disseminating, operating, and managing communications networks supported by JACS.

c. (U) Subordinate and Component commands will provide JCEOI input to JFMO NORTH. Input is required 90-days prior to the commencement of operations to allow adequate time for JCEOI development and distribution. In the event of Consequent Management contingency operations or other national emergencies, the 90-day requirement will be waived.

(1). (U) USNORTHCOM will develop, maintain, and provide the components with the joint layer for the JCEOI. This layer provides the central core of the JCEOI containing only joint circuits and coordination nets. USNORTHCOM will create the suffix and expander list for organizations which would require communications over joint circuits. The component layers of the JCEOI will be prepared by the respective components, which contain frequencies, nets, SINCgars information, call signs and words, and sign or counter signs for all event participants.

(2). (U) AFNORTH and USFF will extract appropriate call sign, call words, and frequency data from the JTF JCEOI to build an Air Tasking Order (ATO) or Navy Operation Task Communication (OPTASKCOM).

5. (U) Spectrum Interference Resolution Reporting

a. (U) Reports of EMI will be reported to the JSME, JNCC(s), NORAD-USNORTHCOM and JFMO NORTH IAW the procedures in reference (d).

b. (U) Follow-up reports will be submitted as additional information becomes available. The JNCC(s) will report on EMI within the JOA IAW reference d. Include NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC on all messages.

6. (U) Points of Contact. JFMO NORTH POC can be reached at (719) 554-4008/4656, DSN 692-4008/4656, Fax (719) 554-8198. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC can be reached at (719) 554-8222, DSN 692-8222. JFMO NORTH organizational mailbox is nc.jsmonorth.omb@northcom.mil (Unclassified) or nc.jsmonorth.omb@northcom.smil.mil (Classified)

Tabs
A -- (U) EMI Reporting
B -- (U) JTF JCEOI Concept
C -- (U) Frequency Management Deconfliction

K-5-3

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24 April 2008

TAB A TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U)
ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE (EMI) REPORTING (U)


2. (U) Procedures. All reports of suspected hostile interference will be reported via secure means. The user experiencing the interference is responsible for submitting the report. All reports will be submitted IAW the C2 structure dictated by the EXORD and reference a. Attempt to resolve interference at the lowest levels possible before submitting a JSIR report to higher HQ.

3. (U) Specialized EMI reporting nodes.

a. (U) GSSC, RSSC.

   (1) (U) Provide the central operational focus for global SATCOM constellation payload management.

   (2) (U) Assists spectrum managers to track, coordinate, and assist in radio frequency interference (RFI) identification and resolution for SATCOM systems.

   (3) (U) Provides assistance to Combatant Commands and other users when there is a disruption to SATCOM services.

b. (U) Global Positioning System [GPS] Support Center [GSC]. The GSC coordinates responses to RFI in the use of GPS in military operations. They provide tactical support for planning and assessing military missions involving the use of GPS and serve as USNORTHCOM interface to the civil community. They routinely assesses the GPS service being provided to the civil community to determine compliance with US national policy guidelines.


   a. (U) The Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) is the OPR for the JSIR program. The JSC also provides analytical and on-site assistance in resolving EMI problems. Interference incidents resolved at the lowest level of the DOD component. If the interference cannot be resolved, units should contact the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC and JFMO NORTH via their chain of command. JFMO NORTH can refer the incident to the JSC to assist with resolution.

   b. (U) JSIR Reporting Format. Submit the following as minimum:

      K-5-A-1
(1) (U) Organization affected by EMI. POC information: Name and telephone number (make sure the POC is familiar with the problem).

(2) (U) Place name, latitude, and longitude where EMI occurred.

(3) (U) Times, dates, periods EMI occurred. Indicate whether the duration of the interference is continuous or intermittent, the approximate repetition rate of interference, and whether the amplitude of the interference is varying or constant and at regular intervals or sporadic during the day.

(4) (U) Systems and equipment affected by the EMI. Affected system function, nomenclature, manufacturer, model number, system description.

(5) (U) Frequency band or authorized frequency of equipment affected.

(6) (U) Station or equipment causing interference and location or call sign.

(7) (U) Allocated frequency band or authorized frequency of the station or equipment causing the interference, if known.

(8) (U) Probable cause of interference (for example, co-channel assignment, harmonics, inter-modulation, spurious products, jamming, etc.).

(9) (U) Extent of impairment to operational capability of affected equipment. Characteristics of interference (reduced range, false targets, reduced intelligibility, data errors, etc.).

(10) (U) Corrective measures to resolve or work around the interference.

(11) (U) Effect of corrective measures.

(12) (U) Additional remarks. Provide a clear, unstructured narrative summary on the interference and local actions taken to resolve the problem.

c. (U) Addressees for EMI reports. Contact JFMO NORTH if unknown.
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24 April 2008

TAB B TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 [U]
JTF JCEOI CONCEPT [U]

1. (U) General. Provides information concerning the JCEOI concept and its use during execution of the base plan. USNORTHCOM is directed to develop and use a JCEOI to support contingency operations and exercises.

   a. (U) The JCEOI provides the JTF Commander, Service components, and subordinate units with instructions for the operation of C-E equipment, systems and facilities. It is the authorized document from which subordinate elements may extract call signs/words, suffixes, expanders, sign/counter-sign and frequency data. It contains a directory of radio nets, units, and their associated frequencies, call signs, call words listed by time period. It also has supplemental procedures for electronic, visual, and verbal interactions such as sign/countersign, smoke/pyrotechnics, and suffix/expanders.

   b. (U) To provide better security, the JCEOI changes call signs, call words, and frequencies daily. These changes increase the difficulty for an adversary to obtain EEFIs by monitoring unencrypted radio nets.

   c. (U) Use of call signs/words and frequencies will be IAW Service approved documents, messages, interoperability agreements, and the JCEOI.

2. Procedures.

   a. (U) The JACS will be used to create, modify, and generate the JCEOI. The JCEOI is a single, comprehensive document containing frequencies, nets, Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) information, and call signs/words for all participants. To provide adequate time to coordinate frequency requirements and design, publish, and distribute the JCEOI, the following relationships and milestones are established:

      (1) (U) Submit all JCEOI data through component HQ for consolidation and forward to the JTF Joint Spectrum Management Element (JSME) for inclusion in the NORAD-USNORTHCOM JCEOI.

      (2) (U) Inputs are required from ARNORTH, AFNORTH, MARFORNORTH, USFF, components and subordinates supporting USNORTHCOM contingencies and exercises.

K-5-B-1

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b. (U) The desired input method for JFC JCEOI inputs are electronic JACS format; files must be formatted and sent as exported (.exp extension) files. At a minimum an electronic copy must contain the Master Net List, Net Groups, Equipment, and Separation Plans as required. Specific information needed by JACS to complete the JCEOI can be found on the USNORTHCOM SIPRNET portal at https://operations.noradnorthcom.smil.mil/sites/nncj6/nncj63/nnbj635/spectrum/jacsjceoi/forms.

c. (U) The NORAD-USNORTHCOM JCEOI will be in half-page 52-line format, generated in two (2) editions, one active edition and one reserve edition. The reserve edition will not be distributed below component HQs level and used in case of a compromise.
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24 April 2008

TAB C TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U)
FREQUENCY DECONFLICTION (U)

(U) References:

  a. (U) CJCSI 3320.02C, Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR), 27 Jan 06 (U)

  b. (U) CJCSM 3320.01B, Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace, 25 Mar 06 (U)

  c. (U) CJCSI 3210.03B, Joint Electronic Warfare Policy, 25 Aug 06 (U)

  d. (U) DOD Directive 3222.4, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM), through Change 2, 20 Jan 94 (U)

  e. (U) Joint Pub 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, 25 Jan 01 (U)

1. (U) Purpose. This tab describes the process for ensuring friendly force use of the electromagnetic spectrum without adverse impact from friendly electronic countermeasures (ECM).

2. (U) General. ECM operations have the potential to interfere with C4 systems. Frequency deconfliction is a management procedure for limiting the effects of this interference. This tab provides familiarization with electronic warfare frequency deconfliction in joint military operations.

3. (U) Definitions.

  a. (U) Frequency Deconfliction. Frequency deconfliction is the first process of EW deconfliction planning for the most effective employment of electronic countermeasures (ECM) assets against hostile targets while protecting friendly emitters from unintentional jamming.

  b. (U) TABOO. Friendly frequencies are of such importance that they must never be deliberately jammed or interfered with by friendly forces. TABOO frequencies are generally long standing but can be limited by geography and/or time. TABOO frequencies may include nets used to pass USNORTHCOM Emergency Action Messages and Atmospheric Tactical Warning information, international distress, stop (cease) buzzer, safety, and controller frequencies.
c. (U) Protected. Protected frequencies are those used by friendly tactical forces for a particular operational requirement, identified and protected to prevent them from being inadvertently jammed by friendly forces while active EW operations are directed against hostile forces. These frequencies are of such critical importance that jamming should be restricted unless absolutely necessary or until coordination with the using unit is made. They are generally time and/or geographically oriented, may change with the tactical situation, and must be updated periodically. Air/Ground/Air frequencies for aircraft control are an example of protected frequencies.

d. (U) Guarded. Enemy functions or frequencies that are currently being exploited for combat information and intelligence. A GUARDED frequency is time-oriented in that the list changes as the enemy assumes different combat postures. These frequencies may be jammed after the commander has weighed the potential operational gain against the loss of technical information.

e. (U) Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL). The JRFL is a time and geographically oriented listing of TABOO, Protected and Guarded functions, nets, and frequencies. It is limited to the minimum number of frequencies necessary for friendly forces to accomplish USNORTHCOM’s missions.

f. (U) Deconfliction Process. The NC/J3 defines the concept of operations with input from the NC/J2 describing intelligence support requirements and enemy electronic systems targets. The N-NC/J6 is responsible for the administrative and technical management of the spectrum requirements and assigns frequencies, analyzes and evaluates potential conflicts, resolves internal conflicts, recommends alternatives, and participates in spectrum-use conflict resolution. The assignment of frequencies is based on the NC/J3 concept of operations. In the absence of a Unified Joint Frequency Management Office, USNORTHCOM has delegated responsibility for frequency management to JFMO NORTH. The responsible frequency management office will create a frequency background environment that encompasses all frequencies, DOD and Civil, which are used in the area of operations. The background environment will be used to deconflict all frequencies that will be used for operations/exercises and contingencies. N-NC/J6 will coordinate the NC/J2/J3 JRFL input to ensure accuracy and completeness. Once approved by NC/J2/J3, the NC/J3 will publish and disseminate through the C-E Annex and EW Appendix.

g. (U) If no disruption occurs to friendly communications during the course of ECM operations, then no frequency conflict exists. However, if unplanned disruptions occur, the following two actions will be taken:

1. (U) For critical functions (generally those frequencies on the TABOO list), an immediate STOP BUZZER notification will be promulgated if the
offending friendly system can be positively identified. The STOP BUZZER notification will be issued only on the control net of the offending jammer and no acknowledgment of interference will be made on the critical function net.

(2) (U) Submit JSIR in accordance with Reference (a).

4. (U) Tasks and Responsibilities.

   a. (U) **N-NC/J6**.

   (1) (U) Coordinate frequency requests with appropriate agencies and lateral and higher commands as appropriate before compiling the JRFL and forwarding it to NC/J3 for publication.

   (2) (U) Nominate changes to the JRFL based on changing or reassigning operational frequencies used by friendly forces.

   (3) (U) Assist in minimizing the adverse impact of friendly ECM on critical networks by providing alternative communications frequencies/modes of communications where possible.

   (4) (U) Maintain the frequency database of allotments, assignments and coordination actions.

   (5) (U) Send STOP BUZZER notifications, when appropriate.

   b. (U) **USNORTHCOM Component Commanders**.

      (1) (U) Establish a unit point of contact responsible for frequency deconfliction.

      (2) (U) Provide the N-NC/J6 candidate nodes and nets with associated frequencies.
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
C4 PLANNING [U]

(U) References:

a. (U) CJCSM 6231 series, Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems, current as of 2006-2008 [U]

b. (U) CJCSI 3110.10D, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) Systems Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) FY02, 31 Aug 07 [U]

c. (U) USNORTHCOM Communications Extension Standards Guidance and Telecommunications Rules of Engagement, 27 Jul 06 [U]

1. (U) Purpose. Identifies C4 systems required to support USNORTHCOM missions, assigned forces and supporting commands, and assigns specific responsibilities to provide, install, operate, and maintain (PIOM) these systems.

2. (U) Execution. Upon execution, C4 will be established between USNORTHCOM and the designated DCOs, DCEs, JTF HQs, designated Base Support Installations (BSIs) and other Federal and State agencies as required.

a. (U) Reference (h) identifies minimum requirements and specifications to extend the USNORTHCOM Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) to deployed or mobile forces supporting HD or DSCA missions. It identifies thresholds and requirements for DCOs, DCEs, Emergency Planning Liaison Officers (EPLOs), QRFs, RRFs, Domestic Attack Assessor Authority, Command Assessment elements (CAEs), components, and subordinates.

b. (U) Alternate Communications. At the direction of USNORTHCOM, communications will be established using tactical and theater fixed base communications, as well as any BSI assets. Should BSI assets fail, implement normal systems restoration plans. If systems are still inoperable, DISN action plans will be initiated to restore communications. If DISN restoration actions are not effective, then available tactical communications systems may be tasked to provide critical BSI communications.

c. (U) Circuit Allocation. USNORTHCOM and Service owned C4 equipment associated with circuits listed in the Mission Essential Service List (MESL) will be employed IAW this plan. The designated JTF/J6 will exercise technical
control of the tactical C4 systems in the JOA. Additional circuits necessary to support contingency operations may necessitate preemption of lower priority circuits and deployment of additional tactical C4 equipment to the JOA.

3. (U) **System Description.** JTFs will be equipped with traditional military C4 systems as well as commercial capabilities. Elements subordinate to a JTF may not be equipped with military C4 capabilities, since their primary mission may be to interface with local, State, and Federal emergency response services.

4. (U) **Planning Considerations.** Specific guidance for planning and implementation of Promina network transmission resource controllers, voice, data, and message switch networks and terrestrial transmission systems.

   a. (U) **Multiplexer Network.** The joint transport network or backbone will be supported using the Promina transmission resource controller.

   b. (U) **Voice Networks.** The backbone of the USNORTHCOM deployed voice network will consist of deployed RED Switches, Commercial Private Automatic Branch Exchange (PABX) switches (REDCOM IGX, and TTC-56 Single Shelter). Gateway links shall be established between US and designated coalition switches as required. DSN service and PSTN will be extended to most deployed locations. PSTN is typically preferred to enable direct collaboration between military and civil responders. Until the entire network is complete, refinement of the routing scheme will be coordinated with N-NC/J635 and reported to the TNCC. Changes will be coordinated with the TNCC, and subscribers will be notified of numbering scheme changes. Circuit status reporting to the TNCC will be IAW the USNORTHCOM JCESI.

   c. (U) **Data Networks.** Joint data networks in the USNORTHCOM AOR include Internet, NIPRNET, SIPRNET, RELCANT, and JWICS. Commercial Internet may be extended to deployed locations to support civil responders.

   d. (U) **Messaging Network.** The USNORTHCOM standard for messaging is the Defense Message System (DMS). Exceptions to this policy are related to specific security classifications or compartmentation.

   e. (U) **Terrestrial Transmission Systems.** The following information and guidance for the activation, operation, and configuration of the terrestrial transmission systems applies to all forces and subordinate elements operating or subscribing to the intra-theater communications systems or networks.

   1. (U) **Joint Radio Net Operations.** Joint C2 radio nets will be used to support combat operations and DSCA; radio net operation will be IAW applicable ACPs and JANAPs. Net Control Stations will maintain positive control over the network's operation. Only authorized and assigned
frequencies will be used. The USNORTHCOM JCEO1 provides information on joint radio nets and will be supplemented as necessary by separate orders.

(2) (U) **Terrestrial Multi-channel Communications.** Terrestrial transmission systems provide significant increases in bandwidth availability and ease the burden on scarce satellite resources. These systems provide robust and redundant paths for the intra AOR network.

(a) (U) Terrestrial transmission media will be used to the maximum extent possible. Every effort will be made to transition fixed nodes (e.g., air bases, port and logistics facilities) from satellite transmission systems to terrestrial systems at the earliest opportunity. Mobile forces receive priority.

(b) (U) Transmission systems will be shared whenever possible to provide an alternate routing capability for restoration of high priority circuits.

(c) (U) To ensure interoperability, C-E units providing support to agencies external to their command will ensure changes in transmission media are coordinated with the agency concerned prior to implementation.

Tabs
A - (U) Collaboration Tools
B - (U) Interagency Communications
C - (U) NetOps
D - (U) Recovery
E - (U) TNCC
F - (U) COP
G - (U) Information Exchange Broker/Knowledge Manager
H - (U) MCCC
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24 April 2008

TAB A TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U)  
COLLABORATION TOOLS (U)

(U) Reference:

 a. (U) USNORTHCOM Information Management Plan, 30 Dec 03 (U)

1. (U) **Purpose.** Overview of the collaborative tools and outlines key features.

2. (U) **Collaborative Information Environment (CIE).** The NORAD- 
USNORTHCOM CIE provides trusted information exchange and situational 
awareness between and among organizations and mission partners. The CIE 
provides the capability for horizontal and vertical information flow between 
traditionally unconnected or even divergent organizations. The importance of 
time and the criticality of information requirements are what drive the 
development and use of communication tools. The capability of each tool is 
flexible and can be applied to a variety of purposes and processes.

3. (U) **Communications Tools.** Ref (a) directs use of specific collaborative tools by 
USNORTHCOM, subordinates, components, and supporting commands. The aim is to 
provide the Commander with the most current, accurate, and timely information available 
in order to achieve decision superiority. Ref (a) also provides guidance on specific logs and 
chatrooms to be used and maintained.
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24 April 2008

TAB B TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U)
INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATIONS (U)

1. (U) Purpose. Coordinate communications methods between USNORTHCOM and other Federal Agencies supporting the USNORTHCOM missions.

