

Remarks by General Victor E. Renuart  
Bipartisan Policy Center Speaker Series, August 6, 2008

First, thanks for the invitation. We appreciate the center looking at this kind of mission. I think it is a great opportunity for us to tell you a little bit from a military perspective as well as what is on our mind from a national security perspective. It's also an opportunity for you to ask tough questions and put me, and the subsequent folks that you'll have in through this, on the hot seat a little bit. Because we owe you and, really, the American people a good sense of what we see day-to-day at the other end.

And I must say it is nice to be 1,600 miles away from Washington from time to time. I look out my window at Pikes Peak and think, you know, on a bad day this is okay. (Laughter.) So I'll relish in that.

It's also kind of neat to be here in this forum. We were talking at lunch about a bipartisan organization. My wife and I really see this every day. I have a young son out here -- well, he's slightly left of Senator Obama's campaign, and then I have an older son who's just slightly out to the right of John McCain's campaign. And so we feel a little bit bipartisan and -- bipolar may be a better way to put it, in our -- (laughter) -- in our family.

But some of the issues that those two young men see every day, are the same things you all are wrestling with and trying to find a way to craft for not only future leaders of our government but also for the American people, in a way that they can digest and understand that collaboration, cooperation, communication, integration of effort in government is the way to succeed. And I use those words particularly because that it is also the way NORAD and U.S. Northern Command has to operate every day.

We have a coalition of agencies that we deal with in the defense of the homeland, and support to civil authorities that represents 120 different activities. And you know, when I was in CENTCOM, we were pretty proud we had a coalition village outside of CENTCOM of about 60 nations that had their flags there by their mobile trailers getting ready for Afghanistan and then Iraq. We felt that was a pretty impressive coalition village. I mentioned ours at NORTHCOM today. It's about 120.

There are 49 sovereign nations -- we call them states in our country -- which we have to deal with every day in order to ensure and affect the security and defense of our communities, our homelands and our families. In addition, we have the territories and districts like the District of Columbia that we work with every day on things like counterterrorism, port security, transportation security, so that we can partner with some of those other 45 sovereign entities. Those are the departments of government that we have to deal with on a routine basis -- TSA, FAA, CIA, FBI, DEA, CBP, all those acronyms that have a profound effect on how we secure, defend and respond to events in our country, but yet they too are sovereign.

The Department of Defense is seen sometimes as a bit of a -- well, I won't say an enemy, but certainly a threat to the ability of some of those institutions to conduct operations. Yet all of us have to be able to work together in order to defend this nation. None of us have control or command over each other, so I won't use the term command and control today, because that's not the way we've learned to operate in the homeland. It is truly a collaborative effort.

It is -- there was a study that was put together by some folks at Booz Allen six or seven months ago, that talked about something called a mega-community. They defined a mega-community as a group of us who all represent disparate organizations but all have to work towards a common cause. None of us are in charge. That's really the kind of environment that we operate in, both in our NORAD role and in our NORTHCOM role. And I'll try to talk to those a little bit as we go through the course of our discussion today.

I'll try to limit this so that we can really spend as much time as you would like on the questions and answers, because I think that's where we can get to real issues.

But as we were talking at lunch, a couple topics that came to mind that people wouldn't normally consider the Department of Defense having the lead role, --is the energy policy, for example. There's a huge security issue with how we develop and design an energy policy for our country for the future. Where do we get that energy from? Do we compete with other countries for that energy? If so, is there a security element of that that we need to be paying attention to today?

I've had a chance to talk with elements of both campaigns. We had Senator Obama at our headquarters a few weeks ago to just sit down and talk about homeland security in his role as a senator. But it was a good opportunity for us to spend some time with him explaining the complexity of this thing called homeland defense.

Two hundred-nineteen years ago today, as a matter of fact, is a pretty significant day in history for NORTHCOM. It was the day that we signed into order the law from Congress that created the War Department. That really began the focus on how we defend our homeland. And as you know -- most of you are way better historians than I am -- this nation focused inward on defense and was, in many ways, very protective of how they engaged externally and certainly where they were choosing to engage in military operations externally. So in many ways that beginning of the War Department back 219 years ago signaled the beginning of NORTHCOM as we saw it develop after 9/11.

So it's fitting for us, for NORTHCOM, to think back on those events and what were the nature and the character of those decisions as we look at how we interface for today and for the future.

