In November 2024, the (then) Secretary of Defense designated the Commander, U.S. Northern Command to serve as the lead synchronizer for Homeland Counter small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (HC-sUAS) Department of Defense operations in the Continental United States and Alaska. The role enables USNORTHCOM to align and focus various DOD HC-sUAS efforts into a cohesive approach to include synchronizing, integrating, and coordinating efforts within its area of responsibility. 

• While U.S. and coalition forces overseas have faced the threat of weaponized unmanned systems for years, small drones have emerged as a significant risk to infrastructure and safety in the United States in a relatively short period of time. 

• The Department of War is appropriately restricted in the homeland and does not manage U.S. airspace. U.S. airspace is managed by the FAA. Title 10 authorities give the DoW permission to detect drones that operate near and over DoW installations, or airspace the Department has restricted through coordination with the FAA.  

• There are more than 350 installations within the Homeland with varying degrees of defensive capability and criticality. The responsibility for defense of these installations remains with the local commander and the respective service; however, USNORTHCOM in the role of coordinating authority stands ready to assist during incident response, and in the development of specific detect, track, identify and defeat capabilities to counter advancing drone threats.  

10 USC 130i Covered Facilities and Assets 

The term "covered facility or asset" means any facility or asset that- 

• (A) is identified by the Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation with respect to potentially impacted airspace; 

• (B) is located in the United States; and 

• (C) directly relates to the missions of the Department of War pertaining to- 

  • (i) nuclear deterrence, including with respect to nuclear command and control, integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, and continuity of government; 
  • (ii) missile defense; 
  • (iii) national security space; 
  • (iv) assistance in protecting the President or the Vice President (or other officer immediately next in order of succession to the office of the President)  
  • (v) air defense of the United States, including air sovereignty, ground-based air defense, and the National Capital Region integrated air defense system; 
  • (vi) combat support agencies  
  • (vii) special operations activities  
  • (viii) production, storage, transportation, or decommissioning of high-yield explosive munitions, by the Department; or 
  • (ix) a Major Range and Test Facility Base  

FALCON PEAK 25.2 was the second Department of War C-sUAS experiment focused on detecting, identifying, tracking, and mitigating sUAS incursions at DoW installations in the United States.  

The FALCON PEAK experiments serve to:  

• Educate the force on the threat posed by UAS 

• Stress the need for vigilance and investment 

• Synchronize industry, interagency, and DoW partners facilitating C-sUAS 

• This field capability experiment event is designed to observe new technologies, enhance collaboration, and provide developers with immediate feedback to accelerate the maturation of innovative capabilities with Department of War-wide applicability.  

• FALCON PEAK offers industry partners an opportunity to demonstrate cutting-edge technological solutions that improve response times and operational adaptability to defend against unmanned systems. The experiment is scheduled to occur during the first two weeks of September 2025.