2. (U) General. The following guidance will apply to DOD forces required to collaborate with local, state, and federal agencies.

   a. (U) All unclassified information will be posted on the unclassified NIPRNET portal to allow maximum information sharing among all participants.

   b. (U) The current method for viewing an Unclassified Common Operational Picture (COP) will be identified at the USNORTHCOM portal.

   c. (U) Unclassified message traffic will be posted on the NIPRNET portal.

   d. (U) When possible, VTCs will be unclassified for maximum participation.

   e. (U) PSTN and commercial Internet services will be pre-positioned at DOD satellite teleports for extension to deployed forces.

   f. (U) Acquisition or employment of commercial communications devices for the purposes of civil interoperability will follow guidelines established in the USNORTHCOM Communications Extension Standards and Telecommunications Rules of Engagement (reference m of this appendix).

   g. (U) Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs) have been prepared for FEMA to quickly identify communications capabilities to support their mission and to expedite the SECDEF review and approval/disapproval process.

   h. (U) Mission success often depends a great deal on the cooperation and coordination of efforts amongst federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector organizations. As these agencies do not generally have a large number of people with security clearances, or the computer systems to process such information, operating in the classified realm should be minimized to the greatest extent possible. If it becomes necessary to operate in the classified realm, paragraphs should be marked appropriately so that unclassified information can still be released to appropriate authorities supporting mission operations.
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24 April 2008

TAB C TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U)  
NETWORK OPERATIONS (NETOPS) (U)

(U) References:

a. (U) GIG NetOps Guidance and Policy Memorandum No. 10-8460 -  
   Network Operations, 24 Aug 00 (U)

b. (U) USSTRATCOM Joint Concept of Operations for Global Information  
   Grid Network Operations, 11 Aug 06

c. (U) CJCSM 3150.07B, Joint Reporting Structure (JRS), 10 Sep 03 (U)

d. (U) DODD O-8530.1, Computer Network Defense (CND), 8 Jan 01 (U)

e. (U) DODI O-8530.2, Support to Computer Network Defense (CND), 9 Mar  
   01 (U)

f. (U) DODD 4630.5, Interoperability and Supportability of Information  
   Technology and National Security Systems, 5 May 04 (U)

g. (U) DODI 4630.8 Procedures for Interoperability and Supportability of  
   Information Technology and National Security Systems, 30 Jun 04 (U)

h. (U) CJCS Standing Execute Order for Computer Network Attack and  
   Computer Network Defense, 20 Jan 04 (U)

1. (U) Purpose. NetOps is the operational framework that USSTRATCOM, in  
   coordination with the NetOps Community, employs to operate and defend the  
   Global Information Grid (GIG). The GIG represents the "end-to-end"  
   information capabilities, to include all aspects of voice, video, and data  
   capability owned and operated by the DOD. To effectively operate the GIG  
   while realizing the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) requirements to  
   direct GIG operations in their theaters, CDRUSSTRATCOM developed an event-  
   based C2 structure. Command and control of GIG operations will be based on  
   the situation at the time. The preponderance of NetOps events are theater  
   incidents and are under the control of the GCC, its Subordinate Commands,  
   and their Service Component Commands. GCCs are considered the supported  
   command for theater NetOps events. NetOps' desired effects are assured  
   system and network availability, assured information protection, and assured  
   information delivery, all requirements to ensure effective military operations.
2. (U) USNORTHCOM Theater NetOps Approach. The execution of NetOps in
the N-NC Theater must be adaptable, continuous and support a seamless
transition through all phases of the joint operations model to execute the full
range of military operations. N-NC provides the following categories that
address the command's NetOps operational approach:

a. Steady State – day-to-day theater NetOps activity executed outside of
designated military operations.

(1) NetOps approach leverages the capability of Joint Task Force Global
Network Operations (JTF-GNO) and the Defense Information System Agencies
(DISAs) through the Theater NetOps Center North (TNC-N) for NetOps
situational awareness and direction of theater based forces. This support
includes complete "end to end" NetOps situational awareness for voice, video,
data, space assets, information assurance (IA), computer network defense
(CND) and spectrum management. Specific detail associated with this support
will be addressed in a separate support agreement.

(2) N-NC subordinate commands and Service Component Commands,
attached forces specifically addressed by operations orders or support
agreements, will provide situational awareness and control of C4 assets
supporting N-NC assigned operations and missions. This will be accomplished
through each organization’s respective NetOps (C4) control centers. Service
consolidated NetOps forces will provide General Support to N-NC Service
Components to ensure theater NetOps obligations. Support agreements
between Service Components and Service consolidated NetOps organizations
may be necessary to ensure operational needs are met. To assure a rapid
transition from Steady State to Direct Operations, USNORTHCOM standing
JTFs will align their NetOps planning and execution to the management
concept outlined in CJCSM 6231.07D, Manual for the Employment of Joint
Tactical Communications Joint Network Management and Control.

(3) Support may also be provided through established host base support
agreements with DOD Components that enable N-NC missions and operations
(e.g., AFSPC/Peterson AFB).

(4) N-NC, subordinate commands, and Service components may establish
information exchange agreements with non-DOD organizations to address
NetOps situational awareness requirements with non-DOD mission partners.

(5) N-NC will assess, establish, change, and implement INFOCONs and
associated Tailored Readiness Option (TROs) for all assigned and attached
forces. Theater INFOCONs will be applicable to other DOD Components within
the theater in accordance with operations orders, signed Command
Arrangement Agreements and other support/memorandums of agreements.
The theater INFOCON process is at Appendix 1 of this agreement. Coordination and notifications associated with N-NC initiated Theater INFOCONs will be consistent with USSTRATCOM Strategic Directive (SD) 527-1 DOD Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) System Procedures (SD 527-1).

b. Direct Operations – designated military operations supported by C4 assets owned and operated by an assigned or attached joint force. (i.e., Operation NOBLE EAGLE, the Hurricane Katrina humanitarian relief operation, and the National Security Special Event G8 Summit.)

(1) JTF Commanders will exercise OPCON of their critical C4 systems and networks through a Joint NetOps Control Center (JNCC). CJCSM 6231.07D and associated enclosures outline the responsibilities of the JTF Commander and the JNCC with respect to NetOps. A JNCC is established by the JTF J-6 to effect control of all joint communications systems and circuits and provide integration of essential C4 systems supporting non-DOD mission partners. Service components and subordinate joint commanders will also establish C4 control centers (e.g., SYSCONs) to serve as the single point for discharging their responsibilities for joint C4 matters. The JNCC manages the communications of the JTF and its Service Components, serving as the NOSC for the deployed portion of the GIG supporting a JTF. It exercises staff supervision over C4 NOSCs belonging to deployed components and subordinate commands. The JNCC coordinates with the TNCC, TNC-N and GNSC as necessary to ensure broad SA of deployed voice, video, and data networks and to address C4 issues that are undermining the operational effectiveness of the assigned mission.

(2) JTF-GNO, its subordinate commands, and Service components will support JTF commanders through the JNCC and Service component C4 control centers (e.g., SYSCONs). Establishment of intra- and inter-Service support agreement may be necessary to ensure end-to-end C4 situational awareness and the ability to influence systems and networks to effectively support JTF operations.

(3) Operationally unique responsibilities will be assigned through tasks in N-NC joint operations plans Annex Ks, orders, and applicable DOD and command instructions.

(4) JTF Commanders assess, establish, change, and implement INFOCONs and associated TROs for all assigned forces. Coordination and notifications associated with JTF initiated INFOCONs will be IAW SD 527-1.
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TAB D TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 [U]
RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION [U]

(U) Reference: http://gets.ncs.gov (U)

1. (U) Purpose. Provide CONPLAN instruction to USNORTHCOM, its
subordinate commands, and Components on available emergency capabilities.

2. (U) General.

   a. (U) There are two primary emergency capabilities employed by
USNORTHCOM, its subordinate commands, and the Service components;
Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), and Wireless
Priority Service (WPS).

   b. (U) Each USNORTHCOM subordinate command and component is
responsible for establishing its own policy for managing GETS and WPS.


   a. (U) The GETS Concept. GETS is a White House-directed emergency
phone service provided by the NCS in the Cyber Security & Communications
Division, National Protection and Programs of the Department of Homeland
Security. GETS supports Federal, State, local, and tribal government, industry,
and non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel in performing their
National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) missions. GETS
provides emergency access and priority processing in the local and long
distance segments of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). It is
intended to be used in an emergency or crisis situation when the PSTN is
congested and the probability of completing a call over normal or other
alternate telecommunication means has significantly decreased.

   b. (U) GETS is necessary because of the increasing reliance on
telecommunications. The economic viability and technical feasibility of such
advances as nationwide fiber optic networks, high-speed digital switching, and
intelligent features have revolutionized the way we communicate. This growth
has been accompanied by an increased vulnerability to network congestion and
system failures. Although backup systems are in place, disruptions in service
can still occur. Recent events have shown that natural disasters, power
outages, fiber cable cuts, and software problems can cripple the telephone
services of entire regions. Additionally, congestion in the PSTN, such as the
well-documented "Mother's Day phenomenon," can prevent access to circuits. However, during times of emergency, crisis, or war, personnel with NS/EP missions need to know that their calls will go through. GETS addresses this need. Using enhancements based on existing commercial technology, GETS allows the NS/EP community to communicate over existing PSTN paths with a high likelihood of call completion during the most severe conditions of high-traffic congestion and disruption. The result is a cost-effective, easy-to-use emergency telephone service that is accessed through a simple dialing plan and Personal Identification Number (PIN) card verification methodology. It is maintained in a constant state of readiness as a means to overcome network outages through such methods as enhanced routing and priority treatment.

c. (U) GETS uses these major types of networks:

(1) (U) The local networks provided by Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) and wireless providers, such as cellular carriers and personal communications services (PCS).

(2) (U) The major long-distance networks provided by Interexchange Carriers (IXCs) - AT&T, MCI, and Sprint - including their international services.

(3) (U) Government-leased networks, such as the Federal Technology Service (FTS), the Diplomatic Telecommunication Service (DTS), and the Defense Switched Network (DSN).

d. (U) GETS is accessed through a universal access number using common telephone equipment such as a standard desk set, STU-III, facsimile, modem, or wireless phone. A prompt will direct the entry of your PIN and the destination telephone number. Once you are authenticated as a valid user, your call is identified as an NS/EP call and receives special treatment.

e. (U) Contact Information:

(1) (U) General questions: gets@ncs.gov.

(2) (U) To apply for or to manage your GETS account: gwids@saic.com.

(3) (U) Mailing Address:

National Communications System
Mailstop 8510
245 Murray Lane
Washington, DC 20528-8510

(4) (U) Telephone: 703-760-CALL (2255) (Washington D.C. Metro Area), or 866-NCS-CALL (866-627-2255) Toll-free.
(5) (U) Fax: 703-848-0299 Washington, DC Metro Area or 888-862-4222 Toll-free.

(6) (U) Trouble Reporting: Network Management Operation Center (NMOC) 703-818-4387 Washington, DC Metro Area or 800-818-4387 Toll-free.


a. During emergencies cellular networks can experience congestion due to increased call volumes and/or damage to network facilities, severely curtailing the ability of National Security/Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) personnel to make emergency calls. With an increasing number of NS/EP personnel relying on cell phones while performing their emergency duties, Wireless Priority Service was developed to provide priority for emergency calls made from cellular telephones.

b. Key Federal, State, local, and tribal government, and critical infrastructure personnel are eligible for Wireless Priority Service. Typical users are responsible for the command and control functions critical to management of and response to national security and emergency situations. Wireless Priority Service is an easy-to-use, add-on feature subscribed on a per-cell phone basis; no special phones are required. Wireless Priority Service is implemented as software enhancements to cellular networks, and is being deployed by cellular service providers in their coverage areas throughout the United States.

c. For complete Wireless Priority Service program information including how to request service, select Program Info on the left-side menu.

d. The NCS also provides the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), which is implemented as a priority calling card. For information on GETS go to the GETS Home Page.

e. Many organizations have an established Point of Contact (POC) for administering GETS and WPS. If you are part of a Federal, state, local, tribal, or industry organization and are unsure if there is an existing POC, please complete the “need to know if your organization already has a POC” form. The Priority Telecommunications Service Center will contact you within five business days.

f. For assistance and information on all NCS Priority Telecommunications programs contact the Priority Telecommunications Service Center toll free at 866-627-2255 (DC metro area, please use 703-760-2255) or gwids@saic.com.
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24 April 2008

TAB E TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U)
THEATER NETOPS CONTROL CENTER (TNCC) NETWORK
COMMUNICATIONS REPORTING (U)

1. [U] Purpose. Provide information on TNCC reporting requirements.

2. [U] TNCC Mission. TNCC provides 24/7 Situational Awareness (SA),
coordination, defense and oversight of NORAD-USNORTHCOM C4 resources.
The TNCC monitors status of C4 troubleshooting, networks, bandwidth,
SATCOM apportionment, spectrum management, and Information Assurance
[IA] activities within the command and for assigned forces.


   a. [U] Normal Operations. During non-crisis and non-exercise periods the
      TNCC conducts normal operations. The functions of each position are:

      (1) [U] Systems and Network Management (S&NM) Watch. Includes
      monitoring the different transmission systems that carry voice, data, and
      video throughout the theater. S&NM functions include the following:

      (a) [U] Maintain SA on the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TIG resources.

      (b) [U] Coordinate scheduled and react to unscheduled outages.

      (c) [U] Report health and status of NORAD-USNORTHCOM TIG
      resources.

      (d) [U] Submit TNCC Daily Network Operations (NETOPS) Assessment
      Report.

      (e) [U] Coordinate with Air Force Space Network Operations and
      Security Center (AFSPC NOSC) and DISA Global NetOps Center (GNOSC).

      (2) [U] IA/CND Watch. Mission includes the following functions:

      (a) [U] Assess impact of C4 issues and the events affecting the
      NORAD-USNORTHCOM operations.

K-6-E-1
(b) (U) Recognize IA threats and coordinate CND measures.

(c) (U) Provide C4 SA to operations, planning, and support groups.

(d) (U) Monitor DRSN conferences.

(e) (U) Represent NORAD-USNORTHCOM in Computer Network Event Conference (CNEC) and Computer Network Assessment Conferences (CNAC).

(f) (U) Complete IA/CND checklists when an event occurs.

(g) (U) Perform S&NM tasks as needed.

(3) (U) **NCOIC of the Watch.** Monitors TNCC operations and provides guidance to the S&NM, IA/CND, and DMS personnel to ensure the TNCC is successful in its mission. The NCOIC will also complete the following:

(a) (U) Assure quality products from the crew.

(b) (U) Attend meetings such as the CSAM, and OPS/INTEL meeting.

(c) (U) Prepare and present TNCC daily briefing.

(d) (U) Brief J6 Director and staff who call in for SA updates.

(3) (U) **Cyber Space Domain Watch Officer (CDWO).** The CDWO monitors the TNCC operations and provides Theater NetOps situational awareness reporting to the N2C2. The CDWO will also complete the following:

(a) (U) Assure N2C2 receives timely and accurate NetOps reporting.

(b) (U) Act as J6 representative to the N2C2.

(c) (U) Prepare and present TNCC daily briefing.

(d) (U) Brief J6 Director and staff who call in for SA updates.

b. (U) **Adaptive Operations (Crisis Ops).** During a crisis or exercise the NORAD-USNORTHCOM HQ transitions to an adaptive structure. When this occurs the TNCC will adapt its operations to support the 24/7 operations.

4. (U) **Reporting Requirements.** Network reporting is divided into Systems & Network Management (S&NM) and IA/CND. All components will report to the
NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC as directed. Reporting formats are found on the NORAD-USNORTHCOM NIPRNET and SIPRNET portal pages.

a. (U) Components and assigned JTFs will provide a daily NETOPS SITREP each workday to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC NLT 2300Z. Reporting times may be adjusted as mission and operations require. Components will submit a Communications Spot (COMSPOT) report within 1 hour of an event. Report formats are posted on the TNCC portal page. Components will email additional charts, spreadsheets, or text files that amplify NETOPS status.

(1) (U) Information required to S&NM.

   (a) (U) Unscheduled outages, start/end times, and mission impact to the following systems as applicable: Data, NIPRNET, SIPRNET/ADNET, JWICS, SATCOM; SHF, EHF, UHF, GBS, IRIDIUM, commercial, INMARSAT, Voice: DSN, DRSN, PSTN/Cellular, Line of Sight Ground Entry Station (LOS/GES), VTC, DMS/AUTODIN, and deployable communications suites.

   (b) (U) Loss of service or issues with the following applications: GCCS, TBMCS, Missile Warning, Air Warning, email, web server, chat, JDISS, GBS, and DCTS.

   (c) (U) Failure or issues with any DRSN conferences.

   (d) (U) Pending scheduled outages, start/end times, and mission impact to the systems listed above.

   (e) (U) Any issues with the above systems or other systems that affect mission capability or readiness.

   (f) (U) Absence of Component Commander and J6/A6.

   (g) (U) Pending actions or issues awaiting action from the NORAD-USNORTHCOM J6 staff such as requests for information or staffing an action.

(2) (U) Information required to IA/CND.

   (a) (U) Current INFOCON, attainment DTG, and any pending change.

   (b) (U) Status of Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) compliance and receipt acknowledgement for any new IAVA.

   (c) (U) Status of compliance with any current Computer Tasking Orders (CTO).
(d) (U) Any incidents/intrusions/infections of component networks.
(e) (U) Any IA/CND issues that affect readiness.

b. (U) POC for current and after hours NETOPS issues for each of the NETOPS areas are posted on the portal page.

c. (U) Components may send reports to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM TNCC at: nc.tncc.omb@northcom.smil.mil (SIPRNET), nc.tncc.omb@northcom.mil (NIPRNET), and norad.nc.tcco@noradhq.relcan.mil (RELCAN SIPRNET).

d. (U) TNCC reports are sent via email from the TNCC. If your component is not receiving TNCC reports, please contact the TNCC to be added to the distribution lists. Reports and reporting formats are posted to USNORTHCOM SIPRNET and NIPRNET portals.

5. (U) Relationships: TNCC communicates with multiple federal agencies outside of NORAD-USNORTHCOM Combatant Command during a crisis. The TNCC uses collaborative tools to maintain communications. These tools include the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Portals, DCTS, and the DSEL.
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250 Vandenberg St, Suite B016
Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3100
24 April 2008

TAB F TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U)
COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE (COP) (U)

(U) Reference: USNORTHCOM COP CONEX, 12 Dec 05 (U)

1. (U) Purpose. Provides an overview of the CONEX for the NORAD-USNORTHCOM COP.


   a. (U) A solid understanding of friendly, threat, and environmental information are key to maintaining SA supporting HD and DSCA. USNORTHCOM maintains a COP to fuse, analyze, and assess information required to create and share SA. This architecture includes static and dynamic track displays as well as briefings for senior officers. Awareness promotes knowledge. To make sound decisions, judgment applied against knowledge generates a level of understanding required for leaders at all levels of command. Properly integrated, the COP reduces elements of uncertainty and increases the level of knowledge.

   b. (U) The end state for the USNORTHCOM COP is as follows: Each battle space domain (Land, Maritime, Air, SOF, NGB, Cyber, and Interagency) has a single integrator for that respective component of the COP. USNORTHCOM provides overall integration of each battle space domain to produce a "fused" COP. Inputs to the COP supporting DSCA are inherent to the missions of Joint Forces Land, Maritime, and Air Component Commands (JFLCC, JFMCC, and JFACC) and JTFs. All USNORTHCOM JTFs report integrated COP information pertaining to their JOA per guidelines established by this CONEX. NC/J32 will provide COP inputs for all special operations forces in support of USNORTHCOM to the COP manager. Additionally, USNORTHCOM leverages the NGBs unique position as a conduit and channel of communications to the National Guard in the 54 States/Territories; NGB supports USNORTHCOM COP development and sustainment by reporting information pertinent to employment of National Guard capabilities employed by the Governor(s) in State Active Duty (SAD) and/or Title 32 status.

   c. (U) The USNORTHCOM COP is capable of fusing Geographic Information Systems (GIS) based information from local, State, Federal Agencies, and other civil sources, with traditional military information that lies within the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Fusion, analysis, and dissemination of GCCS and GIS information promote HD and DSCA mission success.
d. (U) Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness (JBFSA); units/organizations both DoD and non-DoD will employ Blue Force Tracking (BFT) devices or other available tracking mechanisms, while operating in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

e. (U) USNORTHCOM is the COP Fusion Center (CFC) for the USNORTHCOM AOR as directed by Joint Staff and the NMCC. USNORTHCOM will create and maintain an OPTASK COP Message which directs subordinate and supporting commands what information is required in the COP.

3. (U) Detailed information and products about COP operations can be found on the USNORTHCOM portal.
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24 April 2008

TAB G TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 [U]
INFORMATION EXCHANGE BROKER/KNOWLEDGE MANAGER (U)

(U) References:

a. (U) Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Defense 12 Jul 07 (U)

1. (U) Purpose. Provides information and mission description concerning the Information Exchange Broker (IEB)/Knowledge Manager (KM) and their use in support of the execution of the base plan.