The strategic landscape that we see is very different from what -- I started to say that all of you grew up with, but I'll kind of have to go towards this end of the table, where there's a few more gray hairs, when I make that statement, because we --

Q (Off mike.)

GEN. RENUART: -- I'm trying, you know -- bald-haired, no hair, gray hair -- silver hair, I'm told -- my wife said it's silver, it's not gray.

Q (Chuckles.)

GEN. RENUART: But we saw a very different strategic threat problem set out there than we see today. We saw a fairly predictable, homogenous, a bit plodding enemy that we faced. But it was a singular enemy. The Warsaw Pact was really the focus. It affected our economic strategies, our military strategies, and certainly our political strategies.

Today the adversaries are much more different and very diverse, and they're not as predictable. They don't follow the same rules that we grew up almost knowing and loving. They take advantage of the seams in our societies, in our market system. We talked a little bit at lunch about the cyber threat today, and I was asked: Do we focus on the cyber threat out there? Well, absolutely, but we're a consumer of cyber defense. We're not an executor of that cyber capability. So we rely on a variety of other agencies to work collaboratively to strengthen the defense of our nation. The same is true with our economic security. We rely on the strength of the private industry to create a network defense for themselves, which enables, if you will, the network defense for many of our other tools that we operate with, day in and day out.

So today's adversaries are looking for those seams. They're not as predictable, and that expands the problems that we face in the homeland.

It also mandates, like I said earlier, that we build this collaboration, we build this coalition among the many, many diverse interests who have a part to play.

If you read national security planning documents today, they'll tell you that the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for the cyber defense of our nation. Good words, but when you look at the muscle underneath that, you see, first of all, that they're under resourced to do it. Secondly, they don't have the right technical depth to do that. And third, the players in that battlespace are much more diverse than any one department. Yet we've not created a national infrastructure that brings all those parts together to play, to put them at the table to actually work towards solutions.

So whether it is countering terrorism or countering cyber threats, I believe we can no longer -- in the homeland, at least -- we can no longer say that a department is the sole department responsible for success. It's got to be a collaborative effort, not unlike politics. If we're going to have a good political policy for the future, it's got to be done collaboratively, bi-partisanly, with success goals in mind, not just protecting the particular position of one party or the other.

As I mentioned earlier, we were formed in the aftermath of 9/11. We were given the role to defend the homeland and to support civil authorities when disaster strikes. That challenge -- that friction, if you will, has forced us to evolve over the five and a half, almost six years now that we've been in existence formally. Where today I'm comfortable to say we are a robust operational command, NORTHCOM, partnered with a historically tested bi-national command, NORAD, to provide the full spectrum of Defense and support activities from warning -- warning against air threats like the Russians, warnings against air threats like an airliner on September 11th, warnings against space threats like a satellite falling back into reentry with cargo onboard that can be harmful, like space threats that are a rogue nation firing an ICBM at our country. So we can capture those elements of warning.

We've added to NORAD the element of maritime warning. We've become more involved in port security, in international partnerships with shipping firms, in sponsoring maritime domain awareness tools, so that we get a better picture of what's out there at sea. Challenges continue to abound. I'm pretty good at finding a ship that's 600 feet long. It's a lot tougher to find a semi-submersible that's 70 feet long carrying four tons of marijuana. But we're continuing to work with the Department of Homeland Security, with the Coast Guard in particular, with JIATF South out of U.S. Southern Command to become better at that. So we've got that warning set that's critical to us.

The Defense piece is also critical. Every day we pay attention to as much intel that is developed in the FATA regions of Pakistan as we do to looking for homegrown -- supporting our law enforcement agencies in search of homegrown terrorists here in our country. Some would say, well, that's a broad spectrum of your activity; why are you paying attention to that? Because when you create the networks and you look at the nodal analysis of intelligence, you'll see that some guy in Pakistan is funding two people to go to Austria, who is then funding another guy in Scandinavia, who is talking to a guy in Canada, who's then hanging out with somebody just outside of Fort Dix. And we've got to pay attention to that. So we look at that full, broad spectrum of intelligence every day to make sure we're paying attention, so that we can meet our mission.

When I took command about a year and a half ago, we changed one word in the mission statement that we had. And that one word we added is "anticipates," because if you're not out in front of that next threat, whether it's Mother Nature or some man-made event, you're going to always be responding. You will always be answering the "What happened after Katrina?" questions, and we don't want to live there anymore. So we forced the command to think out into the future, think about how we prevent those activities from occurring, how we need to understand that Mother Nature's going to act in certain ways, and so we need to be prepared and positioned to help. So warning and anticipation is a big part of both of our commands.