2. (U) General. IEBs are systems and processes experts concerned with information sharing and information synchronization. They work with operators of the responsible onsite agency to enable better situational awareness and management of critical knowledge. They look across a broad field of operational information to ensure sharing of all critical and relevant information among and synchronization between agencies involved. They are considered critical strategic assets for employment and deployment throughout the USNORTHCOM AOR.

   a. (U) IEBs represent a cross section of operational expertise; they are senior analysts knowledgeable in communications, ground, aviation, chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear, foreign area, and logistics operations, etc., and in tactical, operational, and strategic planning. USNORTHCOM IEBs will be employed throughout the Headquarters as well as deployed to subordinate organizations and mission partners. Their mission is to foster information flow and monitor processes that link between the element to which they are assigned and all others.

   b. (U) Working within the various elements throughout the organization using information sharing technologies, IEBs will remain separated enough to oversee the entire information flow within the element. From that vantage point, they provide recommendations on the information flow policy, process, tactics, techniques, and procedures used to ensure that critical actionable information and knowledge reaches the leadership for timely, informed decisions. Essential to this function is identification of the inhibitors to current policies and processes. The IEBs' primary focus is on the principal driver for information—the Critical Information Requirements—and on the organization's Strategic Priorities. Therefore, IEBs are the information conduit from any organizational element to the remainder of the organization.
c. (U) Each IEB understands and uses the full spectrum of collaborative processes, procedures, and tools of the organization to which they are assigned/attached. This ensures IEBs will successfully operate in a Collaborative Information Environment and will achieve enhanced information sharing. If the IEB is used as an Action Officer and not as an independent information flow facilitator, the expectation would be for the IEB to be less effective, focused on one or a few issues, rather than staying abreast of the broader scope of issues affecting the operational cell.

d. (U) IEBs maintain an operational focus, they build and sustain relationships with all operations elements, and they facilitate seamless information sharing with partner organizations and improve bi-national information sharing. IEBs help shape efforts to synchronize DOD, Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and non-government efforts.

e. (U) IEBs are certified by the Information Synchronization Cell. They also have international certification in Knowledge Management. They will be familiar with all appropriate command collaborative tools as well as any variety used by mission partners.
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24 April 2008
(a) (U) DRSN: Intra/Inter secure voice communications, to include voice conferencing.

(b) (U) Data networking: SIPRNET, JWICS-TS/SCI, NIPRNET, DMS.

(c) (U) Secure and non-secure VTC; to include internal and external capabilities.

(d) (U) STU III/STE.

(e) (U) PSTN.

b. (U) Tasks and Responsibilities.

(1) (U) 153rd CACS.

(a) (U) Exercise management of the MCCC communications networks in support of USNORTHCOM exercise objectives. Provide equipment and personnel to meet C4 requirements in support of USNORTHCOM battlestaff and external agency members. Ensure MCCC communications equipment interoperability, compatibility and integration between USNORTHCOM, Service components and other supporting commands and agencies.

(b) (U) Install, operate, and maintain (IOM) the MCCC platform and associated communications assets IAW this plan.

(c) (U) Install and operate C4 services over commercial leased T-1 and Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) communications paths.

(d) (U) IOM Single Channel Radio (SCR) and MILSTAR circuits, as required.

(e) (U) IOM designated DRSN conferencing circuits, as required.

(f) (U) As required, IOM sixteen (16) additional IST-2 DRSN phones in the remote operating environment (ROE).

(g) (U) As required, IOM an additional eight (8) STU-III capable phone terminations in the ROE.

(h) (U) Coordinate use of joint keying materials with controlling authorities.
(i) (U) Coordinate, and validate the communications systems and interfaces (protocols, standards, etc.) between commercial, fixed communications systems, and USNORTHCOM Patch and Test Facility (PTF).

(j) (U) Conduct Communication Exercises (COMMEX), as required, to ensure functionality of communications systems.

(k) (U) Establish SIPRNET and NIPRNET email accounts for designated Battlestaff and associated members and provide local administrative support. Ensure requisite levels of security are provided for all classes of data networking.

(l) (U) As required, request NS/EP TSP from USNORTHCOM.

5. (U) Command and Signal.

a. (U) The N-NC/J6 exercises operational and supervisory control over all C4 assets; organic, assigned, or attached, or in support of USNORTHCOM. The N-NC/J6, via the TNCC, will direct all activation, restoration, and deactivation of C4 systems, circuits, and links.

b. (U) The Commander, 153rd CACS exercises tactical and administrative control over MCCC C4 systems and activities. This will include, but is not limited to, personnel, equipment, and administrative/exercise areas.
ANNEX Q TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 DSCA
MEDICAL SERVICES

REFERENCES:


c. Joint Publication 3-08, 17 March 2006, "Interagency Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol II."

d. Joint Publication 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, 19 March 2003

e. Joint Publication 4-02, 31 October 2006, Health Service Support

f. AFI 41-301/AR 40-535/OHNAVINST 4630.9C/MCO P4630.9H, 1 August 1996 Worldwide Aeromedical Evacuation System.

g. AR 40-350/BUMEDINST 6230.1E/AFJI 41-315, March 1990, Patient Regulating to and within the Continental United States.

h. DOD Instruction 6490.03 Deployment Health, 11 August 2006


j. DOD Directive 6010.22 National Disaster Medical System, 21 June 2003


m. DepSecDef's 25 April 2005 guidance on "Reporting Immediate Response Requests from Civil Authorities.

1. Situation

a. Operational Area. To provide a concept of operation for Joint Health Service Support, assign tasks, and provide guidance on military medical support provided as a part of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). Joint health service support (HSS) response to DSCA events will be measured based on the scope and magnitude of the event(s). Response will be regionally based, and utilize installation, Joint Force and Joint Medical Force C2 as required.

b. Enemy Forces. See Base Plan and Annex B, Intelligence, Appendix 6, Force Health Protection to Annex Q.

   (1) Threats. Naturally-occurring disease will pose a risk to forces in the NORTHCOM AOR.

   (2) Environmental Health. Harsh climates (e.g. extreme hot, cold, rain, dusts, altitude) can lead to environmental injuries. Contaminated food and water constitute the greatest immediate risk to the health of the force.

   (3) Civilian Medical Infrastructure. The medical infrastructure across CONUS is capable of handling any situation. However, during a catastrophic event, the civilian medical infrastructure may be damaged and/or destroyed and will need to be augmented or replaced by DOD or Federal capabilities.

   (4) Military Medical Care Infrastructure. Military medical care infrastructure is a capable resource of handling most situations. During a catastrophic event, they may or may not be ideally located to respond to the event.

c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan and Annex A, Task Organization.

d. Assumptions.
(1) Sufficient military medical personnel, units, and other medical assets may be limited due to competing operational commitments.

(2) Patient movement by civilian or military assets will be available.

(3) Simultaneous DSCA and CM efforts will require an appropriate regional response on the part of DOD to ensure effective asset utilization and timely response.

(4) The National Guard will respond at a Regional, State or local level.

e. Limitations.

(1) Patient movement to and from airheads and medical treatment facilities will be problematic due to excessive congestion on local roads and limited movement alternatives.

(2) Due to immature, limited and sporadic surveillance programs, detection of disease outbreaks may not occur until large numbers of victims are affected.

(3) Communication between organizations will be limited due to non-compatible systems and equipment.

(4) Other operations will affect the availability of support with regard to personnel, equipment and supplies.

(5) Although DOD forces are expected to be healthy, fit, and to have received appropriate immunizations upon deployment, reality is that many units will be unidentified up to the time of deployment and not have received necessary work-ups and immunizations.

2. Mission. See Base Plan. Within the supported commander's concept of operation, protect forces from health hazards, disease, environmental threats, and non-battle injuries (DNBI), and to provide a standard of essential care in theater (resuscitation and stabilization) for all patients as close as feasible to peacetime US standards of healthcare.

3. Execution.

   a. Concept of Operations. Execute a timely, safe, effective, and efficient response to the President or SecDef DSCA tasking. CDRUSNORTHCOM provides Joint Health Service Support (HSS) to U.S. Military Forces, coalition forces, and civilian personnel in support of this CONPLAN by

Q-3

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providing lifesaving stabilization care and evacuation of patients to designated definitive care facilities. DOD HSS assets deploy within the AOR for the purpose of protecting the force from disease and environmental threats, or manmade disasters and assisting civil authorities by rendering responsive casualty care management continuously through all taxonomies of care through all phases of the operation.

(1) Transition.

(a) While no direct Federal assistance is authorized prior to a Presidential declaration, under the Stafford Act, local military commanders, in response to a request for assistance, may provide "Immediate Response" to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage. When time does not allow the commander or installation to obtain prior approval from higher headquarters, and in response to a direct request from a civil authority, the installations may respond under this Immediate Response Authority (IRA). Within hours, immediate response reporting is required to high authorities. The timely information flow will be key to all planning efforts in continued support.

(b) In all other instances, when directed by SecDef and the CDRUSNORTHCOM deploys HSS forces, in adequate numbers, to provide HSS operations in support of DSCA, provide HSS and implement Force Health Protection measures for US forces in support of disaster relief operations on an area basis; assess State and local requirements; reduce suffering; safeguard the health of the affected population by reducing the threat of an epidemic outbreak; and providing evacuation, hospitalization and treatment, combat stress control, disease surveillance, and veterinary services. Organic medical assets will provide medical services for deploying units. Component units that do not have their own medical assets will receive support from component medical units on an area basis regardless of service affiliation.

(c) This Annex will be executed in six phases (see Basic Plan. This Annex identifies a steady state (Phase 0, Shape) and five operational phases: Phase I (Anticipate) Phase II (Respond); Phase III (Operate); Phase IV (Stabilize); Phase V (Transition). Phases may overlap and more than one phase can be underway at the same time.

(1) Phase O, Shape. Phase 0 is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. USNORTHCOM is continuously practicing sustained deterrence and prevention. Sustained deterrence and prevention are the two primary components of maintaining Joint HSS readiness. The purpose of deterrence and prevention is to discourage or avert health emergencies (natural or manmade) from occurring.
The USNORTHCOM Surgeon will continue to refine plans, conduct training and exercises, leverage technology to improve the HSS Common Operating Picture (COP), conduct surveillance, shape policy and legislation, and refine response concepts in coordination with all Intergovernmental and Joint HSS agencies to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Medical surveillance and intelligence collection and analysis is critical to maintaining a forward leaning posture and situational awareness. Exercises designed to improve preparedness and sustaining forces will occur regularly as a demonstration of Joint HSS capability and in support of escalating threat/responses levels. Force Health Protection methods will be implemented to detect unusual disease threats and occurrences across the AOR.

(2) **Phase I. Anticipate.** Phase I begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, a no notice event, or when directed by the President or SecDef. The phase ends with Tier I pre-identified response forces deployed. Phase I success equals deployment of the Defense Coordination Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordination Element (DCE), Emergency Preparedness Liaison Element (DCE), and other selected response forces, such as Joint Regional Medical Planners (JMRPs). Success is all military and interagency preparations complete and forces poised for deployment. Phase I ends when forces receive a PTDO. Depending on the type and projected scope of event, JMRPs may be alerted and/or deployed with the DCO/DCE to support key activities. Continued coordination with DOD and Intergovernmental partners will focus on organizing response processes at the national, regional and, local levels.

(3) **Phase II. Respond.** Phase II begins with the deployment of initial response capabilities. The phase ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Phase II success equals forces deployed with enough capability to support civil authorities in accomplishment of the mission. DSCA operations are based on requests for assistance which will be made at different times, and for missions that will be completed at different times. Consequently, forces will likely deploy into and out of the DSCA JOA for the entire length of the DSCA operation. Force Health Protection countermeasures are implemented, along with development of a common operating picture at the national, state, and local levels. Medical Response and Sustaining Forces are identified, alerted, and deployed, as required. USNORTHCOM, and Component Surgeons, will begin HSS execution. Federal Coordinating Centers (FCC) and transportation hubs are activated and placed on stand-by to support patient movement activities. DOD MTFs prepare to expand surge capacity in anticipation of casualty reception.
(4). **Phase III, Operate.** Phase III begins when DSCA response operations commence. Phase III ends when Title 10 forces begin to complete mission assignments and no further requests for DOD assistance are anticipated from civil authorities. Phase III success is achieved when currently deployed DOD capabilities are sufficient to support civil authorities. While Phase I and II tasks continue into Phase III, HSS roles and responsibilities are defined more clearly through continued operational assessments and completion of mission assignments. The USNORTHCOM Surgeon coordinates and communicates within DOD, with NDMS elements, and with Interagency partners to determine requirements and ensure response capabilities meet the requirements. Sustaining Forces may be called upon if augmented forces are insufficient to manage the HLD or CS situation. Liaison Officers are established with the Primary Agency and key supporting agencies ensuring smooth integration for HSS execution.

(5). **Phase IV, Stabilize.** This phase begins with the scale down of DOD response operations with civil authorities assuming responsibility for community HSS operations. Phase IV ends when DOD support is no longer required by civil authorities and transition criterion are established. As casualties are significantly decreased, and when Regional, State or local facilities are able to provide sufficient levels of patient care and support the operation on their own logistically, Joint HSS units will be redeployed as they are no longer required. Success is defined as fulfilling the assigned DSCA response missions and civil authorities are prepared to assume responsibility of the operation.

(6). **Phase V, Transition.** This phase begins with the redeployment of remaining DOD forces. The Phase ends when response forces have been relieved redeployed and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands. The decision to implement the transition plan may be based on more than military factors (e.g. political). Success equals complete transfer of HSS responsibilities to civil authorities and timely and safe redeployment of DOD forces to home stations. CDRUSNORTHCOM will direct when this effort is to occur. DOD will continue to provide all levels of Joint HSS to operating forces as required until transition of authority has occurred and all forces are redeployed. During this phase, we return to Phase 0 tasks, maintaining situational awareness via medical surveillance. During transition, patient tracking information, fiscal information, and lessons learned are captured and reported up the chain-of-command.
(2) **Responsibility and Command Relationships.**

(a) Health and Medical Services are listed in the NRF as Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8, with the HHS as the primary lead agency. DOD is one of thirteen Support Agencies, which are tasked to support HHS. Other medical Support Agencies include the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Agency for International Development, and the American Red Cross.

(b) At the Federal level, the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a partnership between HHS, DOD, VA, and FEMA along with major pharmaceutical suppliers, hospital supply vendors, the National Foundation for Mortuary Care, and other international disaster response and health organizations.

(c) USNORTHCOM Surgeon's Medical Operations Center (MOC) will work in concert with the National HHS Secretary Operations Center/NDMS Operations Support Center (HHS SOC/NDMS OSC) to synchronize Health Service Support to the civil populace in a DSCA operation.

(d) During all phases of support, DOD medical forces will remain under the command and control of US military commanders, but will support other US Government Agencies, as outlined above, upon activation by the NCA.

(e) Medical support from DOD will be coordinated from CDRUSNORTHCOM Surgeon through its designated JTF DSCA/JFLCC/Component Surgeons working together with ESF #8.

(3) **Hospitalization.** (See Appendix 3)

(a) Although health services support is a service component responsibility, DOD definitive care healthcare facilities will serve as joint assets to maximize availability of hospital beds and services. Joint staffing of facilities is not a prerequisite to joint use; however, joint augmentation may be directed. These facilities will treat all authorized beneficiaries.

(b) Patients will be hospitalized whenever possible within the state. If hospital beds or capabilities are not available, patients will be hospitalized in neighboring states utilizing the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).
(c) For DOD personnel, each unit is responsible for the medical support of its respective personnel and any functional areas for which it has been assigned responsibility. Individual units will have organic medical care embedded. All US medical treatment facilities are considered Joint assets and as such, they care for all US forces regardless of Service affiliation.

(4) **Patient Movement.** (See Appendix 1 - Joint Patient Movement System)

(a) Each component commander is authorized to regulate patients among their organizations. Ground transport is the preferred means of evacuation within the contaminated zones. Once patients are outside the contaminated zone and decontaminated, air assets may be used. Special precautions must be taken if the agent is biological and contagious. Patient evacuation from the JOA will be regulated by the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC), Scott AFB, IL. All requests for patient movement are initiated via Patient Movement Requests (PMR) process through USTRANSCOM Regulating Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES).

(b) Due the conditions of the lines of communication as a result of a DSCA event, any means available will be utilized to evacuate patients to safety. Nontraditional means of evacuation, i.e. busses, boats, trucks, rotary and fixed wing aircraft will be employed depending upon the situation on the ground and availability of the assets.

(5) **Host Nation Support (HNS).** N/A

(6) **Other Health Service Support.**

(a) Search and Rescue. Components will ensure search and rescue operations are supported medically. The primary mission of rotary-wing aeromedical aircraft is to rescue or evacuate casualties during the initial phases of this operation when lives are at stake.

(b) Civil Affairs. Health service support of DSCA operations will be worked in conjunction with and in support of the state and local efforts.

(7) **Joint Blood Program.** (See Appendix 2, Joint Blood Program to this Annex) The USNORTHCOM will establish a joint blood program office (JBPO) if required.

(8) **Force Health Protection.** (See Appendix 5, FHP to this Annex) Objective is to minimize both disease and non-battle injury (DNBI) and
injury within the USNORTHCOM AOR in order to support civil authorities and maintain freedom of action.

(a) The NORTHCOM Surgeon is responsible for developing medical surveillance policy and programs for all deployed personnel.

(b) Commanders will institute effective FHP measures and health surveillance programs to prevent DNBI. These programs are integral to pre-deployment, deployment, and post-deployment operations.

(c) Commanders should include FHP personnel in the initial deployment planning stages to estimate the health and environmental threats and provide countermeasures and training. (See Appendix 6 - Force Health Protection)

(d) Commanders are responsible for conducting pre-deployment FHP briefings as part of pre-deployment training.

(e) Participating units will maintain vigorous force health protection programs to significantly reduce the disease and non-battle injury (DNBI) risk. Programs will be conducted in accordance with applicable service and component directives and regulations.

(f) Personnel will be immunized IAW USNORTHCOM guidance and service directives.

(g) Organic force health protection capabilities will receive a high priority for deployment in accordance with component mission requirements. The main force health protection priorities to be targeted include:

i. Personal hygiene

ii. Food and water safety

iii. Environmental factors to include CBRNE exposure (See App 6 Tab B)

iv. Infectious diseases

v. Disease vectors and their control

vi. Education

vii. Mental health assessment
viii. Dental hygiene

(h) All local water will be considered non-potable until approved by medical officials.

(i) Unusual occurrences of disease will be reported through the JFLCC Surgeon to the USNORTHCOM Surgeon.

(9) **Theater Evacuation Policy.** The theater evacuation policy is three days for DOD personnel. Patients and staff in damaged/threatened civilian hospitals who are at risk within the effected area will be evacuated as soon as possible to safety. Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF) will be established utilizing state and federal assets. DOD hospitals will be integrated into this operation.

(10) **Dental Services.** Dental support is a service responsibility. Dental care for US military forces will be limited to treatment necessary to relieve suffering and alleviate impairment of an individual's ability to perform assigned missions. Dental personnel will be used throughout the JOA in a medical treatment and care role.

(11) **Veterinary Services.** Large numbers of animals may be injured or killed during a DSCA event. Veterinary capabilities may be required to deploy to the JOA to assess the situation, identify requirements and establish liaison with the state and local animal control and health and agriculture departments. Components will coordinate for veterinary support requirements with the JTF/CDR USNORTHCOM Surgeon.

(12) **Other Areas.**

(a) Adjunct Medical Support.

(1) Coordination and synchronization of efforts with federal, state, and local, agencies, NGOs, and PVOs are essential to success in providing HSS support.

(2) Eligibility of Care

i. Health service support will be provided to effected civilians as part of disaster relief when the state and local medical infrastructure is insufficient to support its population and no other alternatives are available in order to relieve pain and suffering.
ii. Civilians injured or wounded by US forces will be treated by US forces.

iii. DOD civilians who are deployed with US forces in the JOA are eligible for treatment.

iv. US contractors who are deployed in support of US forces are only eligible for emergency care (life, limb, eyesight, or undue suffering) unless it is specified differently in their contract.

v. Members of the American Red Cross, who are deployed in support of disaster relief efforts within the JOA, are eligible for emergency care. All other care is based upon availability.

vi. Members of the Public Health Service are eligible for full care.

(b) State and local support. The potential for medical support at the state and local level is limited. The surgeon will be notified immediately if a state or local medical facility is used.

(c) Mortuary Affairs. Medical support to Mortuary Affairs will be IAW JP 4-06 to provide environmental and occupational recommendations on handling the deceased, and assisting in the identification of remains if given a mission assignment (See Annex D). The JFLCC or JTF Surgeon will assign responsibility for completion of death certificate and identification of remains consistent with guidance if required.

(d) Preventive Medicine. Preventive medicine elements will deploy to the JOA early to assess the threat to the DOD forces, establish required surveillance systems to monitor disease outbreaks among the force, and work with state and local official if requested. (See Appendix 6)

(e) All active duty members who are returned to duty must report to an established holding location to ensure proper transportation and accountability is obtained to move the individual back to their respective unit/Command. Evacuation policy is to be determined. USNORTHCOM J-1 will provide a clear, concise, efficient and effective Return to Duty policy and procedure.

b. Tasks.

(1) CDRUSJFCOM. When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSJFCOM serves as a Joint Force Provider for DSCA operations. CDRUSJFCOM sources
military Services resources and forces to assist civil authorities within the USNORTHCOM OA.

(a) Be Prepared To (BPT) deploy HSS response forces and equipment as directed by SecDef.

(b) BPT identify and provide any additional medical individual augmentation as required in coordination with (ICW) CDRUSNORTHCOM.

(2) CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(a) ICW the Services and CDRUSNORTHCOM, USTRANSCOM will collect immediate, bi-monthly or special event NDMS bed reporting data via the TRANSCOM Regulating Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES).

(b) Provides transportation and in-transit visibility for patient movements and Class VIIA and VIIIB distribution ICW NGB, USCG, and other federal agencies. Provide transportation and in-transit visibility for patient movements, Patient Movement Items (PMI), and Class VIIA and VIIIB distribution, ICW NGB, USCG, and other federal agencies during DSCA operations.

(c) Aggregate and provide periodic patient movement and execution data to USNORTHCOM, as directed.

(d) Execute patient movement mission, ICW State and federal partners when required during DSCA operations.

(f) Exercise OPCON over patient movement forces.

(3) JTF-DSCA

(a) Plan, coordinate and execute HSS operations in support of (ISO) DSCA operations.

(b) Coordinate and integrate health service support (HSS) missions in support of DSCA operations. Develop plans, guidance and procedures how these missions are to be executed.

(c) Provide Joint coordination of HSS (treatment, movement, hospitalization, evacuation, return to duty, force health protection/prevention, veterinary, laboratory services, blood management, dental, combat stress control and medical C4 intelligence) within the land domain in support of (ISO) DSCA operations.

Q-12

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(d) Maintain HSS situational awareness within DSCA JOA.

(e) At direction of the USNORTHCOM organize and operate a Theater Patient Movement Requirement Center (TPMRC).

(f) Coordinate and oversee Force Health Protection activities within the DSCA JOA

   i. Track PM indicators for the AO and prepare reports and estimates of medical threats.

   ii. Monitor and develop plans, procedures and guidelines on countermeasures to reduce the consequence of medical threats.

   iii. Provide operational oversight for subordinate unit Occupational and Environmental Health Programs.

(g) Prepare medical intelligence/threat estimate and analysis. Prioritize medical intelligence requirements and assist subordinates in developing and refining medical information requirements.

(h) Coordinate medical examiner expertise and assistance in the identification of remains upon request.

(i) Provide HSS to USCG as directed

(4) Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH)

   (a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, DSCA, Annex Q.

   (c) Coordinate and integrate Air Force (AF) health service support (HSS) missions in support of the USNORTHCOM. Develop plans, guidance and procedures how these missions are to be executed.

   (d) Provides Air Force Title 10 medical support functions to AF forces attached/OPCON to USNORTHCOM in order to ensure Air Force personnel are capable of supporting USNORTHCOM.

   (e) Identify required AF medical forces capabilities to meet USNORTHCOM assigned DSCA mission execution requirements to facilitate USNORTHCOM planning and operations.

   (f) When directed, provide DSCA to ESF 8 IAW NRF.

Q-13

—UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO—
(g) Coordinate and provide situational awareness for capabilities/assets being provided to USNORTHCOM for which the Air Force has Executive Agent Oversight.

(h) Conduct USNORTHCOM FHP program responsibilities for all AF forces attached/OPCON to USNORTHCOM.

(i) Initiate pre-deployment, deployment and post deployment Force Health Protection and medical surveillance measures for Air Force forces.

(5) Army North (ARNORTH)

(a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, DSCA, Annex Q.

(b) Designate the JFLCC Surgeon.

(c) Coordinate and integrate Army health service support (HSS) missions in support of the USNORTHCOM. Develop plans, guidance and procedures how these missions are to be executed.

(d) Provides Army Title 10 medical support functions to Army forces attached/OPCON to USNORTHCOM in order to ensure Army forces are capable of supporting USNORTHCOM.

(e) Identify required Army medical forces capabilities to meet USNORTHCOM assigned DSCA mission execution requirements to facilitate USNORTHCOM planning and operations.

(f) BPT provide veterinary service to USNORTHCOM components, federal, State and local government agencies when directed.

(g) When directed, provide DSCA to ESF 8 IAW NRF.

(h) Establish a Medical Operations Center with information system architecture compatible with USNORTHCOM MOC in order to provide continuous command, control, coordination and communications.

(i) Coordinate and provide situational awareness for capabilities/assets being provided to USNORTHCOM for which the Army has Executive Agent Oversight. This includes but is not limited to veterinary services, medical logistic, rotary wing medical evacuation.

Q-14
(j) Conduct USNORTHCOM FHP program responsibilities for all Army forces attached/OPCON to USNORTHCOM.

(k) Initiate pre-deployment, deployment and post deployment Force Health Protection and medical surveillance measures.

(l) At direction of the USNORTHCOM serves as the Single Integrated Medical Logistics Management (SIMLM).

   i. Provide oversight for HSS logistical support in support of the USNORTHCOM

   ii. Coordinate the JTF/JFLCC level acquisition of Class VIII and associated support items of equipment

(6) U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF)

(a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, DSCA, Annex Q.

(b) Designate the JFMCC Surgeon

(c) Coordinate and integrate Navy health service support (HSS) missions in support of the USNORTHCOM. Develop plans, guidance and procedures how these missions are to be executed.

(d) Provides Navy Title 10 medical support functions to Naval forces attached/OPCON to USNORTHCOM in order to ensure Naval forces are capable of supporting USNORTHCOM.

(e) Identify required Navy medical forces capabilities to meet USNORTHCOM assigned DSCA mission execution requirements to facilitate USNORTHCOM planning and operations.

(f) When directed, provide DSCA to ESP 8 IAW NRF.

(g) Coordinate and provide situational awareness for capabilities/assets being provided to USNORTHCOM for which the Navy has Executive Agent Oversight.

(h) Conduct USNORTHCOM FHP program responsibilities for all Naval forces attached/OPCON to USNORTHCOM.

(i) Initiate pre-deployment, deployment and post deployment Force Health Protection and medical surveillance measures for Naval forces.
(7) JFHQ-NCR

(a) Develop and maintain a supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, DSCA, Annex Q for operations in the JFHQ-NCR JOA. Conduct planning for likely DSCA contingencies ICW DHS, FEMA, HHS, NCR civil authorities, Service Components in the NCR, JTF-CS, and other federal agencies.

(b) BPT accept OPCON of HSS forces ICW DSCA operations in the NCR JOA.

(c) BPT receive augmentees when required to conduct HSS in support of DSCA operations.

(8) CJTF-AK

(a) Develop and maintain a Level 2 supporting plan to USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, DSCA, Annex Q for DSCA operations within the JTF-AK JOA. Provide an Annex Q to support Level 1 planning for likely Alaska contingencies.

(b) BPT receive HSS augmentees when required to conduct DSCA operations.

(c) Coordinate health service support for deployed service component forces.

(9) National Guard Bureau (NGB)

(a) BPT provide daily SITREPS to the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center on National Guard activities in the USNORTHCOM JOA. Ensure that medical is addressed within the document.

(b) BPT assist USNORTHCOM and subordinate Headquarters with integrating/synchronizing federal and non-federal Health Service Support (HSS) planning, response, deployment/redeployment, and transition efforts with an emphasis on patient movement.

(c) Implement Force Health Protection directives ICW applicable DOD directives

c. Coordinating Instructions.

Q-16

---UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO---
(1) Force Health Protection/Preventive Medicine Guidance. Subordinate Commands and Service Components will comply with CDRUSNORTHCOM Force Health Protection/Preventive Medicine Guidance published in Appendix 5 Force Health Protection or via separate correspondence. Specific threat and geographic FHP guidance will be published in subsequent FRAGOs. Health Surveillance guidance will also be incorporated in this Appendix. Medical chemical defense material will be issued when directed.

(2) Any service forces responding under the Immediate Response Authority (IRA) must notify the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center through the National Military Command Center (NMCC) IAW DepSecDef's 25 Apr 05 guidance on "Reporting Immediate Response Requests from Civil Authorities." Army commands will require notification within two hours of the decision to provide immediate response assistance IAW DA message 0519142Jul05. (See Base Plan)

(3) Foreign Medical Support. Acceptance of Foreign medical support, supplies, or assistance will be dependent upon Department of State policies and determination of legal and clinical appropriateness. See Annex E, Appx. 4.

(4) DIRLAUTH authorized between JTF and USNORTHCOM Surgeons.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Administration. Once operational, surgeons will coordinate all activities and reporting requirements for subordinate medical units operating in the JOA.

b. Concept of Logistics. ARFOR is designated as the SIMLM. The SIMLM will provide logistics assistance to deployed medical elements, coordinate the flow of logistics information/flow of Class VIII material from a source of supply and CONUS based Class VIII national inventory control points and service item control centers. It will also coordinate the distribution/transportation of Class VIII material to U.S. Forces deployed to the JOA. The SIMLM will maintain visibility (including in-transit visibility) of theater Class VIII material assets, provide decision support tools, redirect shipments, and through coordination with the JTF Surgeon can direct cross-leveling of Class VIII assets. SIMLM should be prepared to provide resupply to all medical elements within the designated JOA.

(1) Class VIII resupply will not be immediately available in theater and units must deploy with maximum DOS.
(2) See Appendix 5, Medical Logistics to this Annex.

5. Command and Control.


(1) DOD Medical forces will remain under the command and control of US military commanders but will support other Federal Agencies as outlined in the Base Plan.

(2) The JTF DSCA Surgeon serves as the principal medical advisors to their Commander. The Surgeon will coordinate and synchronize all taxonomies of care and Joint HSS medical resources allocated to the command to ensure their effective use to meet the mission. DOD HSS units will be OPCON to the deploying JTF commander(s), with technical control and policy guidance provided through their respective Surgeon(s).

b. Communications. See Annex K.

(1) Routine coordinating communication between CDRUSNORTHCOM, Service Components, Sub-Unified Commands, and the JTF Surgeons will be by telephone whenever possible. Alternate means of communications are Global Command and Control System (GCCS), teleconference, E-Mail, fax, or AUTODIN message.

(2) Official plans, orders, reports and requests for information will be passed by NIPRNET or SIPRNET email, teleconference and AUTODIN message.

(3) Service components, Sub-Unified Commands and JTF Surgeons will coordinate medical communications internal to their commands. The TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES) will be the primary and preferred means of communicating patient movement requests (PMR’s).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

GENE RENUART
General, USAF
Commander, U.S. Northern Command

APPENDIXES:
1 - Joint Patient Movement System
2 - Joint Blood Program

Q-18
3 - Hospitalization (Not Used)
4 - Returns to Duty (Not Used)
5 - Medical Logistics (Class 8A) System
6 - Force Health Protection
7 - Host-Nation Medical Support (Not Used)
8 - Medical Planning Responsibilities and Task Identification

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX Q TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 DSCA
JOINT PATIENT MOVEMENT SYSTEM

References:

a. CJCS Instruction 4120.02, "Assignment of Movement Priority", 15 April 2005

b. DOD Instruction 6000.11 Patient Movement, 9 September 1998

c. USTRANSCOM Policy for Patient Movement of Contaminated Contagious or Potentially Exposed Casualties, 14 March 2008

d. DOD Directive 6000.12 Health Services Operations and Readiness, 29 April 1996

e. DOD Directive 4500.9E Transportation and Traffic Management, 11 September 2007


g. DOD 4515.13-R Air Transportation Eligibility, 1 November 1994, to include Change 1-3, 9 April 1998

h. Command Arrangements Agreement (CAA) between CDR, USTRANSCOM and CDR, USNORTHCOM, 22 March 2005 (DRAFT)

i. Joint Publication 4-02, 31 October 2006, Health Service Support

1. Situation.

a. Friendly. No Change

(1) Joint patient movement (DOD beneficiary patients/DSCA operations) will be in accordance with existing patient movement TTPs until such time as requirements exceed capability. Expansion of capability will proceed by phases.

(2) DSCA patient movement will be incorporated with existing combat patient movement requirements and CONUS patient redistribution schemes.

(3) Inadequate transportation assets exist within DOD alone to meet all patient movement requirements.

(4) Coordination and planning with Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will occur to ensure proper request for activation of NDMS to facilitate/support outbound and inbound joint patient movement as required.

2. **Mission.** To provide a concept of operation for Joint Health Service Support, assign tasks, and provide guidance on military medical support to Department of Defense (DOD) forces for DSCA in the Operation Area with regard to the movement of patients, medical attendants, related patient movement items (PMI), specialized medical care teams, and non-medical attendants in support of this CONPLAN. The primary mission of the DOD PM system is to safely transport U.S. military patients within the DSCA OA to the appropriate level of care as required.

3. **Concept of Operations.**

   a. USNORTHCOM will fulfill its DSCA mission by responding to requests for assistance in accordance with (IAW) the Nation Response Framework (NRF) and other governing guidance.

   b. Within the NRF, Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 – Public Health and Medical Services provides the mechanism for coordinated Federal assistance to supplement State, local, and tribal resources in response to public health and medical care needs. ESF #8 is coordinated by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) principally through the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness (ASPHEP). DOD is a Supporting Federal Agency to ESF #8.

   (1). In a major public health or medical emergency, local transportation assets may not be sufficient to meet the demand. State or
tribal requests for Federal medical transportation assistance are executed by ESF #8 in coordination with ESF #1, Transportation.

(2). At the request of HHS, DOD coordinates and provides support for the evacuation of seriously ill or injured patients to locations where hospital care or outpatient services are available. ICW NDMS Medical Interagency Coordination Group (MIACG), DOD is responsible for regulating and tracking patients transported on DOD assets to appropriate treatment facilities (e.g., NDMS non-Federal hospitals).

c. The NDMS primarily supports ESF #8, Health and Medical Services, of the NRF. There are four Federal partners in the NDMS including Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and DOD. HHS is the lead federal agency for the NDMS. The NDMS has three missions of emergency medical care, transportation of patients and definitive medical care. DOD coordinates the evacuation of patients from the patient collection point in or near the incident site to NDMS patient reception areas through the NDMS MIACG.

d. USNORTHCOM will, in coordination with the primary agency, set clear mission priorities. IAW DOD Directive 5158.04 United States Transportation Command, USTRANSCOM will plan and execute patient movement and aeromedical evacuation support for USNORTHCOM DCSA operations through a supported/supporting relationship.

e. Responsibilities

(1) USNORTHCOM

(a) Ensure awareness of bed capacity across the OA. Obtain surge capacity data with NDMS partners on a recurring basis, while also pursuing ways to incorporate State efforts that are not included in this data.

(b) Coordinate with USTRANSCOM and NDMS service coordinators in patient movement planning efforts.

(2) United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

(a) IAW rcf d, USTRANSCOM will plan and execute patient movement and aeromedical evacuation support for USNORTHCOM DCSA operations through a supported/supporting relationship.
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i. 18 AF/TACC will act as USNORTHCOM’s Air Mobility Division (AMD)

ii. 18/TACC execute USNORTHCOM AE requirements.

iii. USTRANSCOM’s Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC) will act as NORTHCOM’s PMRC.

iv. CDR USTRANSCOM, through the AMC Commander, will retain and exercise OPCON of aeromedical evacuation forces executing the DSCA mission.

(b) GPMRC shall:

i. Perform bed apportionment, lift-bed plan development, bed reservation, destination MTF designation, outpatient care condition, ITV as well as tracking procedures.

ii. GPMRC assumes responsibility as PMRC in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

iii. Serve as the PMRC for the NDMS, in accordance with the NDMS partnership agreement and guidelines provided by the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS).

f. Coordinating Instructions. USNORTHCOM will facilitate and identify requirements for joint patient movement and transportation issues through the Medical Interagency Coordination Group. Representation in this Group should include, but not be limited to, individual representatives from VA, DHS, HHS, DOD(HA), USNORTHCOM, USTRANSCOM, USAMEDDCOM, USAF SG, BUMED and DOT.

4. Administration and Logistics. USNORTHCOM will facilitate and identify requirements for joint patient movement and transportation issues through the Medical Interagency Coordination Group. Representation in this Group should include, but not be limited to, individual representatives from VA, DHS, DHHS, DOD(HA), USNORTHCOM, USTRANSCOM, USAMEDDCOM, USAF SG, BUMED and DoT.

5. Command and Control.
a. Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with ESF #2, is tasked in the NRF to provide communications support required for ESF #8 execution.

b. DOD is responsible for tracking patients transported on DOD assets to appropriate treatment facilities.

c. The PMRC will be the focal point for patient tracking through the use of TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES).

d. Requests for DOD to manage patient tracking on non-DOD assets is beyond any current NDMS or NRF agreement and must be staffed as a Request for Assistance through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Director Military Support (JDOMS).

Tabs
A - Aeromedical Staging Facilities List (Not Used)
B - Aeromedical Evacuation Aircraft List (Not Used)
C - Evacuation Requirements (Not Used)
D - CONUS Based Reception and Distribution (Not Used)
E - Tactical/Intra-Theater and Strategic Movement of Infectious Patients in a Biological Warfare Environment (Not Used)
F - Tactical/Intra-Theater and Strategic Movement in a Chemical Environment (Not Used)
G - WMD Casualty reception Within HN and Supporting Regions (Not Used)
H - Patient Movement for Non-US Forces (Not Used)
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24 April 2008

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX Q TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 DSCA
JOINT BLOOD PROGRAM

References:  a. CJCS Instruction 6480.4, “Armed Services Blood
Program Operational Procedures” 5 August 1996

21 parts 200 to 299, and parts 600 to 799.

c. Army FM 4-02.70, Navy NAVMED P-5120 & Air Force
AFMAN (I) 41-111, “Standards for Blood Banks and
Transfusion Services,” American Association of Blood Banks,
current edition.

d. Army TM 8-227-3, Navy NAVMED P-5101 & Air Force
AFMAN 41-119, “Technical Manual,” American Association of

e. Army TM 8-227-12, Navy NAVMED P-6530 & Air Force
AFH 44-152, “Joint Blood Program Handbook,” 1 January
1998.

f. OPNAVINST 6530.4A, “Department of the Navy Blood


1. Situation. See Base Plan

2. Mission To provide guidance for operation and management of the
Joint Blood Program within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) during a
DSCA Event, and how it interfaces with the U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO).