But then there's execution and consequence management and the follow-on to that. I'll just say that in the early days of NORTHCOM, there was a real reluctance on the part of the Department of Defense to engage with DHS, because there was some belief that the Department of Homeland Security would somehow see the great financial pockets

of the Department of Defense, and manpower resources, and pull them into the Department of Defense (sic). And at a time when we were at war in two countries, that was going to be a challenge.

I think the current position and belief, I can tell you, of this secretary of Defense, is that if we don't do it, then who? The nation demands that we have a fully capable integrated network of departments who can defend -- who can warn, defend, and respond to events in our homeland. And that has allowed for us at NORTHCOM to have the flexibility to engage in the interagency in a way that we really didn't in the early years of our command.

So now, six years after our formation, I'm very pleased that we are actively engaged with those 45 elements of the government, those departments of our government. They live in our headquarters every day. They're involved in our planning, our operations, and our execution.

It's an interagency operation. It's a military-civilian command relationship; command in the broader scheme, not command and control. It is also a private-sector process. We've created a cell that allows us to reach out to the private sector elements who can have the best effect for us, when the country needs to respond to an event.

And so we're creating, within our logistics division, the ability to share information with Wal-Mart, Home Depot, FedEx and the brown, if you're a UPS person, and with the Red Cross. As well as with faith-based organizations, who actually are out trying to help respond in local communities. How best can they understand what the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, and the Department of Defense are doing, so that they can best integrate their, even if it's just volunteers, their manpower to help us respond?

So we've expanded this model. One of my little competitive remarks that I'll make is there's been a lot of press about how Africa Command is new and novel. And it's got State Department involved in it. And it's going to have this broad interagency footprint.

A lot has been written about my good friend Jim Stavridis at SOUTHCOM, and how he's changing the model of a combatant command, because he'll have more interagency support, to reach out to those nations in South America.

Today and I'm still growing, but today I've got more interagency participation, in my headquarters at NORTHCOM, than both of them combined. And they're doing stuff every day. They're involved in our planning. They're involved in our operations.

So while I am beating my chest a little bit, I'm not necessarily saying that that's great, unless you can deliver a product. What we're beginning to see now is enough muscle and strength behind this organization that we're beginning to see governors coming to us saying, thank you. And that's not what they said after Katrina, if you read those reports.

We're beginning to see many of our vocal critics in Congress becoming allies now, because they understand that we're moving in the right direction. We're creating momentum to ensure we have a more secure homeland on a day-to-day basis and have an ability to respond if something occurs.

Our area of operations is another very interesting one. It is your homes. We're the only combatant command that really has the responsibility to, if you will, conduct our operations in an area like our own homeland.

That poses some great challenges for us. There are some things in the Constitution that we have to pay attention to. And I have, on any given day, about 16 lawyers. I'm sure all -- you guys never have any lawyers around you or anything like that.

I have 16 lawyers that look over everything we do, to ensure that we stay within the bounds of the Constitution. On the other hand, we use those lawyers, that legal advice, to ensure that we also push closely up against those authorities, so that we can provide the best capability in a timely fashion. But in most cases, we don't execute.

I have a great relationship with the FBI, one that is unprecedented for us. Up to about two years ago, the FBI would share no case information with us, because frankly we weren't very good at holding on to that information. But over the last year-and-a-half, we've built a relationship.

We're present in their Joint Terrorism Task Force. We're present in the National Counterterrorism Center in Washington. And we are sharing, with them, the information that we develop.

So we've built this confidence between us that now allows us to get briefed on every FBI hit, as it relates to counternarcotics or counterterrorism. Unprecedented.

They're also getting the benefit of that intelligence information, which we develop overseas, that helps feed their cases. And we've developed a relationship that allows us to hold that information in confidence.

We have undergone a series of evaluations, by a variety of legal and intelligence organizations, to ensure that we're meeting the constitutional limits -- that we live by. And we're doing great in that regard.

So we're finding the sweet spot, as I call it, with how we collaborate with law enforcement, in a way that provides value added without the dominant shadow of the Department of Defense looking over their shoulder.

My Joint Task Force North lives down on the southwest border every day. They're operating sensors. They're using tunnel detection tools. They are providing logistic support, so that the Customs and Border Patrol can grow their capacity and take on that mission for themselves each day.