3. Execution

   a. Concept of Operations.
(1) The Department of Defense is prepared to support civilian authorities in DSCA missions while simultaneously supporting a Homeland Defense event.

(2) Health and Human Services (HHS) is the primary agency for Emergency Support Function 8, Public Health and Medical Service. HHS monitors blood availability and maintains contact with the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) Inter-organizational Task Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of Terrorism, and as necessary, its individual members to include the Armed Services Blood Program Office (ASBPO), to determine the:

(a) Need for blood, blood products and the supplies used in their manufacture, testing, and storage

(b) Ability of existing supply chain resources to meet these needs

(c) Any emergency measure needed to augment or replenish existing supplies.

(3) If the blood product requirements exceed the capacity of the civilian blood agencies, or if blood distribution or storage assistance is required, ESF# 8 will send a Request for Assistance (RFA) to the Joint Field Office (JFO), The JFO in coordination with the DCO will validate the requirement and forward to JDOMS and SecDef.

(4) The USNORTHCOM JBPO, in coordination with the ASBPO, will manage and coordinate all aspects of DOD blood product support and DOD blood distribution assets in the JOA, regardless of Service component.

(5) The Armed Services Blood Program (ASBP) has different blood distribution and storage assets in CONUS. The Armed Services Whole Blood Processing Laboratories (ASWBPL) are major blood product distribution hubs. ASWBPL-East is located at McGuire AFB and ASWBPL-West is located at Travis AFB. Deployable blood distribution assets include Blood Supply Units (BSU) and Blood Transshipment Systems (BTS). Additionally, DOD medical treatment facilities can be used for limited expanded blood product storage capacity.

(6) If HHS requests distribution assets, the USNORTHCOM JBPO will coordinate with available medical units and USJFCOM to designate a BSU and/or BTS to accommodate JOA blood distribution and storage.
b. Coordinating Instructions

(1) The ASBPO is a Level 1 member on the AABB Interorganizational Task Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of Terrorism.

(2) Coordinate with transportation assets to ensure the most expeditious method is used for moving blood from all areas of the country to the JOA. This will become extremely critical is airspace is restricted. In this case, priority on MILAIR must be given for the movement of blood products. As an alternative, Angel Flights can be used to move critical medical supplies, to include blood, even with restricted air space.

4. Administration and Logistics. See Base Plan and Base Annex Q

5. Command and Control.

a. The USNORTHCOM JBPO will determine the format and frequency of DOD blood reports (BLDRPT) and DOD blood shipment reports (BLDSHPRPT).

b. Since the ASBP and the JBPO will be working closely with HHS and other civilian blood agencies, classification of reports should be kept at the lowest possible level.

A--Joint Blood Program Operational Structure (Not Used)  
B--Blood Requirements and Capabilities (Not Used)  
C--Theater Blood Distribution System (Not Used)  
D--Joint Blood Program Manpower Requirements (Not Used)
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX Q TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 DSAC
MEDICAL LOGISTICS (CLASS VIII(A) SYSTEM

Reference:

a. JP 4-02, Health Service Support, Chapter III HSS Planning, Appendix C
Health Service Logistics Support, 31 October 2006 (U)

1. Situation

   a. Facilities.

      (1) The TLAMM and SIMLM(s) will coordinate medical re-supply using
      existing contracting mechanisms (e.g. DLA, Prime Vendor, and Installation
      Medical Support Activities).

      (2) The Services can facilitate the delivery of Health Services Logistics
      Systems (HSLS) through the following agencies: Defense Logistics Agency
      (DLA), Naval Medical Logistics Command (NAVMEDLOGCOM), Air Force
      Medical Logistics Command (AFMLO), and the US Army Medical Materiel
      Agency (USAMMA).

      (3) Medical assets pre-positioned in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

         (a) (U) US Army.

            i. U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) Consequence
            Management (CM)/CBRNE Packages are located in multiple locations.
            USNORTHCOM Surgeon shall coordinate with US Army to determine
            locations and availability of CM/CBRNE Packages. U.S. Army Office
            of the Surgeon General (OTSG) is the release authority.

            ii. Installation Support Packages (ISP) are located at each Army
            Medical Treatment Facility (MTF).

         (b) US Air Force. CM Sets are located at Air Force bases.
            USNORTHCOM Surgeon shall coordinate with USAF to determine
            locations and availabilities of CM Sets.
(c) US Navy. The Navy does not currently have any pre-positioned CM sets located in the JOA.

b. Assumptions.

1. The Services have pre-positioned stocks located throughout the AOR.

2. Each unit will deploy with sufficient medical materiel to conduct operations IAW Service specific basic load.

3. FDA approved Class VIIIa is readily available for use on all forces.

4. The DMSB will develop a USNORTHCOM formulary for DSCA specific events.

5. The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) can deploy a Push Package of materiel, specific to the incident, within 24 hours to an incident site. The Push Package can be operational within 48 hours.

6. USAMEDCOM can provide significant capability in all facets of medical logistics support that deployed forces may require. This includes the use of Installation Medical Supply Activities (IMSA) located at Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs) CONUS-wide to serve as medical Supply Source Activities (SSAs). Additionally, Special Medical Augmentation Response Team (SMART)- Logistics at each Regional Medical Command (RMC), are ready to deploy in support of operational medical logistics requirements to include assessment and assistance to initiate actions necessary to establish single line item requisitioning of Class VIIIa material in support of all types of hazards to include natural or man made within NORAD-USNORTHCOM’s Area of responsibility.

7. The USNORTHCOM AOR is a mature theater for supply purposes.

8. Once an order to activate the Theater Lead Agent for Medical Material (TLAMM) and Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager (SI MLM), these organizations will be able to begin processing and distributing medical materiel within 7 days.

2. Mission To provide the concept of operations for Class VIIIa support.

3. Execution

(1) The TLAMM, once implemented, will report to the CDR, USNORTHCOM.

(2) USNORTHCOM will designate a Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager (SIMLM). The SIMLM will be designated immediately to meet the medical logistics requirements of deploying forces and will execute command and control of medical logistics units until the establishment of a RJTF.

(3) The JFACC will develop a Patient Movement Items (PMI) plan for the USNORTHCOM JOA in coordination with the AMC/SGXL-PMI Manager.

(4) Initially, the TLAMM and the SIMLM(s) will provide logistics assistance to deployed medical elements, coordinate the flow of logistics information/flow of Class VIIIa materiel from sources of supply, Installation Medical Supply Activities (IMSAs) and forward distribution points. It will also coordinate the distribution/transportation of Class VIIIa materiel to U.S. forces deployed in support of DSCA operations. The TLAMM and SIMLM(s) will maintain visibility (including in-transit visibility) of theater Class VIIIa materiel assets, provide decision support tools, redirect shipments, implement cost accounting procedures with reporting mechanisms, and cross-level Class VIIIa assets at the direction of the JTF-Medical Commander.

(5) SIMLM will coordinate continuous Class VIII support to all DOD medical units within the JOA in concert with the TLAMM designated Installation Medical Support Activities (IMSA).

b. Tasks. See Annex Q (Health Services) for specific tasks.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) The Combatant Commander, through the Command Surgeon, is responsible for HSLS in the AOR. The Command Surgeon will maintain close ongoing contact with all activities having command over medical material support to deployed forces in order to monitor the status of Class VIIIa sustainability.

(2) Per NORAD-USNORTHCOM Commander's direction, if a JFLCC is required in order to support the operation, the JFLCC will be designated as the SIMLM for this plan/operation.

(3) Combat commanders shall be kept fully informed of medical sustainability posture and what measures are being instituted to alleviate critical shortfalls.
4. Administration and Logistics

a. Medical Material Sustainability Assessment. Medical logistics sustainability relies on early resupply of deployed medical forces. The expectation is units will initially deploy with 5 DOS.

b. Policy. Deploying units will deploy with medical materiel to conduct operations IAW Service specific basic load. Re-supply will be through habitual/established Service Component channels until a decision to transition to TLAMM/SIMLM support is made. This decision will be made based on operational assessments of immediate and projected Class VIIa support required. As necessary, Service components may be tasked to provide medical logistics personnel to the SIMLM for liaison, warehousing and shipping missions.

c. Communications. Requisitions will be forwarded using existing legacy automation systems. The primary system is the Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support System (DMLSS). Deployed forces requiring Class VIIa will establish accounts with their supply support activities (SSA). This entails providing the unit commander's assumption of command orders and an up to date DA Form 1687, Signature card to the SSA. Units will use the TAMMIS Customer Assistance Module (TCAM) and ultimately the Defense Customer account manager (DCAM) once fielded and personnel are trained for all requisitioning, status, and receipt functions as the primary interface with their designated SSA. Priority of requisitions will be in concert with existing Service regulations unless otherwise directed. Requisitions and the procedures associated will be unclassified unless the operations situation dictates otherwise.

5. Command and Control. As the principal medical advisor to CDRUSNORTHCOM, the USNORTHCOM Surgeon exercises directive authority for the Commander over all medical resources allocated to CDRUSNORTHCOM and ensures their effective use to meet the mission. The relationships between medical units of the components are established within the organizational structure of the component commands.
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24 April 2008

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX Q TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08 DSCA
FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION (FHP)

References:

a. OASD/HA Policy 06-008, Policy for Pre- and Post-
deployment Serum Collection, 14 March 2006

b. OASD/HA Memorandum, Automation of Pre- and
Post-Deployment Health Assessment Forms, 21 May 2004

c. OASD/HA Policy 04-007, Policy Memorandum -
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Interval Testing, 29
March 2004

d. OASD/HA Policy 04-001, Policy for Department of
Defense Deployment Health Quality Assurance Program,
9 January 2004

e. OASD/HA Memorandum, Completeness of Deployment
Medical Records, 15 July 2003

f. OASD/HA Policy 03-007, Policy for Use of Force Health
Protection Prescription Products, 24 April 2003

g. OASD/HA Memorandum, Updated Policy for Pre- and
Post-Deployment Health Assessments and Blood
Samples, 25 October 2001

h. OASD/HA Policy 99-002, Policy for Pre- and Post-
Deployment Health Assessments and Blood Samples, 25
October 98

i. DOD Directive 2000.12, "DOD Antiterrorism/Force
Protection Program," 18 August 2003

j. DOD Instruction 2000.16, "DOD Antiterrorism
Standards," 14 June 2001

k. DOD Instruction 2000.18, "Department of Defense
Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines", 4 December 2002

i. DOD Directive 6200.4, "Force Health Protection", 9 October 2004

m. DOD Directive 6490.2, "Comprehensive Health Surveillance", 21 October 2004


o. DOD Instruction 6490.03, "Deployment Health", 11 August 2006

p. Joint Publication 4-02, Health Service Support, 31 October 2006

1. Situation

   a. Health Threat. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Medical Fusion Cell (MFC) will provide current threat information in order to provide specific FHP guidance. Component commands and assigned JTFs will further describe the health threat in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) with respect to (WRT) infectious disease, environmental hazards, food, water, sanitation, and other health threats that have the potential to reduce combat effectiveness.

      (1) Infectious Diseases.

         (a) Naturally-occurring disease will pose a risk to forces in the USNORTHCOM AOR. Risk may be endemic disease that exist in regions of the AOR or may be emerging diseases (e.g., SARS). Specific FHP guidance WRT these diseases will be provided prior to Phase 2 of the operation and communicated via DEPORD or DMS channels.

         (b) Man-made biological agents may be introduced via intentional or unintentional means. Specific FHP guidance WRT these agents will be provided either in Phase 1 or Phase 2 of the operation and communicated via DEPORD, EXORD, or DMS channels.

      (2) Environmental Hazards.
(a) Weather and Geography. Harsh climates (e.g. extreme hot, cold, rain, dusts, altitude) can lead to environmental injuries (heat exhaustion/stroke, hypothermia, trench foot, dust induced respiratory problems, or altitude sickness).

(3) Food and Water. Contaminated food and water constitute the greatest immediate risk to the health of the force. Deployed personnel must be educated to consume and provide security to approved sources of food and water. Contaminated food and water supplies and poor sanitation cause different types of acute enteric diseases (e.g., typhoid, cholera, salmonella, giardiasis, amoebiasis, botulism, and hepatitis). Food and water may also be used as a vehicle to deliver CBRN warfare agents to DOD forces.

(4) Sanitation. Sanitation practices are key to eliminating or reducing DNB. PM teams will provide guidance to commanders WRT instituting appropriate sanitation methods for deployed DOD forces.

(5) Other Hazards. The full spectrum of health threats (e.g., toxic industrial chemicals/materials, industrial operations, hazardous flora and fauna, vector-borne, animals) will be encountered in support of CBRNE CM operations.

b. Friendly. See Base Plan.

c. Assumptions.

(1) FHP activities promote, improve, conserve, and restore physical and mental health of DOD forces to include DOD civilians and contractors. The core of FHP is the health risk assessment (HRA). The Services maintain subject matter expertise (SME) WRT executing HRAs.

(2) An "all hazards" approach to FHP applies to the USNORTHCOM JOA. FHP guidance will be implemented via this plan, DEPORDs, EXORDs, and DMS.

(3) FHP measures will be instituted via FP conditions. FHP measures will apply to the JOA and, if necessary, CONUS installations outside the JOA.

(4) Health threats in the JOA may not be characterized by civil authorities; therefore, FHP assets will be required to characterize the health risk prior to DOD forces entering into hazardous environments.
(5) Data from NGB response teams (e.g., WMD CSTs) will be available for DOD use.

(6) DOD personnel will be deployed healthy, fit, and compliant with pre-deployment requirements.

d. Legal Considerations. See Annex Q.


3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. FHP is a force multiplier enabling deployed personnel to execute their mission tasks. FHP SMEs will develop and implement directives and guidance to minimize DNBI. FHP activities also support medical planning WRT resource estimation and providing information to scope deployed and follow-on medical care if required.

(1) Pre-deployment Screening. Screening and individual medical readiness are integral to the overall deployment process. Commanders are responsible for ensuring deploying personnel (military and DOD civilian), regardless of anticipated length of stay, are assessed prior to departure and determined to be medically fit for deployment. Personnel will complete the DD Form 2795, Pre-Deployment Health Assessment, and the DD Form 2795 will be reviewed prior to deployment by the unit's supporting medical staff, which will provide recommendations on the individual's deployment eligibility.

(a) Dental. In addition, personnel must be dental class 1 or 2 as documented on DD Form 2813. This requirement does not apply to civilians unless specified in the DEPORD/EXORD.

(b) Immunizations. Deploying individuals must have completed all immunizations listed below. Additional immunizations may be identified via DEPORD/EXORD or specific risk-based exposure scenarios.

x. Hepatitis A (two dose series).

x. Influenza (annual).

x. Tetanus-diphtheria (within last ten years).
(2) Medical Intelligence and Health-related Surveillance. FHP SMEs will review and analyze medical intelligence and surveillance data. Preliminary assessments may be initiated based on the information available WRT potential health threats, countermeasures, endemic infectious diseases, occupational and environmental health (OEH) stressors, mental health (including stress, suicide, and traumatic stress), food and water safety, field sanitation, and personal hygiene.

(3) OEH Site Assessment. FHP SMEs will evaluate proposed bed down sites and ensure adequate data/information is collected to provide the commander a health-based recommendation. The result of the site assessment is to ensure forces are bedded in non-contaminated areas.

(4) OEH Surveillance (OEHS). OEHS is the systematic and routine surveillance of OEH hazards and related illness. These hazards include exposures from deployed workplaces, environmental contaminants, CBRN materials, and vectors. Health hazards range from exposures that cause immediate health effects to low-level exposures resulting in delayed or long-term health effects. OEHS may include sample/data collection, data archiving, and epidemiological studies post deployment.

(5) OEH Assessments. FHP SMEs will identify and evaluate OEH hazards to ensure deployed forces are protected. That is, data/information collected is used in the health risk assessment and risk mitigation strategies developed.

(6) Individual Protective Equipment (IPE)/Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

(a) IPE (i.e., Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) ensemble) may be used to protect against various health hazards. FHP SMEs will be required to determine if MOPP ensembles are sufficient to protect personnel against the potential health threat(s). MOPP gear is required for deployment unless orders indicate otherwise.
(b) PPE will be identified and issued to personnel for protection from conventional health threats, if known. PPE includes such items as repellents and bed-nets for mosquitoes, earplugs for noise hazards, goggles for eye hazards, respirators from inhalation hazards, or aprons and gloves for splash hazards. Specific PPE will be identified as soon as possible.

(7) Health Risk Assessment (HRA). HRA is the process of identifying and evaluating OEH threats in populations or locations over a specified time period. At a minimum, FHP SMEs must qualify the risk(s), fuse health surveillance data, and provide COAs to the commander supporting the mission task while maximizing force health protection. The HRA facilitates the tracking of exposures to the individual in order to perform epidemiological studies and document exposures in the deploying member’s medical record.

(8) Post-deployment Assessment Procedures

(a) Personnel will complete DD form 2796 Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) with interaction with a Primary Care Manager (PCM) within 5 days after redeployment. Individuals will be briefed on post-deployment health concerns and responses, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

(b) DD Form 2900, Post-Deployment Health Reassessment, will be completed 90 days after re-deployment.

b. Tasks. IAW JP 4-02, commanders will develop and implement an FHP plan, which applies to all assigned and attached personnel, DOD personnel performing official duties in the JOA, and contractor personnel employed directly by DOD.

(1) Component Command and JTF FHP Responsibilities

(a) Ensure FHP is considered in all planning phases of an operation.

(b) Establish coordinated FHP and OEHs program elements.

(c) Deploy FHP SMEs to the JOA and incident site as early as possible to identify/confirm the medical and OEH threat to develop/refine/implement FHP plans.

Q-6-6
(d) Ensure deploying personnel are medically fit for duty prior to deployment.

(e) Educate deploying personnel on the health threats in the AOR and how to use appropriate countermeasures to avoid injury and illness.

(f) Ensure an OEH site assessment is completed prior to bed down of forces.

(g) Ensure HRAs are completed prior to operating in hazardous environments.

(h) Ensure approved sources of food and water are available and that food and water vulnerability assessments are completed, when appropriate.

(i) Monitor the efficacy of the FHP plan and subsequent guidance. Make recommendations for modifications as required.

(2) FHP SME Responsibilities (Predeployment).

(a) Review relevant medical intelligence products from AFMIC and medical information provided by other agencies (i.e., APHSC, MFC, and other local sources). Initiate assessments based on medical and operational intelligence and information.

(b) Inform commanders of the health threat and its potential impact on the mission.

(c) Perform preliminary HRAs and determine preventive and protective requirements for health hazards in the JOA. Include analysis of weather, altitude, terrain, endemic diseases, local food and water sources, zoonotic diseases, parasites, hazardous plants and animals, and potential exposure to hazardous and toxic materials.
(d) Analyze disease vector profiles if available and determine vector suppression requirements for unit pesticide application and aerial spray equipment.

(e) Determine additional immunization and prophylaxis requirements and issue directives and guidance as appropriate.

(f) Conduct "pre-deployment" briefings on the health threat and hazards of the operation. Provide individual training to deploying personnel WRT specific protective measures and use of required IPE/PPE if possible.

(g) Educate medical personnel on recognition, prevention, and treatment of probable diseases, injuries, and exposures.

(h) Establish monitoring programs that measure environmental stressors effecting deployed personnel.

(3) FHP SME Responsibilities (Deployment).

(a) Execute programs as identified in the Concept of Operations [para. 3.a] and Component Commander/JTF responsibilities.

(b) Communicate health risks to commanders.

(c) Review emergency and primary care logs daily to support the disease surveillance program.

(d) Conduct epidemiological investigations of suspected disease outbreaks. Factor results into HRAs.

(e) Report suspected/confirmed disease trends to local and component commanders and notify the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Surgeon's office ASAP.
(f) Conduct periodic sanitation inspections in areas of public concern.

(g) Conduct periodic inspections and testing of water systems and waste systems as applicable.

(h) Conduct area monitoring for disease causing vectors. Results of vector monitoring will be coordinated with pest control personnel for action when necessary.

(i) Monitor climatic conditions and recommend work rest cycles, fluid consumption, and other preventive measures as necessary.

(j) Conduct workplace evaluations to identify health hazards in industrial areas if workplaces are set-up to support operations.

(k) Maintain educational programs and perform risk communication to keep deployed personnel aware of current and changing health threats.

(l) Assess if contingency combat stress team personnel are necessary to meet the mental health requirements of deployed forces.

(m) Recommend contamination control procedures based on the threats/hazards present in the JOA.

(n) Monitor the efficacy of the FHP plan and subsequent guidance based on completed HRAs. Make recommendations for modifications as required.

(o) Update medical intelligence and health hazard assessments by working with USNORTHCOM J34, AFMIC, Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine-Global Threat Assessment Program, and other sources.
(4) FHP SME Responsibilities (Redeployment).

(a) Conduct briefings to personnel exiting AOR. Include possible diseases that may manifest after deployment and procedures for terminal countermeasures (e.g., chemoprophylaxis) if administered.

(b) Ensure that post-deployment health assessments are completed and medical follow-up is scheduled if required.

(c) Ensure sampling data (water, food, environmental, soil, air, etc.) is archived.

(d) Support site restoration/remediation efforts as required.

(e) Update medical intelligence and health hazard assessments by working with USNORTHCOM J34, AFMIC, Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine-Global Threat Assessment Program, and other sources.

(f) Assist in After Action Reports and Lessons Learned reporting as directed by USNORTHCOM and Component headquarters.

  c. Coordinating Instructions. See Annex Q.

4. Administration and Logistics

  a. Administration. See Annex Q.

  b. Logistics. See Annex Q. There are no unique logistic requirements to satisfy FHP requirements.

5. Command and Control. See Annex Q. There are no unique relationships WRT FHP.

Tabs

Q-6-10
A--Lead Force Health Protection (FHP) Responsibilities for APODS and SPODS (Not Used)
B--Force Health Protection (FHP) in a CBR Environment (Not Used)
C--Force Health Protection (FHP) Deployment Occupational and Environmental Health Surveillance (Not Used)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section/Annex</th>
<th>Coord/Input</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Plan</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Provides general guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex A—Task Organization</td>
<td>Coord</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B—Intelligence</td>
<td>Coord</td>
<td>Provide Medical RFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C—Combating WMD</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>NBC medical support requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SAR plan support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C—Evasion &amp; Escape</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C—Non-combatant Evacuation Operations</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Med NEO Processing and HSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C—Critical Infrastructure Protection</td>
<td>Input/Coord</td>
<td>Health Service Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D—Logistics</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Health Service Support overview. Evac/Return to Duty policy. Evac Opns requirements and abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D—Food and Water Supply</td>
<td>Coord</td>
<td>Medical Examiner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex D—Mobility and Transportation</td>
<td>Coord</td>
<td>Health Service Support overview. Patient Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex E—Personnel</td>
<td>Input/Coord</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex E—Enemy Prisoners of War</td>
<td>Input/Coord</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex E—Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained persons</td>
<td>Input/Coord</td>
<td>Health Service Support overview. Patient Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex E—Chaplain Support</td>
<td>Coord</td>
<td>Chaplain Support to HSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex F—Public Affairs</td>
<td>Input/Coord</td>
<td>Immunizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex F—DOD National Media Pool</td>
<td>Input/Coord</td>
<td>Media Pool Health Service Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Coord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Environmental Considerations</td>
<td>Coord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Host Nation Support</td>
<td>Coord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Interagency</td>
<td>Input/Coord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>Contingency Contracting</td>
<td>Input/Coord</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX V TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

References: See base plan

1. Situation

   a. General

   (1) Natural or man-made disasters and special events can be so demanding that local, tribal, state and non-military federal responders are temporarily overwhelmed by the situation. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a long history of supporting civil authorities in the wake of catastrophic events. DOD brings unique and specialized skills and assets that can rapidly stabilize and improve the situation until civil authorities can again effectively respond to the needs of their populace.

   (2) When approved by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or directed by the President, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is prepared to respond quickly and effectively to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) to the Primary Agency under the National Response Framework (NRF) in order to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. In addition to large-scale disaster response, DOD has long provided smaller scale support for wildland firefighting, National Special Security Events (NSSE), such as political conventions, and Special Events (SE) such as major sporting events.

   (3) It is vital that the Federal government synchronizes its efforts throughout all of its departments, agencies and organizations as it plans activities and actions to respond to disasters and special events. The interagency process facilitates integrated planning and clarifies lines of responsibility between DOD and many governmental and non-governmental agencies. CONPLAN 3501 supports other Federal Agency response to emergencies and security events. Failure to integrate planning early will cause seams in synchronization of agency and military efforts, may cause shortfalls in resources needed to support mission accomplishment, and could jeopardize the overall success of operations.
(4) The NRF provides the coordinating framework for support provided under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288) (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121, et. seq.). The Stafford Act and the Economy Act (Title 31 United States Code Section 1535) are the major pieces of legislation that govern the federal response, which includes DOD. Support under these acts range from small-scale efforts to large-scale operations involving thousands of DOD personnel. This plan covers the full spectrum of DSCA from small to large-scale operations.

b. **Purpose** This annex provides a single source reference for interagency coordination and support for Commander, USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). It provides a framework for coordination between DOD and other Federal agencies engaged in activities supporting the conduct of DSCA planning and operations to prepare for, prevent, respond to, mitigate and recover from natural or man-made disasters and DSCA planning and operations to prepare for and execute special events.

c. **Interagency Relationships**

(1) DSCA is provided when a Federal agency requests DOD assistance via the Request for Assistance (RFA) process and it is approved by the SecDef or when DOD is directed to provide assistance by the President or the SecDef, or authorized in separate established authorities. DOD is in a supporting role during DSCA operations. The Commander of USNORTHCOM is authorized to provide DSCA support in response to actual or potential natural or man-made disasters, or other emergencies requiring DOD-augmented support within the USNORTHCOM AOR. DSCA is a complex, multi-echeloned mission with guiding authorities, policy directives, and operational doctrine that have evolved over the past several years to better adapt to changing requirements in the Federal departments and agencies and the private sector. It is important to fully understand the appropriate authorization to be utilized for the provision of the requested support, as well as the reimbursement mechanism. DSCA may be provided to Federal, State, tribal and local authorities for all types of events across the preparedness spectrum in order to protect, prevent, and respond to incidents, whether natural or manmade, routine or catastrophic. It may include Federal military forces; Reserve Component forces, including the National Guard; DOD agencies and components; and DOD civilian and contractor personnel. DSCA does not include those DOD missions directed by the President, under Constitutional Article II authority in his role as Commander-In-Chief, to defend the country against threats.
(2) The National response to a natural or man-made disaster or special event will include support from DOD, with certain capabilities, to primary and/or coordinating agencies. As such, USNORTHCOM must maintain the existing relationships it has with the primary and coordinating agencies responsible for planning for and participating in the response to disasters and special events. The relationships that USNORTHCOM has with governmental and non-governmental agencies on a daily basis play a critical role in our ability to execute this CONPLAN.

d. Federal Government Roles and Responsibilities The NRF will form the basis of the Federal disaster response. It defines Federal departmental responsibilities for sector-specific responses, and provides the structure and mechanisms for effective coordination among Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Pursuant to the NRF and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordination of Federal operations and resources, establishment of reporting requirements, and conduct of ongoing communications with Federal, State, local and tribal governments, the private sector and NGOs.

(1) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) The Secretary of Homeland Security is the Principal Federal Official (PFO) for domestic incident management. The Secretary is responsible for coordinating federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The Secretary may delegate this authority and appoint a representative to serve as PFO on-site during a disaster, emergency, incident, or event. DHS uses the NRF and NIMS structure to coordinate the federal response. As part of DHS, FEMA plans, coordinates, and conducts the federal disaster response and recovery efforts with local, state, and tribal authorities. (See Annex V for other federal government departments and agencies).

(a) The President directed the development of the NRF to align federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-hazard approach to domestic incident management. The SecDef retains approval authority for Requests for Assistance (RFA), and all RFAs are evaluated for their impact on readiness, cost, legality, lethality, risk and appropriateness.

(b) The NRF uses Emergency Support Functions (ESF) to provide the structure for coordinating Federal interagency support for a Federal response to an incident. There are 15 ESFs. When requested by
civil authorities and approved by the SecDef, DOD provides DSCA and is a support agency to all ESFs.

(c) The NRF Support Annexes identify federal Coordinating Agencies responsible for supporting DHS domestic incident management. When requested by civil authorities and approved by the SecDef, DOD provides DSCA and is identified as a cooperating agency for the majority of Support Annexes.

(d) The Incident Annexes from the National Response Plan remain in effect until superseded by the NRF at a later date. When requested by civil authorities and directed by the President or SecDef, DOD provides DSCA and is identified as a cooperating agency for the majority of Incident Annexes.

(2) **Department of Defense (DOD)** When requested by civil authorities and directed by the President or SecDef, USNORTHCOM is the supported combatant commander providing DSCA IAW the NRF. DOD is a support agency to all 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) under the NRF, and a Cooperating Agency to the majority of NRF Support Annexes and NRF Incident Annexes.

(a) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD (HD&ASA)) provides policy oversight for DSCA.

(b) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) communicates SecDef guidance to the Combatant Commanders, Services, and DOD Agencies. On SecDef’s behalf, the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) communicates and coordinates the policy guidance and executes directions of the SecDef. JDOMS is responsible for identifying and coordinating available resources for DSCA requests and releasing related execute and deployment orders when approved by the SecDef.

(c) When directed by the SecDef Commander, US Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) serves as a Joint Force provider for DSCA operations. CDRUSJFCOM provides military resources and forces to assist civil authorities within the USNORTHCOM OA.

(d) When directed by the SecDef Commander, US Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) provides deployment, employment, and redeployment common-user air, land, and sea transportation, terminal management and aerial refueling for forces engaged in DSCA operations and provides aero medical evacuation as required. As directed, CDRUSTRANSCOM deploys military resources
and forces, and supports USNORTHCOM DSCA operations within the
USNORTHCOM AO.

(e) The National Guard Bureau (NGB) coordinates with the
Joint Force Headquarters State through The Adjutants General to
conduct domestic operations to assist local, state, and tribal authorities.
NGB assists USNORTHCOM in synchronizing and integrating federal and
state military operations to avoid duplication and achieve unity of effort.

(f) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is a public
engineering organization within DOD providing engineering support and
services to DOD activities around the globe, as well as to the nation's
civil works, flood protection, and navigation infrastructure. USACE
performs emergency support activities under separate authorities
provided in Public Law 84-99. USACE also provides support as a
Primary Agency and Coordinating Agency for ESF #3, Public Works and
Engineering, and is a support agency to other ESFs as specified in the
NRF annexes. When USACE conducts operations as an NRF Primary or
Coordinating Agency, there is a coordination relationship with
USNORTHCOM and a JTF activated for DSCA. USACE does not operate
under USNORTHCOM C2 when conducting operations IAW the NRF.

e. Assumptions See Base Plan

f. Legal Considerations See Base Plan

2. Mission When directed, USNORTHCOM conducts Defense Support of
Civil Authorities operations within the Operational Area to support civil
authorities mitigate the effects of a disaster and during special events.

3. Execution

a. Commander's Intent Anticipate and execute a timely and effective
response in support of civil authorities during special events and to
mitigate the effects of a disaster. Provide appropriate DOD capabilities in
a timely manner to assist civil authorities to provide necessary services
and recover as quickly as possible.

(1) Purpose To anticipate and mitigate the effects of a disaster
and provide timely and effective DSCA when required.

(2) Key Tasks

(a) Anticipate USNORTHCOM requirements to respond to RFAs.
(b) Achieve Unity of Effort with local/tribal, state (including National Guard), and other Federal responders.

(c) Collaborate with DOD, interagency, and intergovernmental partners.

(d) Establish interoperable, flexible, and scalable C2 for deployed USNORTHCOM assets.

(c) Coordinate closely with the Primary Agency to keep the American people informed.

(3) **End State** National authorities, in consultation with local, state and tribal authorities, have determined that military assistance is no longer required, civil authorities are conducting necessary sustainment operations, and OPCON of deployed assets is transferred back to their respective commands.

b. **Concept of Operations**

1. **Joint Operational Area (JOA)** The USNORTHCOM JOA for DSCA is the 48 contiguous States, Alaska, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and any possession of the United States within the USNORTHCOM AOR. Areas of operation can be established within the operational area as necessary. Areas of operation should be large enough to accomplish DSCA missions and should not typically encompass the entire operational area. USNORTHCOM DSCA in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands is limited to natural disaster response operations only.

2. **Operational Limitations**

(a) Federal forces can only be placed under the command of Title 10 authorities.

1. Title 10 Commander

2. Title 10/32 Dual Status Commander

(b) Title 10 military personnel shall not be employed to enforce or execute civil law in violation of United States Code, Title 18, Section 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act), except as otherwise provided by law.
(c) DOD forces shall not procure or maintain any supplies, material, or equipment exclusively for providing DSCA, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

(d) Intelligence collection on U.S. persons is restricted by Executive Order 12333 and DoD Policy.

(e) Reserve Component forces, including the National Guard, cannot be ordered to Title 10 active duty to provide assistance to either the Federal Government or a State in time of a serious natural or manmade disaster, or catastrophe, per 10 U.S.C. 12304. Exceptions are made for use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack that results, or could result, in significant loss of life or property.

(3) Force Requirements. USNORTHCOM force requirements to conduct DSCA operations are based upon the nature of support requested by civil authorities and approved by SecDef or the President.

(a) Based on the nature of the DSCA operations, USNORTHCOM can request the forces necessary to conduct DSCA missions via a Request for Forces (RFF) processed through the Joint Staff.

(b) Friendly forces include other Combatant Commands; Component and Supporting Component Commands; Subordinate Commands; the Military Services; the Department of Homeland Security; and supporting Defense Agencies.

(4) Deployment

(a) USNORTHCOM conducts DSCA operations in the 48 contiguous states, Alaska, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. When directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM can deploy DSCA forces from subordinate commands, or forces OPCON to USNORTHCOM via an RFF.

(b) USNORTHCOM DSCA in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands is limited to natural disaster response operations only.

(5) Employment

(a) The Joint Staff issues a SecDef-approved DSCA Execute Order (EXORD) annually that delineates tiered DSCA response forces.
and CDRUSNORTHCOM's authorities to deploy and employ them within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(b) The USNORTHCOM Commander's Intent is to anticipate response requirements and execute a timely, safe, effective, and efficient response to approved requests for DSCA. The top DSCA response priorities are to save lives, prevent human suffering, and reduce great property damage or loss.

(c) USNORTHCOM provides DSCA when directed by the President or SecDef, which is typically after local, tribal, state, and other federal resources are overwhelmed and civil authorities have requested DOD assistance. Support can be provided to prevent, protect, respond, and/or recover from a potential or actual incident. If SecDef approves the request, CDRUSNORTHCOM is the supported combatant commander for the DSCA response for those areas within the USNORTHCOM AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM determines the appropriate level of C2 for DOD forces based on the magnitude of the DOD response.

(d) For a small-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can deploy a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), who serves as DOD's single point of contact in the Joint Field Office (JFO) and validates requests for assistance. If designated as a Joint Force Commander (JFC), the DCO can provide C2 for the entire DSCA effort so long as the response force does not exceed the DCO's C2 capability. However, if a larger C2 structure is needed, a DCO, working for the JTF commander, will still deploy to serve in the JFO.

(e) For a medium-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can use a single-service Response Task Force (RTF) or a Joint Task Force (JTF) to manage supporting military activities. As directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, a JTF commander exercises OPCON over DOD forces in the JOA with the following exceptions: U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) assets, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) resources, National Guard forces operating under state control, and in some circumstances, DOD forces in support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the United States Secret Service (USSS).

(f) For a large-scale DOD response, CDRUSNORTHCOM can: Establish or expand an existing JTF with multiple subordinate JTFs, and/or utilize ARNORTH as the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), or appoint other domain component commander(s), to provide C2 of the forces.
(g) Immediate Response Authority. Immediate Response is any form of immediate action taken by a DOD Component or military commander, under the direction of DOD directives and any supplemental guidance, to assist civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. When such conditions exist and time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from the DOD Components and Agencies are authorized to take necessary action to respond to requests from civil authorities consistent with existing law and regulations. As soon as practical, the military commander or responsible official shall make a report through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center (NMCC), which will then notify the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center. This notification should reach the NMCC within a few hours of the decision to provide immediate response. Army commands will require notification within two hours of the decision to provide immediate response assistance. Upon SecDef approval and CJCS EXORD execution, CDRUSNORTHCOM may request OPCON of any forces that remain at the incident.

(h) Because DSCA supports civil authorities in the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, no enemy forces are expected to oppose these missions. However, like any military operation, forces performing DSCA remain vulnerable to degradation caused by man-made events or natural conditions.

(6) CONPLAN Structure  This is a six phase plan:

(a) Phase 0, Shape  Phase 0 is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. Actions in this phase include inter-agency coordination, planning, identification of gaps, exercises, and public affairs outreach. These activities continue through all phases.

(b) Phase I, Anticipate  Phase I begins with the identification of a potential DSCA mission, a no notice event, or when directed by the President or SecDef. The phase ends with Tier I pre-identified response forces deployed. Phase I success equals deployment of Defense Coordination Officer (DCO)/Defense Coordination Element (DCE), Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO), and other selected response forces. These forces will be postured to facilitate quick response after coordination with PA/PFO/JFO and coordination with state, local and tribal officials.

(c) Phase II, Respond  Phase II begins with the deployment of initial response capabilities. The phase ends when response forces are
ready to conduct operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Phase II success equals forces deployed with enough capability to support civil authorities in accomplishment of the mission. DSCA operations are based on requests for assistance which will be made at different times, and for missions that will be completed at different times. Consequently, forces will likely deploy into and out of the DSCA JOA for the entire length of the DSCA operation.

(d) **Phase III, Operate** Phase III begins when DSCA response operations commence. Phase III ends when Title 10 forces begin to complete mission assignments and no further requests for DOD assistance are anticipated from civil authorities. Phase III success is achieved when currently deployed DOD capabilities are sufficient to support civil authorities.

(e) **Phase IV, Stabilize** Phase IV begins when military and civil authorities decide that DOD support will scale down. Phase IV ends when DOD support is no longer required by civil authorities and transition criteria are established. Phase IV success is achieved when all operational aspects of mission assignments are complete.

(f) **Phase V, Transition** Phase V begins with the redeployment of remaining DOD forces. The phase ends when response forces are relieved, redeployed and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands. Success in Phase V is achieved when DOD forces have transitioned all operations back to civil authorities.

(7) **Crosswalk with NRF Phasing for Response** To assist planners to work more effectively with interagency partners, a crosswalk between the phasing structures of this CONPLAN and the NRF is helpful.

(a) The NRF uses and describes three phases of effective response. These phases are: Prepare, Respond and Recover.

(b) The NRF Prepare phase directly correlates to this CONPLAN’s Phase 0, Shape.

(c) The NRF Respond phase corresponds with this CONPLAN’s Phases I-IV, Anticipate, Respond, Operate, and Stabilize.