As we began to draw back down, some of you have heard the cacophony of comments from governors along those boarder areas who would say, "Oh, please don't take away our National Guard, please don't take away our DOD forces." But the reality is we're building capacity with those federal agencies that's allowing them to take on more and more of that role. Is the border more secure? You bet it is. Is it the way we want it? Not yet. We've got to keep this collaborative effort moving forward in the future.

I've got two great international partners that we deal with everyday. We're going to add a couple more here when the Unified Command Plan is signed this fall. But for now, Canada and Mexico, our number one and number two trading partners in the world, are border partners if you will, offer us some unique challenges, but they also offer us a relationship that is, again, unprecedented in history. Mexico today is fighting for its life. Somebody was talking about fragile states a little bit ago. If Mexico's not on your list, it needs to be.

Having said that, President Calderon gets it. He understands the threat to his nation by these drug cartels. He understands that he's got to get after those who would criticize it for the graft and the money laundering and the corruption that occurs in his government. He's invested in two leaders of his military, General Galvan and Admiral Saynez, that are about as credibly and corruption-free as any I've seen. He's given them instructions to reach out to the United States to work closer together. We have the best relationship with Mexico that we've ever had.

When I took the office, I said, "I need to go see Mexico." And the staff said, "Well, as you know, that's kind of a touchy thing. We'll try to get you an appointment down there. We think we can probably get you into see Admiral Saynez, he's the navy guy, because my predecessor, Tim Keating, was a Navy officer and they had a relationship, so you could probably go see the navy guy." I got a call before I left that said, "No, both of them want to see you."

So, I saw both General Galvan and Admiral Saynez on my first visit. That is unprecedented. Secretary Gates visited the country a few months ago, had a great visit down there. I've had Admiral Saynez to visit us in Colorado Springs; again, unprecedented. General Galvan was supposed to come, except this little thing called Hurricane Dolly kind of put a crimp in his travel plans, and so, we'll reschedule that. We've had members of the Mexican House of Representatives and the deputy-secretary-level from five of their major government departments, Proteccion Civil, their attorney general and others. They come and visit with us and spend a day, and that has created huge opportunity for us with Mexico. So, we're making great progress there. The Merida Initiative is one that is critical to Mexico's success, it's critical to our credible relationship-building program that has been ongoing for the last couple years. It's about half what we need, so if you know anybody out there, I'd like the other half. Next year would be good. But we have to help Mexico build their capacity.

Look north, Canada has got a government that also gets it. As you know, it's a minority government, but it's operating like a majority government. It's the darndest thing you'll ever see. Prime Minister Harper has confidence in his ability to drive the nation. I think they will have an election in the next few months. I think that will allow him to establish what will be a coalition majority, if you will. They've had two chiefs of defense staff that are second to none with a vision that has transformed the Canadian military from a peace-keeping military, and frankly that's all it could be. They've gutted it in terms of capabilities over the last probably three to 15 or 18 years. Our governments didn't get a long for a period of time. There were some who said let's just make NORAD go away. NORAD has never been more meaningful than it is today: land, sea, space, air, all, they're providing great support.

The Canadians are modernizing their military in historic fashion. They will end up, in the next 12 years, looking a whole lot like ours. F-18s will go away. The Joint Strike Fighter is likely the choice. The C-17s, they've purchased. The C-130Js, they will buy more of. They're modernizing their helicopter fleet. It looks like they will go to a CH-47, the same helicopter that we're flying. They're building 13 to 14 new ships. They'll look a lot like a BDG-51 that we are using, built under Canadian license, but completely interoperable. And they're fighting every day hard in the Kandahar province in Afghanistan. The Canadians are good friends and they're working hard out there. They're small, they understand that. They have some limitations; they're working to fix that. But they are a great partner.

Along our border, we still have a challenge. We talk about Mexico as being a thin border, a porous border, but trust me there are probably 1,200 snowmobiles that go north to south or south to north just in the state of Vermont everyday in the winter. We don't know who all those folks are, but they're going back and forth. Now fortunately, we're pretty comfortable that most of them are good Vermonters or Canadians who are just having fun going back and forth. But, the challenge of controlling that border is huge.

We've made some good initiatives. We work with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police out in the northwest along the border. We're providing them, again, some support with sensors and information sharing so that they can begin policing for predominantly drugs going north and I would say illegal aliens, if you will, coming south. And we're working through that.

Two really strong partners and strong relationships. Partners that both have some unique needs. Mexico, we've got to continue to underpin them in a delicate way because their government has to be seen as leading. But also in a visible way because they want to show that they are closely connected to the United States.