(d) The NRF Recover phase correlates to this CONPLAN’s Phase VI, Transition.
(e) It is important to note that the beginning and end of each of this CONPLAN's phases may not directly correspond to the beginning and end of the NRF phases. They may overlap or gaps may exist.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Direct Liaison Authority (DIRLAUTH) is authorized with the Federal Department and Agency partners listed in this CONPLAN for the purposes of planning, synchronizing and execution of this plan.

(2) DIRLAUTH among subordinate units, service forces conducting Immediate Response operations and Title 32/SAD forces, as well as other Federal forces conducting DSCA operations in the USNORTHCOM JOA.

(3) Service and functional components will capture costs during all phases of the DSCA response for ultimate reimbursement from the primary agency.

(4) Any Service forces responding under immediate response authority must notify the N2C2 at the time they notify the National Military Command Center (NMCC) IAW DepSecDef's 25 Apr 05 guidance on, "Reporting Immediate Response Requests from Civil Authorities."

(5) Operations will be provided on a reimbursable basis unless the operation was ordered by the POTUS or reimbursement is waived by the SecDef. Immediate response should be provided to civil authorities on a cost-reimbursable basis, if possible.

(6) Communicate/disseminate common public affairs, strategic communication themes and messages consistent with ASD (PA) and ASD (HD&ASA) guidance, National and DOD policy and guidance.

(7) Conduct exercises and rehearsals with other USNORTHCOM components and subordinates, military services and the Interagency (IA) including state and local organizations.

4. Administration and Logistics  See Base Plan

5. Command and Control  See Base Plan

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Commander
OFFICIAL:

Bernd McConnell, SES
Director, Interagency Coordination
ANNEX W TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501 (U)  
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING SUPPORT PLAN / CONTRACTOR  
INTEGRATION PLAN (U)  

(U) References:  
a. (U) Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations, Volumes 1  
and 2 (i.e. the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)) (U)  
b. (U) Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations, Volume 3  
i.e. the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition  
Regulation Supplement (DFARS)) (U)  
c. (U) Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support  
of Joint Operations, 6 April 2000  
d. (U) DODI 3020.37, Continuation of Essential DOD  
Contractor Services during Crisis, Change 1, 26 January  
1996 (U)  
e. (U) DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to  
Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces, 03 October 2005 (U)  

1. (U) Situation.  

a. (U) General.  

(1) (U) Purpose. This plan sets forth a contingency contracting  
operational concept and support plan with associated contractor  
integration guidance to ensure mission essential supplies, services and  
minor construction unavailable through normal logistics channels can be  
provided to all U.S. Forces within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).  

(2) (U) Scope. This annex addresses purchasing and contracting for all  
classes of supply, services, and minor construction by U.S. Armed Forces  
supporting this plan. No major construction is envisioned under this  
plan. Appendix 6 to Annex D of this plan discusses engineering support.  

b. (U) Enemy. See base plan.  

c. (U) Friendly. See base plan.  

(1) (U) Contracting support to the joint force will be provided primarily by  
threater support and external support contracting sources. External
support (e.g. LOGCAP, AFCAP, GCSC) contracting may be provided by Army Materiel Command, Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency and Naval Facilities Engineering Command, respectfully, as administered by Defense Contracting Management Agency when properly requested through Service logistical support channels. System support contractors may also provide support under this plan.

(2) (U) The National Guard Bureau (NGB) may provide support via United States Property and Fiscal Offices and Base Contracting Offices with resident contracting authority. NGB contracting offices provide support under the direction of respective state authorities unless activated under federal service IAW Title 10 of the U.S. Code. In every case, NGB contracting officers have authority to obligate federal (i.e. "Title X") funds.

d. (U) Assumptions.

(1) (U) During a contingency, the need to preserve the loss of life and property will be paramount. Extensive life support, transportation and construction requirements will quickly overwhelm organic local, state and federal capacity. The economy within and proximate to the JOA may become stressed or non-functional. As a result, local contractor sources may become scarce. This will potentially limit contracting operations within the JOA, creating an environment of scarce resources. Close interagency coordination must occur in order to prevent inter- and intragovernment competition and wasteful duplication of contracting effort. Preference for local procurement operations, in accordance with the Stafford Act, may become difficult or impossible. This close interagency coordination (especially with the Department of Homeland Security's primary contracting offices—FEMA and GSA) must be maintained throughout all phases of the operation.

(2) (U) During plan execution, resident contracting operations in the JOA will continue to operate under regulatory guidance or procedures approved through the Senior Contracting Official (SCO) for the BSI contracting office and the ARNORTH contingency contracting organization.

(3) (U) Due to an urgent/high priority nature of most requirements, expect reduced lead-times and expedited delivery requests.

(4) (U) Streamlined contracting procedures may occur after formal contingency declaration. Contracting officers shall coordinate closely with cognizant SCOs to ensure compliance with all laws, regulations and policy.
(5) (U) Limited authority and responsibility for purchasing may be delegated to Ordering Officers and Field Ordering Officers IAW the instructions set forth in this plan and regulatory guidance as promulgated by the SCO.

2. (U) Mission. To plan, coordinate and implement an effective joint contingency contracting plan in support of the joint force and other organizations, as directed, during Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Concept of Contracting Operations.

(1) (U) A centrally coordinated, decentralized effort by all theater support contracting activities corresponding with a centrally coordinated effort among external contracting activities within a potentially constrained, chaotic JOA will best serve the joint force.

(2) (U) When utilizing contracting support, commanders will make maximum use of local purchases of supplies, services, and minor construction before requesting Civil Augmentation Program (CAP) support.

(3) (U) DOD activities will submit requests IAW established procedures as directed by the cognizant SCO.

(4) (U) HQ NORAD and USNORTHCOM/J44 (J44) coordinates joint contingency contracting planning for the USNORTHCOM AOR. All Service components shall coordinate contracting planning with J44.

(5) (U) BSI contracting offices shall provide theater support contracting in the JOA for commodities, services and minor construction in support of collocated BSI organizations supporting the joint force. BSI contracting offices will obtain augmentation for expanded operations through parent Service channels.

(6) (U) The ARNORTH contingency contracting organization shall provide theater support contracting in the JOA for commodities, services and minor construction in support of DOD operations exclusive of BSI operations. Deployed contracting personnel will be integrated and OCP to the ARNORTH contingency contracting organization in accordance with this plan and memoranda of agreement (MOA) between ARNORTH and each Service component.
(a) (U) Service component contracting personnel will primarily provide support to their respective service but can be tasked and/or redeployed within the JOA to support sister-service contracting requirements at the discretion of the ARNORTH SCO to best support CDRUSNORTHCOM priorities.

b. (U) Control.

(1) (U) Each Service establishes HCA (i.e. procurement/contracting authority) for theater support contracting through various mechanisms. J44 will coordinate joint contracting planning for USNORTHCOM and all subordinate commands. The Service SCO for each designated BSI will provide theater contracting policy, procedures and contingency contracting planning for this plan in support of BSI contracting operations. The ARNORTH SCO will provide contracting policy, procedures and contingency contracting planning for this plan in support of contingency contracting operations exclusive of the BSI. This annex does not discuss control of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) contracting operations. Refer directly to the USACE for USACE plans and procedures. USNORTHCOM subordinate commands must closely coordinate external support and system support contracting (e.g. Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and Service CAP) during this plan's execution.

(2) (U) Upon declared contingency, deployment of a JTF headquarters element or at the direction of the CDR USNORTHCOM ARNORTH contingency contracting personnel shall deploy as set forth in applicable ARNORTH plans in coordination with J44. J44 shall communicate contracting personnel augmentation requirement requests contained in the ARNORTH plans directly with force providers—including USJFCOM.

c. (U) Tasks.


(a) (U) Serve as the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) staff proponent for contracting in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(b) (U) Coordinate DOD contingency contracting planning for the USNORTHCOM AOR.

1. (U) Conduct contingency planning with all DOD organizations providing contracting support, contracting personnel and or contracting
equipment in support of USNORTHCOM (e.g. ARNORTH, AFNORTH, USFF, MARFORNORTH, DOD agencies, etc).

(c) (U) Coordinate inter-service support agreements and memoranda of agreement for contracting support relationships with all Service components.

(d) (U) Designate primary backup locations for contracting operations supporting this plan.

(e) (U) Serve as a contracting advisor or designate a contracting advisor to any component Acquisition Review Board (ARB).

(f) (U) NORAD and USNORTHCOM J44 (Peterson AFB) PCC Information: Division Chief: DSN 692-3548 Staff Officer: DSN 692-0794

(2) (U) All Senior Contracting Officials (SCO).

(a) (U) Delegate theater support contracting authority to contracting officers.

(b) (U) Provide oversight to ensure all acquisitions are properly executed in accordance with applicable law, regulation and policy.

(c) (U) Maintain direct communication with the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA).

(d) (U) Fulfill all HCA assigned and delegated statutory and regulatory contracting responsibilities.

(e) (U) Serve as a contracting advisor or designate a contracting advisor to any component Acquisition Review Board (ARB).

(f) (U) Serve as a contracting advisor to any Logistics Procurement Support Board (LPSB).

(g) (U) Serve as a contracting advisor to any Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB).

(h) (U) Coordinate with J44 and Services to deploy contingency personnel and equipment.

(3) (U) USNORTHCOM Service Component Designated Base Support Installation’s Contracting Organization.
(a) [U] Execute the theater support contracting mission on behalf of CDRUSNORTHCOM or JFC in support of BSI operations.

(b) [U] Coordinate contracting activities with the ARNORTH contingency contracting organization's SCO or J44 designated activity.

(c) [U] Execute contracts and agreements during non-contingencies in support of forecasted contingency requirements to support this plan.

(d) [U] Exercise OPCON over all assigned and attached contracting personnel and equipment.

(e) [U] Conduct contingency planning with higher headquarters.

(f) [U] Maintain a list of vendors to support this plan.

(g) [U] Provide contracting personnel to participate in exercises that support this plan.

(h) [U] Develop and publish written instruction for Ordering Officers, Field Ordering Officers, as appropriate.

(i) [U] Maintain liaison with appropriate local and state government officials (including state National Guard contracting offices) in order to facilitate coordinated interagency contracting operations.

(4) [U] Commander, ARNORTH Contingency Contracting Organization.

(a) [U] Execute the theater support contracting mission on behalf of CDRUSNORTHCOM or JFC in support of fielded forces.

(b) [U] Act as coordinating authority for theater support contracting within the JOA.

(c) [U] Exercise OPCON over all assigned and attached contracting personnel and equipment.

(d) [U] Conduct contingency planning with higher headquarters and J44 (including established JTFs).

(e) [U] Provide comprehensive theater support contracting by deploying contingency contracting personnel to geographic and operational centers of gravity IAW this plan and appropriate orders.
(f) (U) Provide contracting personnel to participate in exercises that support this plan.

(g) (U) Serve as chairperson or designate a primary contracting advisor to any Logistics Procurement Support Board (LPSB).

(h) (U) Serve as chairperson to any Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB).

(i) (U) Develop and publish written instruction for Ordering Officers, Field Ordering Officers, as appropriate.

(j) (U) Provide Information Management support for expanded, augmented, contingency contracting operations.

(k) (U) Maintain liaison with National Guard Bureau officials in order to facilitate coordinated contracting operations between AC and RC units within the JOA.

(5) (U) **Service Components.**

(a) (U) Coordinate contracting support plans to be included in subordinate plans with J44.

(b) (U) Provide additional planning support to include external support and systems support contract plans for use in the USNORTHCOM AOR during contingency operations. Ensure input of external and system support contractor personnel data into the approved contractor management system IAW DOD and Service policies and directives.

(c) (U) Coordinate contracting personnel deployment into the JOA with J44 and (if applicable) designated JTF.

(d) (U) Deploy contracting personnel with contingency contracting kits, supplies to sustain contingency contracting operations for a 30-day period. Augmentation personnel shall bring military clothing and equipment.

(e) (U) Provide support (billeting, subsistence, MWR, etc.) to deployed contracting personnel via designated supported unit (or BSI) as assigned.

(f) (U) Coordinate National Guard contracting operations with the ARNORTH contingency contracting organization.
(g) (U) Provide contracting support to deployed forces through National Guard contracting offices, if available.

(6) (U) **Deployed Contingency Contracting Officers/Personnel.**

(a) (U) When deployed in support of this plan, operate under OPCON of the ARNORTH contracting commander for all theater support contracting activities.

(b) (U) Upon arrival in the JOA, report to the assigned contracting office for integration into theater support contracting activities.

(c) (U) Coordinate any pre-existing contracting warrant information with the SCO for review and issuance of HCA issued warrant, if applicable.

(d) (U) Deploy with all required military clothing, equipment and personal gear.

(e) (U) Conduct contracting activities under the direction of the contracting unit commander or director of contracting IAW this plan and SCO policies.

(f) (U) Prior to redeploying from the JOA, contracting officers shall submit a closeout report annotating among other items that all issued contracts are closed out or have been reassigned to other contracting personnel. Deviations should be addressed with the SCO. As part of the closeout report, redeployed contracting officers will report all their contract actions, disputes, and claims issued and/or administered to the contracting unit commander.

(7) (U) **Funding Certification/Vendor Paying Agencies.**

(a) (U) In lieu of automated systems (e.g. PRWeb, ABSS), provide purchase request certification procedural guidance to the SCO.

(b) (U) In lieu of automated systems (e.g. WAWF, EFT), provide manual vendor payment procedural guidance to the SCO.

(c) (U) Provide paying agent, finance officer representative and/or IMPREST fund cashing procedures to the SCO.

(d) (U) Comply with applicable JOA contracting policies promulgated by the SCO.

(8) (U) **Defense Contract Management Agency.**
(a) (U) Work directly with DOD suppliers to help ensure that supplies and services are delivered on time, at projected cost, and meet all performance requirements.

(b) (U) When requested by Procuring Contracting Officers (PCOs) and falling under published DCMA roles and responsibilities, provide administrative contracting officer support primarily to external support and system support contracts executed in support of this plan.

(c) (U) Coordinate contracting operations in the JOA with J44, subordinate JTFs and theater support contracting activities.

d. (U) Contracting Capabilities. Time phasing of contracting capabilities in support of this plan are provided as follows by phase:

(1) (U) Phase I, Shape.

(a) (U) Services identify, train, and exercise contingency contracting personnel.

(b) (U) Services identify peace-time contracts that may be used during execution of this plan. Services consult with servicing contracting offices to incorporate contingency requirements into existing contracts. Primary focus on BSI surveyed installations.

(c) (U) Services identify contractor augmentation program contract capability for use under plan execution to J44.

(2) (U) Phase II, Anticipate.

(a) (U) ARNORTH contingency contracting cadre placed on alert (leave cancelled, non-mission essential training and operations curtailed).

(b) (U) ARNORTH postures personnel for deployment.

(c) (U) Services posture contingency contracting personnel for possible deployment as augmentation to ARNORTH.

(d) (U) Services identify potential contracting requirements in support of DSCA operations.

(3) (U) Phase II, Respond.

(a) (U) ARNORTH contingency contracting personnel deploy.
(b) (U) Designed BSI contracting office executes assigned tasks. See paragraph 4c of this annex.

(c) (U) ARNORTH contingency contracting organization executes assigned tasks. See paragraph 4d of this annex.

(d) (U) Services augment ARNORTH and BSI contracting organizations.

(4) (U) **Phase III, Operate.**

(a) (U) All DOD contracting organizations supporting this plan provide contracting support to USNORTHCOM.

(b) (U) All DOD contracting organizations supporting this plan provide contracting support to civil authorities, as directed.

(5) (U) **Phase IV, Stabilize.**

(a) (U) DOD contracting organizations commence contract close-out, transfer contract authority as required.

(b) (U) DOD contracting organizations phase release contingency contracting personnel for redeployment.

(6) (U) **Phase V, Transition.**

(a) (U) Contingency contracting personnel redeploy to home stations.

(b) (U) Contingency contracting personnel complete After Action Reports.

(c) (U) DOD contracting organizations reconstitute forces.

e. (U) **Contracted support required under this plan.** TBD.

5. (U) **Deliberate Planning for Contingency Contracting Support.**

a. (U) Memoranda of Agreement shall reinforce the responsibilities between USNORTHCOM, standing JTFs, and Service Components as promulgated in this plan.

b. (U) **Continuation of Essential Services During Emergencies.** IAW Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.37, Change 1, dated January 26, 1996, requiring activities will identify any contingency requirements associated with procurements when submitting requirement packages to the contracting office. Recurring services
contracts and ID/IQ contracts are prime candidates for inclusion of contingency (line item) requirements. Local DOD contracting offices should incorporate potential contingency requirements in support of this plan during the acquisition process.

g. (U) U. S. Contractor Integration Planning, Deployment and Re-deployment.

(1) (U) Pre-deployment. Cognizant Contracting Officers will coordinate with DOD requiring activities and contractors to ensure contractors provide medically and physically qualified contractor personnel to perform duties in support of this plan. All contractor personnel shall complete deployment processing, as appropriate, and receive required immunizations, health screenings, etc., prior to entering/performing under contract within the JOA. Service components shall ensure all contractor employees provide medical and dental records and provide specimen samples for deployment center and/or Government medical validation.

(2) (U) Contractor Accountability. Requiring activities will maintain accountability over contractor personnel performing in the JOA. Contractor personnel status information will be reported in the “Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker” (SPOT) as describe in paragraph 5.g(3) of this annex and as designated by Service components.

(3) (U) Contractor Deployment.

(a) (U) DOD contractor personnel data shall be entered into the approved management information system—commonly referred to as SPOT. SPOT has been designated as the Joint Enterprise contractor management and accountability system to provide a central source of contingency contractor information IAW DODI 3020.41. Contractors are required to maintain by name accountability of their personnel within SPOT while government representatives utilize SPOT for oversight of the contractors they deploy. SPOT may be accessed at https://spot.altes.army.mil/default.aspx.

(b) (U) Subordinate commands shall maintain accountability of contractor personnel utilized in the JOA, ensuring completion of specific JOA entrance requirements (e.g. vaccinations), communication of JOA-specific policies and procedures and contractor personnel re-deployment tasks and accountability closeout.
(c) (U) Clothing. Contractors are not permitted to wear military-style uniforms (e.g. service specific battle uniform) while executing DOD contracts.

(4) (U) Support. Commanders at all levels must plan for, allocate and coordinate resources to support contractors and contractor personnel in the following areas.

(a) (U) Medical. When the civilian medical system cannot provide support, contractor personnel will be provided resuscitative care, stabilization, hospitalization at level III military treatment facilities, and assistance with patient movement in emergencies where loss of life, limb, or eyesight could occur. Hospitalization will be limited to stabilization and short-term medical treatment with an emphasis on return to duty or placement in the patient movement system or civilian medical system. Contractors must request specific authorization for medical or dental care beyond this standard through the local chain of command in coordination with the cognizant contracting officer. All DOD medical care provided to contractor personnel shall be recorded and reimbursed from the contractor to the Government.

(b) (U) Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection.

1. (U) NC/J34 will ensure through the Service and functional components that programs are in place to validate logistics support contracts and agreements to consider AT where applicable. The Service and functional components are responsible to ensure the contracting process for support of forces will incorporate considerations for AT measures during the contract award, execution and evaluation processes when the effort to be contracted for could affect the security of forces residing, exercising, operating in, or transiting through the USNORTHCOM AOR. The contracting process will be incorporated and addressed in the Service and functional components' AT Program Office vulnerability assessment process and assessed during higher headquarters' assessments. The Service and functional components shall provide copies of assessments for these areas to NC/J34.