Golly, I've lost my place in my speech. I've just been talking on and on. I think -- let me just throw out about three or four other items and then I'll open it up to questions and I think that keeps us pretty much on time. You all can have the rest of the day off. Oh wait, I forgot, this is Washington, never mind. In Colorado we do that.

I mentioned the Arctic. This is an area that is increasingly of concern for me. Again, today I can't tell you that there's a specific defense threat out there. In fact, I'll tell you there isn't a specific defense threat.

But as we look at nation states trying to determine what energy resources are there, as we look at the fact that -- whether you call it global warming or unseasonably warm temperatures or premature ice melting or whatever you call it -- the fact of the matter is there is more navigable water in the Arctic circle than there has been in recent years. Last year, we had seven cruise ships making the tour of the Northwest Passage. I hope I can afford to do that someday, but the fact of the matter is sooner or later one of them is going to break down and we're going to have to do search and rescue. Sooner or later there will be two oil exploration ships bump into each other and we're going to have to separate the combatants out there, if you will.

Sooner or later there's going to be increased air traffic because we're buying bigger, new airplanes that are going to use those polar routes more and more. All of those have a security implication. And yet, today we are still laboring with how we shape that security policy in the Arctic?

Should we adopt the Law of the Sea? UNCLOS is out there and the U.S. has held off on that. There are a few members of Congress who still are not supporters. If you know any of them, we need to get on with this.

This is important for us strategically for our nation. The only way we have a seat at the table is by ratifying. It is important to the homeland defense of our country to ensure that we can continue to have those discussions, which means we need to sit at the table. So, we're a big supporter. I've talked to Congress in each of my testimonies about the support for that provision.

Russia. The very reason NORAD was built was to protect against the Bear bombers that were going to fly over the pole and strike us. By the way, those Bear bombers are still flying around today, as a matter of fact.

But Russia has changed its presence in the global defensive environment substantially over the last year. They're flying their bombers up along our air defense identification zones. They are sortie'ing their nuclear submarines. They are testing their nuclear ballistic missiles. And they're talking about it in a way that is a little bit more -- maybe strident is the best way to put it -- than they have in the past.

Now, do I think the Russians are going to attack us? No, I don't. But I think more importantly for NORAD, since 9/11 we cannot afford to have aircraft that are unknown to us, unidentified to us, non-compliant with our international aviation rules of the road, approaching or flying in our airspace.

And so we pay very close attention to what the Russians are doing. We identify them either visually or electronically. We monitor them as they fly up along our airspace.

And so we're, in effect, going back to the future to a degree, paying attention to Russian aviation flying in and around or close to our airspace.

The systems that we use to do that are getting old. They were built in the '50s, '60s and early 70s. They've been modernized so they're not all vacuum tubes, but they're pretty close.

So we need to modernize that system of sensors for the future. Getting funding to do that is one of my number one combatant commanders integrated priority list items. And we're getting some support for that but we've got to fill some gaps. I don't want to have to go back to fixed radar sites. I want to take advantage of new technologies.

So we're looking at things like over-the-horizon radar, like space-based sensors, like passive detectors and others that are still in the developmental stages. In the meantime, I've got to modernize some of those radar systems. And again, we're working with Congress and the services to help us do that, and I think we've got a good roadmap.

Finally, I'd just talk a minute about chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives, CBRNE is the acronym, threats to this nation. Arnold Punaro was the chairman of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. And in there NORTHCOM took a pretty good whipping over a variety of topics.

My personal opinion is Arnold didn't get it exactly correct and I've talked to the committee and him about that. But he did get some things exactly correct and this threat is one of them. We don't know and can't predict very well when a terrorist may be able to get the ingredients and the technology and the skill sets necessary to create a weapon of mass effect, and then bring it into this country and use it. And so we've got to be prepared to respond to it if our intelligence, if our anticipation, if our prevention breaks down and doesn't work.

As a result of some of that work from the commission, Congress mandated the Department of Defense put together the ability to respond to three near-simultaneous nuclear, chemical, biological events in our country. For about a year and a half after that we kind of languished along with something called contingency task forces, which means that if it happens today we'll go in the address book and we'll pull up 73 different units, we'll give them to you and off you go. So I'd get units that were untrained and never worked together. They had the skill sets but not integrated into a larger effort. They would show up from all over the country, they'd never seen each other before and we'd start to work.