2. (U) Responsibilities: Services, Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities are responsible for applying AT considerations in the contracting planning process and for ensuring that AT requirements are incorporated where applicable in support contracts to include requirements definition, pre-award, post-award, execution, and contract evaluation.
a. (U) Incorporate AT considerations into commercial relationships in order to develop a vested interest, on the contractor's part, for ensuring the safety and security of U.S. forces.

b. (U) Where applicable, include measures for limiting access to in-transit units in support contracts. This effort should include the establishment of exclusion zones and the badging of contractor personnel and the flagging of support vehicles/boats so legitimate workers can be easily identified.

c. (U) Where applicable, include review of company personnel hiring policies and processes to ensure they adequately screen for applicants that present security risks via the Terrorist Screening Center.

d. (U) Incorporate flexibility into support contracts so that routine schedules and predictability can be avoided.

3. (U) Contract Review. Upon receipt of services from support contracts, Contracting Officers Representatives (CORs) or Quality Assurance Evaluators (QAEs) should review those applicable AT measures that were and/or were not utilized. From this review, CORs or QAEs may recommend upgrade to the Contracting Officer, after consultation with the ATO, contractual adjustments as appropriate to ensure AT measures are adequate in the future. Contracting officers should attempt to incorporate AT changes into existing contracts. In cases where extra contract security measures are not a viable option, CORs or QAEs should coordinate with their appropriate AT staff elements to ensure an appropriate level of FP is provided.

4. (U) Where applicable, future contract awards should consider adequate AT performance as an evaluation factor during proposal review. Other service providers not under contracts governed by the FAR, such as airport personnel and some transportation providers, should be vetted where feasible.

5. (U) Where applicable, contracts must include provisions for AT measures. These provisions must at a minimum cover:

a. (U) Vetting of contractors to include review of hiring processes and policies to ensure personnel who present a security risk are properly identified and screened.

b. (U) FP responsibility for contractors. Level 1 training will be offered to contractors.
(c) (U) Contractors compliance with all USNORTHCOM AT provisions of NC AT OPORD 05-10B, 15 July 06.

6. (U) The checklist provided in Tab B, App B, Annex C, NC AT OPORD 05-01B, 15 July 06 can be used for contracting in support of the overall AT Program.

(c) (U) Mortuary affairs. Generally, civilian medical examiners and coroners will maintain jurisdiction over military and civilian (including contractor personnel) fatalities. When the local, state, or other federal mortuary affairs system cannot provide support, DOD may provide mortuary affairs support for contractor personnel while executing contracts in the JOA. This support will be provided in accordance with JP 4-6, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations, DOD Directive 1300.22, Mortuary Affairs Policy, DOD Instruction 1300.18, Military Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures’, and Army Regulation 638-2, Care and Disposition of Remains and Disposition of Personal Effects.


(e) (U) Individual Protective Equipment. The Government may provide individual protective equipment to contractor personnel on a reimbursable basis or as Government Furnished Property. Protective equipment required for contract performance (e.g. chemical protective equipment) that cannot be procured through commercial means by the contractor must be provided to the contractor through the DOD requiring activity.

(f) (U) Weapons. Unless performing contract security functions, contractor personnel shall not carry or employ weapons in performance of DOD contracts under this plan.

(g) (U) Subsistence. Contractor personnel may be afforded access to DOD-provided rations and military controlled dining facilities absent any conflicting language contained in applicable contracts. Government contracting officers shall coordinate any Government provided subsistence to contractor employees with commanders exercising control over subsistence stocks. Government contracting officers should require contractor reimbursement for each contractor employee provided military subsistence in accordance with negotiated or published per diem rates.

(h) (U) Military postal services. Not applicable.
(i) (U) Morale, welfare and recreation (MWR). Not applicable

(j) (U) Religious services. Not applicable.

(k) (U) Legal support. Not applicable.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics.

a. (U) Administration.

(1) (U) Logistics Procurement Support Board (LPSB).

(a) (U) When required, the LPSB shall be convened to address the following issues:

1. (U) Establishing JOA-wide contracting and contractor management policies and procedures, not specifically addressed within this annex.

2. (U) Determine prioritization of contracting requirements, as required.

3. (U) Coordinate with DOD and Services on potential loss of contract support and risk management of same IAW DODI 3020.37 “Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crisis.”

(b) (U) The LPSB shall be composed of representatives from the following non-exclusive list:

1. (U) USNORTHCOM or JFC/J4 (Chair)

2. (U) Service components. (voting members)

3. (U) USSOCOM, when required. (voting member)

4. (U) ARNORTH Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC), or designee (advisor, board OPR)

5. (U) BSI SCO, or designee (advisor)

6. (U) DLA (advisor)

7. (U) DCMA (advisor)

8. (U) US Army Corps of Engineers (advisor)
9. (U) JFC/J1 (advisor)

10. (U) JFC/JA (advisor)

11. (U) Interagency organizations, as required (e.g. DHS/FEMA, GSA, etc.)

(2) (U) Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB).

(a) (U) When required, the JCSB shall be convened to address the following issues:

1. (U) Eliminate duplication of effort by coordinating theater support and external support contracting support.

2. (U) Determine appropriate external or theater support contracting mechanisms to support requirements.

3. (U) Provide an exchange of information among contracting activities covering such matters as sources of supply, prices, and contractor performance.

4. (U) Provide guidance on consolidation of purchases.

5. (U) Coordinate the enforcement of contractor management policies for external support and theater support contracts.

(b) (U) The JCSB shall be composed of representatives from the following non-exclusive list:

1. (U) ARNORTH PARC, or designee (Chair, board OPR)

2. (U) USNORTHCOM or JFC/J4 (voting member)

3. (U) Service components. (voting members)

4. (U) USSOCOM, when required. (voting member)

5. (U) BSI SCO, or designee (advisor)

6. (U) DLA (advisor)

7. (U) DCMA (advisor)

8. (U) US Army Corps of Engineers (advisor)
2. (U) JFC/J1 (advisor)

10. (U) JFC/1A (advisor)

11. (U) Interagency organizations, as required (e.g. DHS/FEMA, GSA, etc.)

b. (U) Logistics.

(1) (U) Disbursing and Finance Support. See paragraph 3.c.(7) of this annex.

(2) (U) Program Management Support. Services must provide adequate program management support for all applicable service contracts, including external support contracts, in support of this plan.

(3) (U) Legal Support. Contract law support in support of contracting operations is required under this plan. Contract law support shall be provided by a mix of HQ USNORTHCOM, JFC, BSI and Service component legal representatives.

(4) (U) Force Protection Support for Contracting Personnel. See Appendix 15 to Annex C of this plan and paragraph 5.g.(4)(b) of this annex.

5. (U) Command and Control. See basic plan and Annex J.

a. (U) Government Contracting Officers must ensure the terms and conditions of contracts executed under this plan contain appropriate language to effectuate the guidance contained herein.

b. (U) Directive authority for contracting operations. Commanders at all levels must comprehend the unique relationship of contractors and the U.S. Armed Forces. Contract terms and conditions, as negotiated on behalf of the commander by the Contracting Officer, along with operation of U.S. law dictate the responsibilities of the contractor and its personnel to the Government.

c. (U) Unauthorized commitment. Government personnel without otherwise having the authority to do so, who direct contractor personnel to perform outside the terms and conditions of their contract, may become pecuniary liable for any and all unauthorized commitment of Government resources.
ANNEX Y TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

References:
(a) (U) 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review SC Execution Road Map, 25 September 2006
(b) (U) Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, 14 May 2007
(c) (U) US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and SC, June 2007

1. (U) Situation. See Basic Plan

   a. (U//FOUO) General. This annex provides SC guidance informed by higher directives and partner agency coordination. It is synchronized with the Joint Staff and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG). SC is defined as “focused US Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power”.

   b. (U) Potential Audiences.

      (1) (U) DOD key personnel:

         (a) (U) Military personnel

         (b) (U) Civil servants and contractors

         (c) (U) DOD family members

      (2) (U) US citizens:

         (a) (U) Domestic (includes Congress and State Governors)

         (b) (U) Abroad

   Y-1
(3) (U) Friends, allies and peer competitors:
   (a) (U) State, local, provincial, and tribal governments
   (b) (U) Foreign military personnel
   (c) (U) Private sector partners
   (d) (U) Civilian populations

(4) (U) Adversaries:
   (a) (U) Terrorists
   (b) (U) Foreign governments

   c. (U) Enemy. See Annex B (Intelligence).

   d. (U) Friendly

   (1) (U) Actions to focus interagency effort in support of this operation:

   [a] Department of Defense

   1. ([U//FOUO]) Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG). The SCIG synchronizes strategic communication plans and actions across the Joint Staff with the Services, the Combatant Commands, Office of the Secretary of Defense and other Unified States Government agencies to provide effective collaboration and planning; support DOD policy and plan development; and assess their effectiveness.

   a. ([U//FOUO]) Assist in the collaboration with IA partners on DOD support to the Federal Response; obtain consensus on SC effects and themes IOT obtain informational unity of effort.

   b. ([U//FOUO]) Assist in promulgating SC efforts with other combatant commanders and DOS to: (1) assure our partner nations (neighbors) during the response (2) reassure of our sufficient capabilities and commitment to security arrangements (3) deter adversaries from exploiting the crisis.

   (b) (U) Department of State (DOS).
1. (U//FOUO) Convey messages that dissuade and deter adversaries from miscalculating the US defensive capabilities while supporting a Federal response to a domestic incident.

2. (U//FOUO) Collaborate with neighbors and partner nations to show our commitment to our established security relationships during the DOD response to the crisis.

3. (U//FOUO) Involve applicable partner foreign offices to the greatest extent possible.

(c) (U) National Guard Bureau (NGB). The NGB coordinates with National Guard forces and assets through the States Adjutants’ General to assist local, state, and tribal authorities; and also assists in ensuring “Force Health Protection” of those forces while under the command and control of the states. NGB will notify USJFCOM upon receipt of any warning or execution orders for deployment or support of domestic operations under state control to enable USJFCOM to assess implications for further Title 10 response.

f. Assumptions.

(1) (U//FOUO) Media organizations will begin an enhanced news cycle upon notification of a national incident requiring DSCA. Public Affairs offices will be quickly inundated and overwhelmed with media queries regarding DOD support to civil authorities.

(2) (U//FOUO) Terrorists will see the crisis as a time of vulnerability for the US and seek to exploit the situation.

(3) (U//FOUO) Partners will be concerned about DOD’s capabilities to concurrently support a Federal Response and provide support to established security agreements.

(4) (U//FOUO) Domestic population will be concerned a DOD response will weaken US defensive capabilities.

(5) (U//FOUO) Domestic population will be concerned that support to the GWOT around the world will decrease DOD’s capability to respond to a DSCA mission.

(6) (U//FOUO) Allies or neighbors will offer, and in some cases, provide assistance that will need to be integrated into the DOD response.

(7) (U//FOUO) National Guard forces will be deployed early to any crisis and indistinguishable from DOD response forces to the common observer / media.
g. **(U//FOUO) Legal and Policy Considerations.** Significant legal and policy issues could arise during operations in DSCA. (See annex E)

2. **(U//FOUO) Mission.** When directed, CDRUSNORTHCOM conducts Strategic Communication to support DOD's contribution to the overall federal response and dissuade or deter adversaries from miscalculating HD capability during a DSCA response.

3. **(U) Execution**

   a. **(U) Concept of the Operation.** This SC Annex is designed to provide an overarching DOD communication framework from which all military elements involved in the federal (DSCA) response can support the larger USG SC efforts during a crisis. SC efforts are most effective when they synchronize what we do, what we say and what we say we do and SC needs to be involved in the entire battle staff. DOD SC supports the Primary Agency and will not overshadow their lead. This annex provides some clear SC effects, themes (lines of persuasion), audiences, SC tasks and measures of effectiveness.

   1. **(U) SC Effects.** The SC Effects for the CONPLAN are:

   a. **(U//FOUO) Allies and friends are assured DOD is capable of fulfilling its global commitments during the event.**

   b. **(U//FOUO) Adversaries are deterred from exploiting the situation.**

   c. **(U//FOUO) Public, state, and local authorities are confident that USNORTHCOM is vigilant and civil support requirements are anticipated, responses planned and operational/organizational seams are mitigated.**

   d. **(U//FOUO) Canada is a cooperative partner.**

   e. **(U//FOUO) Mexican-US military-to-military and interagency relationships are enhanced as a result of transparency with USNORTHCOM.**

   f. **(U//FOUO) N-NC DSCA capabilities are perceived as effective in supporting the larger response/recovery efforts.**

   g. **(U//FOUO) Audiences are confident the N-NC selected redeployments are part of the overall coordinated effort. (Transition/Redeployment)**

   2. **(U) SC Themes.**
(a) (U) USNORTHCOM effectively partners/integrates with the Primary Agencies to support state and local authorities, as directed.

(b) (U) DOD is fully capable of responding to multiple requests for assistance.

(c) (U) DSCA operations are part of, and integrated with, the overall Federal response.

(d) (U) DOD is strong, collaborates well with all partners and is well prepared to execute DSCA.

(e) (U) DOD is always committed to meeting its global responsibilities during any DSCA mission.

(f) (U) DOD still has the capability to respond to threats against the US or US interests.

(g) (U) DOD will support a USG response for any attempt to exploit this crisis.

(h) (U) The US is resilient and will be stronger and better prepared as a result of this experience and lessons learned (post event only).

(i) (U) Throughout DSCA missions, HD remains a top priority at USNORTHCOM.

(j) (U) Active, Guard, Reserve and civilian DOD efforts are unified in their disaster support.

(k) (U) USNORTHCOM anticipates requests, actions and requirements to support developing situations.

(l) (U) NORAD and USNORTHCOM remain vigilant to anticipate, deter, detect and defeat threats to the Homeland.

(m) (U) The U.S and Canada partner in managing continental events.

(n) (U) Mexico's partnership is important to disaster response options.

(o) (U) (U) N-NC collaborates with mission partners as we execute a planned transition to steady state operations (Transition/Redeployment).
(p) (U) DOD, interagency and State efforts are unified in their
disaster response (Transition/Redeployment).

(q) (U) DOD active duty and reserve forces are redeploying to reset
for future contingencies (Transition/Redeployment).

(3) (U) Endstate. The SC end state is the public knows DOD’s
capabilities to conduct DSCA, allies and friends assured DOD can fulfill its
global commitments during the response, and adversaries are deterred from
exploiting the situation.

b. (U) Tasks.

(1) (U) Director, N-NC J2

(a) (U) Monitors adversaries to anticipate intentions to exploit any
crisis.

(b) (U) Provide continuous assessment of SC effects on foreign
audiences.

(c) (U) Provide the SC Working Group updated foreign audience
analysis.

(d) (U) Provide continuous N-NC/J2 Subject matter expertise to the
USNORTHCOM SC working group.

(2) (U) Director, NCJ3

(a) (U) Highlight visible preparedness, staging and supporting efforts.

(b) (U) Identify and exploit opportunities to send messages to all
audiences supporting SC effects.

(c) (U) Recommend deployment of the Civil Affairs Information Support
Element (CAISE) and Combat Camera, where appropriate.

(d) (U) Provide IO/J39 and FOC/J35 subject matter expertise and
current operations integration support to the USNORTHCOM SC working
group.

(e) (U) Optimize media embeds, where appropriate.

(f) (U) Integrate SC guidance into execution directives (EXORDs,
MODs and FRAGOs).
(3) (U) **Director, NCJ5**

(a) (U) Plan, set agenda for, and synchronize the USNORTHCOM SC working group activities and products.

(b) (U) Develop and maintain Strategic Communication, Annex Y, to this plan.

(c) (U) Coordinate all SC plans and activities with the Joint Staff / OSD Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG).

(4) (U) **Director, NC-IC**

(a) (U) Provide subject matter expertise on Public Diplomacy (PD) and situational awareness of USG agency SC activities to the USNORTHCOM SC working group. Assist in the sharing of USNORTHCOM SC planning with the interagency.

(b) (U) Conduct regular coordination with DOS PA/PD on AOR specific SC issues.

(c) (U) Collaborate with interagency and international partners and the private sector to demonstrate a seamless approach to defense and security.

(d) (U) Anticipate requests for Federal assistance through dialog with interagency partners to facilitate proactive DSCA execution.

(5) (U) **Director, NC-PA**

(a) (U) Provide PA participation and subject matter expertise to the USNORTHCOM SC working group.

(b) (U) Prioritize Commander's media opportunities

(c) (U) Incorporate approved SC into PAG and PA activities.

(d) (U) Participate in the DHS PA National Incident Communication Conference Line (NICCL) to coordinate messages as appropriate.

(e) (U) Conduct media analysis to determine SC effectiveness and provide to SCWG.

(f) (U) Support the Primary Agency's communication efforts.

(g) (U) Highlight visible preparedness, staging and supporting efforts and optimize media embeds, where appropriate.
(6) (U) **Director, Commander's Communication Strategy & Integration Group (CCSIG).**

(a) (U) Provide USNORTHCOM Engagement subject matter expertise to the USNORTHCOM SC working group.

(b) (U) Integrate and synchronize engagements and activities to enhance N-NC communications and strategic messaging in support of operations.

(c) (U) CCSIG conduct analysis and/or assessment of approved communication engagements and activities to advise the Commander. Provide feedback to the SCWG.

(7) (U) **Director, NORAD-USNORTHCOM National Guard Office.**

(a) (U) Support/ facilitate enhanced communication between N-NC and NGB to provide mutual understanding of National Guard and NORAD-USNORTHCOM Effects, Themes and Tasks

(b) (U) As appropriate, facilitate enhanced communication between N-NC and State TAG/staff to achieve coordinated themes, messages, between N-NC and State Leadership

(c) (U) Provide Subject Matter Expertise to the Strategic Communication Working Group, when requested.

(8) (U) **Director, NORADUSNORTHCOM Commander's Action Group.**

(a) (U) Maintain contact with OSD, JCS, NGB and DHS Legislative Affairs and inform Congressional members of affected/supporting states

(b) (U) Provide USNORTHCOM Commander's Action Group subject matter expertise to the USNORTHCOM SC working group.

c. (U) **Coordinating Instructions**

(1) (U) As appropriate conduct operations, actions and activities supportive of stated effects.

(2) (U) Exchange mutually supportive themes with interagency partners.

(3) (U) Provide assessment of the N-NC communication strategy effects in your lanes and report to USNORTHCOM through normal reporting channels.

Y-8
(4) (U) Consider embedding of media into operations and use of other media related activities.

(5) (U) Seek 3rd party advocates to publicly acknowledge that N-NC's job is done. (State Authorities, NIFC, FEMA) (Transition/Redeployment)

4. (U) Administration and Logistics. Per Basic Plan

5. (U) Command and Signal. Per Basic Plan

   a. (U) Required Authorities.

      (1) (U) USG coordinated SC is approved by the NSC/DOS.

      (2) (U) DOD PAG is approved by OSD ASD (PA).

      (3) (U) Elements of Military IO have separate approval processes.

   b. (U) Relationships

      (1) (U) Public Diplomacy. DOS is USG lead for PD. USNORTHCOM lead for Military Support to PD is the NORAD-USNORTHCOM (US) Political Advisor (POLAD) office (Commercial Tel: (719) 554-6191 or SIPR email: nc.polad.omb@northcom.smil.mil)

      (2) (U) Public Affairs. See Annex F. OSD ASD (PA) is lead for DOD PA. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Public Affairs Office is the USNORTHCOM lead for PA support to operations (Commercial Tel: (719) 554-6889 or SIPR email: nc.pa.omb@northcom.smil.mil)

      (3) (U) Military Information Operations. See Appendix 3 to Annex C.

VICTOR E. RENUART JR.
General, USAF
Commander

Appendixes (None Used)
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24 April 2008

ANNEX Z TO USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501-08
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