That's not a very logical way to approach a problem set. And so, this year, Secretary Gates has put money in the budget to fund, train and equip, and maintain readiness of the first of three coherently organized, single command and control organizations. We call it a funky name, we call it CCMRF, so, CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force. We'll have the first one operationally capable on the first

of October this year. It's about 4,800 folks, medical, chem and bio, decon, survey, logistics, engineering, all of those skill sets that you need to go to the scene of one of these events that is catastrophic in nature and then begin to manage the response to that. We'll build a second one in '09. We'll build a third one so that it is ready in '10.

That will give the nation then three robust consequence management response forces. They'll be assigned to NORTHCOM. We will exercise each of them each year. Each of them will go through a large scale taxing event that will validate their training levels on a yearly basis. I said each of them -- they'll be one each year, one of those events each year, so they'll get one every third year. And that is a huge step forward for the country. It gives us real capability as opposed to contingency capability as it were.

The secretary of defense also signs an annual -- we call a DSCA, D-S-C-A, Defense Support of Civil Authorities that's designed to give me forces available to do hurricane response, to do wild land firefighting, and to support other hazards that may develop in the nation. So, a bridge collapse in Minnesota, earthquake or tornado response in parts of the country, and I have the authority then to move some forces that will allow us to make a difference early on.

So, in the six years that we've been in existence, we've had great success at first, making people aware that this is a bigger problem than they've understood when the command was formed, and secondly, you've got to resource this. You can't just give a mission and say, "Go do it and figure it out on your own." And so, for the first time -- really, as of last year -- the first time since its formation, NORTHCOM is resourced at a level that I'm very comfortable with and it's growing over time. And the services are now funding programs that have meaning for us so that we can respond to the nation when it's at need. It's a great job. It's one, as you can tell, I'm very passionate about. There's still huge challenges to go.

Ron said something earlier about what keeps you awake at night. I don't know if you know much about the pandemic influenza, but what keeps me awake at night about that is not so much that I'm worried if it could occur, it's that I'm concerned that we haven't come to grips yet with the speed with which it can transport itself. Now, the good news is, you know, right now, we have no confirmed human-to-human transfer. We haven't met many of those conditions. So, we can say, well, it hasn't happened, so it can be okay. Well, trust me, if it happens, it'll be in this room before we can buy a plane ticket back from Bangkok or someplace like that. It can move that fast.

So, how do you prevent it? How do you contain it? How do you continue those critical elements of government that have to be continued? How do you maintain the defense of your country while you are managing the effects of these kinds of influenzas? So, we sponsored a series of local community activities. Last year, for example, in Colorado Springs, the annual flu vaccine program was done under the construct of a pandemic influenza vaccination program. And so, we practice with the logistics, with the medical care, with the security, with the isolation of areas of the city so that you could at least approximate some of the challenges. That's a concern for me.

We also have the challenge of 9/11. Flight 93 that hit the ground in Pennsylvania was being chased by two F-15s that day. We had come to the decision -- the Department had come to the decision that if we can get to that airplane, we would very likely shoot it down. The good news is for those pilots -- one of whom thought his cousin was on the airplane -- the good news is they didn't get to Flight 93 -- and those two pilots wouldn't have had to be put in that situation. We all know of the heroics of people on that plane, but there's another one out there somewhere. Don't know where, don't know when, don't know how it will unfold, but all the intelligence that I see says that the aviation medium is still one that is intriguing to those terrorist organizations who try to harm us.

So, how do we prepare ourselves to monitor every flight that's in the country? How do we make sure that we can get to them before they can get to critical infrastructure? That's our role every day in NORAD and in NORTHCOM. But the other thing that keeps me awake at night is we're not going to get to one of them before it gets to its target. Then what? Today, I have the authority of the secretary and the president to execute a mission to shoot down one of those aircraft. That will not be a good day in my life. So, we want to work very hard at preventing that from occurring as opposed to having to respond and operate in that environment.

Those are probably the two most frightening things that I have. You can talk about Korean missile defense and how we work missile defense. By the way, that program works really good. It's in testing, but we're in a great spiral development program that allows us to test and operate at the same time. But those two are probably the ones that I'm most anxious about because I think they're the things we have sort of the least control over. The rest of the missions, I think we're in pretty good shape.

So, I've rambled on way longer than I was supposed to. I apologize. But hopefully I've given you a few areas that you can dive into with questions and we'll continue the discussion. Thank you very much.